Welcome back to the Madeleine Paul hilliard Conference Center here at the higgins hotel. I hope everybody enjoyed their lunch. We spent this morning doing some pretty high Level Analysis of the political and strategic situation that existed amongst the allied leaders. But as we all know, wars are fought on battle feels, not in board rooms, and these summits, though they dictated much of what would happen on the ground, they wouldnt have mattered much if we didnt have armies in the field. So our next session will look at how yalta affected the execution of the closing months of world war ii. To do this, we asked our very own rob citino, dr. Citino is the executive director of the institute for the study of war and democracy as well as the Museum Samuel and mary stone Senior Historian at the National WorldWar Ii Museum and ill beat him to the punch line and say hes got the longest title on staff. Hes an Award Winning military historian, published ten books, primarily on the german army. Talked for three decades including stints at west point, u. S. Military academy, and the u. S. Army war college. He first came to the museum in 2012 for our International Conference. Then he came in 2013 for our International Conference, then he was one of our featured tour historians at the 70th an versusversus anniversary of dday cruise. As he always reminds me, he did not come to our 2015 International Conference because we didnt invite him that year. Better yet in 2016 he invited him to join the staff as the museum Senior Historian and we couldnt be luckier to have top notch scholar who guides our content, but also a great guy who is in charge of the institute. So ladies and gentlemen, our friend, rob citino. I mean, what was up in 2015 . What did i do you sit at home and there is this big Party Happening in new orleans and youre wondering what happened. Thank you very much for those comments, jeremy. Thanks to all of you for being here. I distinctly remember the first time i spoke at the museum in 2012, the International Conference. I was at the friday morning 8 00 a. M. Slot, with gerhard weinberg, the eminent historian. I just remember walking into that room and it was jam packed and there was electricity in the air and you had an audience who came to play. Folks who know a lot and have good questions to ask and, you know, i suddenly realized the National WorldWar Ii Museum is a place where you have to bring your agame. Thank you for attending this symposium. We worked out, you never know how timely something is go to be, it is the 75th anniversary, we knew that was going to happen. But who can predict how timely these things are going to be and this one on yalta, 75, certainly is. So jeremy has asked me and jeremy is my boss, so i do whatever he tells me to do, asked me to speak on the role that yalta played with regards to the end of world war ii. To take us out of the realm of diplomacy and put us back out to the battlefield and talk more about military operations and strategy and thats what im going to try to do here. And ill try to leave plenty of time at the end for questions as well. As you heard so far today, we usually view the yalta conference i would say through a single lens. The way in which it determined the post war order in which we still live, the post war order seems to be fraying and we may actually be living in the post post war era right now. Well have to determine whether thats true as things play out. Thats how we usually see yalta. And determining the post war order, especially in europe, and let me just say, that makes perfect sense. The soviet occupation and communiization, you can make an argument that all the facts flow naturally out of the negotiations among the big three at yalta. Im still reeling from the first slide that dr. Plokhii put up, the faces imposed on nightmares for the next three weeks. Now, seen in that light, as the lens that this is about determi determining the post war order, you can make various assessments of who so to say won at the yalta conference. And for much of the time that ive been alive and ive been working in scholarship, stalin usually gets the laurels. I know this from personal experience. If youll indulge me for a moment. I grew up in cleveland, ohio, as i like to call it, beautiful cleveland, ohio, on the west side, a town with a Huge Population of huge european ethnic groups. We used to say and i have no way of determining whether this was or is actually true, there are more slovenians, more in cleveland than there were in the actual capital of slovenia. Probably not true today. May have been true when i was growing up in the 60s and the 70s. Every february there was a mountain of mail to the cleveland plain dealer. The morning newspaper in cleveland, castigating the allies and fdr in particular for having sold poland, yugoslavia, hungary, romania, for having sold one of those countries down the river at yalta. That was the phrase always used fdr sold poland down the river or yugoslavia or hungary at yalta. In the 70s, i was born in 1958, one of the big issues was the return of the crown from st. Steven to hungary. There say crown traditionally associated with him and has a crooked the crown was off kilter because it was hit by a turkish musket ball. I dont know if thats true but those are the legends of the crown. It was being held in the United States, some patriot smuggled it out and president carter wanted to give it back. So improve relations with hungary. It roiled politics in cleveland for the better part of three years. Mary rose ocarr, she was leading the charge not to give the crown of st. Steven back to the communists. And so that was yalta talk for five years growing up about the captive nations of Eastern Europe. Now what im going to try too argue today, there is another lens through which we can and should look at yalta. It is one a little less used. Dr. Plokhii referred to it enough times but ill try to go into