The apollo 13 crew, captain james lovell, captain John Swaggart mr. Fred haise. I would like to start by saying i am not a superstitious person. Therefore, when we were assigned apollo 13, i thought nothing of it. Some said 13 was a lucky number and were happy i got that number. It started just before the flight, as was documented. As we were approaching the final phase of training, the last couple of days are usually taken very leisurely, keeping a couple of days free to unwind from the long Training Cycle and get rest so that when we launch, we are in good shape. As you know, a turn of events occurred and ken mattingly, our command module pilot, was exposed to the measles, we had to make the decision to bring jack along. They asked what i wanted to do because we worked as a team for a long time, but i realized the Space Program had matured to that degree whereby we had quite a few people who were well knowledgeable about the spacecraft and well to fly. As a consequence, on friday we decided to take jack. I would like to say right now i have never regretted that decision. We as a team and john can particular helped us out in our ensuing odyssey tremendously. I would like to break off a second and introduce a couple of other people of our team that also served, although not in the same position as we were. Marilyn . This is my wife marilyn. [applause] and this is my wife mary. [applause] i think the entire crew of continental storage is here tonight for jack. [laughter] [applause] jack had a lot of help from his wife. [laughter] the launch saturday morning was not unusual. It was a nominal launch. It seemed even a lot easier than i had experienced on apollo eight. Lift off came just as i had known it before. Communications were excellent, and the entire boost phase was compared very favorably to what i had experienced for, except during the s2 burn, at which case i noticed the inboard lights come on in the second stage, indicating an engine had shut down. I followed normal procedure and realized it had come about two minutes early, ground confirmed this and as a result we had an early engine out in the second stage and our total boosting time was about one minute longer. This would not impair our flight, however. We had enough fuel to relight the third stage and go on in a trajectory towards the moon. The flight, up until about 56 hours, was what you would call entirely nominal. We followed the flight plan. We were ahead of the game. It took us a little longer to get rid of our pressure suits than we thought, and we had asked the ground at about 55 hours if we could indeed get into the lunar module three hours early. The flight plan called to go to the spacecraft at 58 hours. The ground said fine, why dont you open up the lem and do your housekeeping chores . There was an Engineering Task we had to perform, and with that was a Television Program we were set to put on. We decided to open up the lunar module, fred went into the spacecraft, went down, looked at the super helium, the critical helium on the the critical pressure on the super helium tank to make sure it was nominal. It was. Then we put on the tv show which was called for in the flight plan. I guess the show lasted about a halfhour, and just after we turned off the camera, fred was still in the lunar module, jack was in the command module on the lefthand seat and i was in between in the lower equipment bay, wrestling with td wires at the camera and watching fred coming down, when all three of us heard a rather large bang, just one bang. Now before that, fred being in the lunar module had actuated a valve which nominally gives us that same sound. Since he didnt tell us about it, we all jumped in sort of worried about it, but it was his joke and we all thought it was a lot of fun at the time. So when this bang came, we really didnt get concerned right away. But i looked at fred and fred had that expression like, it wasnt his fault. [laughter] we suddenly realized Something Else had occurred, but exactly what, we didnt know. I would like to let fred and jack explain what their impressions were at this same instance that i heard the explosion in the lower equipment bay. Jack. I had felt a vibration accompanying the bang, not a large vibration, or a shudder. I proceeded to look at jim at about the same time, i guess about two seconds had lapsed when i had a master alarm and a main interval. I transmitted to houston that we had a problem, and proceeded to the righthand side of the spacecraft to look at the voltage. The voltage at that time was normal. The current was not high, and the fuelcell flows was normal, which indicated that whatever it was, it was some sort of transient that didnt exist at that time. Me, being a command module pilot, and the source of the bang not immediately determinable, i thought it had occurred in the lem, and i said lets sit back and lets get the hatch in here and think about it, because we had the tunnel open at this time and thought we might be vulnerable to losing pressure. So i proceeded to get the hatch in, to begin installing the hatch. And by this time, fred 20 to the lunar modules pilots couch, and i will let him tell his observations about instruments and other caution warning alarms. Mr. Haise first of all, due to my position being a lot more familiar with the lem, my first impulse on feeling this shudder and explosion was to make sure the lem hatch, and this induced voltage on the other main buss. That is when i got smart and thought i should look at the other fuel cells, which i hadnt even considered had a problem. I found fuelcell one not outputting any amps. From this point on, we were under the hands of houston, troubleshooting and looking at more dials, another metering the led, and eventually we got to a point where houston called and asked us to shut down fuelcell three. We shut down the valve and i ask for a reconfirmation, since when you do that it is sometimes irreversible when you shut one of these things down. It can only be restarted from Ground Support equipment. And they assured me they really meant it, so i went through with it and subsequently, the same command was given for fuelcell one. About this point, the pressure, the oxygen pressure had gone in tank two. Tank two, and the pressure in tank one was steadily decreasing. It was obvious it wasnt holding its own. And right about