Transcripts For CSPAN3 National Security Officials On U.S.-Iran Tensions 20240713

Today and staying for the full day and for this final panel. Im with the center for American Progress. I know every day it seems like president Trumps National security approach seems like a daily train wreck across the board, and on iran in particular it feels like a train wreck. But lets be clear, we are where we are today on iran by no accident. What President Trump is implementing right now is an approach which is erratic, its confused, but its the product of a very concerted effort to undermine what i thought was very important work done under the Obama Administration to try to stabilize the middle east. And many of the people in the room here were part of that, either inside of the government or outside. We have a great panel which john has already introduced and im not going to go through the bios and things like that. What were going to do today have a bit of a conversation for a few minutes talking about where are we and where do we go from here, thats the main thrust. Were going to draw you in, because theres so much expertise and its such an important issue. 2020 has started with i think a very negative, in fact frightening note for most folks. Again, the center for American Progress for years has been at the core of this. Many years ago, we released a strategy called contain and engage. And i think i saw joe and andy earlier who were authors of that. Again, as larry just said, these ideas were templates. These were ideas that offered thoughts about where to go. And i think in some ways this informed where things went in a constructive way. What were going to do today is assess the category 5 hurricane were experiencing right now, 42 gauge where were going to be a year from now, if we can, and talk about where do we go from here. Let me first start with arianna from rand. Well start where we should start, which is with iran, in the region, and the implications of whats happened, not in the last week or ten days but the trump strategy. Take us through that and well talk about how we got here with policy and where we go from here. Thanks brian and to c. A. P. For having me for this very timely conversation. Because i guess weve had basically one news cycle per hour since the beginning of 2020, i thought i would start with a bit of an overview of what is going on domestically in iran. As we speak, there is a lot of going on. Ill talk a little bit about the region, and because thats not enough, wrap it up with the Nuclear Issue. Sure. In november, as everyone remembers, in iran there were a number of protestes. People in the United States were wondering if the regime was about to collapse any second. The regime was very effective and efficient in cracking down, more so than it had been in the past, over the course of 72 hours they shut down the internet, killed several hundred people and essentially managed to get the protests under control. Then of course the president lou allowed, authorized the killing of soleimani and it seemed like everything changed overnight where people in iran were no longer protesting corruption, mismanagement, incompetence in their own government and turned their attention to supporting and rallying around it and essentially protesting the u. S. Action and decision to kill soleimani. The conversation changed. Then of course the irgc came out and took responsibility, kind of shockingly, actually, its not something they typically do, theyre not an organization that is known for accountability, for taking responsibility. And they did that for a change, saying that they had down the airliner accidentally and they tried to take responsibility for that. And that of course started the protests all over again which are ongoing as we speak, theyve been going on for three days. This has us all wondering whats going on in iraq, what do we make of it, how does it feed into u. S. Policy. As a political scientist and has someone who has been alive over the past few years and has watched Public Opinion kind of go up and down in this country, i think its really important that we recognize just how fragile and how unpredictable and unreliable Public Opinion can be, and to hold two ideas in our heads, that it is possible for the iranian people to at the same time be frustrated with their own government, believe that it is incompetent, corrupt, and that it has put them where they were today, while at the same time wanting to prevent a conflict with the United States, just bearing in mind that for the majority of iranians today, the iran iraq war is not something they read about in history books, its something they grew up with, its something they experienced, their families have experienced. For them, a conflict with a superior adversary is essentially reminding them of their cities getting bombed and people having to go down to shelters to make sure that they dont end up dead. So they can have these two ideas at the same time. They can be opposed and frustrated to their own government but they can also want to make sure that things dont escalate and show unity and rally behind their government in the face of a foreign adversary. So in my view, one thing that the Current Administration is not doing well enough and that we should be bearing in mind is that, you know, its all fine to wish for the regimes collapse and hope for a liberal democracy in iran. I think we can all agree that would be fantastic and we all want that. But not