Transcripts For CSPAN3 Hiroshima Nagasaki And End Of World W

Transcripts For CSPAN3 Hiroshima Nagasaki And End Of World War II 20240711

Airplane dropped atomic bomb on hiroshima and that bomb has more power of 20,000 tons of tnt. The japanese began the war from the air at pearl harbor. They have been repaid many fold, and the end is not yet. With this bomb, we have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to supplement the growing power of our armed forces. In their present form, these bombs are now in production, and even more powerful bombs are in development. It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the far east. We are now prepared to destroy more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the japanese have in any city. We shall destroy their docks, theyre factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake, we shall completely destroy japans power to make war. It was to spare the japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of july 26th was issued at potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they have not yet seen and with the fighting skill of which they are already well aware. Ian toll is an author and independent scholar, a pacific war historian and set to release his latest book twilight of the gods, war in the western pacific 1944 to 1944. Ian toll, welcome to the washington journal on the 75th anniversary. Thank you very much. Im glad to be here. We have heard from the former president harry truman after the hiroshima bombing. From your research and study of the war and the bombings in particular, why did harry truman do it . Well, you know, i think the decision to use the bomb was really implicit in the manhattan project. So it was really assumed from the time, before the time that truman came to office in april, after the death of fdr, that this weapon, if it worked, that it would be used. And so it may be more accurate to say that there was a nondecision essentially. Truman did not decide to intervene, to stop a project that was very much in train when he came into office. The assumption had been made that if that if we built the bomb, and if we had the bomb we would use the bomb to bring the war to an end. I think the perspective that we have now that the atomic bomb, you know, is essentially different from conventional weapons. Thats something we have in hindsight. For truman and his advisers, in 1945, i dont think that was clear to them, that the atomic bomb was fundamentally different from conventional bombs. We had already wiped out an enormous percentage of japans urban areas when conventional bombing and incendiary raids. So using the atomic bomb did not seem like sort of a break or departure from what they had already been doing. It is really with hindsight that we understand that weapon to be something basically different, in a different category. Is it true that harry truman, when he assumed the presidency, after fdrs death, april 12th of 1945, that, one, harry truman did not know anything about the manhattan project. Two, how did he learn about it in the space of less than four short months . How did he become confident in his decision to use those weapons . Yes, it is true that he was not briefed on the manhattan project. He been vaguely aware that there was a very large, very secret, very expensive project underway. In the senate, before he was put on the ticket as fdrs Vice President ial candidate in 1944, the most important thing that he had done in the senate, the thing that made his name was that he chaired a committee which investigated corruption and waste in the munition industry. This is called the truman committee. And in his capacity as chairman of that investigative senate committee, he had learned about these enormous plants that were being built in tennessee and in washington state, and he had inquired and begun to use his investigative resources to try to determine what exactly was happening there. And secretary stimson, Henry Stimson was the secretary of war, essentially went to truman and said were doing something really important and it is very secret, and were going to ask you not to inquire any further and truman agreed. So when he very suddenly with fdrs death was elevated to the presidency, he was briefed on stimson and by james burns who was the war mobilization czar who truman subsequently appointed as secretary of state. And he was fully briefed within about 24 hours of assuming the presidency on the state of the manhattan project. It is the 75th anniversary of the bombing of hiroshima. Bombi. Were talking about it with ian toll, whose brand new book is coming out in september, twilight of the gods warn in the western pacific 19441945. The lines as they were for last hour, 202748000. For those of you, world war ii vets or family, 2027488002. And japaneseamericans 2027488003. One of the questions that came up last hour, why didnt the u. S. Do some sort of demonstration of the bomb to show the japanese its power instead of actually using it on a city . Yeah, i mean, you know, i think that thats a hard question. You know, in my view the really hard questions when it comes to the atomic bomb is not so much should we have used the bomb or not, given the circumstances in the summer of 1945, the urgent need to end the war and to end the war quickly without an invasion, i think in those circumstances using the bomb, i think, was defensible. Dropping it on a city is a different question. And i think im in a minority really among military historians, and this is a preference i have, that i would have liked to see the weapon used against a military target. The question of a demonstration has also been raised. You know, there are arguments against a demonstration are that number one it might have backfired. If you had announced you were going to demonstrate the bomb, and it hadnt worked, which is a real possibility, that would potentially have redoubled japanese determination to resist. I do think there would be a way to demonstrate the bomb without running into that problem. Dropping it very high in the atmosphere, off the coast, say, of tokyo, off of tokyo bay, you know, would have made an i nor mouse flash. It would have sent a message to the japanese. I dont think that would have prompted a rapid surrender. So, you know, the reason