Lectures in history on American History tv on cspan3 every saturday at 8 00 eastern. Lectures available as a podcast, find it where you listen to podcast podcas podcasts. On august 6thropped, an arm b29 dropped atomic bomb number two on hiroshima, japans seventh largest city. Sion] a communications, military and Industrial Center of on of considerable importance. A stunned universe now swiftly learned mann had a new weapon o shocking destructiveness, a 70,0 weapon p boarding on the absolu. In the blast thousands died instantly, 70,000 missing, 140 i enthusiastic injury. Tyhed. Of those 43,000 were badly hur. The city was unbelievably crushed. Of por and 90,000 meetings overm demolished. Remains were aptly describedge as vapor and ashes. Ned an i man had torn from nature, newfound knowledge and fashioned instrument of annihilation. Menacing implications of this r extraordinary weapon were frightening to every day people. Isnt it terrible, all those. Peoplele killed. Days later another bomb dropped on sea port of nagasaki, highly congested,he extensive naval facilities. This bomb, exploding over the district, took the lives of 42,000 persons. This bomb exploding took the lives of 42,000 persons and injured 40,000 more. It destroyed 39 of all the buildings standing in nagasaki before the calamity. Mutilated city as a graveyard with not a tombstone standing. These two terrifying blows were struck at japan only after profound consideration of human military factors involved. The atomic bombs were dropped to end the war quickly, and they did he said the war quickly. Richard frank is author of downfall here to talk to us further about the 75th anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bombs by the u. S. By jap. Thank you for joining us. Thank you for having me. In that last clip we just heard, military film from 1946, it said pretty definitively atomic bombs dropped to end the war quickly, and they did end the war quickly. First of all, was this the right decision to make and were those bombs the reasons for the he said of the war . The short answer is yes and yes. They were dropped overwhelmingly the primary reason to end the war as quickly as possible, save lives, both american and japanese. One thing thats critical to get to at the start, to understand the context of this. From my side i have two basic principles we have to follow. One is to count all the dead. Second is to treat all the dead sharing common humanity. By that, i very much mean the japanese as well. Basically the Asian Pacific war million noncombatant. Of that number, the number of japanese noncombatants, 1 million or 2 million, due to atomic bombs and soviet intervention in 1945. That math tells you immediately that for every japanese noncombatant who died in the whole war, between 17 and 18 otherdied. Overwhelmingly other asians and 12 million of them are chinese. By the summer of 1945, most of those 17 or 18 million noncombatants who were not japanese were already dead and they were dying at a rate between 8 and 14,000 a day, 240 to 4,000 a morant of thats the context. Its important we dont overlook or did he mean or diminish or dehumanize japanese but equally important we understand the total context of this and where the deaths are taking place, and they are primarily not japanese. Richard frank is with us for a half hour as we look back further on the 75th anniversary of the atomic bomb drops on hiroshima and nagasaki. We will take your calls after a couple of minutes of conversation. Look at the numbers on the screen for our guest. Eastern and central time zones 2027488000 is your number. Out west 2028001. Two special lines, one for world war ii veterans and their families 2027488002 an for japanese americans 2027488003. We look forward to talking with you and you talking to our guest, richard frank. Richard frank, more perspective here. How widespread in 1945 was the support for president truman and his decision to use atomic weapons and has that changed much over time . Yeah. The support for truman in 45 and sometimes afterwards was extremely high. Looking at numbers ive seen punching up above 80 . Its changed over the years because the narratives have been employed over the years have changed very much. One of the things that really concerns me about this, i dont question we should talk about this, controversial but i find it astonishing that this conversation takes place in which various alternatives are advanced in lieu of the atomic bombs. What is conspeck wyss about that discussion, they never talk about what the cost of the alternatives are. When you actually get down and start doing the cost of the alternatives you understand why mr. Truman in his decision didnt take a good choice, he basically choices between astonishingly awful to horrendously horrific and chose what secretary of war stimson would call the least horrible choice in terms of the events. This is the 75th anniversary of the nagasaki bombing, the second bombing. August 6th being the first one, hiroshima. Richard frank, what was the difference between those three days and what the Truman Administration was looking at, the destruction in hiroshima, what made them decide to drop a second bomb three days later. There was no second. The authorization order released people to start dropping bombs and keeping dropping bombs. There was no checkback. When we talk about the two bombs, another aspect about this controversy people dont understand, the problem with the notion that one bomb would have done it or demonstration would have done it is this. Have you to look at the japanese side. Their reaction to this was based on the fact they had an Atomic Bomb Program which had not produced a bomb but it had educated the top levels of japanese leadership and the fact producing fissionable material, which you have to have to take a bomb, was extremely different. When it came and the announcement was it was an atomic bomb, the Imperial Army said we wont concede they had one bomb until we have an investigation. The Imperial Navy took the track, they may have one bomb but there cant be that many, cant be that powerful. Basically what japanese leadership was looking at, not the fear of one bomb but an arsenal of powerful atomic bomb weapons. As