to plan for it, not to make policy based on the notion that the regime is about to collapse this year or even in a decade, and we will should be really thinking our National Security and interests and put those at the forefront rather than hoping for something to happen. So that brings me actually to the question of the region and the maximum Pressure Campaign and how thats been playing out. I think if were generous with the administrations maximum Pressure Campaign, we can say that it has had some tactical successes here and there. For example, if we take the administrations word at face value, brian hook says this quite frequently, secretary pompeo has alluded to this, iran may have less cash to be spending to nonstate groups in syria and lebanon and iraq, and thats a good thing, right . But to me, the point of the maximum Pressure Campaign, again, if we take the administrations own stated objectives at face value, is not to have some tactical successes here and there. Its to seek a fundamental change in behavior along the 12 points that secretary pompeo has laid out. And there i think it is quite clear today that as of right now, that has been essentially a failure, that iran has not changed its behavior, in fact it has doubled down on a lot of the behavior that we find so problematic and it has pushed the envelope in a way it hasnt in recent years and it has done so very visibly. The fact that you had the strikes against bases in iraq directly trying to target u. S. Interests and presence in iraq is something that i think we can attribute to how so the cycle of escalation that has brought us to where we are today. Were seeing a similar situation with the nuclear file. Iran announced last week in the middle of all this that theyre taking the fifth and final step to dial down compliance with the jcpoa. We dont really know what that intel is quite yet, in contrast to some of the previous steps they had announced which were very practical, this time around it was more of a political statement. They said they were going to see themselves as no longer bound by the limits that were imposed under the enrichment program. But they havent said exactly what theyre going to do next. So we have to stay tuned and see how that plays out, what actions they actually take concretely, if any. And at least from my perspective, and i think from a u. S. National security perspective, its good news that theyre continuing to work with the iaea, that theyre not actually doing anything to dial down the access of the agency and its inspectors to iranian facilities and the Nuclear Program. But certainly in the next few months well find out what they intend to do. The europeans having triggered the dispute resolution mechanism today may add more to their calculus and may lead them to take more action. Again, here too, we have seen iran just doubling down and pushing the envelope on its Nuclear Program rather than scaling it back as the administration had hoped. So, you know, in general you asked me to give you my assessment, its quite bleak. I think weve actually taken quite a few steps backwards instead of taking steps forward in terms of changing all the behavior and actions and policies that we find so troubling with iran. So the risks are increased, the outcomes are close to nil. I want to turn to jake, because you were of course involved with others in the first engagement with iran that led to the jcpoa ultimately. From a policy perspective, how did we get here . I think we all understand it, but then where do we go from here next . And later on in the conversation, as hard as it will be, well try to imagine where we might be in a year. But if you were advising today, how do you reel things back and get things back on track . What would you do . I think most people first of all, that was just a phenomenal laydown and incredibly efficient as well in capturing the totality of this, so i wont go in detail through how we got here. Ill just make an observation which is that the maximum Pressure Campaign theoretically is about producing the, quote unquote, better deal. But really at the end of the day, the sanctions are the strategy. The pressure is the point, because the administrations view is that as long as theyre putting pressure on iran, something good is going to happen. Maybe, just maybe, the regime will collapse. But even if it doesnt collapse, maybe theyll come out with their hands up and agree to the 12 points or something close to them. But even if they dont come out with their hands up and accept the 12 points, at least were squeezing them in ways that weaken them, distract them, make their lives more difficult both in the region and at home. So as far as the administration is concerned, leave aside their stated objective of a better deal and look at their actually objective, they feel like this is working. Theyve just got iran in a world in which its feeling pressure, its feeling squeezed. Now, i think they also believe that a free iran is just around the corner, which is a dangerous assumption for them to be making right now. But thats basically the reason that we are where we are, because the Trump Administration essentially said we can impose all this pressure. I think what they forgot is iran wasnt just going to fold, it had cards to play too. It had three cards. Moving the Nuclear Program forward. Attacking shipping and Oil Infrastructure in the gulf. And then making life worse for the United States in terms of its presence across the