Okay, thank you for coming out. Its wonderful to see you here today hello, my name is Christopher Mcknight nichols, im a historian at oregon state university, scholar of intellectual history of the u. S. Role in the world. I specialize in isolationism, internationalism, and globalization. My work is called promise and peril, america at the dawn of a global age, just out in paperback, you can buy a downstairs. I have the distinct pleasure of being the chair and coorganizer of this panel. Its a fascinating panel. Our panel is entitled turning. 1916, u. S. Foreign relations before and after that kept us out of war election. This is not just about u. S. Foreign relations, but also international relations. The spark for this panel is this intending all of the 1960 election in which Woodrow Wilson ran on a he kept us out of war platform, despite military intervention ongoing in the mexico and caribbean. This roundtable brings together superb historians to discuss whether 1916 should be as the end of the era or the beginning, or was 1916 a turning point . Any of us have firm stances, many of us will probably equivocate. Here i wanted to give special thanks to university of illinois historian kristen hawkinson who helped organize this. She helped come up with the idea. Would also like to thank the American Historical Association and the panel cosponsors. The society for historians of the gilded age a progressive era and the society for historians of American Foreign relations. Our aim today in this panel is to consider and to reconsider how recent transnational, international, imperial, political and world historical scholarships has affected our assessments of u. S. Foreign Relations Relations in the years leading up to and following 1916 although of fungible mental issue of our panel will reach share and recent trends and opportunities in u. S. Is street, and World History and in foreign relation scholarship pertaining to foreign relations. Each of us will make brief remarks i hope, five to eight minutes, i will keep us on the clock these are designed to be thoughtprovoking rather than comprehensive. We will touch on a variety of themes here including humanitarian relief and the environment, human mobility, great power politics, military interventions, inter imperial rivalries, colonial policy, anti colonial struggles for sovereignty and the animating debates of concerns around isolationism and internationalism. And offer to offering a variety of fanatics, panelists also contribute a range of geographic perspectives i think this is what maybe makes our panel unique. It stretches us to think more about areas outside the United States. To think about europe. Do you think about mexico. Haiti and the caribbean. East asia and beyond. Were hopeful of generating a dynamic discussion not just across the panel, but also with you all. In that vein, i just wanted to say at the outset that we would like you to please come few up at the mics when it comes time too cute for q as. Right as we begin, its incumbent on me to talk about a bit about the election of 1916 and then we can move on to the most fascinating details. Having served one term, with europe and the world embroiled in the great war, alongside significant u. S. Disillusionment with progressive reform, Woodrow Wilsons path to reelection in 1916 was our from certain. Ultimately, he became the first democratic president sent and since Andrew Jackson in 1832, to be elected to two consecutive terms in office when he defeated Supreme Court justice republican Charles Evans hughes in the president ial election. Policy figured prominently in the campaign. While its true that entry into the war in april 1917 produced a formal party truce in the interest of national unity, this did not shield the Woodrow Wilson administration from fierce congressional criticism culminating in a breakdown of that truce. Of course, the election took place while world war i was being fought in europe and while mexico was going through the mexican revolution. We will hear more about that soon. With u. S. Troops on the ground in roughly a dozen locations throughout the world. Republican candidate cues primarily and harshly criticized wilson not for his spirit stance as were not taking necessary preparations for facing the conflict of europe. Given this and given hughes is lack of attention to the socalled mexican problem, most scholars argue that will sense commission as an anti war candidate was reinforced by this campaign and not just by his facile slogan. Diplomatically, u. S. Public sentiment leaned toward the british and the french. The allied powers. But the country remain neutral, at least formally, towards the conflict in europe. We will hear more about the ways in which that formal neutrality was actually undermined by actual trade and loan practices and other policies. The democrats Reelection Campaign painted wilson as a peacemaker and highlighted such recent efforts in 1916 as a january initiative to bring together all the powers of europe for a mediation conference. However, during the course of 1915 and 1916 leading up to this perhaps turning point, germanys aggressive wartime naval tactics brought the u. S. Ever closer to entering the conflict. For instance, in april, 1916, wilson defended neutral rights as he had after the sinking of the lusitania in 1915. He threatened to sever diplomatic ties with the germany following the sinking of the passenger very sussex by a uboat in the english channel. The attack marked the beginning of a new you boo you vote campaign, or when they had been planned, but the bluster by the Wilson Administration led to the germans backing down this uboat campaign. So there was a divide in the response of the mecca american electric. Pro wilson voters saw an assertive trump of u. S. Diplomacy. Some might call it leading from behind. In terms of the war of 1916, there were a number of major events and we do not have enough time to go through the. There were major battles. There were many months long battles at burden and the sum which resulted in 1 million total casualties. 