Make clear that new york citys restrictive premises license and accompanying transport ban are unconstitutional. The citys restriction on transporting firearms to places where they may be lawfully possessed and its insistence in its revised regulations that any transport be continuous and uninterrupted are premised on a view of the Second Amendment as a homebound right with any ability to venture beyond the area with a firearm. That view is inconsistent with text, history and tradition and this courts cases. The text of the Second Amendment protects rights to keep and bear arms. That latter right makes clear that the Second Amendment protects rights that are not strictly limit today the premise and theres no historical analog for the citys prohibition on transporting firearms to places where they may be lawfully used. To the contrary, the Second Congress required the militia to take their own firearms from their homes to the Training Ground and the regulations on limiting where firearms may be discharged, where training may occur, that the city invokes both underscore that the general rule was that firearms could be safely transported between and among places where they could be used and discharged. This court recognized as much in helder by recognizing the history of handgun possession outside the home and by recognizing the governments interest in limiting possession in sensitive places, not every place outside the home. The city has struggled ever since this Court Granted to make this case go away. But those efforts are unavailing and underscore their continuing view that the transport of firearms is a matter of grace rather than constitutional right. The city has now been blocked by a state law and the state has not been party to these proceedings. The state says, city shall not enforce the regulations. So whats left of this case, the petitions have gotten all the relief that they sought, they can carry a gone home, they cany it to a Practice Range out of state. So, justice ginsburg, the petitioners have not gotten all the relief before the city and the state changed their law. I think the best way to illustrate that, if we prevailed in the District Court, we would have been entitled to a declaration that the ban is and was unconstitutional but we would be entitled to an injunction that did three things, prohibit future enforcement of the transport ban, second, prevent the city from taking past conduct in violation of the pan into account in licensing decisions and, third, an injunction that safeguard our right to transport meaningfully such that it wouldnt be limited to continuous and uninterrupted transport. As far as what you said about enforcing past violations, no plaintiff has alleged that they ever violated the regulations when they were in effect. Thats not correct, justice. If you look at paragraphs 12, 15 and 17 of the complaint at pages 28 and 29 of the joint appendix, all three of the individual petitioners allege that they regularly went outside the city of new york to firing ranges outside west chester basically and new jersey. All three of my clients are on the record as saying in the past, they engaged in conduct that is inconsistent with the transport ban. And if you understand the ways that the i believe that the city has fore sworn any future prosecution for past violations. I thought that that is the representation they made to this court . Well, justice, in their latest letter they were very careful about what they represented. They represented that they wouldnt try to prosecute somebody for past conduct if that past conduct didnt violate the current regulations. So if the past conduct happened to involve a stop for coffee and not continuous and un but that has to do with the current law and that hasnt been decided by the court below. Thats something thats a complaint about the limits of the current law and not the limits of the old law. Youre asking us to mix apples and oranges now. I dont think so, justice. I think what im asking you to do is exactly what this court did in the knox case what youre asking us to do is to take a case in which the other side has thrown in the towel and completely given you every single thing you demanded in your complaint for relief, and youre asking us to opine on a law thats not on the books anymore. And one thats not on the books, not because of something necessarily the city did, but because the state, a party whos not a party to this litigation, has changed the law and prohibited them from doing. So this is, i think, something quite different. Youre asking us to opine on an old law, not a new law. And the new law hasnt been reviewed below yet. In knox, the thrust of the underlying complaint was that the supplemental fee assessment that the union imposed on the members was unconstitutional. But you got what you want know. In terms of the contiguous, we dont know whether the city is taking the position that you cant stop for a cup of coffee. If you leave your gun in the car, im not sure how they would know you were traveling with a gun. But put that aside. Before i put it aside, let me say, i think we do know the answer to that because in subsection of the new regulations, they made clear that the kind of transport they were allowing, at least within the city of new york, had to be continuous and uninterrupted. I dont know what continuous and uninterrupted means if it doesnt if it means that you can make stops for coffee. And i assure you, i think the right way to think about this for article three purposes, if we had been successful in the lower court and proposed an injunction, i guarantee you the words continuous and uninterrupted would not be in our proposed injunction. If the city had offered their injunction, we would have said we dont accept that. We think thats inconsistent with the right we prevailed on. And it would renter the case not moot just like in knox there was a dispute about the sufficiently of the refund offered in an effort to moot the case. The dispute that lies between the parties about the sufficiency of the refund notice, wasnt the same dispute that initiated the negotiation, but it was a live controversy for article iii perurposes. This court could address the question presented here and leave the question of continuous and