region. It was the third of those and the attack on the proxy attack on the American Contractor that led to the Soleimani Killing. Even if we set the Soleimani Killing aside, today iran still has those three tools and still over the course of the coming months is likely to use those tools in various places. Even if they dont take further action. The europeans came out today and basically said we see where youre going, especially on this Nuclear Issue, and we dont like it so were triggering the dispute resolution mechanism under the jcpoa. I think theyre doing so not to kill the jcpoa but rather to deter iran and to get iran back into some modest form of compliance. So its very difficult to predict where well be on january 20th, 2021. Its hard to predict where well be on january 20th, 2020. And a lot of us have made predictions, some of which have borne out and others havent quite borne out. But just for the sake of argument lets assume that the jcpoa is terminal but not entirely blown up. It exists on lifesupport, basically, a year from now, that theres instability in the region but not outright war and a democratic president is elected and comes into office. I think that there are two fundamental projects that need to be undertaken simultaneously and theyre connected to one another. The first is figuring out how you reestablish Nuclear Diplomacy in a way that isnt just going straight back into the jcpoa, calling it a day and walking away, but is reentering an arrangement with the iranians on the nuclear file that also seeks to secure longer term guarantees with respect to Nuclear Restrictions, and sequencing that diplomacy at a moment when the iranians will be heading into their own president ial election later that spring will be very complicated. And it will require deep consultations with our allies and partners who will have their own ideas for what to do about it. And then the second is, how to think about the regional file in connection with the nuclear file. In the Obama Administration we essentially said were going to do the Nuclear Issue and then not tie our hands one way or the other in terms of our ability to deal with irans regional activities. The trump argument is you have to do all of them together in a single negotiation. I dont think the trump argument makes a whole lot of sense. The United States sitting across the table from iran and negotiating the proper role for iran in iraq and syria doesnt actually compute, like how do we work that out. That requires a regional negotiation that the United States can participate in or underwrite or play a role in, and that should be connected to, but on a parallel track from, the nuclear file. And coming up with the way to sequence and engage conversations among the regional actors about what a long term deescalation looks like at the same time that were executing a nuclear play, that is immensely complicated but i think necessary for whoever the next president is. And ill just close by saying, i dont know whether to be to see a Silver Lining in the cloud that the saudis, the emiratis, have looked at this period of instability in the last few months and started to pull out feelers across the gulf to say, hey, maybe we should find a different way forward here. That may or may not be the case a year from now. But i think we have to try to take advantage of the fact that there seems to have been a sobering up among the players in the region about what a longer term outlook might look like and we should lean into that and not immediately assume that there is no possibility, there is no space for regional diplomacy. And i would just say we shouldnt hold the nuclear file hostage to regional diplomacy but nor should we see them as completely distinct. We have to somehow see the connection between the two and how you get into the specifics of that i think will be one of the big pieces of business Going Forward. Great, thanks, jake. Avril, arriane gave us a picture of the region and jake talked about how we get there from here. I want to his the pause button and ask you about an issue thats related to not just the soleimani strike but strikes all around the world. As you know, theres a big debate that were having in this country, and many in the room here take part in it with their expertise and thoughts and a lot of our colleagues do, about who has the authority to go to war. And its a debate within our system here, in our democracy, but its also got International Legal implications. So i thought we would hit pause and say, where are we on that debate, where do you see sort of the action in congress, how do you see, importantly, also the International Dimension of how the United States has been conducting strikes like these, like the one against soleimani, but then, if not too ambitious, more broadly, where are we in terms of constraining the executive. And you sat on the other side as the deputy National Security adviser and someone who served in the administration and you were on the hill before too. Give us your thoughts on that simple topic. Yeah, exactly, in two minutes or less, right . All right. Let me start with the International Legal piece because i think thats worthwhile and it really connects in many respects to the policy pictures of both arianna and jake have identified. From a u. S. Perspective, the way we have interpreted International Law provides a basis for taking an action like the action against soleimani only in three, really, circumstances. One is when you