Breakfast at st. Anthem chej in manchester, new hampshire, live over on cspan 2. You can watch online at cspan. Org or listen live on the free cspan radio app. Next, a discussion on the political situation in afghanistan, and the role that taliban and other power brokers like the u. S. , china, russia and pakistan may play in future peace arrangements. From the Brookings Institution earlier this week, this is just over an hour and a half. Welcome. Im mike owe han lon briefly playing the role of mc to say hello and welcome you before i hand it over to tom bowman. Tom is a very distinguished and accomplished npr reporter. Thrilled that he would join us. He spent time in the field in afghanistan, embedded with u. S. Combat units and other parts of the broader effort there that no of course is approaching the end of its second decade. Before i hand the baton to him ill introduce laura miller, who was the acting special representative for afghanistan and pakistan at the state department, had numerous other jobs in that capacity. Has been at the Rand Corporation where she recently completed a coauthored 200 page study on a proposed afghanistan Peace Agreement written as a simulated or model agreement that parties themselves could perhaps consider, because even though we all are aware that an american is not going to write the ultimate peace deal, the parties themselves may benefit from a little bit of provocation. As we know that weve been talking about having a peace negotiation for a long time, but its not clear how specific people have gotten in their overall concepts of what that would mean. Thrilled to have her. Shes now ott the International Crisis group, that does Field Research around the world. Vonda brawn, my intrepid researcher who has written a book on afghanistan but also staudied transmashl krill nam Networks Working on a book on mexico, but also has recently studied in nigeria where shes back from Field Research and indonesia and other parts of the world. I am a huge fan of her bravery and brilliance. Without further adieu, tom, thanks for join us. Thanks to everyone for coming out. Afghanistan is back in the news thanks partly to the Washington Post in a series, afghan papers. I hope you have many questions because were going to be start calling on you very quickly. I want to start by asking michael how he sees things right now with the peace talks, and also talk a little bit about your proposal to have 5,000 troops in afghanistan for the next five years. As some of you may know, there is talk about reducing the forces in afghanistan now currently about 13,000 down to about 8600. That could happen this week. Your plan says to go lower, 5,000 for fine years. Why that number. Ill say that laurel and vonda know more. Ill tee up and whet your appetite. Im struck again that laurel, writing this paper and some of the thinking that vonda and her claes colleagues have done, thats sort of the essence of what weve seen so far in discussions about how to reach power sharing compromisesing wi wi wi with, deal with the taliban and Afghan Forces that have no want to deal together. I think peace is a long ways off. I hope im wrong. In the meantime i think we need a concept that americans can discuss, debate and hopefully settle on to some extent for the new presidency. And at a time, i first decided to write this 5,000 troops for five years concept when President Trump was talking about pulling out of syria completely and maybe turning his gaze next to afghanistan. And when democrats were criticizing trump for his fecklessness and reckless necessary in talking about these foreign commitments and yet i sensed the democrats didnt want to commit to a longlasting afghanistan presence either, everyone sort of hopes we pull something out of a hat and get a peace deal that allows us to go home without defeat. The concept is a way to take the drama out of policy and say lets take some out and gradually go down to that number. Im not suggesting we should do it the first week of the new president ial term, whether its a democratic or reelected President Trump. But that could be a conceptual framework that would allow us to take two or three bases, bag rammir, a base in the south around canned har, and one or two in the east, maybe jalalabad and host. That would create the footprint that allows us to do intelligence gathering. This year has been the most since 2012 or so, and so this would allow us to sustain the Afghan Forces in the help they need most but continue to leave most of the fighting to them. As weve already been doing, frankly, now for the better part of half a decade. Thats the basic logic of a concept, zbifb a floor beneath were not going to go, suggest that we glide down to that over the next couple of years and stop having these annual reviews in washington that takes so much time and energy from senior policymakers and dramatize it almost too much in our talks. Youve come out with a report on a peace plan. Talk a little bit about that. And also, do you think peace is a long way off . Maybe the peace deal could come soon but actual peace is a long way off, do you agree . I think our genuine Peace Process that grapples with all the very difficult issues of how to govern afghanistan, how to secure afghanistan, is a ways off. But that doesnt mean that a Peace Process has to be a long way off. And having a process underway that brings the sides together into genuine negotiations can have a positive effect on reducing violence in and of itself. And is worth doing. And in my view, worth staying for, militarily and diplomatically, engaged in afghanistan for some period of time, to give it a real shot. Where my analysis differs from michaels is that i dont think that, given that weve all seemed to digest the idea that the United States is not