that you might have done that, really, is abstract. Its an abstract reason and you do it because in the long run it may be it may enhance the countrys moral standing. You know, i do think thats important. But youve had some callers who are who have fathers or grandfathers who are in the war. For american veterans, particularly those who would have participated in6xyk well, yes, hiroshima had a really important Regional Military headquarters, the second army was headquartered in hiroshima. Hiroshima had been an army town, going back to the days of the samurai. So there was an important military target in hiroshima. The city was not chosen for that reason. None of the four cities on the target list for the atomic bombs, hiroshima, nagasaki, nagata, on the sea of japan, and kokura, on the northern tip of the island of kushu. Those cities had not been chosen because of their military character and the military installations that were in those cities were not specified as the aiming points for the bombs. The cities were chosen because they had been relatively unscathed in conventional bombing raids and the idea was that you wanted to drop the bomb on a city that had the topography and the conditions that would provide the greatest demonstration to the bombs power. And so yes. No, finish your thought. Yeah, so, you know, it is true that there was, you know, an important army base in hiroshima. Now in the clip that you played from by president truman, you know, upon announcing the first atomic bomb he said that we had hit an important Japanese Army base. Right. Well, hiroshima was a large city, it was the seventh largest city in japan with a base in it. So, you know, i think just from the point of view of looking back with 75 years of perspective, you know, in that situation, you would prefer that the president of the United States, you know, look into the eye of the camera and tell the world exactly what we had done without mincing words, without using that kind of circumlocution. Was there a third bomb ready to be dropped in case the japanese did not surrender . The third bomb would have become available by the end of august. On august 6th we hit hiroshima, august 9th we hit nagasaki. We did not have a third bomb at that point. It would have been another two to three weeks. Ian toll is our guest, your calls are next. Charles in richard monday, virginia, good morning. Caller yes, good morning. Its very interesting when you hear those depictions. One thing about why they dropped the bomb is because america was so passionate against japan. Japan had pulled a sneak attack on pearl harbor, and we didnt even know that the war was it should have been a war declarer and japan didnt do that. What happened when the bomb became available truman knew a thing about it. All you knew hed just become president. They didnt really like him. And they put it to him, look, we have this bomb. To me, it was already you cant drop an atomic bomb and say, well, lets drop it tomorrow, lets drop it next week. They had already planned, everything was planned for the bomb. And really didnt make a difference what truman had to say because it was in the works and the United States was going to drop that bomb. All right, charles, ian toll, do you think that the president had a say in that . Well, absolutely. I mean, the constitution confers enormous powers. Virtually Unlimited Power as commander in chief in wartime. And so, you know, truman had the power to simply tell his cabinet and his military leaders, you know, we will use the bomb, we wont use the bomb, were going to use the bomb in the following way. So i dont think theres any question that he had the power to make the decision. I do think that its true, as charles said, that the motive of revenge was in the mix there. I think that was, you know wouldnt say that was the reason that we used the weapon the way we did but it certainly did set the context, the sneak attack on pearl harbor, japanese atrocities against civilians, the treatment of prisoners of war, these were all factors that played into the decision to use the atomic bomb and also to burn down japanese cities with incendiary bombing raids. But yes, truman certainly could have simply decided, he wouldnt have had to ask for permission, wouldnt have to have his military chiefs or cabinet take a vote on the question. He could have simply said were not going to hit a city. Or we are going to explicitly warn the japanese that we have this weapon. In fact, in his private diary on july 25th theres a very strange entry where he says actually he says i have instructed secretary stimson, the secretary of war, to use this weapon against military targets and not against women and children. And i have also instructed him to that we will make an explicit warning to the japanese telling them to surrender. Now, thats odd because he didnt give that order but in his diary he seems to have believed it, or perhaps he wanted to, you know, have future historians, you know, believe that the whole decision had been made differently. But certainly he had the power. And one of the fascinating counterfactual questions is if fdr had lived how would have fdr decided to use the bomb . He certainly wouldnt have been at all he wouldnt have hesitated at all to make his own decision. He was accustomed to doing that. Lets hear from anthony in north creek, new york on our line for world war ii veterans and families. Caller good morning. Im calling for my father and his two brothers. My father went into the army in february of 41. He fought in the philippines. He fought in iwojima and okinawa and occupation in japan. He came home in late 1946. We never found out why he he never talked about the war until he got older and he was against them dropping the bomb. But then he says if we would have had a fight, fight them, we would have had to invade japan, i probably would have never came home. So it was a flip of a coin. And my personal opinion, if i had to make that decision, i would say, yeah. His brothers were one was in normandy. He was a para trooper in the 101 and my other uncle was also a medic. Those people from that generation they fought hard and they fought for our country. When i talk about my father and brothers, im proud of them. Ian toll, a map from your book, one of the planned invasions, part