have a u. N. Security Council Resolution that actually allows for that action, authorizes it. Or in selfdefense or collective selfdefense, right . And ill come back to that in a moment. Or when you have the consent of the country in which you are operating and the action that youre taking is otherwise lawful. We know that number three is not an option here because iraq was very clear about the fact that they did not provide consent for this action, right . So we end up coming back to the second criteria, the sort of selfdefense, right . And recognizing that there are a lot of conflicting statements that have come out of the Administration Since the strike. It did seem at least at first as if they were claiming that they were acting on an imminent threat in that circumstance. And under International Law, the United States has taken the view that you can in fact take action against an imminent threat. Under International Law as well, you have to do so in a necessary and proportionate way. And so all three of those things are terms where people spend a fair amount of time trying to unpack what they mean, how broadly do we, you know, interpret imminence, how broadly do we determine necessary and proportionate. First of all, the facts that have been discussed really do not necessarily add up to imminence from my perspective, even with a fairly broad interpretation by the Obama Administration, i mean, the attorney general gave a speech where he talked about the factors that you look at for imminence and he talked about there being a window of opportunity within which you have to act, that if you dont act in that window of opportunity that otherwise there will be harm, essentially there will be killing of your citizens or otherwise, and third, the likelihood that the action that you take actually reduces the chances of further attacks coming forward. And i would say that the case hasnt been made publicly for those considerations. And so then you get to this question of, even if we were acting in selfdefense, in another country, without their consent, is that lawful under International Law . And again, the United States has taken the perspective that yes, that can be lawful when you judge that that country is unwilling or unable to address the threat. So why does this matter . Thats one of the critical questions people ask themselves in this context. It matters from my perspective on a whole series of levels. One is, i actually believe in International Law. I think International Law serves the United States in a range of twhas ways that if we start saying we dont care about it or not making the case for it and all those things, that we basically deteriorate or denigrate International Law in ways. And i would say this whole issue of imminence and the way were approaching it is one aspect of the problem. Things like tweets that you can target cultural sites which is a clear war crime or that you can take action thats disproportionate, also unacceptable according to the law of war, all of those things add up to the United States sort of disregarding International Law in ways that i think is honestly challenging then for our partners and allies who want to be able to stand with us and say some of these the iranian action that are being taken are unacceptable, are illegitimate, and all those things, when they have challenges with the position that the United States and the president of the United States is taking. And its also concerning for iraq, which is relying on us in effect to respect its sovereignty and territory, and when were asking and continuing to rely on their permission in this context. And its also deeply depressing, frankly, for Many Service Members who are around the world trying to change other militaries on how to obey International Law when they see these kind of things. It matters in a whole series of different ways. It also makes it more challenging if were not making the case on an International Legal basis for doing this. Frankly, again, to basically promote the policy that jake was identifying, which is, you know, about coming back to the table, about saying that we in fact do respect the commitments that we sign ourselves up to, that this is something that we want to pursue seriously and do so on an international basis. Thats sort of a broad piece. It does obviously come back also to the domestic legal authority. And there, i think thats been particularly challenging as well. I mean, we know how difficult it has been i think for congress to assert itself. And some of that blame i put on congress and some of that blame i put on essentially the way the executive branch ultimately, over, frankly, decades, has sort of increased authority and power in this space in the context of the war powers. But the way the analysis would go is essentially, you would look at the action, so take the strike, for example, against soleimani, and you would say, is this action something that constitutes a war from a constitutional sense, or is it something less than that . And the executive branch has set up a structure for essentially evaluating what constitutes a war from a constitutional perspective, and they say, basically it has to do with what you anticipate to be the nature of the scope and the duration of the conflict that is effectively planned as a consequence of this action. And if you end up in the space of, its a war from a constitutional perspective, then the department of justice has recognized there is a limitation, in other