Sti perspective of a person who has studied decisionmaking in the white house. And a valuable member of really making the Network Connections and the interviews that are the underlying factor and underlying base of this project work. Will, i thank you for that, and i turn the mic over to you. [ applause ] all right. Thank you very much, jeff. Im honored to be moderating this panel here with four very dear friends and valued colleagues. There is a concern afoot that as a moderator i might let it go to my head and try to interject myself too much in the discussion. So ill be sitting down there while they make their presentations and come back up here during q and a time. You have the detailed bios of each of the speakers so i wont repeat those. First here is professor richard immerman. His bio says he recently retired from temple university. And that may be technically correct. I know richard well, richard does not know the meaning of the word retirement. Were Close Friends on the state Department Advisory council and he continues to be a scholar and mentor in the gild of scholars and historians. Next to him is professor mel leffler at the university of virginia. Another titan in the field of diplomatic history. I started reading this books when i was an undergrad. Continued reading his books as a grad student. And continue. Mel is only one of the four who does not technically have a chapter in this edited collection, but without giving up too much in the peer review process, lets just say that he paid a very Important Role in approving all of the process and made sure it came to process. Our entinterloper is dr. Kori schake here. Frankly, kori is a longtime dear friend and former colleague from the beneficiary aush administra. She currently runs the International Institute for studies in london and is frankly a better historian than a lot of cardcarrying historians. And finally, professor Andrew Preston who is a canadian by birth and citizenship. Did much of his education and studies in the United States and is now a professor in the uk at cambridge university. Also, a dear friend and also a contributor to the book. So, with that, we are going to turn it over to our panel, each one will be reading his or her comments from it and well have q and a time. Please welcome me in joining them. [ applause ] its good that the podium is set up like it is, otherwise, im sure that, you know, will would have moved the mic up to his level and i would have had to be jumping up and down to reach it. So, let me begin by saying how thrilled i was to join this project, to be able to accept actually jeffs invitation. The cost of the drama controversy and implications, and i would say ongoing implications that attended the Bush Administrations decision to surge in iraq. For any historian foundations and ill underscore historian, the subject is really irresistible. Making it that much more attractive say chance to contribute to what is really a first cut at history. As we discussed this morning, and actually, at both sessions, the archival evidence is still classified, most of it. And will remain so for a decade, and probably more. In fact, if i have one thing to all of you who participated, do everything you can to get this material released. I spent a lot of time with the archives and its becoming increasingly d lly difficult to any material released in nil president ial administration. And thats going to be a problem for the future. But until lieu of that, we do have access to the oral testimony of a remarkable number of pivotal contributors of all Different Levels which really is virtually unprecedented for this type of project. I also had a more personal interest. I have been studying National Security decisionmaking and policymaking for some four decades. It began back in the 1970s when i began to explore the foreign policies of the sizeisenhower administration which has come up several times and largely because those processes have become legendary, even though the assessments of them can often be diametrically opposed. Ill come back to that in a moment. But you can understand why a project aimed at drilling down into such a momentous yet complicated decision held such great appeal for someone like myself. You can therefore also understand easily why that appeal grew even greater as i pored through the interviews. A consensus quickly emerged, really surfaced among the contributors regardless of their position or perspective that the process was outstanding. And i think thats been reinforced today. The adjectives ran from textbook, to model, to highly effective. And in fact, the worst that could be really said of them was that they were good. Indeed, except for a few who lamented that the process took longer, and even then there was an upside to the length that it took. And that has been discussed today. There was really only one dissent. And that was the to describe the process as strange. But even in that case, it worked in the sense that it enabled president bush to make a courageous decision. And i think theres ample evidence that was the case. And though courageous does not necessarily mean wise or right, it certainly was, perhaps, better than the alternative. Now, granted, in a number of respects this consensus was predictable given the nature and to some kenseth the conception of the project. Theres the famous old adage that history is written by the victor, attributed to winston churchill. Although historians dont know if in fact he really did say it. One could make sense that applies to all histories and the same. And most oral histories. The judgment in this case of those who were interviewed, and i think, again, this was reinforced today. And im not in any way suggesting that it was wrong is that the decision to surge was a good one, largely because, and i think as major osullivan said, the outcome was good. This seemed true even to those who were not on board at least early on. And those like condi rice would be an example of that. She did not come on board until the end. But she said she was very proud of how the whole process unfolded. Conversely, those who might