then it was apparent to me it was a question of time that the command module was going to be dead, it was going to lose that fuel cell also. So i lost interest in that position and headed for the when jim noticed we had considerable venting outside the command module, it indicated we were losing the liquid material from the area of the surface module Service Module, so it indicated we truly had a problem in the Service Module. When you first hear of this explosion or bank, you dont know what it is. We have had similar sounds in the spacecraft before, that were for nothing. And the impression was when we came back that we had an electrical problem that caused the bang, because in previous testing we had some problems along these lines. That quickly went away. And i looked out the window and saw this venting. And my concern was increasing all the time. It went from, i wonder what this is going to do to the landing, to, i wonder if we can get back home again. It went into that type of seriousness. And when i looked up and saw both oxygen pressures, one actually zero and one going down, it dawned on me and fred and jack about the same time that we were indeed in serious trouble. It was apparent, and the ground told us so, they were on the ball all the time, that the only way to survive was to transfer to the lem. At that time fred went into the lem, got out our activation checklist, a checklist that is normally not used until prior to firing up firing up the lem to detach from the command module and prepared to go down to the surface. The first milestone, and i consider this after the accident, more or less survival now, the first milestone was to get alignment on the lem platform. Alignments are important because, without knowing exactly which way the altitude of the spacecraft in space is, there is no way of knowing how to burn or use the engines of the spacecraft to get a proper trajectory to come home. So we had to have an alignment on board the spacecraft. We knew the command module was going to lose it pretty soon, because we were going to lose power. So as we worked, fred and i went into the lunar module, fred got the power on, we started to widen the platform. We used a procedure in the activation checklist, checked angles, there was arithmetic involved in all these procedures, and i had on occasion during practice failed my arithmetic test. And i was so concerned about being sure the arithmetic was correct, i called down to the gauntlet to do the math, came back and i put it in. But we did get a platform alignment, and that was our first milestone. From then on it was an entirely different situation. Up until the incident, normal command is in the command module. Control is by the Service Module engines as far as attitude control. But we transferred our command to the lunar module, and were using the lunar body will engines for control. We had done some practice in this before, but never thought we would ever have to use it in a particular control situation. And to get control of this vehicle and pitch, you have to use one translation controller in one way, and roll in another way, and you can use the aca. So what we did, fred would handle one part of the control and i would handle the other, and controling the maneuverability of the spacecraft. We also had back here, Service Module completely filled with main engine fuel. We had used very little of it, just in one small, midcourse term. We also had rcs engines that were almost completely filled with fuel. An important point at this time is the fact that we had gotten off what we call the prereturn trajectory. We had done our midcourse maneuver sometime before, and this meant we were no longer on a path that would allow us to be slung around the moon and come back toward the landing spot on the earth. We had gotten office trajectory because we wanted to go to our landing site. The first thing the ground told us to do was to turn this engine, to get us back on that prereturn trajectory, which was going to get us up in the indian ocean. I think i lost track of oceans. It was the indian ocean at about 155 hours. 155 hours. The controllability of the spacecraft was ok as long as we had our indicators up, because we had practiced that. But to save power we shut that down for a while, and had to control it by looking at our computer display. I had never tried that before. I really dont know who had, and it is a very difficult task. We spent a lot of the first part of our emergency time just putting the spacecraft in this mode. Our second milestone was the burn. The first maneuver was to get us back ready for return and the second was to get us home early. The nominal flight time back home was 155 hours, if we had done nothing else, but because consumables were critical, and the ground was calculating consumables and fred was also doing back of the envelope type calculation, which, he figured if we were lucky we had one hour of spare controllables left before related. We had decided, and the ground had decided, to burn about two hours past 79 hours, i maneuver to shorten the time to get home. This was also going to be an automatic burn from the propulsion engine, and this burn was also very successful. After that, the ground was concerned with power. We were too, and we decided to go into a powerdown mode. We turned off just about everything. I would like to have jack and fred tell about our powerdown situation and some of our survival and environmental problems. On the lem side of the house, we had already done the procedures in a book called the contingency checklist. First of all, backup to the consumables, that one hour reserve i computed was with water and that was on a longer return. So as soon as we got the second burn in, we got a lot more padding. But at any rate, everybody, myself included, got a little bit fooled about how low the lem could actually get down to. After completing this powerdown, it settled down on consuming about 11 amps per hour. With the command module being inert, that led us to another environmental problem which jim will discuss. On the command module side of the house, as soon as i found that i had the batteries on the line also, fuel cell two, and as soon as i ascertained jim and fred had powered up the lem, we shut down and fuel cell two gave out on us. We powered down at command module completely. Just subsequent