Globalization and my work that most pertains to our panel today is a book called promise and peril america at the dawn of a global age. Just out in paperback. You can buy it downstairs. I have the distinct pleasure of being the chair and coorganizer of this really exciting panel i think and i hope youll agree once were done. Its a fascinating topic with tremendous contemporary relevance as well as historygraphical significance. U. S. Foreign relations before and after that kept us out of war election. This is really not just about u. S. Foreign relations but also world relations, international relations. Now, the spark for this panel is the centennial of the 1916 election in which Woodrow Wilson ran on a he kept us out of war platform despite the military interventions ongoing in mexico and the caribbean. Marking the centennial of this election this round table brings together superb historians with a wide array of focuses to address whether or not 1916 should be seen as the end of an era or the beginning of an era or in short was 1916 a turning point . Many of us will have firm stances on this. Some of us will probably equivocate a little bit. At the outset, i wanted to give special thanks to university of illinois Urbana Champaign historian kristen hoganson who helped to organize this. She helped come up with the idea, coorganized with me, even though she couldnt participate on the panel at all. So thanks to kristen hoganson. Id also like to thank the American Historical Association and the panel cosponsors. The society for historians of the guilded age and progressive era and the society for historians of American Foreign relations. Our aim today in this panel is to consider and to reconsider how recent transnational, international, imperial, political and world historical scholarship has affected our assessments of u. S. Foreign relations in the years leading up to and following 1916. Although a fundamental issue of our panel is periodization the panel will also share their insights on recent trends and future opportunities in u. S. History, in World History, and in Foreign Relations scholarship pertaining to the guilded age and progressive era and Foreign Relations. Each of us will make some fairly brief remarks i hope, five to eight minutes. Ill keep us on the clock. And these are designed to be thought provoking rather than comprehensive. Well touch on a variety of themes here including humanitarian relief, on the environment, human mobility, great power politics, military interventions, interim pimm imperial, rivals, anticolonial struggles for sovereignty and the animated and central concerns as such heated terms as isolationism and internationalism. In addition to offering a variety of thematic expertises, panelists contribute a range of geographic perspectives and i think this is what maybe makes our panel unique. It stretches us to think more about areas outside the United States. To think about europe, to think about mexico, haiti, the caribbean, east asia, and beyond. And were hopeful of generating a dynamic discussion not just across the panel but also with you all and in that vein, i wanted to say at the outset that wed like you to queue up at the mics when it comes time for q a. Now right as we begin, its incumbent on me to talk about the election itself in 1916 and then we can dispense with that and move on to maybe some of the most fascinating details we have coming. So having served one term with europe and the world embroiled in the great war, alongside significant u. S. Disillusionment with progressive reform, Woodrow Wilsons path to reelection in 1916 was far from certain. Ultimately, he became the first democratic president since Andrew Jackson in 1832 to be elected to two consecutive terms in office. When he defeated Supreme Court justice republican Charles Evans hughes in the 1916 president ial election. Foreign policy figured prominently in the Election Campaign and while its true that ultimately entry into the war in april 1917 produced a form of party truce in the interest of national unity, this did not shield the Woodrow Wilson administration from fierce congressional criticism, culminating in a breakdown of that truce with the Senate Rejection of the league of nations. Of course the election took place while world war i was being fought in europe and while mexico was going through the mexican revolution and well hear more about that soon and with u. S. Troops on the ground in roughly a dozen locations throughout the world. Republican candidate hughes primarily and harshly criticized wilson not so much for his hemispheric stance as for not taking, quote, necessary preparations to face the conflict in europe. Given this, and given hughess lack of attention to the socalled mexican problem, most scholars argue that wilsons image as an antiwar candidate was reinforced by this campaign and not just by his facile slogan, he kept us out of war. Diplomatically, u. S. Public sentiment leaned toward the british and french, the allied powers. But the country remained neutral, at least formally, toward the conflict in europe. And well hear more about the ways in which that formal neutrality was actually undermined by actual trade and loan practices and other policies. The democrats reelection slogan, this famous he kept us out of war, painted wilson as a peacemaker and highlighted such recent efforts in 1916 as a january initiative to bring together all the powers of europe for a mediation conference. However, during the course of 1915 and 1916, leading up to this perhaps turning point, germanys aggressive