Naval battle in history and was a decisive victory for the United States and their allies. Up next, six panelists participate in the 75th befallingy discussion the panel, a retired admiral discusses the legacy of the battle. All, i would like to put in a little plug for a marvelous new book written by our first speaker or edited, tom cutler has edited this retrospective published by the Naval Institute. Recently it was put out and in fact filled with interesting new and old assessments of the battle, including some japanese testimony. Also a number of the panelists have written for this as well. I wanted to at least give that a plug. Second, what i wanted to do was this,ould not resist namely for a couple of reasons. Thanks to wikipedia i discovered the fact that it has become the basic Foundation Source to go , which then says you cannot cite it. I did have one person who used it for his entire paper, which is another story. But i discovered some different points. If you search this battle, and then you go to wikipedia, you discover a series of things. The other part is they were to different entries, so i went to for you to them. One, i could not believe, it is called the world wonders. This message is completely written up, although not with the latest from naval history on the actual lieutenant, but the fact is we have that. That there is a wikipedia entry on the largest battle in naval history. Leyte gulf is the largest battle arguably, but wikipedia says , and then theyrs craddick credit based on displacement. What we are going to do today, we are going to have a distinguished panel that will talk about a range of issues. There short biographies are in your program, but for the sake of cspan, let me introduce each of them weekly. Trent, who will talk about the decision of halsey. Historian with many awards. We also have paul, who has been with the Naval Institute for years and has published multiple , aks on multiple subjects number of books on battleships and the oral history program. He will be talking also about some of the decisions relating to Admiral Halsey and admiral lee. We also have david kennedy,alking about the naval aviator movie and screenwriter and retired captain, and then finally andrew taylor, talking about his fathers experiences as a pilot in the fighting squadron who later went on to thatn squadron 20 and from point decided that when he was talking about building his essex wouldfigured not work but enterprise was probably a good name. We will start with trent. We had his lights . No slides. You are your own visual aid, sir. [laughter] thank you for that lovely introduction. About halseytalk and his decisions. The entire take third from the north . He does not need to. What is the backdrop . We can stand here 75 years away from that decision and say it was the wrong decision trade think it is valuable to look into how the decision was made, and thatd his staff eliminates some lessons in terms of how to make decisions under stress and uncertainty. It is important to understand some of the background. The Central Pacific campaign, which was illustrated earlier, engages and is driven by the granite campaign plan. First two emphases, the is there is an intent to keep pressure on the japanese. The pace of the offensive must be sustained to keep the enemy off balance. The second thing that the plan tries to do is to destroy the japanese fleet. These two are linked, if you destroyed the fleet, you create options to accelerate the pace of the offensive. Alluded to one factor, so in june there is this battle. This is now, we know, a significant victory because it japaneseoes to the airpower. It effectively destroys it. This was not known at the time. It was criticized for not being more aggressive and not destroying the fleet at an earlier date. Sonu instructions find their way into the third fleet operating starting in july of that year. If an opportunity of noises to destroy a major portion of the enemy fleet, that becomes the primary task. This is something that is in halseys instructions. If they come out, i need to go after them. Not only does he have that instruction, but he had a preconception towards aggressive action. If the japanese come out, how will he go after them . He will use the third fleet battle plan which he and his staff composed. Attributes. S two one is it seeks to achieve something that the navy had been practicing to do all through most of the interwar time, especially through the 1930s. They are trying to bring the enemy under the attack of carrier plans simultaneously. His plan assumes the task force 34, the commander the major group, would be attached to the forces during the approach at night so the japanese could be under the guns of the ships and attacked by carrier aircraft. That was one of the keys to the plan. The other is it emphasizes concentration, the use of the entire third fleet for this had been an emphasis of the doctrine for decades back to the early years of the 20th century, the composition of battle plan , and to assume that we have to operate as a single fleet. Halsey embraced those things. Atthe situation develops ,eyte, as carita approaches halseys text forces are distributed to the east of the islands, and he approaches. Kuritas forces, and he subjects the force to and then attack halsey not halsey. And appears around to be going away, and at about that time is when the Northern Attack on the 24th of october. So halsey assesses this and gets together they subset of his staff and tries to decide what 1950 decidesabout we will bring the entirety of the third fleet together, task force 38 together and head north. Now there were alternatives. Many of his subordinates were aware of them. Potentially Better Options. [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2019] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] help that it would have been more appropriate to divide, to separate, send one force north, keep another force off of the exit to San Bernadino strait and deal with kurita and he especially thought this because about 15 minutes after halsey 2005,is decision, roughly carrier aircraft had noted it had turned around. It was coming back. So bogan works out a plan where two task force carrier groups would stay or would go north and then task force 34 and task group 38. 2 which he was part of would stay off San Bernadino strait. Bogan receives a dismissal either from halsey or from his staff, probably the staff at that point. No, were not going to do that. Were going north. And they thought ozawas force was a decoy. He had currently assessed the situation and sent visual signals to halseys flagship. Hey, i think thats a decoy. We should divide. And he acknowledges as i one is nd it the second one is not replied to. Paul will tell us more about that of his description of admiral lee. And the navys best tactician at the time, he is chief of staff to the commander of task force 38 by admiral marc mitscher. Birk and mitscher work out another approach to divide the group. The task that they were in is the one that is closest to ozawa. So rather than delaying its journey to the north, theyre thinking why dont we take our carrier group, go north, deal with ozawa and the other two carrier groups can stay off San Bernadino strait and deal with kurita now that he has reversed course. Birk is admit that Something Like this has to be done and he is arguing with mitscher. We need to tell halsey about this. We need to have an alternative plan. And mitschers reaction is very interesting. And one of the reasons why i chose to write about this is i was struck about what mitscher does. He says halsey wants my opinion, so he will ask for it. And its striking to me that mitscher who has no shortage of aggressiveness in other opportunities in another battles , his initiative has been so kur tailed. Why . A lot of it has to do with how halsey approaches decisionmaking and the context of the decisions that are made in this battle. So according to Thomas Alexander hughes who published the biography of halsey, his trusted group that he would work with and make decisions shrink. So he is not doing a good job at entertaining and alternatives and bringing diverse perspectives into his staff and of trying to understand what options are available. His intelligent officer wasnt even part of the decision discussion and decides to go south. Halsey dominant this inner circle of the staff and he carries his decision. They dont challenge his options. Now this is different. So as commander of the third fleet in South Pacific and commander of the South Pacific before that, halsey had commanded from shore. He had to. That is an effective way to operate. He had disperse task groups and he had to ensure that there was capacity for them to act on their own initiative on the circumstances that were emerging. But prior to that, halsey had been a Task Force Commander himself and one of the things that