more detail on it here. He set me up nicely. In this light, we could judge it a remarkable success for everyone concerned. Thats to gain yaltas impact on the end of the war itself. On the strategy of the allies and on the actual course of military operations in the wars last months. Were taking about a conference that happened in february, 1945, and a war that came to an end in europe in may and then in the pacific in august and september. What happened in those months and how did yalta impact what happened on battlefield, on the front, so to say, in those months. So let me begin with, i think, a fairly obvious point and well stare at this map for a while. The big losers at the yalta conference were not the east europeans as badly as they may have been treated. The real losers were the germans and germany itself. Yalta rammed the final nail in the coffin of german strategy for the wars endgame such as it existed. Now, summarized briefly that strategy ran Something Like this. Germany intended to make allied victory as expensive as possible. Through fanatical, ideologically based resistance of the german people. Think a french revolution style levee en masse, a callup of the entire population, a German National uprising. So the plan had actually been followed since late 1944. The plan was to call up last ditch levees of troops. These were made up of manpower combed out of rear areas, supply troops, administrative troops, even lightly wounded turned out of their hospital beds, thrown back to the front, given a rudimentary training, formed into a division. A big chunk of the German Fighting strength at theattle of the bulge were the grenadier divisions and they were holding larger segments of the front going forward. At the point that those reserves were exhausted, you know how many when you have taken every desk jockey and turned them into an infantryman, at the point those were exhausted, they would turn to folksturm battalions of old men and young boys, grandpas and grandsons in the same unit quite literally, given a single shot antitank weapon, and sent out to do or die against the invaders. You see pictures of some german soldiers, soldiers i use loosely capture on the eastern and western front and they look like sophomores in high school because in many cases thats precisely what they were. Now, when those were exhausted, you run out of old men and boys, eventually, there would be last second partisan resistance all over germany, a nation in flames, a people standing up against the hated invader in both east and west. Often going under the general heading of the werewolf movement that these would be sort of partisans who could fight grill yo warfare against the invaders. Once again, the idea was to force the allies to fight hard, over every inch of ground, against a population that was fired by National Socialist revolutionary fervor. According to the scheme, eventually probably in britain or the United States first, enemy morale would crack. It is just too expensive. Cant fight over every single village in germany in both armies, western and eastern invaders meet in the middle. Eventually morale would crack. In the high deliberations, almost always assumed that would be britain and the United States. Or the United States first. And that was splinter the grand alliance. And that would free german troops to mass against the soviet foe driving in from the east. There was a strategy and it was discussed all the time at the upper echelons of the german high command and that more or less was the strategy i read sometimes that hitler had no strategy, just trying to choreograph a dramatic downfall for himself. Im not a fan of that point of view but you see it argued in literature from time to time. Now, saying there was a strategy is a lot different than saying there was a good strategy. Whether that was realistic or not and, frankly, its hard to argue theres much there that was actually going to work. That entire strategic prospectus was smashed to pieces at yalta, simply by reaffirming the unity of the grand alliance. Simply by presenting a united front to the german enemy. Simply by implicitly restating the ally commitment to unconditional surrender. It wasnt a brilliant discussion at yalta. But never had been rescinded. So implicitly restating unconditional surrender. Simply by allaying stalins fears that somehow the west was going to do a deal against him, yalta laid the groundwork for the endgame in europe. That would end, we all know spoiler alert in the total destruction of German Military power. Sure. That seems inevitable to us today. Hey, its february this war is going to be over in three months. But hard fighting was going on all across the front while the yalta conference was taking place. Nobody was doing a victory lap. Nobody was driving forward at top speed against negligable opposition. Every village and town was being fought over. In february, theyre still in the rheinland, a long, long way from where they wished to be. So, victory seems inevitable. Were all guilty of it. If you have a class, University Professor or lecturer and you have limited time and youre behind on the syllabus, believe me, well, the war was over in two months. If youre in charge of fighting that war, it looks a great deal more difficult from that perspective. And if the study of diplomacy and history tells us anything, its that nothing is inevitable, but theres nothing less inevitable than the end of a war. When it happens its always a relief. And in that sense, im arguing that yalta was a kind of guarantee of allied victories since, by this point in the war, victory probably was guaranteed as long as the grand alliance held together. So, the german folk storm, these battalions made up of boys who were not yet of draft age and men who were well, well past it, the motto was a people rises up, a people stands up. But, you know what . In the face of these vast forces by the allies in the face of