About her policy. The American People cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy. Tonight, therefore, i would like to answer some of the questions that i know are on the minds of many of you listening to me. How and why did america get involved in vietnam in the first place . How is this administration change the policy of the Previous Administration . What has really happened in the negotiation in paris on the battlefront vietnam . What choices do we have if we are to in the war . What are the prospects for peace . Let me begin by describing a situation i have found when i was inaugurated on january 20th. The war had been going on for four years, 31,000 americans have been killed in action. The Training Program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule. 540,000 americans within vietnam, with no plans, no progress have been made in negotiations in paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal. The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad. In view of the circumstances, there is some ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American Forces, from a political standpoint, this wouldve been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was an office. I could blame the defeat which would mean the result of my action on him, and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me bluntly, this was the only way to avoid allowing johnsons war to become nixons war. But i had a greater opportunity, and i think of the years of my administration and the next election, i had to think of the effect of my position on the next generation. On the future of peace in freedom in america and the world. Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some americans are for peace and some are against piece, the question at issue is neither if it was johnsons war becoming nixons war, the great question is, how can we win americas piece . Me let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in vietnam in the first place . 15 years ago, North Vietnam with a Logistical Support of china and the soviet union launched a campaign to impose a communist government on South Vietnam. In response to the request of the government of South Vietnam, president eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people in their efforts to prevent a communist take over seven years ago, president kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel as combat advisers. Four years ago, president johnson sent american combat forces to sell vietnam, now many believe that president johnsons decision to send combat forces was wrong. And many others, myself among them, have been strongly critical the way the war has been conducted. But the question facing us today is, now that we are in the war, what is the way to end it . In january, i can only conclude that the precipitous withdrawal of forces from vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam ut for the United States and the cause of peace. This would allow the communist to complete the massacres that they are doing in the north 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands of moore died in slave camps. We saw a prelude of what would happen and selfie it on when the communists entered the city of last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3000 civilians were shot to death and buried in mass graves. With the sudden collapse, these atrocities would become a nightmare of the entire nation. And particularly for the million and a half catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the communist took over. For the United States, those first defeat in our nations history, resulted in a claps of confidence in American Leadership not only in asia but throughout the world. Three american president s have recognized the great mistakes in vietnam and understood what had to be done, in 1963, president kennedy said we want to see a stable government there carrying on national independence. We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw, in my opinion, for us to withdraw from that after it would been a collapse in South Vietnam and southeast asia, so we are going to stay there. President eisenhower and president eisenhower and president johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office. For the future of peace, precipitous withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam, without question, would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments of maintaining peace. In the middle east, and berlin, eventually even in the western hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives and it would not bring peace. It would bring more war for these reasons, i have rejected the recommendation that i should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change american policy on both the negotiating front and the battlefront. In order to end the war, fought on many fronts, i have initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts. And a television speech on may 14th, a speech before the united nations, i set forth are peace proposal in great detail. We have offered the complete withdrawal from all outside forces in one year. We propose to cease fire under international supervision. We have offered elections with the communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized Political Force and the saigon government has pledged to accept the results of the election. We have not put forth our proposals, we have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth to the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own vision. At the paris speech conference, we demonstrator our flexibility and public meetings. Hanoi has refused to even discuss, they demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms which are that we withdrawal of American Forces and overthrow the government of South Vietnam as we leaf. We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums, i recognized in january that along a bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to a public statement, i have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement. Tonight im taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you, some of our other initiatives. Initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed. I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace. After my election, through an individual who is directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, i made two private offers for a comprehensive settlement. Hanoi is as four or surrender before negotiations. Because the soviet union because the soviet union funds most of the equipment, our assistant for International Affairs and i personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the soviet government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have extended productions for that same and with representatives through diplomatic relations through North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have today produced results. In mid july i became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadline in the paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where im now sitting, with an individual who had known ho chi minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him, i sent a letter. I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that the necessity of making statements for propaganda removal, they might make progress of bringing the war to an end. Let me read from that letter. Dear mister president , i realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But