occurred is as halsey moves o command the third fleet at leyte gulf he returns the shipboard. And he slips back into patterns of decisionmaking habits that he had adopted when he was a Task Commander rather than fleet commander. When options are presented to us, when we can make decisions are heavily influenced by the circumstances in which we appear and the circumstances that we are in at the time. So i think halsey being aboard ship influenced his perspective. He slips more of the habit of being a Task Commander and less of a fleet commander and over the proceeding weeks, he had essentially pushed mitscher aside. He had not brought in his perspective. Halsey essentially assumed command of task 380 himself. And this is a significant factor in his decisionmaking. And finally i think its very important to note that halsey was tired. Hes been operating for weeks. Theres a very rapid pace of this offensive. There was a cost to that. So if the narratives of those who were there who were to believe if halsey made his decision, he retired. And i think the staff that worked with him were very hesitant even if the situation changed, and as new information came available, would wake him up to revise that division. So in conclusion for us is halseys decision is incorrect but there are lots of factors that are at work, complicated reasons, tom alluded to. Ive tried to draw up some of the reasons but one of the keys that we should take away is that Better Options were available. Better options were being entertained by a fairly senior navy officers. They had devised ideas for how to do it in a better way. And if halsey had retained focus on his responsibilities as fleet commander and not shifting into task force, made more use and groomed a more talented staff, then i think he might have overtchomed fatigue he was facing we wouldnt be discussing controversies related to padding of messages the world wonders and halsey might have secured a victory, not just over ozawas forces but kuritas as well. He had the capability with the forces that were available to do that. So these remarks kept relatively short. I hope i have simulated some of your thoughts and i look forward to your questions. Thank you. [applause] before i introduce Paul Stillwell, i am going to exercise one short bit of moderators discretion to provide some well, actually, old but new material that hasnt come out previously. Back in the 1980s, i was privileged to interview retired Commander Reserve e. Calvert chess on, philadelphia lawyer who happened to be mitschers Intelligence Officer and they were correcting the story, not anything substance tiff to what trent said that are worth it to note. As trent noted, halsey had bypassed mitscher completely during much of this time. Mitscher was hugely frustrated by the fact that halsey who had not commanded he commanded a fleet at shore but had not command. Lt sea since 1942. And the problem is whereas halsey still had the tendency to believe his aviators when they came back from strikes, mitscher had put in place with chess on with the lieutenant that could listen to japanese transmissions. They were checking on what the aviators were bringing back. And it was the grim reapers off the enterprise were the folks who were putting together this new approach. And cheston told a story that he was told to go down to wake mitscher up and bring him up. And mitscher grumbled. Mitscher was not was also very tired. He did have a heart attack from as much as everybody on the staff knew. He was not feeling well from this time. He had been through everything from march well, from february of 1944 on without a break. And on top of it, they had just been, you know, saved the cruisers off of taiwan and then lost the carrier princeton in the previous day. The first real loss since the solomons of an american Aircraft Carrier. And this had weighed heavily on mitscher as welch he comes up according to cheston in his pajamas but wearing his famous fishermans cap and said tell me what it is. They discuss it. And essentially what, he says is its not quite as simple as this. He says halsey has listened to a blank damn thing that i have said to him all this time. Im not going to raise this with him. So let this be the idea that information has me and it was the idea of mitscher was saying im not going to get through him navy. So our next speaker is Paul Stillwell to talk about force 4. Thank you. Half a world today was the climax of the battle. And top, im looking forward to the next book. I will be 100 at the time. [laughter] this league had to be one of the most frustrated naval officers in world war ii not have a chance at the japanese in this battle. Graduated in 1908 and all of his professional life had been preparing him to fight in this battle. He was a member of the gun club, most of whom were ordinance postgraduates. He was not. His postgraduate education and training came at sea. He was a master of tactics, unnery and use of radar, seamanship handling and very few of his contemporary flag officers did know how to use radar well. He had demonstrated that in the canal of the candle and his force sank the hiroshima and it was a turning point, the 1942. Of 1415, november, its been called the fork in the road. After that victory, the japanese began to give up their efforts to retake the canal. Tried and talk about the battle of the philippines sea. By 1944, the battleships, the cruisers, the destroyers were integrated into the Carrier Task Force which was the Striking Force the Island Hopping campaign. They did not have a chance to operate independently to practice tactics, to practice gunnery. And for that reason when admiral mitscher really pushed by commodore burk asked if he wanted to go after the japanese, he said no. We have not practiced at this. And the other factor was the japanese were retreating. It would have been a long tail chase, probably followed by a nighbeat in which the japanese had demonstrated a great deal of skill. Ut admiral nimitz wanted admiral lee out there the pacific. He did not get east of hawaii from the summer of 1942 till the spring of 1945. He was the man that the Pacific Fleet wanted in command for the expected great collision of the giant ships. Thomas told you about the threeprong approach. Kurita coming through the civilian sibuyan sea. Admiral bogan, commander of task oup 38. 2 said please, let us stay here and cover the heavy ships. Sorry, nope. The independence was light carrier. She had sent out patrols that night and as interpret has told us, they saw that the kuritas force was coming back east and a half investigation lights were on. And in the San Bernadino strait and so that the japanese could come east through there and see their way to go attack the transports that had unloaded at leyte. E had his staff believe that ozawa force was a decoy. They tried to communicate this. I interviewed gil earthson who is almost like a son to lee. And he saw the opportunity and lees flagship, sent a flashing light to halseys flagship and said these folks are coming east. Something to be concerned about. Who knows who initiated the response from the new jersey but it was a flashing light message also, said only roger, which means ok. Weve heard you. They got underway. Halsey took all these task forces task groups north with him. The aggressiveness to go after ozawa and lee was sort of a prisoner in this force that was going north. He tried going once more. Please, let us stay here. Let us guard the strait. Not even a courtesy of an answer that time. Halsey was so singleminded. So the ships went north. And then kinkaid intercepted the messages. He had been told or he had trent said he had read the mail halsey had at proposed contingency plans, setting up task force 34. He did not execute it but kinkaid did not realize that. The upshot was that kinkaid thought that lee and his battleships regarding San Bernadino strait. Halsey thought that kinkaids were. He said so well and cool handling. What we have here is a failure to communicate. And the results were disastrous. So kuritas force did break through. They started beating up on taffy 3. Kinkaid got those messages. And he started sending reports back, telling halsey hey, weve got a problem here. Hat about lee . And lee was so frustrated. I interviewed a man on his staff, communications officer, and he said they got these kinkaid reports and he took one of them to lee on the flag bridge and he said lee scholer just slumped. You might have seen a tear come down on his cheek. This was the battle that lee had been ready for and he was a prisoner in this group going north. Nd then came the message where is task force 34, the world wonders. Probably one of the two most famous and best remembered messages of world war ii in the pacific. Right up there with air raid pearl harbor. His is an old drill. Kinkaid by this time was getting frantic and he sent this message. Didnt bother to encode it. Just sent