wartime naval tactics brought the u. S. Ever closer to entering the conflict. For instance, in april 1916, wilson defended neutral rights as he had after the sinking of the lusitania in 1915 and threatened to sever diplomatic ties with germany. Following the sinking of the passenger ferry sussex by a uboat in the english channel. The attack marked the beginning of a new uboat campaign or one that had been planned. But the bluster by the Wilson Administration led to the germans backing down this uboat campaign. So there was a divide in the response in the american electorate. Prowilson americans saw this as a triumph of u. S. Assertive neutral rights diplomacy while critics perceived this as what today we might term leading from behind, or diplomacy from behind. Now, the war in terms of the war in 1916, there were a number of major events and we dont have enough time to go through them all. There was a major battle, series of battles, jutland, which wound up being a truce that resulted in the british blockade continuing. There were many monthslong battles in the somme and at v d verdun which resulted in a million total casualties. So 1916 can be seen as at least a watershed in terms of the fighting of the war itself. Politically in 1916 wilson had the advantage of incumbency but feared the potential of a reunited Republican Party. Now much had happened of course in the four years since the last election when wilson faced off against William Howard taft of the republicans, Teddy Roosevelt of the bull moose progressive party, and socialist eugene debs. In the intervening years, wilson has emerged as an even more powerful champion of the Progressive Agenda on the domestic scene and as a strong spokesman for american neutrality in the devastating war that was being that was raging across western europe. But as historian Lloyd Ambrosius has shown, wilson recognized as Many Democrats in fact had not in the west and in the south that the u. S. Could be drawn into the war at any moment by an act of some obscure german sub commander. Therefore, while wilson advocated continued neutrality, he also called for military preparedness and the apparent tensions between those two policies troubled Many Democrats, particularly irishamericans and germanamericans. Leading to some intense political vulnerability for wilson in the election cycle. At the Democratic Convention in st. Louis in summer 1916, wilson won on the first ballot. As did his running mate, Vice PresidentThomas Marshall of indiana. The platform called for the following military preparedness, a World Association of nations to maintain peace after the war in europe had ended, panamerican unity, a ban on child labor, womens suffrage, though wilson hadnt yet endorsed that, and prison reform. During the convention, the delegates cheered most vigorously for the now Famous Campaign slogan he kept us out of war, which world conditions really made far more of a hope than a promise. As wilsons private notes make clear, he understood this all too well. He made the core of his campaign, therefore, three ps. Peace, preparedness, and progressivism. And he sort of added a fourth p, which was prosperity. And this is important to think of in terms of International Dynamics because it was allied stimulus via war orders and loans that led to a shift back from a recession that had begun to occur early in the war, particularly for southern agrarians. On the republican side Teddy Roosevelt believed the war would bring him back into the white house. As many of you no doubt know, he championed intervention, he accused wilson of cowardice for his mediation efforts. But the outspoken roosevelt failed to really understand the depth of the divide he had generated in the party one election cycle before. So the republicans nominated Charles Evans hughes, a really fascinating character. We may get into him a little bit more. And who roosevelt famously termed a bearded iceberg. But hughes won the nomination on the third ballot and former Vice President under Teddy Roosevelt, charles fairbanks, also of indiana, importance of swing states here were not getting too deeply into the politics but indiana, ohio, states like that were really important in this election. Became the republican Vice President ial nominee. All right, so wrapping up the course of this. Perceptive observers were confident that hughes would win in november. Even wilson seems to have had doubts about his path to reelection. According to historian john milton cooper, ever the fighter, he relished the struggle but was not necessarily optimistic about the outcome. As scholars tend to note, the Republican Party stood united behind a single candidate and the democrats had won only three president ial elections since 1860. Voters seemed apathetic, maybe even weary of progressive reforms, and the key accomplishments of the Democratic Administration over the last four years seemed scant, at least at the time. Hughess Foreign Policy, moreover, emphasized a straightforward preparedness program, which seemed far less muddled than wilsons simultaneous calls for neutrality and preparedness in the same breath. Critics charge wilson with wanting the nation both in the war and aloof from it. A utopian stance that we still hear from many historians and political scientists today. This seemed remarkably unrealistic, at least to his critics in 1916. Famously hughes and his staff went to sleep on november 6th, certain that they would win the election. It was not clear until at least two days later when the returns from california and ohio came in, that wilson was the likely winner and it took another two weeks for hughes to actually concede. So what happened . In short, wilson won, he secured 30 states to hughess 18, he won 49. 