be called the losers, donald rumsfeld, for example, in terms of this context, and, again, not through the fault of the project, but they were silent. They were not interviewed. Or didnt agree to interview. Actually repeatedly didnt agree to be interviewed. And so was the same case with george casey and many of the other military readers. Now, dont get me wrong in any way, what we learned from the oral histories is original, highly ininformative and fascinating. Its terrific grist of any student of National Security decisionmaking. It provides us with the history of a surge beyond anything that we were privy to before. And thus, if my opinion, the book should be used in every course that anyone teaches on u. S. Foreign policy or International Relations. But as i said, originally, it was the first cut. And we have to keep that in mind. And in many ways, it whets our appetite for more of the story. More of the analysis and more documents. And i do hope, and this came up very briefly, that among those, there will be more that pertain to what scholars often call the missing dimension of the history of International Relations which is intelligence. I mean, that was mentioned there. I have, again, a personal interest in this pipe would very much like to know, not only the correlation between the intelligence and decisions, what kind of an input it was, but really, what i think is a fascinating question is whether the reforms that took place in the Intelligence Community between 2004 and 2005 made any effect in terms of how the consumers of that intelligence did so. And i was particularly interested in peters comment in which he said, in terms of 2007, with maliki is that intelligence could not guarantee. Of course, intelligence could never guarantee. I mean, all it can do is inform and reduce uncertainty. But one of the reforms, which is near and dear to my heart, was that the intelligence would have different types of scenarios. Which wasnt always easy for the intel for the consumer. But nevertheless, that was sort of pivotal and it was required. To me, thats a whole other sort of story, or parallel story, which id love to be explored. But, again, i dont know how and when it might be. Anyway, let me circle back to the process itself. And to reiterate that it was my study of eisenhowers foreign and National Security policies in the 1950s and the architecture that generated them that was the initial spark from my interest in National Security decisionmaking. And to you know, in many ways, and while im reluctant to use eisenhower as a model, and i sort of did. And when will read my essay, he blasted me for doing it. And the same thing happened at the workshop, so im ready to sort of get it again. But, you know, im suggesting in any way that all administrations should mimic that architecture. Or would i suggest that administrations do not have to adapt their processes to the demands of the contemporary environment. What today we conventionally refer to as the interagency process is much broader and much more complex than it was back in the 1950s. And for that matter, through the end of the cold war. For example, todays National Security council dwarfs in size and scope and authority anything that eisenhower put together and institutionalized in the 1950s. Conversely, i would argue, and this might be something that would be interesting to explore in the second volume or the third volume or the fourth volume, the power of the state department which under eisenhower remained the core of the Foreign Policy process. And whose secretary of state was the unparalleled leader and spokesman of the Foreign Policy community. And god forbid anyone try to cross him, back in the 1950s what he does. That short and power has receded steadily. Even as that of the pentagon has increased. And well, i got to stop pointing anyway, and then there is the situation which is also important and the personalities have come up in several different contexts in terms of the conversation, that no president since eisenhower with the possible exception of george h. W. Bush, i have to mention that because jeffs here. None have possessed anything close to his reputation, stature, or therefore, experience or political capital. You know, because of his military authority, i think there was no one in that class. So that was sort of very important. But nevertheless, i think the fundamental pillers of his process are as applicable today as they were then. And ill just mention very quickly, you know, a couple of them. Including which would be engaging the right people at the right level at the right time, providing an environment conducive to invoking constructive debate that cuts across agencys line and to which the president is an eyewitness. Ensuring that the debate serves as all options and scenarios, the success for which requires a custodial manager. National security adviser who is sort of walks the fine line between honest broker and policy entrepreneur. And final, some sort of mechanism that ensures that once a decision is make, and implementation begun, monitors the progress to decide whether or not some sort of change is necessary. To repeat, im not claiming that that process or architecture are models. Im a historian and not a political scientist. And that every president must be able to devise an architecture that he or she is comfortable with. And i would argue that has been to be present. And ill quickly go over my criticism which will limit how much i can be criticized for. But ill be happy to discuss anything further during the question and answer. So, to begin with, there was not a mechanism to trigger a review or say monitor. And to trigger, eisenhower had an appendage of the National Security council, many of you know this called the operation coordinating board. It never worked as well as it was intended to work. But it did ensure that an execution of a policy could not continue indefinitely without some kind of appraisal of that policy periodically. Not continue waally as brett mc said, but it could be at various intervals. In this case, there was no mechanism to trigger that review, sort of