it right out. Where is lee . Send lee. Don rotate on the 25th. Edward matthews was one of the intelligence managers on lees staff. And he gave me a visual picture of what it was like to be up top side in the flagship washington. As dawn broke, he could see the battleships pull out and they so they couldf attack the japanese ships. Well, that would have been a chance for lees ships to sink some battle ships. But no. Halsey decided to take them south. High overhead that day was command David Mccampbell, commander of air group 15 for whom and his father, jack taylor, flew in that same air group. He was doing high coordination and at one point, he said he could see the japanese and american fleets at the same time. And then to his astonishment, the american ships turned south. He did not find out till later why not. South, orce 34 headed trying to get kurita who by then had already turned around and gone home for reasons of his own. Detached the two fastest and new ps, the iowa jersey, ironically, halseys flagship is heading away from the air action which inflicted serious damage on the japanese carriers but did not sink the two japanese ships. They finally got back about 1 00 in the morning on the 26th. Nobody to attack. The opportunity had been lost. There is something that admiral kinkaid wrote years later. I can imagine the reaction of my classmate lee having steamed 300 miles north, 300 miles south in the greatest naval battle of all time with awe respect to phillip on to did not fire a single shot. This was the moment he had waited for but it never came. Well, a person who didnt have to imagine his reaction was his flag lieutenant neil ertson and he summarized halsey lees reaction very succinctly. He said we did not go after the japanese and the marianas in june because they didnt institute a threat. They were going the constitute a threat. They were going the other way. They were coming toward us. They were a threat. And we could have crossed their tee and well just never know. Thank you. [applause] i dont have prepared remarks but and im prepared to be a part of the panel but ill tell you i read about this story and its what really inspired me to want to be a naval officer. And in your studying of history is to prepare you for your moment. And im a screenwriter and work on movies. I work with emotion and i work with timing. And you dont get to pick your fight. Your fight picks you. So you learn lessons in the ready room so that when that event happens to you, you are not going to be a goat. Youre not going to be that pepper. You dont want to be admiral lee. You want to be the guy that doesnt have that either is not found wanting or takes advantage of it when it comes. And when sully landed his plane the the water, that wasnt the first time he thought about that. He kept running in his mind over and over again and he was prepared and when it happened he constituted. What i look executed. What i looked at in this battle, is something i try to inspire my sons and in the new generations of moviemakers was the example of naval leadership and i took evans. Mple of ernest and my thesis at as a senior, at school was the imperatives of stress on naval leadership. And it was a comparison between standard argument facing and debate and naval leadership and the big stress that the audience that youre creating is designed to be destroyed by another udience. Now, im an aviator by background but i started off in helicopters and went to jets and i use to say that folks in my squad ron. I know what you say about each other when theyre not around. The navy is a conglomeration of tribes that hate one another. They talk bad about one another. So one of the things you say a failure to communicate. You got your first string, your second string, you got your third string and evans and these guys on the destroyer, theyre probably the fourth string. Theyre not expected to fight. Theyre in the rear with the gear. Theyre not in a position where anybody really expects anything to happen. And as we researched quite a bit into his background and into the background of the ship and we found he had old married men and draftees. Ok . This was not the navys first string. Butter nest evans, if you study the way he put that ship together he built a team that could stand that stress. And he did it by loyalty begets loyalty. When they refused to give him his ice cream what, did he do . Ill stand by until you give me my freakin ice cream. And he sent it down to his troopers. And do you think his troopers miss that . No. It was not the first time that he stood up to a battleship. They had a little liberty event that happened in one of their brief stops for fuel where some of the sailors were being insulted and they got into a little bit of a tiff. And ernest said you dont make tigers out of pussycats. You make them out of baby tigers. And they left port. But he formed the team that could stand that. And by the way, what were the stakes involved here . This is a very navy group. Im a navy guy by background but i was an army brat and my father was on that beach and if those guys had not succeed in what they did, i probably wouldnt be here today. Ok . So there was an awful lot of stakes there. A lot of inner service rivalrys and a lot of back and forths, miscommunications. But as a moviemaker, i understand that action is character. And character is action. And when ernest evans saw that danger up there and he said all engines ahead, i stand by for torpedo attack, and all of his guys were posing are you kidding me, sir . Eally . And they attacked with ferocity and it is an inspiration to this day. And again, naval leadership, this is the other thing and as a civilian is when ive got something that is called leadership but its not leadership. Its management or supervision or its oversight. And leadership what is your people do when youre not around or what your people do when you are threatened. Do they do what they want you to do or not . And you dont get to find that out until its too late to do anything to fix it. So i think this is you dont get to pick your fights and like i said, naval leadership is the essence of training your people to do that. Theres some questions that i have and ok, by the way, a quick anecdote. One of my researchers went in and got the exam that evans took to get to the Naval Academy. We saw the exam. Its hilarious. He missed a couple of points. But one was there was a question that said a mule always involves and you could select something. And the proper answer was food. [laughter] and you know what ernest evans picked . This young cherokee you know, this young naveamerican. He picked hunger. Thats what he picked. Another question said a contest always has and it had all of your choices. And he selected victory. He did not select opponents, which was the correct answer. So he got kicked on that. But you know what . Years later, he came around. [laughter] so, again, i appreciate the opportunity to do this. This is an inspirational story i think and this is the kind of thing that needs that our young people want. Because the thing that bothers me as a moviemaker, as tv, whatever it is, you know, i see what the kids are watching today and its not rail good. Its not inspirational. Theyre not reading kipling and tennyson and that anymore. And, you know, as i tell my kids, you are what you eat. You are what you read. You are what you watch. So dont watch trash. Be careful what you do. And i remember and one of my young my son was being abusive to his little brother. Just beating him all kinds of stuff. Saying youre boring, your dumb. And i said ok. Avery, im going to make you watch a movie. So i made him watch boys town with spencer tracy. And hes watching this movie and i said its not an option. Mom cant intervene. Well watch this movie. So he watches the movie and he came back afterwards and he was crying. And tears were coming out of his eyes and he said what kind of a father would make his son watch that movie . [laughter] hey thats enough. Thank you. [applause] good job. Thank you. I really have to follow that . Im andy taylor. Im a business guy. I am not an academic. I am not a moviemaker. Im more akin to a used car salesman. But i have a few things to say about my father who is the greatest generation guy. And going back when he was 19 years old, pearl harbor occurred he signed up. He wanted to fly. He had never flown. He went signed up with the Army Air Corps which i might divert a little bit. Barbara taylor, my wife here, is the daughter of a Lieutenant General in the air force. However, shes Everything Navy now and she is the sponsor of be u. S. S. That will commissioned this year. But navy, he signed up in january, february of 1942. Called up in late 1942. And joined the fleet in the pacific. Air group 15 in june of 1944. Now i point that out because theres a lot of time there and there was a lot of time to train. And so when he arrived with