to paris and the and plus two just prior, we set the command model into basic configuration, standard switch configuration that works from the ground. Then we began a series of procedures. We were interested in, did we indeed have a main bust, or did we lost it or had we lost it . I went in there one time to go to sleep and jack was on the couch and i said jack, put up the window shades, lets get this space nice and dark and let us relax and have it nice and dark and we can get some sleep, and i woke up a couple of hours later, and i was freezing. As normally happens, putting up window shades in space cuts out the sunlight and normally cools down the spacecraft. But in most flights, heats from the systems would rewarm us. But we got the window shades off after that and the spacecraft never did warm up again. The command module steadily kept going down in temperature i think until just prior to reentry, it was down to about 38 degrees. Along with that was a chilling coldness, the walls were perspiring, the windows were wet, and it wasnt completely healthy. We went in there for some hotdogs one day and was like entering the freezer for food. Jack, tell them about innovations the ground gave us, hydroxide canisters. We did have a shortage of lithium hydroxide. The ground read us a procedure in order to adapt lithium hydroxide canisters for use in the lem. And as they read this thing up, jim and i constructed one of these things. I think at this point the partial pressure of Carbon Dioxide was reading at 15 millimeters. We constructed two of these and put them online and i think within an hour, the partial pressure of co2 was down to 2 10. So these were very effective devices. And we used four of these, the command module canisters, and never did use the main canister we had in reserve for the lunar module. As the temperature went down, we became concerned about keeping warm. Fred and i broke out our lunar boots, which we had stowed away in the module. Jack looked at his wet feet a couple of times, but he had an extra set of underwear, so he put that on. We had a third sleep restraint which fred puts on and kept a little warm. One of the biggest problems was one which might have hurt our trajectory, and that was that we didnt want to dump things overboard. As it turned out later on, it was more of an problem than we thought at the time. However, we were told dont throw any wastewater dumps over the side because it might change the trajectory and we are tracking you, and we want to make sure you come back at the proper angle to reenter. Fred, tell them what we did with all that stuff. [laughter] well, the things we had on board that were built for that sort of purpose work three bags on board the command module, about that size square, network really that were really a backup, provided for a backup mode of operation if the main system failed in the command module froze up. On board the lem for draining out the soup on the lunar surface, we had six bags about this size in the lem. Beyond that we had the three ecds, bladders that we each wear normally under the suit. That was about the only natural gear that we had. We looked around and in the lem, we had a tank that was mounted in the back of where the flight data file is located on the left side, and the tanks purpose is that purpose is that and the tanks surface is that when you are on the surface, some of the water escapes and is supposed to drain into this tank. So we had enough combination of hoses and disconnect between the two vehicles, using both lem and command module gear, that we found accommodation that we could hook up our ucds with a fitting that went to the tank. So that saved us for a little while. After that when it got full, we looked around some more and came across two fairly long two fairly large bags that were about that long, they were in the lem. And we were to use these bags to drain the remaining water and determine how much water we had left. Again, that turned out to be kind of where to get it to drain into that bag, but it involved the use of a six foot hose with a key in the middle in this bag middle and this bag, so we succeeded in using both of those large bags. So you can see that survival now became one of initiative and ingenuity, and one which the ground continually helped us along. We had all kinds of people on the ground trying to think of ways of extending our lifetime. We were also looking for ways to use the system, use it for oxygen or our emergency oxygen supply, in case we ran out. But as the flight progressed with the ground calculating our consumables, and they found we were using less power, less water, less oxygen and our lithium hydroxide canisters were holding up quite well. So it was Getting Better all the time, fortunately. We did power down everything though, and at about 105 hours, the ground after subtracting realized they that we were not om our trajectory that we would be able to safely back on, and we would have to make another maneuver. By this time, the crew stations became a lot different. There were three people in the lunar module now, usually built for two, because control had driven jack away from the command module in jacks normal position was on top the engine cam overseeing what fred and i were doing. This last maneuver was going to be unique, because we did not have the platform powered up, so we didnt have a normal method of determining the attitude of the spacecraft in order to perform the burn. On apollo eight some time ago, we were concerned with perhaps losing the platform on the return voyage, but since no one had ever made a lunar trip before, we came up with some way out ways of determining how we could make these corrections, and someone here came up with the idea of using the terminator of the earth to orient the spacecraft and use the sun position to get orientation and pitch and with that knowledge we could then make corrections to correct our angle of entry into the atmosphere. And as you know, the angle of entry into the atmosphere is a very small angle, only about two degrees, so it has to be controlled very carefully. At 105 hours they give us instructions to greenlight the engines and orient the spacecraft in this matter and give this procedure a try. When they read the procedure to us, i couldnt believe it, because even on apollo 8, i never thought in all the wo