4 of the popular vote. Though his share of the Electoral College vote in 1916 was much smaller than in 1912, his share of the popular vote was over 7 higher. More to the point, wilson loomed so large over his party that he could take credit for the narrow Democratic Victory in congress, and as historian John Thompson has observed aptly, not the least part of wilsons accomplishment in 1916 had been the widespread approval he gained as a mandate coming out of the election for his shaping of americas response to the cataclysmic war that had engulfed europe 2 1 2 years earlier. Now, the degree to which this electoral and Public Opinion achievement therefore marked a turning point for wilson is something i hope well talk about but the degree to which this heralded a change or a real sea change in American Foreign relations and world relations is our main topic for today. So having dispensed with what happened in the election and some of the causes and consequences, well now get into the core animating concepts and debates about what the consequences and stakes were. So, ill first introduce our initial speaker. Im very pleased to introduce professor julia irwin, an associate professor of history at the university of south florida. Her research focuses on the place of humanitarianism in 20th century u. S. Foreign relations. Shes the author of a great book, making the world safe the American Red Cross and a nations humanitarian awakening. Shes now working on a booklength study entitled catastrophic diplomacy a history of u. S. Responses to Global Natural disaster. Please help me in welcoming professor julia irwin. [ applause ] thank you very much for the introduction and for giving an introduction to the whole round table. And i promise i will keep within my five to eight minutes as allotted. So my research is, as chris mentioned, focuses on the role of u. S. Humanitarian aid in u. S. Foreign affairs, so thinking about both war relief and Disaster Relief and the role that they have played in u. S. Foreign relations. Both International War and disaster assistance, as i show in my work, have long been important elements of u. S. Diplomatic, strategic, economic, and cultural relations with the world. Both before world war i, before 1916, and indeed well after. So from my perspective as a historian of u. S. Foreign aid, should 1916 be seen as the end of an era in u. S. Relations with the wider world as a turning point in u. S. Foreign relations . My short answer to this question is the everunsatisfying yet oh so typical historians answer, yes and no at the same time. I promise ill come back at the end with a little more specific. But seen through the lens of u. S. International humanitarianism, 1916 does mark the end of an era in u. S. Relations with the world in certain respects. But at the same time, i think we can identify many more points of continuity in u. S. Humanitarian efforts, trends which really link the decades prior to 1916 with those that followed. So in my brief remarks today id like to touch on both of these points. Both these points of continuity and change. Lets begin with the former, points of continuity. Why should 1916 not represent a turning point in u. S. International humanitarianism tu more so during the first 15 years of the 20th century. During these decades, the United States provided millions of dollars in cash, material supplies, and other forms of assistance to foreign victims of war and natural catastrophes in many parts of the world. Much of this work was carried out by the private sector, by missionaries, by charities, by american corporations, by American Financial houses, and by private citizens. Often, though, with the support, active support and assistance of the federal government. Significantly, though, the u. S. Government itself was also starting to play a greater direct role in humanitarian assistance in these years, providing increasing levels of state Department Support and involvement, congressional funding, and military assistance for humanitarian crises. One of the most memorable examples of this comes in late 1908, early 1909, when theres a major tsunami in southern italy, the u. S. Congress allocates 800,000 in Disaster Relief to this event, which is a pretty substantial amount for this time. This humanitarian assistance, i argue, serves key strategic, diplomatic, and moral objectives of the United States as it was expanding its role on the global stage. This is something we cant get into in these five to eight minutes but if you read my book, im sure youll learn more. Building on these foundations, though, the years 1914 to 1916 would see further developments in u. S. Foreign aid. During this era of u. S. Neutrality in world war i, americans provided significant levels of food, medical assistance, and other forms of relief to european soldiers and civilians on both sides of the conflict. Many americans, moreover, delivered humanitarian aid on the ground in europe. Herbert hoover and the commission for relief in belgium are of course the most famous but not the only providers of u. S. Assistance in these years. Wilson, in other words, may have campaigned on the he kept us out of war slogan in 1916 but the United States was hardly uninvolved or out of the war or for that matter outside of the world when we take its global humanitarian activities into account. Through the channels of humanitarian assistance, the u. S.