the fleet, air group, thad hat will be out there since february, and he went through the battle of formosa, which is a precursor to leyte gulf, where the japanese lost another bunch of pilots and airplanes and my father commented, he won two dfcs the japanese pilot seems very disorganized. Fter the Mariana Islands turkish feud, it was very messy. They lost one third of the complement of the air group 15. So back to leyte gulf, a couple of early interesting experience. My father explained to me and we are very interested in the navy, having our Company Named after the enterprise that he flew a little bit off of. And my father would say the navy changed him. He was flunking out of college just before pearl harbor. And he was quoted in Fortune Magazine saying fortunately, world war ii came along to relieve me of any economic responsibility. [laughter] but i was fascinated with him and he had his navy blues and all of that when i was under 10 and just ever since. And if you go to our lobby in our headquarters, we have really classy models of every enterprise that has ever floated and including one thats being built right now. But notably in the battle of leyte gulf, two quick stories. When the ship was found, he was sent out on a mission and as a fighter plane, and the mission was to strait because there was no any air opposition. So his job with his division so he said strait he guns were hard to get straight up in the air. So we went down without air brakes in healthy cats screaming d heli cats and screaming and fired away. And he said we managed to pull out, come out and just over the tops of the water, got up and my father said to himself damn, and then his Section Leader said all the tor planes havent continual in torpedo planes havent come in yet and were doing it again. And he said thats the scariest thing hes ever done in the navy. And so on the last attack against ozawa, my father took off. They formed a strike group led by David Mccampbell and it was in mid or Late Afternoon and so theyre up flying out to find ozawa. And so theyre all in formation and some guy comes on the radio and says rebel 99, this is rebel 43. My engine is running rough. And mccampbell got back and said all of our engines are running rough. Stay in formation. True story. So ill close on that. Thank you all to the panel. I really enjoy hearing some of the details and ive got some more stories if anyone wants to hear them. Thanks for the opportunity to be here and barbara and i are felized to be sponsors. Pleased to be sponsors. My friend and colleague dave winkler did an interview with jack taylor and it is available on the historical foundations website at navyhistory. Org and i commend to you this first person account here. Ok. It falls to me as moderator to try to bring out some additional issues. I bring some things to the panel in advance. I want to throw in a couple of extra things that has that have occurred to me and i thought we might start off with the the first one that hits me, that goes beyond where we were is this question of which in effect get those question of the orders that were given so both fleets. And that is was leyte gulf in a traditional sense like trafalgar or a decisive naval battle . Was it one that in fact put a punctuation on the naval conflicts of world war ii . I would say yes. [laughter] youre a business guy like me. Yeah. [laughter] ill agree with paul but with some caveats. If you look at the japanese perspective, that answer fits because they are attempting to create enough disturbs in american plans that disturbance in american plans that could began to seek some negotiated peace and they failed with that. From an american perspective, it is not wholly satisfying although japan reacts but ships get away. Ones which they hope to destroy. Paul . I would just paul and then tom. Theres a couple of toms. Excuse me. I would add a couple of unrelated comments. S is im delight the taylor are here and i recently lived in st. Louis and recently suffered through the National Championship series. [laughter] and i can tell you that counseling and psychotherapy have helped. Yeah, but we won the stanley cup though. After naming the building after your company. And the other thing is i think this can sum up all of leyte gulf. Its my favorite work of fiction. Every book ive ever read, tamed mutiny even though he made up a lot of it, there are basic truths in it. And the key statement he had was the navy is a system designed by geniuses for execution by idiots. And we saw that at leyte gulf. [laughter] put another spin on the term, decisive. Tom, any thoughts . Decisive in the fact that the some serious things could have happened there and serious things did happen there. More serious things could have come out of that. So the japanese are not down and out at this point. But after this, they are convinced that theyre down and out to the expense as i said that this giant battleship is going to be running the ground at okinawa. So i would say it is decisive in that respect. I would say that the japanese they didnt call it show one for no reason. This was their one chance. And the guy that should be kicking himself right now is kurita. Because he had the chance to be one of the greatest heroes in his nations history. He could have killed hundreds of thousands of americans and destroyed if he had and what is it . I mean, somebody tell me. Why . If youre going to do a show thing and its supposed to be kamikaze, and then you turn away and run away . I dont understand. You know what, he thought he was doing. But, again, i think it was inevitable that they were going to lose. It was going downhill. But this was, you know, a very, you know, amazing battle in itself. And i would love to talk a little bit about the afteraction as well. Why we left those survivors in the water for over 50 hours . What was that about . I mean, the fact that we had to wait for an l. S. U. To come off the beach finish some guys to disobey orders and how many of those destroyer sailors died in the water as a result of that oversight and what is the accountability for that . I dont see that happening. Ok. Good. Since we have time, let me move to an issue that has come up in relation to this, and that is something that we havent spent any time on and that is lets look at the japanese side and just to raise this question. What do the japanese think they can do with them that would have resulted in the strategic result that trent just noted pushing the United States towards a negotiated settlement . Will, one of well, one of the keys they have is the amphibious forces are instrumental to making progress across the pacific and not only the philippines but the island beyond that. So they recognize that that is potential point of weakness. And so one, it is a way to get at that. Reduce the american capacity for Amphibious Operations and shipping. And theyre trying to get to it you ask about kurita was and i think part of i mean, there are a lot of things that can factor into it. He went swimming beforehand. Hes a tired. But i think Something Else that is factoring into his decisionmaking. Kurita sees himself as a japanese admiral. We fight battles. We fight other worships. Im going to sail into leyte gulf and sacrifice myself and my ships to wreck these amphibious . This is not the glorious, you know end i had imagined for myself. I think that was part of his decisionmaking. The first person to sink an Aircraft Carrier with naval gunfire. Hes a decimating this group. But he gives up at the last moment. And its contrary to this kind of pseudo romantic imagery we have of the samurai. He is going to sacrifice himself. He didnt he ran away. You know . When his moment came, he was the goat. And thank god he was the goat because those on the carriers, the persistence that people just threw themselves at the enemy is so inspirational. Airplanes making repeat passes against antiaircrafts with no weapons on board, with no ability to fire on board. It is just inspirational. Thats weather you say how long would i do . And theyre really amazing lessons to be learned. I think one of the ones that factors into kurita perhaps is the fact that these aviators and destroyers are charging at them. And one might think what do they know that i dont know i dont in a situation like that . It seems like pure insanity that theyre attacking this way. Hes thinking what follows this . Keep in mind hes not sure who hes looking at there. And another thing to keep in mind is that the japanese and the americans dont see each other much during this war except through aircrafts. And now theyre looking at each other and theyre having a hard time identifying who theyre looking at. Theyre call the destroyers cruisers and that sort of thing. And these carriers look to them, Aircraft Carriers, im not sure what theyre willing at there. That was also factored into that too. I am confident that the japanese expected to inflict