of the planned invasion of japan, is that figure of a predicted anticipated 1 million u. S. Military casualties fairly accurate in terms of across the board, is that from your research as well . Well, no. I mean, if the question is at the time that we were planning operation downfall, operation olympic was the first stage of downfall. That was the inviolation of kyushu, the Southern Island of japan. At the time the military leaders were planning that operation there was never a point at which they were projecting casualties on the order of a million. Theres been quite a lot of work done on this because by historians and researchers because of how often you hear that kind of figure, we might have lost a million or half a million. The answer seems to be that the casualty projections were significantly lower than that. And, you know, its a disputed point and there were different casualty figures, different ways of thinking about it. But at no point did our military leaders, while planning that operation, at no point did they expect something on the order of a million casualties. The projections were much lower, you know maybe as many as 200 total casualties. Now, you know, that doesnt really tell us much about the atomic bomb decision. You know, theres not a you cant say, well, casualties would have been lower so we should have invaded. You know, i think invading would have been a disaster. Regardless of what kind of casualties we would have taken. And so avoiding a bloody invasion of japan was absolutely essential. And thats why i think using the atomic bomb was inevitable. As i say using it against a city is a different question. I dont think we should have dropped it on a city. We should have avoided that, i believe. Thats just my preference, my belief. But, you know, as the caller, you know, mentioned, i mean, there were so many people in this country who have fathers, grandfathers, great grandfathers, uncles who are veterans of that war, and who really believe that their lives were on the line. And thats something that i respect very deeply. Its interesting that the caller said that his i think it was his father, he said, had been in japan with the occupation after the war and that he had his personal belief had been that we should not have dropped the atomic bomb. Just a last comment, one of the really interesting phenomenon when you look at veterans of the pacific war is that those who were in japan after the war, with the occupying forces, they tended to have a much more kind of nuanced view of the japanese. In fact, many of them came to like the japanese generally as a people and they were more ready to kind of make the distinction between the way Japanese Fighting forces had had behaved during the war and the way that the japanese people are in general. They were more willing to make that distinction because of the personal exposure they had had to japan and to the japanese in the nation of japan after the war. Our line for japaneseamericans is 2027488003. On that line in los angeles, scott, good morning. Caller good morning. Im half japanese and my father was drafted in world war ii. My grandfather was drafted by the Japanese Army and fought in man churia. I keep seeing every year, when they talk about pearl harbor, that america was attacked unprovoked, which is not true. Truman says on that clip that youve shown, like charles said on the in the call, that japan bombed pearl harbor unprovoked. Thats not true. The flying tigers were flying under the awg, under secret order of the president and until 1996 when either i think it was ray it was either reagan or clinton acknowledged that the flying tigers were part of the military because they got the va benefits. Then it showed that the awg was under military payment by the United States government through the company of shanote. I keep hearing of this japanese unprovoked attack when thats not true. Im not saying the war wasnt a bad thing because it was a very terrible thing of what japan did to china, parts of russia, to the philippines, to the americans and the people who actually ended up fighting with them. It was they were terrible things that happened. All right, scott, well get a response from our guest, ian toll. Yeah, well, i mean, you know, i think the you know, the count against the japanese for the way they began the war was not so much that it was an unprovoked attack. Fdr said it was unprovoked in his speech to congress the day following the attack, but that there was no formal declaration of war prior to the attack. So it was the idea of a sneak attack, a surprise attack, that really infuriated americans. You know, the attack had been planned under cover of diplomatic talks. We were engaged in, you know, negotiations directly with the japanese government to try to adjust the you know, the differences that we had in the pacific, and that attack suddenly descended on pearl harbor without a declaration of war. And so yeah that, i think, played into the particular brutality of the pacific war. Scott didnt say what his father, i believe he said, did when he was drafted. But, you know, one of the i think most interesting stories about the pacific war and little herd is the role of japaneseamericans who, you know, worked as interpreters, who worked as language officers, who helped develop propaganda messages to aim at the japanese. And it was an essential role in places like okinawa, the heroism of the japaneseamerican soldiers who, you know, went down to the caves and negotiated directly with Japanese Forces trying to encourage them to surrender. At enormous personal risk. Thats one of the, you know, Great Stories about the pacific war, its not as familiar to people. All right, to gene in buoy, maryland, good morning. On our line for vets and families. Go ahead. Caller good morning. I was 12 years old when we declared war on the japanese. I was the youngest of five children. My three brothers and a sister all were in active duty in the military. The for two reasons, one personal and one family. We loved trumans decision. My two brothers at the time of the just before the invasion, my two brothers were in combat, two of them were in combat in the navy in the pacific. One was in pd booth and the other on a fuel tanker. Both had

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