words, under the declaration of war clause, the president of the United States is not allowed to act unless congress has declared war. However there is the exception in the context of selfdefense, right . So you have sort of that structure. And there is some at least, you know, arguments over how you would define selfdefense in that particular frame, right . Then you get to below a war in a constitutional sense which is frankly every military intervention that weve seen for the last many decades, and what the department of justice has said is that there is a constitution that basically the president has the authority under the constitution to take action in a military operation that goes below this level, right, where its serving an Important National interest and can do so without congressional authorization in advance and then essentially will make generally a war powers resolution report and then congress has 60 days if you remain in hostilities to determine whether or not theyre going to approve that action and give authority for continued use of force in that scenario or whether or not your troops are going to have to come back, in a sense. Then of course theres all kinds of questions about remain in hostilities. That was a great overview. I think its important to remind folks that these actions that we take, fergif we do it in the ri way and with the right process, could have some more legitimacy. Currently were on very shaky grounds. And thats the debate congress is having. Jake, you mentioned something earlier about the pathway forward, ill start with you and you guys can jump in on it. You mentioned you saw a need to bring in regional partners and link these discussions in a sense. I think president obama tried to do this in inviting some of the leaders of the region to camp david in 2015 and talk about measures on the security front, but they werent part of the nuclear deal conversation. My question is a difficult one policywise and for progressives, how do you bring these partners along when theyre so flawed, their own action, whether its the yemen war, whether its their own support for terror in some countries or you see in iraq its very fragmented, theres divisions we saw in the vote in the parliament in the last week. How do you actually execute that in this moment, how do you reassure the partners over their very legitimate security concerns without doing what trump has done, which is give them a blank check, whether its saudi arabia or the gulf countries . I know its a bit hypothetical, were moving to a magical world where donald trump is no longer in the white house. First, i do think that, for example, the u. S. saudi relationship is going to have to undergo a serious reexamination, whoever is elected, as long as its not trump, whoever the president is, is going to take a hard look at that relationship and rebalance some of the elements of it. And thats to the good. Weve heard all the major democratic president ial candidates speak about that in a way on the campaign trail like we have not heard essentially since the foundation of the kingdom of saudi arabia. And that is an important and legitimate thing to do from both a values and an interest perspective. The case that i would make is that a pure kind of throwing the baby out with the bath water with saudi and just saying a pox on all your houses and forget it is not ultimately going to be constructive for u. S. Interests, that we have to find a way to talk to the saudis about their legitimate security concerns even as we hold them accountable for many of the illegitimate actions theyve taken, and critically, and i think this is the ingredient we just havent either maybe had the opportunity or the wherewithal or the bandwidth to pursue, we need to have an honest conversation about what the regional outcome could actually look like at 30,000 feet and be real about it. On the one hand you have pompeos 12 points which is im sure the saudis and emirates and others would say, great, the iranians out of lebanon, cut advertise wi ties with syria, great, perfect. But come on, lets have a real conversation about the fact that iran is a regional actor, will play a role in this region, and what is a role consistent with a Real Security architecture that could work. And that means pushing our partners not just to fall back on bromides about iranian malign influence, things we all agree with, about saying, this is how i could see this actually playing out in a way where each side is deescalating, where were taking steps in places like yemen, theyre taking steps in places like syria, what have you. And thats, unfortunately for the u. S. , part of the reason why i think that requires a regional to regional conversation is we cant broker this for them. We cant impose this on them. But we damn well can push the heck out of all of them, the iranians too, to come to the table together. And, you know, its kind of the get real doctrine, in a way. Now, this isnt going to happen overnight. Its going to take a long time. But i think we would be making a mistake if we just say, were going to put it on the shelf and deal with the Nuclear Program and see what happens. I think we want to be doing both of those at the same time without holding the nuclear deal hostage. You participated in a panel in c. A. P. A few months ago, deescalation in the middle east. One of my friend was joked with me, how is that working out for you . We had someone from carnegie and someone from israel and talking