far more damage than they actually did. That would be a factor in trying to bring about a negotiated peace. And as to kuritas motivates, one that i heard described to him is he figured keeping going would be suicidal and unlike the code, he did not want to throw away a lot of lives for no apparent purposes. Trent . One other thing that i think is important as we think about what kurita was doing. He wants hes like the escort carrier groups. He unleashes his forces saying everyone operate independently and go after them rather than maintaining sufficient cohesion to operate as a unit. His flagship reversed its course to run away. So he loses touch for the battle. And he loses and i think that allows him to transition from potentially what is early in the fighting day were going to go for this. Were going to get them to hes, is this a good idea . Should i be assisting in the suicidal bash . Maybe not. And the same thing that weve heard attributed to halsey and mitscher. He was tired. He had been through a lot. And after two or three days, the constant action, the judgment. Obably wanes a bit another little story that might have a bearing on this subject. After the action and my father had talked with a few people on these escort carriers and he calls them jeep carriers. He says these guys are on these ships and these shells would go through the ships, bam, bam. Because it was an n. R. A. Ed piercing shell. Thoughts maybe theyre not in a ll fleet of heir Aircraft Carriers. One of the points thats made and i refer you to this book. Theres a number of interesting issues. One is just the perspective that i noted that because the carriers were small. You thought they were further away. And could not discern who they were. And so that also gave as well as a ferociousness with the torpedo and air attacks that made a big difference. The other thing that also hit me was the comments of the admiral which comes out of the proceedings was the issue from the early 1940s. He was chief of staff to kurita. And he raised this point and im curious about the reaction to this that he felt like the entire mission was unworthy those by a werent going after the american fleet, really. They were going after as he says really ill going after a theyve been landing for a number of years now. So what am i attacking . Im attacking empty transports. Any comments on that . [laughter] to the remark i stated early after you had the discussion before and it does get to this idea. We can see that not only in well, i should sacrifice myself for honor and the emperor and so on. I should s. A. C. Myself for things that are worthy. Also the war, youve got that problem. The Japanese Naval officers dont want to sink commercial merchant sinking and were killing them long,ically and they dont get that. So that factors in a largely and conditions like you pointed out earlier. [indiscernible] [inaudible question] i dont. Actually, that gets into one of the whatif questions. I think thats part of the point. Yeah. They werent. They werent. If kurita had turned in and bombarded that, i mean, they were not just empty ships sitting there. And they were they were in a protected area. So the idea was that the navy did its job and protected the rmy forces that it had landed. And the other point was there were still initial echelons to land. So the comment about the worthiness and trents point, there were some significant numbers of american Ground Troops still there coming in. That actually just to circle back to decisive issue. Again, i had already raised this with you on the email. The question of what if. One of the Great Stories for those who remember the movie gettysburg or remember the history of the battle is the story of the 20th of maine starring Joshua Chamberlain lawrence and if they had not charged, the rebel forces would have gone over round top and destroyed the union lines. Which a number of folks in particularly doing a lot of good work said no, well, you know, there was a lot of union forces behind them and thats not going to work. And what would have happened if kurita had not turned around and gone forward . How good would this have been . What was there to stop him . For among other things, besides the that havies . But also the other two. Oldendorff is on his way and were going to get ugly slugging matches. The older battleships against the much more modern japanese battle line. And its going to get very interesting. Now, did he have ammunitions . He is taking the battle ships that have the most armed left. Dining room Armored Vehicle left. And it turns out those ships, if i remember correctly are the ones who because at sir ben the strait, theyre the ones that can actually see with distance to invade the shelf the ones that are less pesky. They have all the radars and fire controls. Yeah. I mean, theres a range of differential for kuritas battle ships. And so theres a really interesting issue about this other might have been besides what im going to hold off this will we get into the real might have been for paul about task force 34 and return to one another question that occurred to me this morning and that is the big picture issue for all of this to both sides. And thats who knew what, when, and how did they know it . And, you know, you can kind of walk through this. Start with, think about nimitz and he is being a eback in pearl harbor and hes one, been following the campaign. Hes already lost a light carrier. And princeton had in fact exploded and killed hundreds of sailors on birmingham. So the fact is youve had two major campaigns that are one gone, the other one badly damaged. Two cruisers badly damaged. Theres a lot of issues that hes worrying about the idea of a possible loss to the japanese to start with. So hes getting only what he can get. Hes a got ultra but theres some interesting issues about that that we can talk briefly about. But the real question is what does halsey know . What does kinkaid know about all of this . And im not talking in regards to here. What lets break it down. What does clifton straight knows when this comes in. Clifton spray is totally surprised. When they first saw the japanese coming over until they see its the americans. And they see wait a minute. Somethings wrong with this picture. So yeah, a total surprise. Is that the circle on your briefing there. I see something unusual on the bright side. I think its important to go back even earlier. So what do they know . What they know is in some part shaped by the assumptions that they have and one of those that halsey had is the japanese is not going to fight for the philippines. They have not come out. All the planning documents prior to leyte gulf assumed if the japanese do come out, theyre going to going to be Tokyo Express runs. Light forces to potentially try to resupply the japanese only island and bring reinforcements, bring supplies in but not fight a major action. So this is an assumption up and down the american command chain where theyre not going to seek major battle and thats true. Halseys reaction before he cites the japanese and before he understands theyre coming. Because youre sending two of your task groups back so you can refuel. So he recalls, one, immediately. So that he has three. Thats why theres three involved in the battle. Ultimately he recalls the second but doesnt make it in time. And one of the things thats interesting to me, he recalls the one that has more battle ships. Right. We can draw a great contrast between this and the battle of midway in terms of ultra. The code breakers in the base. At healer bar borrow predicted when and wear the japanese was able to come. So surprised them greatly. One of halseys Intelligence Officers later wrote a booking and have said we did not have that kind of advanced information for leyte gulf. What if they had known the japanese plan . Right. Right. I mean, actually, its a point i refer to you, its actually over 20 years old but i refer to you to john prados book which remains the basic source on this, up two issues. One is you have to commend the japanese for their Operational Security and also their overall security. You dont have the situation where admirals plan went down and noted to shore and the philippines was provided help and then passed it on. So we had a pretty good sense on what was going to happen on the philippines sea. But you didnt have anything like that happened. But one thing that also is worth noting is again, the issue of hat do you Pay Attention to . Prados points out we had really good information on japanese tankers but the tanksers were generally commercial or army . And while they were doing refueling, the fact is that to do what degree that we were paying attention, that was the japanese were maintaining the security so they couldnt be tracked. So its that kind of issue as well. Midway was strategic as well as operational in terms of what was available. This was operational and tactical. So