pretty sicily because of this golf, i wanted to take this to reaffirm my desire to work for just peace. I deeply believe that the war in vietnam has gone on for too long. And bringing it to an and can benefit no one the time is come to move forward at the conference table, for an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming, and open minded. And in a conman effort to bring peace to the brave people of vietnam. Let history record, at this critical juncture both sides turned their face towards peace rather than towards conflict more. I received ho chi minhs reply, three days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken in paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press. In addition to the public meetings, Ambassador Lodge has met with their chief negotiator in paris in 11 private sessions. Weve taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret, so that some channels of communications which still may prove to be productive. But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since a year ago, and since this administration came into office on january 20, can be summed up in one sentence. No progress whatsoever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table. And now, who is at fault . It has become clear that the obstacle in a negotiating the end of the war is not the president of the United States, it is not the southeast government. The obstacle is the other sides absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so, while it is convinced that all has to do is to wait for our next concession and our next concession after that until it gets everything it wants. There could now be no longer any question that progress and negotiation depends only on hanois decision to negotiate, negotiate seriously. I realize that our efforts on the diplomatic front can be discouraging to the American People, but the American People are entitled to know the truth, the bad news as well as the good news. Its the lives very young man involved. Now let me turn however to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched i recognize that we might not succeed in bringing the end of the war through negotiation. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace. A plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens for the negotiating front it is in line with a major shift of war policy which i described in my press conference in guam. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the next in doctor. A policy that will not only help and the war vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future vietnams. We americans are a doityourself people. We are impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trade has been carried over to our foreign policy, in korea, and again in vietnam. The United States furnish most of the money, most of the arms and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom. Before any american troops were committed to vietnam, a leader of another asian country said this opinion to me when i was traveling in asia as a private citizen he said, when you are assisting another country to defend its freedom, u. S. Policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them. In accordance with this wise council, i laid down in guam three principles as guidelines for future american policy toward aid. First, United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, which all provide a shield if a Nuclear Power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases of all the other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the man power and experience. After i announced this policy i found the leaders of nations which might be threatened by communist aggression welcomed this new direction in american foreignpolicy. The defensive freedom is everybodys business, not just americas business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the Previous Administration we americanized the war and vietnam. In this administration, we are vietnam eyes in the search for peace. The policy of the Previous Administration not only assumed primary sponsor that before the war, but did not adequately express the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left. The plan was launched following a visit to vietnam in march. Under the plan, i ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment to South Vietnamese forces. In july, my visit to vietnam under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. Our air operations were increased by over 20 . And now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in american policy in vietnam. After five years of americans going into vietnam, we are finally bringing american men home. By december 15th, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam including 20 of all for combat forces. South vietnamese will continue to gain strength and as a result, they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our american troops. Two other Significant Developments occurred since this administration took office, enemy infiltration, which is essential if they are two who launch major attack, over the last three month is less than 20 of what it was over the same period last year. And most important, United States casualties have declined over the last two months to the lowest point in three years. Let me now turn to our program for the future. We have adopted a plan, which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all u. S. Combat Ground Forces and their replacement by self eaten emmys forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness, as South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of american withdrawal can become greater. I have not do not attend to announce the timetable for a program. There are obvious reasons for this decision which im sure youll understand. As ive indicated on several decisions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on three fronts. One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in the paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to glaciated in agreement. They would simply wait until our forces have withdrawn and then move in. The other two factors is the level of enemy activity and the progress of the Training Programs of the cell feet these training forces. I am glad to report tonight, progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in june. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal has been more optimistic than when we made our first estimates in june. This clearly demonstrates that it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must maintain the flexibilities for each withdrawal decision rather then on estimates that are no longer valid. Along with this optimistic view, i must candidly wonder with caution, if the level of enemy activity increases, we might have to adjust our timetable according lee. However, i want the record to be completely clear on one point. At the time of the bombing one year ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stop the bombing of North Vietnam, they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. We have note it, the level of infiltration, reduction of our casualties and basing our withdrawal partially on those factors, if the level of infiltration, or are casualties increase while we are trying to to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy. Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If i conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes are remaining forces in vietnam, i shall not hesitate to take strong and ef