going to win the war twhab a second best and satisfactory option is to keep it going for some indefinite period of time or some specify a number of years, period of time. I dont think thats truly sustainable politically in the United States. I dont think its sustainable even operationally for an indefinite period of time. And it certainly doesnt do anything for the Afghan People, who are greatly desirous of peace. What ive demon one in my repor try to paint a picture of what the substance of the outcome might look like. Its a set of ideas and options and alternatives thats intended to help fill in some of the gaps and thinking and analysis of what the substance of peace could look like. And i think when you look at it you see a Peace Process will take a while and why it will be difficult to do. These are issues that are going to be very con ten shus. Afghanistan isnt so much more complicated than a lot of other places around the world that have had Peace Processes, some of which have produced a result. The diends of issues and possible solutions are ones that have been explored in other Peace Processes and occasionally succeeded in bringing down levels of violence. Now the taliban have repeated lee said they want all troops out of afghanistan. Your plan calls for some sort of eye residual force that would be going after terrorists, isis and so forth. Talk a little bit about how you envision that kind of a force. Yeah. So ive included the idea of potentially having some kind of residual International Military element that would continue counterterrorism efforts working with afghans. Whether that could actually be led by americans, i think, is somewhat questionable, and im by no means certain that you could get taliban agreement to such a residual force, certainly not at the outset of a negotiation. I dont think you could enter into a negotiation assuming you could get that as an outcome. But i think its something that you could try to get as an outcome of a peace negotiation. But i do think theres a hard question for u. S. Policymakers as to whether thats a musthave element of a Peace Process or a great if we can get it element. Because i dont think its certain that you could get that through a peace the pentagon has repeatedly said they would like some sort of residual force to remain if the country. Vonda, what about that . Youve been recently in afghanistan talking to the taliban. Would they accept that, do you think . I need to say that out of many members of the taliban and to the extent i was able to speak with individuals, its not at all clear how close they are to the bash war. Its also very important to understand that the taliban is talking to tremendous amount of people, almost all the power brokers except members of the president and the government. And they think to people what they want to hear. So same individuals, same factions, will tailor messages on the basis much what they expect the audience to hear. That said, with this preface and the need to understand that we are very much, we the International Community, is operating in an opaque environment where preferences are not clear and not stated, there have been some consistencies. One of the most significant, striking dimensions from the conversations i had was that the taliban members were systematically expressing the disastrous outcome would be for the u. S. To withdraw without a deal with them. So they still very much want the u. S. Strikes deal and they very much like the deal that ambassador cali zblad achieved by the end of august and then President Trump canceled. For them thats still the starting point of any further talk and more of what they envisioned the talk. They are however very unhappy about the possibility of u. S. Withdrawing its forces without deal, fearing this greatly augmented force in afghanistan that they want to avoid. Some of the military people i talk to in afghanistan say that the u. S. Leverage is the money to keep the country going. That if all u. S. Troops leave, the money leaves with them. Talk about the taliban. Do they talk about that . Absolutely. About usa leaving . Absolutely. Thats an issue that they are focused on with quite consistent messaging across large numbers of interloketers. That it would be disastrous for the u. S. To liquidate in afghanistan and eliminate once they are in power. And they definitely believe they will be in power, although they will make the argument that they will share power with someone. And the in some form is really the crux of all the difficult is in the negotiations that will be the really the hardest part. But nonetheless, they assume they will be in power, to some extent in some form they will share power. And theyre also rather clear they do not want to repeat the 1990s including the socioeconomic collapse in the country. They message very clearly by pointing examples to saudi arabia and say, look, United States, you have such a great relationship with saudi arabia. We want a regime like sautd raib, would be happy like this. We and you could be friends after you made the deal with us and your forces leave. And you should keep the money flowing. And indeed, in my view, really the longterm or not even longterm, the grappling that the United States needs to and the International Community needs to deal with is not just, how do we get to a peace deal . How do we get to significant red reduxtion of conflict but how do we shape the behavior of our brokers, one of which will be the taliban quite likely, what kind of leverage will we have so we dont see catastrophic laws of human rights and freedom so that there is some accountability in the country and some respect for human rights . And i very specifically say some because under the Current Situation its problematic and its likely to see significant after