about some of these that jake had mentioned in his previous about the outreach from saudi arabia, uae, oman is constantly doing outreach, which is great, i think, and important. How do you see iran responding to this, you know, this increased tension and then this outreach from some of the gulf countries . Is there an opportunity to deescalate in the region and start there first, or no . Yeah, i think so. I mean, part of the iranian strategy since may 2019 has been to obviously raise the cost of the maximum Pressure Campaign for the United States. But part of it has also been to drag other parties into this tension, because what had happened since essentially the beginning of this administration was that the United States was imposing costs on iran and iran was the only one that was suffering, essentially, right . And the europeans of course were upset but, you know, it wasnt really affecting them that much. The gulf arabs were not unhappy, some of them. Oman, qatar, being outliers, but the saudis, the emirates were not unhappy. They had pushed for this sort of policy for a while. I think where the iranians have been quite sufficiently ovccess past few of months is to show that this this going to have implications for the region. Thats what were saying, thats what jake was describing earlier on, now were seeing them actually try to take action and try to return to the table. The iranians had been wanting to get the saudis to come and negotiate with them. And of course they wanted that because they felt like they werent in a position of strength in the region, lets not kid ourselves, the iranians are not doing that because theyre being nice. Its because they feel like theyre doing well in the region. But the saudis were not really reciprocating. Now there is this overture, i think jake is exactly right, that we can build on it, that we can use this opportunity and get the two sides to talk to each other, because ultimately were not were not going to put a map of the middle east on the table and divide it up between the u. S. And iran, right . This has to be a regional process. And i think that this is a bit of a side effect of the maximum Pressure Campaign. But it has, there is a Silver Lining that the region, the saudis and emirates, are realizing you cant just kick iran out of the region as theyve said in the past. You have to deal with them and if youre going to deal with them, you need to sit down and have a conversation about where the region goes next. I wish we had more time. I need to pause here and alert folks that have questions, were going to have about ten or 15 minutes for questions and a dialogue. I think were going to run until about 5 00. So start thinking of your questions. Ive got so many more i want to pick up on in terms of policy because its such a rich policy in a short period of time but i dont want to avoid this question question, too in terms of where are we in our National Conversation in iran, and the politics with donald trump every day, and the question in essence is this, we have a lot of expertise in the room, many of which are trying to advise different candidates about how to talk about this, how do we avoid the trap of simply reacting to Donald Trumps atrocious, reckless action, or things of what i, what i think is a racist tweet about the house, the speaker of the house, and the senate leader. How do we do this in a way that isnt just in a critical, a critical of him . We need to criticize but how do we make this pivot and connect to some of these issues that we talked about earlier in this conference, connecting and communicating with the american public, because the formula as youve outlined, jake, and we talked about it, agree with it, i think it is a smart policy but it is a bit more of a political question, how do he would not get caught in that trap that i think democrats were before cap was founded back in 2002, 2003, of simply reacting to this global war on terror frame, and trying to fit with that box, and how do we do it without sounding like the sat quo, lets go back to, status quo, which is to go back to 2015 and thats it. And some of your comments are indicated. Better legal framework. More diplomacy, and more connection with what iranian people are talking about. But how do we avoid that type of conversation where were just reactive . Im going to start. I mean i think you asked about the deescalation, right, how is it going, and the irony, i think, to that, and very much building on air anas points, is i think trump doesnt want the situation to escalate, even though i think there are members of the Trump Administration that have different views on how things should evolve, right . And yet, actually by taking the maximum pressure route, and not providing a diplomatic outlet, in effect, the only response is, as has been identified for iran was really taking, in responding to economic warfare, was to do the kind of destabilizing activities that we typically see them engage in, which has caused us to have to es late, right . Because now we send thousands of troops to the region to try to protect our asset, our people, all of these things. And in fact, i mean i think, there is, there is a way to have a conversation about this, that is both relevant to the democratic progressive base, as well as to the right in a sense, which is to say that, you know, actually we need to have a measured approach in this space, we need to have a comprehensive strategy that brings in allies and partners