a grand firm alliance, the german people stood up and the vast majority of them sat right back down again. And, hence, the mass surrenders at the end of the war and the lack of any real guerrilla resistance. By saying there would be no room for that sort of thing, yalta probably did good work bringing about german surrender in may. Hitler shooting himself helped, but hitler shot himself because of what happened at yalta as well. I think thats also part of what we want to say. The second impact of yalta at the end of the war has to do with the shape of operations in europe in the last few months. So once again, in my era, ive already revealed 1958. I grew up in the middle of the cold war, maybe at its coldest. People can always argue about what were its worst moments. In my era, historians often spoke of a race to berlin. This is how they characterized the end of the war. And they castigated the western allies for having lost the race to berlin, making this mistake, that mistake, this blunder and that one, thus surrendering a big chunk of post war germany and Eastern Europe to the soviets. Now, there were always big problems with this thesis. By march 1945, the beginning of march so immediate post yalta, powerful soviet offenses had smashed their way already into the reich itself and came to rest along the line of the order and nice rivers. Just about 50 miles from berlin. At the time, western allied forces under allied commander eisenhower were still stuck on the rein, 300 miles away from berlin. This is where we are at the time and here is where the soviet sorry, i dont mean to sounds like the home team. Here is where the western allies were at the time and here is where the soviets were. A real discrepancy in who is closer to berlin. But soviet defenses had smashed its way into the reich itself, overrunning east prussia here and the coastal province of pomerania and came to rest here on the line of the oda and nice. Seizing the german Capital First was thus extremeryly unlikely for the western allies but also a highly risky operation that was foreign to eisenhowers sober sense of strategy. Eisenhower does take his share of risks in the war but by and large the operations on the map are not what you could consider napoleanic in the chances they take, in the risks theyre willing to court. Thats a little 1967 book by Steven Ambrose of sainted memory. Steven ambrose, of course, is one of the fathers of this museum, along with our own nick mueller. He wrote a book called eisenhower in berlin in 1945 the decision to halt at the albaa, where the americans would eventually stop. He was one of the first, i think, to make a sustained argument in favor of ikes decision not to go for berlin, not to risk, oh, i dont know, 80,000, 90,000 or 100,000 men in a senseless fight for a city that was going to be divided amongst the allies anyway. Thats essentially the contour of ambroses argument in eisenhower and berlin 1945. Its still a book, like everything Steve Ambrose wrote, its still a book well worth reading. But, in fact, the strategic context for all these developments was laid again at yalta. After this show of interallied unity against the germans, a lunge for berlin that snatched the big prize from under stalins nose would have been difficult to justify, i might even say difficult to explain amongst the people who would have had a hard time explaining would have been a lot of americans. Stalin was, of course, paranoid about this very possibility. Stalin paranoia was a way of life. And feeding stalins paranoia was probably not a Winning Strategy for the allies at this point in the war or, frankly, at any other point. That was the background for the march 28th note from eisenhower to stalin, telling the soviet dictator that allied forces intended to drive east with the aim of cutting germany in half, north to south, not to detour northeast to try to take berlin. So, my point, instead of a messy topspeed race to berlin and a subsequent, very bloody urban mele, which is what the proponents going for berlin are really asking for, yalta ensured that the war in europe would end with the meeting of soviet troops on the alba river april 25th, 1945. And i have to say, having weighed the pros and cons, pluses and minuses, its probably a better option. And i hope a lot of people in the room would agree with me. Well, what did that decision then lead to . Deciding to forego a risky, longdistance strike at berlin allowed the u. S. Army to focus on a juicy operational target all its own. The encirclement of the main german force in the west. Let me go to now there was a stroke of luck on march 7th, as u. S. Forward units ninth Armor Division seized an attacked railroad bridge over the rein river just here at the bottom of this little map. You may know the story. Troops rushing forward. Theres a german bridge that hasnt been blown yet. German troops on the bridge and on the opposite side of the river, depressing the buttons and every switch they could to blow off the charges that will destroy the bridge. American troops are already on the bridge. They press it. It blows. It lifts up in the air and it comes back down to rest intact. Its one of the most amazing moments in all of world war ii. Naturally, you know, its rather freakish, by all accounts, the bridge should have gone into the river. And the nazis reacted nazi command reacted as you would expect, rounded up all the troops responsible for it, gave them a courtmartial and had them shot. But it is nothing more than a horrible stroke of bad luck from a german perspective, but at any rate, the americans seized the bridge over the rhein. Getting over the rhein, its not crossing the little stream in your backyard. Its a major mississippistyle river and was going to be difficult to have any kind of a crossing operation. By the end of the month, massive allied forces were driving over the rhein heading east. In concert with an attack across the rhein b