it was a much more difficult problem and also the americans had a problem. They didnt have air bases in range for the air, long range a reconnaissance to know in timely enough manner to know what was going on. But lets also look a little bit at what halsey believed versus what halsey actually knew. Ok . Pointed out that the ozawas force only had 108 aircrafts. Who would know that . How would they know that . Probably halsey did not know that. I dont think he would have gone chasing after empty Aircraft Carriers. He thinks hes going after the main element. So i dont think he did know that at all. And had no reason to, really, considering we shut down a lot of aircraft at the turkish shoot but how many is a lot . Yeah. This get backs about who is responsible for formosa . Was it the issue of the lack of coordination and the lack of capability of Japanese Naval air forces but yet at the same time, you also have the one less son that comes out at the 23rd of october. Princeton is sunk by japanese air attacks. And thats, again, the first carrier since the coordinate is sunk. So this is something to make people really, really worried. Ok. Halsey said if i had been at the marianas in june, you wouldnt have had the battle in october. Thats right. Jason dotter striked the first blow exacting a tall on kuritas force. Where do we mess up as far as properly deploying submarines, you know, to kind of block the advanced kurita . Who knows . [laughter] i dont know. I mean, who cares about subs outines . Submarines . One of their greatest strengths was their independence of action and that they didnt need any detailed instructions when they went out. They were told to go out from pearl harbor, sink as much as you can and come out and were fine and jolly roger. And the fact that they didnt have the command and control during the sub ryans was one of our strengths. With the strength maybe comes to the other side which they are not directly attached to the battle group. Because if they had been directly attached, they would have gone to take it. But its good to see when we dont tell our submariners what to do, they tend to do the right thing. Yeah. Thank goodness. That independence of action is something that really saved us. Mike has a comment. Hi. Terrific presentation. Ive been studying a lot about leyte gulf because the u. S. Navy is liable to be fighting in the same waters that were talking about right now in the future. But in defense of halsey, even if he had known that there were only 108 aircraft on those carriers, he probably wouldnt have known how quickly air groups can be reconstituted. So sinking them is one way to make sure that theyre never going to be useful again whether they had 108 or zero on board. Thats right. And so, the other thing that i think is interesting is nobody mentioned that one of the reasons that kurita may have failed in its mission, which she did fail and why he failed is he was promised landbased air support. The Imperial Army air force was a no show as opposed to having air cover and that transit through San Bernadino strait. He was alone and unafraid. So once again the command and the control from the side of the japanese side failed miserably. Good point. Final pitch. We have lots of people in the room here who have influence in the secretary yat of the u. S. Navy and there should be a new destroyer named ernest evans. We had one back in my era and its never been replicated again. This is a medal of honor winner that should be recognized once again. So hopefully somebody will make a comment to the secretary yt. Good point. Let me before i go to bill, i did do some digging on the submarines. The fact is while the submarine force was both the southwest pacific and lockwoods Pacific Fleet submarines, they did do exactly what they did at midway not in the same way in terms of scouting lines but they were off of japanese ports down in the south trying to look at these guys coming up. They didnt have the speed to keep up with these folks. And they werent going to be positioned inside the philippineses given the nature of the waters, and to actually have put them on the east side of the philippineses when if you actually spent any time looking at the gee og if i its worthwhile to do so. The key point what this battles comes to is there are only two ways to exit the northern and central philippineses. You have to go out or come out the strait. So this was not one of those questions in which the japanese had multiple points of direction to come down, or just to come straight down. So the americans knew where they were coming through. They didnt know when, or completely what but there was no purpose necessarily of putting submarines there because the other part of the problem is if you put u. S. Submarines there they were likely to be attacked by american aircraft. This kind of goes to the personality of admiral lee. I was once told that the difference between the army and the navy is in the army you cant do something unless somebody tells you you can. The navy, you can do something unless somebody tells you you cant. Thats probably no longer true. It was when i had the job. So the question is, there was always with admiral lee there is this always you know, why didnt he turn task force around . Because hes been told not to. Shouldnt have asked the question. Ive got an oh by the way on this. There were two Naval Academy classmates class of 1935 dave and buzz, the first ship ot of the academy was u. S. S arizona. Mcclinton said im going into submarines to get away from the battleship. And buzz said im going into aviation to get away from the battleship. They were met up later on an island. How did that go . If i may be allowed to if i may be allowed to propose another what if. What if kinkaid had properly known that lee was not coming, that he had to protect against both sides of the pinser and what might have happened . Thats an excellent question. So we talked a bit, tom talked a about. We havent goten into some of the questions. If you look at the details, that primarily is a american destroyers, there is the battle lines does work. They probably deliver the final blows against the last japanese battleship as it is advancing. Tom i disagree that the japanese were turning around to get away. I think they were just opening their broad side. But anyway and thats why theyre turning in line like that. Im not sure. But i think theres an argument to be made that kinkaid, could have left cruisers and destroyers and sent the battleships along with some escorts north. Something like that probably would have been a likely disposition because that was kind of the nature of the approaching threat. It was known that hes got two old battleships and not much else. A followup. In that case he would have seen a worthy adversary. He may not have decided to retreat. Lets take a little time, since we have already corresponded on this to talk about oleden dor of and the strait and i mean you could make an argument that this was in many ways perhaps the most perfect surface action fought in world war ii. And so the question is, what you dont have to go through the whole book much less the rticles. Well thats what the Naval War College calls it. But on the other hand theres the issue of comparative to use wikipedia displacement involved here and whats involved. So lets look at what oleden doffer did how he postured his forces and all. Mainly this interesting point that this is seventh fleet covering force, this is not something that is designed for surface action or anticipates it given the loadout and all of that. Yet look at how he in effect stages things. And i do want to put in one plug for those who have never thought about it. If you have never read the book or seen the movie in harms fact the ttle is in strait in terms of how john wayne raised his forces. I just wanted to note that even though the ship gets blown up but lets look at how this works. Well, i think one of the reasons it worked very well and have written about elsewhere, is olden doffer grabs some of the standing plans that can be used for u. S. Pass groups and something that hallsy doesnt do. So i talk about having options to divide his forces. The new manual issued by the Pacific Fleet in june 1943 upports the idea by the time superseeded by tactical orders and doctrine u. S. 10 a. And he just grabbed the plan out of that, i forget which position it is but the orientation of the battleship at the center and cruisers on other side is one of the dispositions right nout of that. He says were going to use this plan, were going to fight or open fire with the battleships initially his plan was to open fire at moderate range to conserve the shells that he had, and this is just how its going to work and well send destroyers after the japanese if and when that makes sense. Theres a really interesting contrast to what they do. Because the first attack is not actually from his forces. Theres