uninterrupted for the lower court if it wanted to. But theres no basis for not answering the question presented. Thats the oddest decision i have heard. Answer an old law thats no longer in effect and then reserve consideration of the new laws interpretation for the lower courts. I dont know how that doesnt constitute mootness on the issue thats before us. If theyve agreed and you agree that everything but the continuous and uninterrupted has been resolved and youve gotten everything youve wanted as demanded in your complaint, you can travel to a second home, you can travel to any lawful firing range, thats all your original complaint demanded. If you got all of that, that is the issue that was before us. A new question is whether and youve agreed we should leave that to the courts below, what continuous and uninterrupted is. That happens to go to the new law, not the old one. With respect, justice, we dont think weve gotten everything that we could have gotten if we prevailed in the District Court interesting continuous and uninterrupted, but also we would like given our five years of history in this litigation with my friends on the other side, we would like something more than their representations to protect us against the use in the future of past conduct i have one question. The sg tried to give you a lifeline by saying you could get damages. But i read your representations to the court and you said we could get damages. I dont see a request for relief, either damages or nominal in your complaint. And you dont say we want damages in your submissions to us. Did you ask for damages nominal or we asked for all other appropriate relief in our complaint. We did not make a specific request for damages below. Im happy to affirm that we would like damages but i also think you have to ask for permission to amend your complaint to seek that, dont you . We would have to do that. But we were happy that they recognized the case wasnt moot, we didnt feel like we needed a damages lifeline because we think we have multiple strong arguments based on this courts precedence including the knox case that said this dispute isnt moot. One more on the damages. As far as i know, this court has never used a request for damages to save a case from mootness. I dont know of any such case. Im not aware of one, either. Perhaps my colleague will have one since it was his suggestion. But we think we have plenty of cases from this court that are analogous to this situation. With respect, i dont think the practice of getting the recognition after its granted that a grant may not signal anything good for the defendant. Thats quite common practice that they come up with an idea to moot the case. If you think of a couple of recent cases, not just knox, but trinity, light du trinity. In each case, this court said, no, thats too little too late and if this court starts accepting these maneuvers, its going to be very hard for the court to i dont think its bad when people who have an argument settle their argument and thus theyre no longer is one. So i wonder if should i ask them this question, you say this case is still alive because the city of new york might prosecute one of your clients because they stopped for coffee on the way to a firing range. I think im going to ask them that. And i have a suspicion they will say no. We arent going to prosecute that particular individual. So then what should i do . Should i we have a dispute, you think they will. They think they wont. That suggests to me that we have the live controversy. If the standard for mootness is whether its possible to effect relief, i guarantee that an injunction that enforces those promises are going to give my clients more relief and do keep in mind, what makes this case different, this is a discretionary licensing process where the city makes judgments about good, moral character. There are 79 officials in the Licensing Department of the city of new york. Where are they going to look for guidance . They could, i think, look for guidance to a courtordered injunction. Im not sure theyre going to pull the transcript from this argument, let alone a letter from the city to the Solicitor Generals Office for this. We think were entitled for that kind of relief. We think this case is quite straight forward because theres no historical analog for this kind of transportation restriction. As i suggested, if you look at the second militia act a passed by the Second Congress, they not only understood that you could transport your firearms from your home to a place where they could be lawfully discharged, but they required it of the members of the militia. If you look at the history and traditions of this country, there are very few laws that try to do anything like this and the few that tried to do this were invalidated by the court. As i understand new york, they have two kinds of licenses, it has a premises license and a carry license. And youre attacking the premises license scheme on the ground that it doesnt allow you to carry. So why dont you just attack the carry license scheme if you want to carry, why didnt your license get a carry license . Justice kagan, i think what my clients wanted in this lawsuit, and there are plenty of other lawsuits out there challenging carry restrictions, they wanted the right to transport, not the right to carry. Transporting is a kind of carrying. You take your gun and it goes with you some place, thats a kind of carrying. I will agree with that. I think its also a kind of bearing which is why i think this is a straightforward case. All im asking is, theres a premises scheme and your clients want to carry which suggests that you should have brought a challenge to the challenging scheme if you thought that was deficient. My clients for years had at least two of the three, had for what the city for a while called a target license. And i didnt give them a full right to carry but it did give them the right to transport their firearms to new jersey and other places, probably would have allowed a second home, im not sure that issue was squarely presented. My clients did not insist on getting a carry license either under the before this lawsuit was filed or in this lawsuit. What they wanted is to restore rights to transport their firearms between and among