it it happened thats what nagasaki bomb did, convinced top leadership, that we had not a bomb but an arsenal of atomic bombs. The war minister, second most powerful man in japan after emperor, had been adamant, after nagasaki hes going around telling leadership americans have 100 atomic bombs and the next target is going to be tokyo. Thats an amazing argument to make to continue the war. How far along was the u. S. In dropping of bombs in planning an invasion of japan, the main islands of japan. Very good question and gifrt. A plan to start on the 1st. Mr. Truman approved that on the 18th of june, 1945. At that time he was quite reluctant but presented with scenario in which we have overwhelming supportofsuperiority going to kyus kyushu, therefore american casualties would be acceptable. What we know now, radio intelligence uncovered the fact japanese exactly anticipated the First American invasion was going to take place on southern kyushu. They built this huge buildup of ground and air force, 10,000 aircraft, half of them kamikaze, 700,000 troops. Instead of going in with this overwhelming superiority, vault echelon would face japanese. The senior naval officer had never wanted to invade japan and had been biding his time to bring on a showdown over whether an invasion should take place. By the 9th of august 1945 with the intelligence, he was prepared to bring on this huge showdown with an army over whether there should be in invasion of japan. Only japanese surrender cut that off before it reached a level of mr. Truman having a review. A call from tom from arlington, west virginia. Youre on with richard frank. Were talking about the 75th anniversary of atomic bombings of japan. Go ahead, tom. Good morning. Good morning. Im age 60 and i remember the howard zen lectures of my College Years of how history being rewritten so much right now by people with agendas. Im hearing on talk radio the only reason why we bombed progressive talk radio, that is, the only reason we bombed japan because they were not europeans. In other words, they were people of color, which is nonsense, because we bombed dresden over in germany. That was a purpose of demoralizing the german people, for them to surrender. Its unfortunate what happened with the dropping of the two bombs. It did open up pandoras box. But on the other hand, it saved millions of japanese lives who would have been caught in the crossfire as well as american lives and casualties. Am i wrong on that, professor . No. Basically you have to bear in mind right up until the he said, it was assumed the bombs would be used against germany as soon as they were available. Turned out from a technical standpoint didnt have bombs ready to use against germany. They surrendered in may. First bomb, test bomb, was detonated in july 1945. Let me come back again to a really basic point. Its not that the argument on advancing we dont care about the japanese who died. I wrote very graphically about that in my book, both the fire raid in tokyo in 1945 and also hiroshima. But what ive been going over these many years now is the fact our narratives weve been using on this simply talk about japanese deaths, the fact japanese were asians. They dont mention we were in the war, basically because we wouldnt abandon china. Our American People at the time reading New York Times, reading it day by day through the whole war, they were we will aware of how horrific the war was in asia. Weve completely blotted that out. Thats why those narratives are so powerful because people simply do not realize how horrific the asiapacific war was. How have japanese textbooks for Young Students portrayed the war, and has that approach changed over the years . Thats sort of a complex question. The larger question, the larger issue, i think, for japan was the whole period of world war ii was an an area that was not really forthrightly discussed, still not forthrightly discussed. Clearly in japan, and i can understand this, to view themselves as the greatest victims of the war. If you have been dealing with historians and people from other asian nations, you get a full flavor how infuriating it makes people in china and elsewhere. I was sitting at a conference with people from republic of china, presentation made very much along typical lines of what i call critical literature here. As hes sitting there, i see him going from bafflement to fury as he realized this narrative entirely omits, doesnt count and doesnt treat chinese, vietnamese, indonesians, koreans as sharing a common humanity with japanese civilians in two cities. Let me add further, a point i alluded to earlier, basically when the soviet union enters the war, according to embracing defeat classic book about occupation of jap they capture between 1. 6 and 1. 7 japanese nationals in manchurian. When its over they returned 1. 2 million. Between 400,000 and 500,000 japanese either died or disappeared in soviet captivity. We know from soviet archival documents about 61,000 of them are japanese soldiers. So that tells you basically between 340 and 400,000 noncombatants died in soviet cap tifts after hostilities, those are higher numbers than atomic bomb attacks including latent deaths. We go to rick in phoenix. Good morning. Good morning. I just want to add my voice. Not sure what has been discussed earlier but my father, who barely survived the war in europe was being prepared to transfer to jaap japan. That would have eliminated my brothers life after that state and many other mens lives. It would have been criminal when you add everything up here, it would have been criminal for truman not to drop that bomb. Hundreds of thousands of chinese massacred in a horrible way, they were, as you just mentioned, the russian threat that would have taken japanese territory and greatly complicated the postwar era. Theres so many reasons why truman had to do that. What was the alternative . I heard generals saying they were going to block aid japan until they gave up. What . Could you address those points that you havent yet . Thank you, rick. Richard frank. Thats a really excellent point. On the american side, there was basically an unstable compromise between the army and the navy over a strategy to end the war in unconditional