automatically. And even though from late 2005 to 2006, many National Security officials, and entities at Different Levels, expressed profound concern with u. S. Policy and direction. That there wasnt a review. There were meetings, many, many meetings referred to in interviews as stylized, but they didnt necessarily get them to where it needed to go. Finally, the nsc itself, or elements of the nsc really forced a review. And yet, it took place covertly, clandesti clandestinely, i dont know what word you want to include in which it basically cut out the secretary of defense and many of the service, the uniforms and military. Again, that really could not have happened. And then that leads to which was mentioned. So what i consider one of the strangest episodes in decisionmaking history which is that which surrounded the camp david meeting that june, in which it was teed up. And that the meeting never really got off the ground, again, for a variety of different reasons. Im just going to quickly summarize. But my general point is that even though well, let me just add one more thing to go. Then there was the issue which comes out very clearly that the nsc does conduct basically its own sort of informal review. You have other ones going on, but its the nsc that really develops a preference, if that would be the word, or at least puts on its table the notion of having a doubledown time of strategy which ultimately becomes the surge. It is not generated by one of the agencies, so it is difficult, again, that would be thats in violation of sort of the eisenhower model in which it would have been put up it would have had to have been mentioned, unless no one thought about it at all. Early in the process, to the credit of the nsc and the staff, and particularly the credit of steve hadley, and so many of those who are here, attesting to the other eisenhower principle, that the organization no matter how good it is really only as good as the individuals who are part of it. So, in this case, it really was the individuals that sort of negate everything i said because it compensated for what i consider really flaws in the structure, relying on sort of extragovernmental inputs, officials outside the formal chain of command. Concealing some of the deliberations from others or whatever. The nsc did ultimately arrive at a recommendation that enabled br president bush to make this courageous decision. A decision that the nsc wanted to make and clearly that president bush wanted to make, at least for the second half of 2006. It surely was a courageous decision, although ill leave it to history as to whether or not it was the wisest decision or the right decision. But the question is whether the system worked. Maybe it did, if the in fact that the barometer is that the policy ended up where they wanted to be. But i dont think that thats the right question. So, i mean, i would like to ask those who were involved in it, if they were writing a textbook on decisionmaking process as 0 whether this is a pathway they would recommend to get from point a to point b. And i think not, actually i sort of hope not. Thanks very much. [ applause ] , so, first of all, i want to begin by thanking the organizers for asking me to sanattend toda. I think that it was really inspiring this morning and earlier this afternoon, inspiring both as scholar and even more importantly, inspiring simply as an american citizen, to listen to the thoughtful reassessment of decisionmaking that went into the surge. I think its incredibly impressive for us, as americans, to think that we have had such people, whether we agree with their decisions or disagree with their decisions making policy in the highest echelons of the white house, the state department and the pentagon and elsewhere. And i think it behooves us, all of us, as americans to think how Different Things are today. And how consequential it is that we do not have serious thoughtful minded people engaged in the process comparable to the ones that weve heard today. I also want to preface my remarks by saying that i dont have a stake in this volume. I have no i was not interviewed for it. Ive not written an essay for it. I was an outside referee. But i also hope that peter fever will take my comments thoughtfully as an objective scholar because i did not sign the letter as an academic in 2002 opposing the war. And id like to think that ive come to whatever views ive had, which are pretty complex and textured about the decision to go to war. And about the aftermath. And that just because im an academic, i dont necessarily have vested opinions politically inspired. On probation. Okay, im on probation, i know, ten minutes from now, i think i will probably not get your affirmation, but at least im on probation right now. So, i want to say, i was asked to make some comment. Overall comments about the book and the surge. I think its a wonderful book. The interviews are really illuminating. The volume is seamlessly edited. The interviews are brought together in a very, very effective way. So that they provide an excellent, really excellent chronological overview of the decision to surge troops in iraq. I also very much admired the essays. I admired them because they offer such different perspectives. Theres an essay by three of the key policymakers, steve hadley and Megan Osullivan, and peter, one essay by them. And then six or seven other essays by very renowned scholars. Three of them who appear on this stage. And whats significant about all of the essays is that they make you think really deeply about process, strategy, and president bushs overall decisionmaking. And what i want to do in the ten minutes or so that i have is to talk a little bit about these three matters. Process, strategy and overall decisionmaking. So, first of all, in terms of process, richard, who youve just heard is very critical of the process. But actually so are some of the former policymakers, like philip s sulico. Steve hadley and megan and peter offer a compelling defense of the process in their essay. They make two really important points. They say that the process gave the president mo