places where they could be used. Thats different from a license that says i get to have this firearm with me at all times, loaded, ready to go. What they wanted is to restore their right to transport firearms, locked and unloaded, between places where they could be lawfully used. Thats what they asked for. Thats what theres no historical analog for. If i could emphasize, when regulation like this is inconsistent with text and has no analog in history or tradition, it is unconstitutional, full stop. The way the lowers courts have interpreted heller, its a one way ratchet. If text, history and tradition are to the contrary, then the courts proceed to a watered down form of scrutiny thats heightened in name only and i think this court should reaffirm that text history and tradition, essentially, is the test and can be administered in a way that provides real protection i want to go back for one second to the question presented. Does new york citys ban on transporting a license, locked and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside the city limits consistent with the Second Amendment. Youre going to hear in one minute, there is no new york city ban on transporting a licensed locked and unloaded handgun to a home or other place outside. I think youll hear that. Now, what will your very brief response, theres a question presented, they say there is no ban, and you say you can finish the question. That was it finished. Thank you. My answer in a nutshell is knox. My slightly longer answer is every time this court confronts a post maneuver to try to moot a case, it almost by definition will try to take away from you the question presented. Thats what happened in knox. The question presented concerned the constitutionality of the special assessment. This court decided both. Thank you, your honor. Thank you, counsel. Mr. Wall. Mr. Chief justice and may it please the court. On the merits, text, history and tradition all condemn new yorks transport ban. Such bans have been rare and commonly struck down because of the right to keep arms keep and bear arms must entail and has always entailed the ability of a lawabiding citizen to carry a firearm from one lawful place to another. On mootness, petitioners pointed to economic violation o constitutional rights. If they prevail here the District Court can award them damages just like any 1983 plaintiff. But they never asked for it. Thats true, justice ginsburg, but there is a specific rule. Federal rule 54c, that says the prayer of relief defaultses on the default judgment and so the question for article 3 purpose, and granted, there are questions about whether under the rules of court should allow them to inject the theory is it would have to weigh that against the citys tardiness in changing its theory of the case, as well. For article 3 purposes, is it impossible for a court to grant effectual relief . It is not. It is possible for a court to award them as a result of the citys conduct. Has the sg, the solicitor general, ever asked this court to allow such a late interjection to save the case from mute inous. He said he wases n not aware of such case, are you . We obviously participated on the merits before the city suggested it was putinous. Is that the name of the case and it was decide the other way that the court said no, were not going to allow that to happen. First, its in 1926 so it predates the federal rule and it predates 54c which the prayer for relief no longer binds. I also think the facts are somewhat distinguishable here where they have evidence in the record at the Summary Judgment stage of their economic harms. To be sure, theyre not focused on damages and what they wanted to was to engage in a conduct. Not focused on damages, its an understatement. They practically wont take damages. Theyve had every opportunity to say that they want damages, including today and for whatever reason, mr. Clement has basically said this case is not about damages. Thats not why we think its not moot and thats not what we want. I heard mr. Clement say im happy to affirm that my client wants damages and we dont think we need that lifeline and we think theyre good and we disagree on the other theories, but the question under knox admission products is it possible to ordain damages and here is the record of economic harm and if they get a declaration on the merits, there is no barrier to their receiving an award of damages from the court . Would you remind me where in the complaint they set forth dng . I think the best examples are page 32, 33, 35, 36 of the joint appendix and 52 to 54, 56, 57 and 59 to 61. Those are both the pleadings and the Summary Judgments and affidavits and they rely on two kinds of harm. One is the competitions they were not allowed to attend with the firearms and the other is the cause of dues and membership fees to the incity ranges which i think implicitly are suggesting are higher than the outer limits. Mr. Wolf, they filed a company mrant and a brief for a Summary Judgment, they filed a surr petition and in response they filed another brief there, and in none of those places did they ask for damages. Damages has been injected into this case because of the solicitor general in a very latebreaking threepage letter. Justice kagan, i will grant there is post on both law and the petitioners have come up for why the case is not moot. Damages could change hands and say its not moot. I suppose you can also rest it on future consequences and say theyve come too late and it has an express scheme that allows you to consider these schemes. I thought in your brief, you you on ject the every other theory why it was live. It did in difunous. And it allows you to consider the conduct and you have a representation that comes as mr. Clement said in his letter at the 11 1 2th hour. On those packs can you say were not going to take a look at the citys representation . You could. That is not our theory. Our theory is that money could change hands here and theyd be entitled . What do you think of mr. Clements theory . I take it that you reject mr. Clements theory about this continuous travel and stopping for coffee . I think its a close call. On our view, thats a new controversy that arises of the new law and not the old controversy, and i think its a hard ques