surrender. The army thought the critical issue was time. Therefore they allocated an invasion because they believed the invasion would be the swiftest way to end the war. The navy studied war with japan literally for decades. One of the fundamental premises of that study was invading japanese home islands would produce politically unacceptable casualties. The navys alternative was block aid. What doesnt get mentioned in these discussions as it should, and this was basically the policy, all the Navy Officers lined up behind it, talked about it as the alternative to the bomb, this gets back to the very basic point i made about counting all the dead. Blockade was bluntly aimed to end the war by starving to death millions of japanese, mostly noncombatants. Thats what blockade was about. In view of the limited power of atomic weapons and other conventional weapons at that time, compared to what we have today, a blockade was actually the most ruthless strategy the u. S. Was prepared to employ against japan. That was the direction we were going in august of 1945, if the invasion of kyushu was off and he gets his way then we do block aid, kill millions of japanese noncombatants. By the way, those asians not japanese, who are dying every single day, had their deaths on top of the japanese dying. The death tolls for alternatives when you sit down and contemplate them was sickening, mind boggling. We have len on the line from west virginia. Hello, len. Good morning cspan and mr. Frank. Im the son of an okinawa veteran training to go to the invasion in japan. Of course they never had to go because president truman had the common sense to do what he did. For those who criticizes um truman and the army ill tell you what my dad said, let every one of those critics go to the family of people, american gis who were saved from invading japan and certain death and tell them that truman did the wrong thing. I know you dont have the guts to do that. Thank you, mr. Frank, for your books. Very informative. Len, thank you for calling. Richard frank, has history been fair to president truman regarding his decisions . My view, no. Let me add another dimension to this. Mr. Truman postwar famously said he didnt lose any sleep over the decision and various comments like that. If you really go through everything he actually said, in his mind he had sort of an area two compartments. One compartment, did i make the best decision of what was presented to me. He always believed if you really understood all the alternatives, he made what secretary stimson called least abhorrent choice. As bad as the bombs were and those choices, the alternatives were worse. On a personal level, truman was never indifferent to the deaths of japanese that his order had caused. In fact, very shortly after hiroshima, we intercept this message from the Japanese Navy reporting 100,000 japanese had died at hiroshima. Mr. Truman clearly was reading that. He talks in a Cabinet Meeting or just before a Cabinet Meeting to other government officials. He said hiroshima bomb killed 100,000 people. He didnt pull that out of the air. He said all those kids. He has various other comments hes making about the fact that this was horrendous, the consequences of the decision. The decision may have been right but the consequences were horrendous and he recognized it and felt it very deeply. You know, once again, when you deal with people from other asian nations trapped in japans empire or americans saying were two bombs necessary, a common comment from them is why only two. From their perspective, the death rate is so incom parable between the japanese and other peoples, they find the american struggle to be baffling. A little more of the history, end of the war in the pacific 1945, so hiroshima happens on august 6th. August 9th we talked about drop the atomic bomb same day soviets declare war on japan, invade manchuria. Six days go by, emperor announces unconditional surrender. What happened . Walk us through the six days to get the emperor to the point of surrender. A little context here. Basically what you have to understand is to get japan to surrender was really two steps. Someone with legitimate authority had to decide japan as a nation state would surrender. Then japans armed forces had to comply with that surrender. Neither one of those steps was a certainty through most of 1945. The emperor makes the critical decision. He makes it in the afternoon of august 8th, 1945 when he talks to the foreign minister and says the war must end now. This is after hiroshima, before soviet intervention. There were other factors on his mind including loss of faith and meet the invasion, concern about the japanese people reaching revolutionary state sometime probably in the fall. These all played into his mind. He announces that the decision before the inner circle of leadership in the Early Morning hours of august 10th. We have the diary entry, learns of the decision, one of the officers in imperial headquarters says i dont think commanders will comply with an order of the emperor. Two from the Imperial Army send messages say were not going to comply with surrender orders even from the emperor. Theres more back and forth in tokyo. They send their first message, really their first serious message about winning the war. It has language saying the precondition they want is the prerogatives of the emperor somp ruler will not be compromised in the surrender. American state Department Officials immediately realize this is a demand that the u. S. To get the japanese to surrender make the emperor supreme, not only japanese government but occupation authorities. Has he a veto over occupation and occupation reforms. Of course we send a message back saying clearly the emperor is going to be subordinate to the occupation commander. That causes more turmoil in japan. The emperor insist japan surrender and get the government to agree. Whether they would ever have agreed without the emperor, i dont know. Then we saw a fraught period where its a question whether they are going to get japanese forces, 5, 6 headline strong to surrender. One of the inner cabinet members later tells american interrogators the roughest, most fraught days he spent, these four or five days worrying whether