and folks in the region and so on in order to manage this situation so that were not going down this road that forced us to send thousands of troops into harms way that actually escalates the challenge that were facing and that means that we end up spending more of our time and money and effort in this part of the world, while were dealing with a whole series of really important broad geopolitical strategies, visavis china, other things in this space, and i think that may be a way, you know, a space within which to sort of drive the conversation, to indicate that theres real value in the approach that weve been describing. Just to build on that, in terms of the, how we kind of make the case to the american people, trumps argument basically is i killed a really bad guy with american blood on his hands, and people said there were going to be a lot of consequences and there really werent. Its all good. People are like okay, all right, that makes sense. I think our response to that has to focus on interest in the region that people can get. We dont want iran to get a Nuclear Weapon. We want to continue to keep taking the fight to isis. And we dont want to get dragged further militarily into a region that has brought us nothing but military heartache. How are we doing on those three things . Iran is closer to a Nuclear Weapon than they were before and they continue to make announcements as airana was saying in the wake of the soleimani strike, we suspended our counterisis operations, because weve got to be protecting our embassies, thanks to donald trump deciding to take us down this road, and by the way, iraq is even now talking about kicking us out, whether they do or they dont, they will put pressure on us to reduce our ability to go against terrorists and in the last year, iran, the United States has sent 18,000 more troops to the middle east. How is that thats all donald trump deciding to tear up the Iran Nuclear Agreement and make life worse for us on three core things that should matter to the american people. Whats his plan for any of that . For me, that gets us out of the to ing and fro ing of what iran will do next and what will trump do next and focus people in on those interests and the before and after, and before they werent problems and now theyre problems because trump made them problems and he has no plan for how to deal with it Going Forward and frankly, i have to say, i have been really impressed with the democratic candidate response to this, essentially across the board. I know theres been a little bit of back and forth among different campaigns, but if you think about 2004, or even 2008, to a certain extent, in 2004, everyone attacked howard dean for saying that capturing saddam didnt make america safer, Democratic Candidates, and in 2008, while president obama was strongly against the iraq war, of course, he felt he had to be really all in on the afghanistan war, almost to compensate, because we were still in this war on terror frame, as a candidate. The Democratic Candidates this time around were like huhuh, this is crazy. Lets not do this. And none of them felt i think obliged to kind of say, you know, i dont know, maybe we ought to get behind the president and what hes doing. And i think that that shows you first of all, where we are in a kind of postpost 9 11 war and post war on terror frame but it also shows you that the Democratic Party is not going to take anything from donald trump when it comes to pushing them around. And more on this, i would highlight before we turn to questions, the polling which we talked about we did last year demonstrates what both of you just said, that theres actually more consensus between sort of the more progress ive, what we call them global activists, and those traditional internationalists on these issues, that its important i think in the fight against, arguing against trumps conservative nationalism, to remember what sort of the common ties are there and the common arguments even in the midst of very tough primary fight for folks. So let us open it up. Weve got time for questions here, raise your hand, tell us who you are and your affiliation and if you want to direct your question to a political panelist. Hi, my name is Katherine Kennedy townsend and i would love to hear what is going on with iraq right now, are we going to pull troops out are we going to stay there . Iraq. Ill start. I think its very hard for me to imagine that were able to stay at the presence that we are right now or in the way or the frame that we are right now. I think the domestic politics are really challenging, obviously. The Council Representatives have passed this vote that basically said u. S. Troops have to leave. The Prime Minister is in a particularly weak scenario, as an acting caretaker, essentially of the government, and so on, and has asked for a delegation of folks to come over, to talk about the reduction and evacuation of troops in is answe a sense, and i think, there is going to have to be some version, essentially, some appropriated work done, on what a new presence might look like, if at all, and that is somehow satisfactory to the domestic politics that theyre managing right now, even though i think there are people in the Iraqi Government that would like us to remain in some form. I think its also, this situation is again ironic in the sense that soleimanis greatest wish, with respect to iraq was to get us out, and yet thats exactly what this situation is ultimately leading to