peace deal. I wish the peace deal could be the way the Afghan Government envisioned it, essentially a replica of the colombian deal in which the taliban gets minimal penalties and just agrees to demobilize and have five seats in the afghan parliament. The Afghan Government still puts that forth as the model they want. They bring in colombian advisers constantly to explain the colombian process. I think its completely unrealistic. This is just not the way the deal will look like. Talk a little bit about the taliban. If all u. S. Troops leave or even if theres a residual course do you think the taliban would have enough power to take over the country . I would say they dont and are well aware of it. Thats why they are so leary of us leaving without having a deal with them, a deal that positions them well to have significant power in Transitional Government and more than Transitional Government. So they are well aware that they the security is the worst its been for many dimensions, the level of taliban influence is very significant. You can go to liberated districts in 20 miles out 30 kilometers out of the district, the taliban is there and government officials will not go there. Government officials might be hunkered down to just the office and have 40 bodyguards and not there to step out of the office because of the level of taliban presence. But that said, the taliban is well aware they cannot just take the country. And that they will face a civil war that will be very fragmented civil war that could erupt in the south, that are importance of power brokers who can become significant military obstacle and they will have capacities in the north. Its not going to be the line more and more north past the shamali plain, so they want to avoid that. The war is stalled but its stalled in the way that gives gradual small ekrooegs of power to the tal zan sad. I largely agree with that. Theres no question that if the United States left tomorrow, that the taliban would seek to take advantage of that. But there would be very strong opposition to the taliban as well. Likely a civil war. Likely an intensified and more multisided civil war than you see now. Its also why i find it quite worrisome that some of the Afghan Government side seem to think theyd be better off with an american departure and no peace deal with the taliban if thats the choice they had to make, than going ahead and compromising with the taliban. I agree 100 . To build on that, we all know that the United States has used more ordnance in afghanistan this last year than all through the 2010 decade except the beginning. Thats extraordinary and it shows that the afghan army needs help. Even though theyre doing most of the fighting and dying and we only have 15 the number of people we had at peak, they are not ready to hold on. On the other hand they do have all the major cities, 60plus percent of the population lives under protection, however imperfect. The u. S. Government stopped providing these statistics. But at present the taliban is so far away from winning this war that im really glad that laurel and vonda emphasized the point they would not be the automatic vicktors if we pulled out. The most likely thing is either a hodgepodge of different smaller cities gradually falling into taliban control in different parts of the south and the north and the west, but the Government Holding on to other parts, or ultimately you could imagine more of a ethnicallybased breakdown, pash tune versus taj eek, with a lot of ethnic cleansing to each side help consolidate their own territories. I hope it never comes to that. You could imagine that as well. Those are the kinds of outcomes as opposed to a complete taliban takeover. I would like you to each address this question ive been asking for several years, civilian people, military people, how would you do it differently . Lets say the tours come down, the 9 11 attacks happen, military goes to afghanistan, overthrows the taliban. Each of you is in charge of this effort. Tell me what your plan is. I go first . Yes. Ill start with the early chronology. I think that and im not really being too harsh on the Bush Administration when i say that because everybody says they were distracted by iraq and didnt care about afghanistan. Nobody did. Once we got rid of the taliban there was not a human cry from the United States or europe that we should do a medium footprint and try to build up institutions in a golden window of 02 to 06 when the taliban wasnt fighting. That was missed. If you had built reasonably Competent Police and army and tried to reach out to more taliban elements around be more inclusionive and inclined towards amnesty to some of them, i think you could have built a society that sort of functioned and didnt create an opportunity for a taliban resurgence. Thats the fundamental opportunity i think we missed. Again, im not trying to be overly harsh on the Bush Administration, because i wasnt ad kaifting it myself at that time. I was distracted by iraq and homeland security. Its not accusatory. But as i look back that was the number one missed opportunity. Laurel, youre in charge. You know, i dont think that it would have been realistic to build up the Afghan Security forces or gourchnance capacity more quickly than effectively than was done. I think there are natural abilities to do those things in societies that are as poor and as institutionally undeveloped as afghanistan. The key thing is that period from 2002 to around 2005, preventing the insurgency from taking hold, from developing, would have required political outreach to taliban individuals. I dont say the taliban as an organization as such, because it had lost some organizationam integrity. Was that a mistake not reaching out to the taliban . It was absolutely a mistake. It was