1916 can be seen at least as a watershed in terms of the fighting of the war itself. Politically in 1916, wilson had the advantage of incumbency, but rightly feared a potential of a reunited Republican Party. Much had happened of course since in the four years since the last election when he faced off against william taft, Theodore Roosevelt and socialist unit dabbed is. As a historian sean, wasnt recognized, as Many Democrats had in fact not, in the west in the south, that the u. S. Could be drawn into the war at any moment by an act of some obscure german subcommittee. Therefore, while wilson advocated continue neutrality, he also called for military preparedness. The apparent tensions between those two policies troubled Many Democrats, particularly irish americans and driven americans. It led to some intense political vulnerability for wilson in the election cycle. At the Democratic Convention in the summer of 1916 in st. Louis, wilson one on the first ballot as his Vice President trumps marshal of indiana. The platform called for military preparedness, a World Association of nations to maintain peace after the war in europe had ended, pan american unity, a ban on child labor, womens suffrage, and prison reform. During the convention, the delegates cheered most vigorously for the now Famous Campaign he kept us campaign slogan, he kept us out of war, which world conditions really made more of a hope and promise. As wilsons private notes made clear, he understood this all too well. He made the core of his campaign there for three peace. Peace, preparedness and progressivism. He sort of added a fourth piece which was prosperity. This is important to think of in terms of the International Dynamics because it was allied stimulus, war orders and loans that led to a shift back from a recession that had begun to occur early in the war, particularly for southern agreeance. Although Teddy Roosevelt thought it would he would bring him into the white house, the champion intervention. The accused wilson of cowardice for his mediation efforts. But the outspoken roosevelt failed to really understand the depth of the divide he had generated in the election cycle before. The republicans nominated Charles Evans hughes, a very fascinating character. We might get into him a little bit more. Roosevelt famously turned him a bearded iceberg. But cues earned the nomination on the third ballot and former Vice President under Teddy Roosevelt, charles fair banks, also of indiana, swing states, not getting too deep into the politics, but states like that were import in the election, became the republican Vice President ial nominee wrapping up the course of this. Perceptive observers were confident that use would win in november. Even wilson seems to have had doubts about his path to reelection according to historian jonathan cooper, ever the fighter, he relished the struggle but was not necessarily optimistic about the outcome scholars tend to note, Republican Party stood united behind a single candidate and the democrats had won only three president ial elections since 1860. Voters seemed apathetic and perhaps wary of progressive reforms and the key accomplishments of the Democratic Administration of the last four years seems scant at the time. He was Foreign Policy more overemphasized a straightforward Preparedness Program which seems far less muddled than wilsons simultaneous calls for neutrality and preparedness in the same period. Critics charged wilson with wanting the nation, both in the war and aloof from it. A utopian stance that we still hear from many historians of political scientists today. This seemed remarkably unrealistic, at least to his critics in 1916. Famously, hughes and his staff went to sleep on november 6th, certain that they would win the election. It was not clear until at least two days later when he returns from california and ohio came in that wilson was the likely winner and it took another two weeks for hughes to actually concede. So what happened . Im short, wilson one, he secured 30 states to use is 18, he won 49. 4 of the popular vote, though his share of the Electoral College vote in 1960 was much smaller smaller than 1912. More to the point, wilson looms so large over the party that he could take credit for the narrow victory in congress. Not the least part of wilsons accomplishment in 1916 had been, quote, the widespread approval he gained as a mandate coming out of the election for his shaping of americas response to the cataclysmic war that heading got europe two and a half or two and a half years earlier. The degree to which this electoral and public achievement therefore marked a turning point for wilson is something i hope we will talk about. But the degree to which this heralded a change or a real scene change in American Foreign relations and world relations is our main topic for today. Having dispensed with what happened in the election and some of the cause and consequences, we now get into the more animating concepts and debates about what the consequences and stakes were. I will first introduce our initial speaker. Im pleased to introduce professor julia