a group of destroyers that have been patrolling. These actually are seventh fleet destroyers where he had been part of the fifth fleet and third fleet. Is o captain jesse toured commanding this group and basically says, ok, i want to go down the strait, i want to go after these guys. Can i do that before they get farther up . And he says sure. Go ahead. And so the destroyer comes down the strait on either side, and unleashes a series of torpedos that disrupt the japanese formation, sink one of the battle ships and basically wreck the four destroyers that he has at the front, or at least three of them. So this ability of American Naval officers to collaborate more effectively together in the moment in part because of this common doctrine theyve developed over the course of the war is a striking contrast to what the japanese are able to do. And it also gives meaning to something that he says, but im not sure everybody heard and that was the meaning of the discovered to my unhappiness has been an acronym lost, tried to use it with my command. They were intelligence folks. It means unless otherwise directed. And coward action was exactly that. He essentially sent a message to him and said unless otherwise directed i will. And he had to have enough knowledge and faith in his command tore say go or not. And it was command by anythinggation. And this is the essence of what the United States navy knows how to do in combat. It what i point out to some of my civilian friends with some humor is in every manual that ive ever gotten on the navy it has the general prudential rule. It says to effect nothing contained herein shall preclude the commander from deviating as necessary if required which is the same thing as saying when in doubt win the war. So you are allowed to do you can say to cover your you know what but also just say sir i just execute it had general prudential rule. Lee had been otherwise directed. Thats right. But he is not obligated to fail. You still have again in the aviation world it is the general prudential rule, because you dont want to follow the manual into the ground. I do want to make one comment on the point. Back in 1991 jeff bacon who does the cartoons for navy times did a cartoon that was the difference between the warfare communities and it saw a submarine looking fairly nerdy with glasses saying you cant do it unless the book says you can. Then disheveled officers who say you cant do it you can do it unless the book says you cant. Then a nave aviator with a moustache and longer hair and a flight suit and hes saying it is better to ask forgiveness than ask permission. So there is something to that. Ts focus on the paul and i have corresponded on this. Lets look at the big might have been. Ok. What if paul in fact detached task force 34 at San Bernardino strait . There was an article a er of years ago, reprinted by the way. Yes. And at great length said the conclusion was that it was pretty much a standoff in capabilities between the classes that the factor that would have made the difference as lees tactical expertise in maneuvering the ships and there was a response some months later by the retired vice admiral who had been the gunnery fire control officer and he said, well, they dont have it exactly right. I was there and we could distinguish targets on our fire control radar at 40,000 yards even if they were maneuvering. So the idea was that engage at the longest range, youve got these projectiles that go up 35,000 feet in the air and then can come plunging down and go through deck armor. And so he said i agree with them on the final outcome. I just have a different way of getting to that. Lee had the expertise, thats why he was there. So i think he would have beaten them but he didnt. Heres my question for you. What do you tell the class of 2020 at the Naval Academy . If you say, look, ive given you a presentation for an hourandahalf, what is your take away . Why does the thing that i want you to remember when you were in command and everything goes crazy . Whats the one thing out of this class i want you to remember so you act instead of freeze . Whats that take away. . Be prepared for the unexpected. As i look at situations in history there are a few that stand out where you could have with 100 confidence predicted the outcome and been wrong. So now aways were teaching our tudents to use metrics to make decisions, to use algorithms to make decisions. And judgment is decisionmaking in the absence of all the facts. Youve got all the facts. Who needs judgment . But we need to train our people be able to use judgments still. So again with 100 certainty i would have said, they would anileyate that landing force. He may die but he will go down in glory. 18. 1 against 16, 18. 1 against five. Do the math. Newton is right youre not going to win. Thats a heck of a thing coming in. But thats the lesson to teach them is just because you have to be careful because theres something thats going to come in there that you may not expect. One other thing about iowa versus yam ato. The iowa class had radar fire control, the japanese ships did not. It had surface search but didnt have nearly the distinguishing power that the ark 8 fire control system did. I would answer that question too sort of interwoven. First just more or less repeat what has already been said. Things are not going to result the way you have to assume, you have to be ready to act in the moment. But all the preparation you do beforehand is essential. That is, we can fault the Decision Making, the command structure, a number of other things. Theres a lot of effective preparation that goes on beforehand that establishes the conditions that make victory more likely. So if i were speaking to graduates of the naval cad my thats one of the things that i would try to stress. A lot of prework touf do. You described what he did, which is with the ship, with the command. They sort of go, all right, were going because he laid the foundation to make that effective. And then another thing, i agree, we dont have to conject tur too much about what the potential to market a fire control system was at least radar. And mark 34. Because first there were numerous incidents during the war and one in the battle itself, the battle of West Virginia part of his group has that radar and has a similar fire control system, she had been modernized after apparel harbor. And claims a first hit on the remaining japanese battleship. Theres some dispute, and just the Fire Control Team sees it. Its time for the sal vo to land and it explodes and they can see the japanese pag odea superstructure. So this system for the day is remarkable. Now, and i have a question which is we said the japanese only have 109 pilots left. Aircraft. Planes. Well theyre not going to have a whole lot more pilots than that. Why . And if you systemically study the japanese approach they did not have a systematic approach. They didnt keep training pilots. We had pilots that were flying in combat missions in the early days of the war, they went back to the Training Command and they completely changed the Training Command. The way youre training is bogus, from everybody goes to every pipeline in order to wings, to were going to divide. We used a systematic approach. And my skipper on the uss schofield would give us live briefings on basics and say whats the difference between a piece of equipment and a system . The piece of equipment is the gun that fires the weapon. So the japanese never had a systematic approach. Their logistics were horrible. They changed the basic caliber in the middle of the war so nobody knew what kind of bullets they were getting. So theres a huge Lesson Learned there that they were not ready to maintain that. The pilots that were flying in 1944 were the same pilots that were flying in 19 41. They were not continually refreshing that group. Not like we did. I would talking to students, trying to point out a couple of things. I mentioned this is a rich case study for all sorts of studies. I also want to try to emphasize the fact that the idea of we need to be resilient. We heard this word coming up all the time now. And theres something to be said for that. This battle illustrates that. And a lot of people died on both sides but theres some serious stuff going on here and i think its important to point that out. What you have to understand about the navy is were a little different about infantrymen, you know, more sailors killed in the pacific than there were marines and people are surprised at that. A lot more. But part of the reason is that infantrymen can make decisions like do i put my head up or down, go forward or back. Theres a certain amount of individuality there that you dont have on a ship. When a captain decides to go charge ahead, theyre going with him, everybody goes. I mean, its the way it works. Not to make fun but at the same time its serious business. And the other thing i would point