in some form. And moreover, there are other forces at work here, where we certainly saw the russians try to move in, essentially, in terms of their influence, in this space, and i suspect theyre looking at this as an opportunity to do some more of that, and the Nato Training Mission has been suspended, so effectively our fight against isil is now significantly affected, if not at a standstill. And so i think, and that affects iraq, and their security, and their ability to manage the situation within their own threat, so none of this i think has been good for iraq or our relationship for iraq, and i think were going to face a fair number. If i could add just an endorsement of our colleague daniels analysis on iraq. Terrific. He has written, it is terrific, and it shows the investments, though many of us were against the iraq war, the Obama Administration and those who went in, there is a deep understanding of the complexities there and the second thing i would say, you sought the reporting this morning, we were minutes away from, apparently from independent reporting from americans actually getting killed tuesday night than would have been a horrific moment so this fiction of training versus combat troops which the formulation i was for in the past, that demonstrates how slippery it is for the thousands of soldiers who are out there. Robin . Hi, im robin meed from the project at the bellfor center in harvard. Speak up a little bit. Sure. Rob dineen. Ariann, you explained how the Regional Response recently in the past few months have been to seek, with iran, paradoxically, that came about as a result of what was perceived to be a nonu. S. Response after obcac in saudi arabia and other attacks on u. S. Shipping and in a sense the killing of soleimani was an overcorrection of what had been seen as an underresponse, and so jake, you had mentioned kind of future administration, the need to return to diplomacy, but while we were busy watching soleimani, trump abrogated 40 years of bipartisan policy first in, the Carter Doctrine which was to protect the flow of shipping in the gulf, do you see the democratic response to be to reestablish the Carter Doctrine, and have the gulf be a vital interest to u. S. Policy . Or it would seem to me, easy to slip into it in the sense of continuity with what trump has actually started which was, if you will, more consistent with what could be framed as a retreat from the region, or a pivot away from it. Look, i think there is a general sense on the democratic side, across the candidates, that the United States needs to really follow through on the concept of rebalance and put more emphasis on a Great Power Competition with china and russia, on climate change, on global corruption efforts, on a whole series of things that dont implicate the security situation in the middle east. And so there will be a gravitational pull away from the United States kind of making the flagship kind of Foreign Policy and National Security initiative of the new administration, to be some major play in the middle east. However, i also believe all of the democrats are deeply invested in the diplomacy that led to the iran deal. And in reviving the basic bargain of Nuclear Restrictions for sanctions relief, that lay at the heart of that deal, and stopping iran from getting a Nuclear Weapon through peaceful mean, and that the situation they will confront in trying to disentangle militarily from the region actually presents opportunities for diplomacy that again are not, should not be held hostage to, but can be connected to that nuclear engagement, that i think are pretty, are pretty appealing type of diplomacy can come out of this, where it is not just the United States, i mean many other actors not just the regional players among themselves, obviously the russians are a factor in the region and other countries, too, so i think in a funny way, even though there will be this kind of psychological shift away from the middle east, towards other things, there will also, people will see the genuine opportunity for oldfashioned american diplomacy, to play a real role in not just securing a Nuclear Agreement Going Forward but also in dealing with this set of issues around the region that if we dont have some answer for, well find a way as they did at the end of the Obama Administration of pulling us back in. The only thing standing between us and drinks at 5 00 p. M. , you have final remarks . Katrina mulligan. Ive been known to make mistakes before. So please join me in thanking the panel first. And welcoming katrina mulligan. Thank you. On that theme, as a person with the responsibility to stand between you and drinks, and knowing better that given we all could use a drink after the year we just had, im just going to get a few key things out of the way. Events like these, as you guys know, dont plan themselves, and we have a tremendous team here at cap that helped to put this together. I want to first thank all of our speakers and panelists for taking the time out of their day, the cap National Security team, and in particular, alex schmidt who did a lot of the laboring or for making this event happen. [ applause ] thank you. Caps Leadership Team in particular gordon gray, and yurin candon, and last but certainly not least, i wanted to just thank kelly macknammen, whose leadership [ applause ] yes. Kellys leadership and live coverage of the house panel looking into the rise of antisemitism, and what congress can do to counter it. L