erwin, a professor of history. Her research focuses on the place of humanitarianism. History of u. S. International civilian aid in late 19th and early of 20 centuries. Shes working on a book entitled catastrophic diplomacy, a history of u. S. Responses to Global Natural disasters. Please help me in welcoming professor julia erwin. [applause] professor erwin thank you for the introduction to the whole roundtable. I promise i will keep within my five to eight minutes. My research focuses on the role of u. S. Military and aid in u. S. Foreign affairs. Aching about war relief and Disaster Relief, and the roles they played in u. S. Foreign relations. Both International War and disasters as i shown my work have long been important elements of u. S. Diplomatic, strategic, economic, and cultural relations with the world. Both before world war i, before 1916, and indeed, well after. From my perspective as an historian of u. S. Foreign aid, should 1916 be seen as the end of an era in u. S. Relationships with the wider world . My short answer to this question is the ever unsatisfying yet typical historians answer yes, and no. I promise i will come back in the end was something more. Seen through the lens of u. S. International humanitarianism, 1916 does mark the end of an era in u. S. Relations with the world in certain respects. At the same time, i think we can identify many more points of continuity in u. S. Military efforts. Trends which link the decades prior to 1916 with those that followed. In my brief for march today, i would like to touch on both of these points of continuity and change. Lets begin with the former, points of continuity. Why should 1916 not represent a turning point in u. S. International humanitarianism, and by extension, u. S. Foreign affairs more broadly . Prior to 1916, the u. S. Government and u. S. Citizens both took part in many humanitarian operations throughout the world. For well over a century prior to 1916, the United States provided limited amounts of aid for the victims of many periodic wars, famines, and disasters and other nations. U. S. Involvement in overseas humanitarian aid moreover had accelerated greatly in the 1880s and 1890s, and all the more so during the first 15 years of the 20th century. During these decades, the United States provided millions of dollars in cash, material supplies, and other forms of assistance to foreign victims of war and natural catastrophes. Much of this work was carried out by the private sector, the missionaries, charities, american corporations, and American Financial houses and private citizens. Often, with the active support and assistance of the federal government. Significantly, the u. S. Government itself was also starting to play a greater direct role in humanitarian assistance during these years, providing increasing levels of state Department Support and involvement, congressional funding, and military assistance for humanitarian crises. One of the most memorable examples of this comes in late 1908, early 1909, when a major tsunami in southern italy, the u. S. Congress allocates 800,000 in Disaster Relief to this event, which is a pretty substantial amount for this time. This assistance i argue serves key strategic diplomatic and moral objectives of the United States, as it was expanding its role on the global stage. Something we cant get into in five to eight minutes. But if you read my book, im sure you will learn more. Building on these foundations, the years 1914 to 1916 with the further developments in u. S. Foreign aid. During this era of u. S. Neutrality in world war i, americans provided significant levels of food, medical assistance, and other forms of relief to european soldiers and civilians. On both sides of the conflict. Many americans, moreover, delivered humanitarian aid on the ground in europe. Herbert hoover and the commission for relief in belgium are the most famous. But not the only providers of u. S. Assistance in these years. Wilson, in other words, may have campaigned on the fact he kept us out of war slogan in 1916. The United States was hardly uninvolved or out of the war. Or for that matter, outside of the world. When we take into global humanitarian activities into account. The channels of humanitarian assistance, u. S. Government and citizens had been involved in World Affairs for decades prior to 1916. But nonetheless, the election of 1916 and the subsequent u. S. Entry into the war this is really the more important turning point here can be seen as a turning point in u. S. Humanitarian aid, in at least two respects. First was the nations incredible willingness to mobilize for humanitarian assistance after 1916. Statistics on the American Red Cross, the nations preeminent wartime aid agency, make this trend starkly visible. Counting just 286,000 members in 1916, the American Red Cross would see his numbers explode to 22 million adults and 11 million children, about one third of the u. S. Population at the time. During the same years, u. S. Citizens gave 400 million to the American Red Cross to fund its relief operations. 400 million was not pocket change in 1917 and 1918. U. S. Entry into the war as the statistics suggest generated an unprecedented level of support for u. S. Military aid, that was never seen before the nations past. A second clear shift with the u. S. Governments increasingly formal involvement in u. S. Foreign aid after 1916. After the armistice, the u. S. Government would formalize its role in International Humanitarian aid further still. When congress established and bonded the American Relief administration, the u. S. Governments