out is the inspiration of this thing. Im sorry but it brings tears to my eyes every time i read about this. Theres a wonderful scene where captain evans, another ship is passing by and looks down and sees evans, hes missing fingers, bloodied all over, down steering manually. The stack is hanging off one side of the ship the bridge is gone. And theyre still fighting at this point. I mean, its eyewatering. It really is. Any thoughts . Thinking about business to your question my father said something really interesting from the getgo. When he started our business with 25,000 in borrowed money, one employee, used to let the phone ring extra times because he wanted his perspective employees to think he was busy. But hes a nave aviator. Every day is a new day and a good day. But he used to Say Something to our people as the business grew early on that allowed the business to grow beyond a small or meezium sized business. He would say to people you can do just about anything you want but if you are wrong and you might get fired over it, i suggest you call me first. And that allowed us to today have a very good decentralized system, although everybody kind of knows what the boundries of the Playing Field are. Once again. The last, the best first person account ive seen of sir guile is from admiral james holloway, former chief of Naval Operations and dave winkler has got jack taylor and jim holloway, a chapter in toms book. And the holloway was in the destroyer, he was a luletnant and he said he looked in the range finder and the whole thing was filled with this pag odea maft of the battleship. Oh my god thats what i saw in my text book in annapolis. One last question before some final questions from the audience. That is, we talked a good bit about the major figures, the major commanders and all. But who are the Unsung Heroes that we think ought to get a little more credit in all of this . I mean obviously ernest evans and all i would say that jack taylor is one of those as well in terms of the many aviators that flew particularly in terms sboinsy. And david noted the followup. But who do we want to also add on that we should think about . Well, we mentioned jesse coward does not get a lot of recognition in some of the accounts and so forth but i think that kind of thing was Game Changing in certain ways. And deserves probably more attention than weve given in the past. In my study ernest evans is the captain of the ship moved his officers to where he thought their strengths were. And they didnt necessarily like that. And he took one jent and said youre going to be my gunnery officer. And he said noir. And he said no youre going to be my gunnery officer. Ok, i will do that. And when those fletcher class destroyers turn off angle and point five barrels toward the enemy and theyre each firing at 60 rounds per minute thats gun. Me as an m 3 machine can you imagine that amount of fury coming out . And thats because that gunnery officer had trained his people to do that. And when they were getting backed knocked out they kept fighting and had backups. So those officers at that level are amazing and are inspirational what they did and hat their crews did. The admin department, like to go around and try people mid ship minnesota for discrepancies. So i cant call his actual name but known as hecter the specter. Theres also the gunners made. But i dont think ill go there. And whose famous. I think his name is henry carr. For whom if you go back to the book, theres this incredible drawing of carr attempting to load his gun as hes dying in order to keep fighting against the japanese. Any final questions from the audience or comments . We talked earlier about the Lessons Learned from the battle. One of the enduring legacies for the Second World War the navy and the pacific is the preparation at the war college and the games and i know youve got an entire book on the subject so i guess this question is posed to you. How does this actual war battle compare with what the training was in the 20s and 30s . How did what they trained for in newport reflect what the reality was in the philippineses, say . Thats an excellent question, because i think the reality reflects a mistaken assumption that might have been valid at the time but in some of the prewar preparation. Because the navy assumed i focus the emphasis, on concentration and that was something that was emphasized at the Naval War College and found its way into war planning. If we fight a large action its going to be concentrated fleet against each other. And through the war the japanese had shown their ability to operate in distributed formations in large battles. So theyre not concentrated at midway, theyre not concentrated in many of the solomon fights, theyre not concentrated in the way that we would have assumed, and one of the things that i think is very interesting is although this finds the way into the thinking of hallsys subordinates saying we should be able to operate in a more distributive fashion. It doesnt find his way to hallsy and his staff. Their battle plan is still we will operate as a singular fleet, we will concentrate and this is how were going to fight. The japanese dont want to fight that way. So theres an insufficient adaptation in that sense. So i think that is something that is important to keep in mind from a tactical sense. For an operational sense, i think it reflects a lot of the prewar planning. We will advance across the pacific, especially later prewar planning where theres a through ticket, a rapid advance to get back to the philippineses as soon as possible. Now its this methodical, step by step i think is a wrong characterization. But its more methodical and i think its a clear culmination of that thinking and preparation. One last question. Ask about form osea, which of course the philippineses could have been bypassed all together. And how surprising was that to the Imperial Japanese navy . They had a plan but didnt they have a plan for and could at have been a factor in why they departed to fight another day . Because he doesnt know whats going to happen . And doesnt he think theres a force coming from both north and south . You know. Wouldnt you want to reserve a significant part of your fleet to fight indeed a last battle closer to your home island . There is logic to that. But if you look at the show plan theres a series of them. Show one is for the phillipines. And they were essentially all in plan. No matter where the americans come, i forget which one is the form osa one but theres a version. And the intent is to use all the remaining strebts of the japanese to try to win victories, not necessarily to win the war outright but to seek more favorable circumstances. So i dont think it would be logical to assume that thats part of the Decision Making at that point. At least the plans set are were going to move all the chess pieces in and try to win the victory. The decision not to go after form osa and to go after the i would comment on that saying this is where personalities play. One thing about macarthur, he is persuasive. This is been proven time and time again. He is up there against the nimitz trying to sell the philippines. He said the filipinos understand why we left and why we couldnt come back. They will not understand if we bypass them at this time in the war. Nimitz said after the war that everything in the pacific had been anticipated at the war college with the exception of the common causes. Kamikaze. [applause] thank you very much and thank you to the audience. It is now my pleasure to introduce [indiscernible] to put this all in context and to bring it home for us. We are honored that you are here. Thank you for a magnificent career. Many of us first made your acquaintance through the movie top gun. Perform youras legacy. It father was a magnificent warrior who you make proud every day. A relationship with the significant Taylor Family. You are the soul of the uss enterprise as well as the strike group. You bring us honor today so thank you for being here to represent then i will have some closing comments. Good morning. That has probably been used. Discussion from a Wonderful Group of panelists. [applause] i want to thank the Naval Historical Foundation for hosting this event and i want to echo what was said at the beginning. I want to thank my very good friends andy and Barbara Taylor who sponsored this. The Taylor Family has given so much to the navy. Enclosing raising a hellcat off the bottom of lake michigan. They completely restored it. It was a beautiful thing down at the museum and pensacola and jack taylor was there and got to sit in it. The the taylors are making Taylor Conference Center at the Naval Academy which is going to be a fantastic venue. I think the 100th anniversary might find itself at the Conference Center. What a wonderful venue that will be. I think andy is getting a welldeserved break. We were just thanking you and barbara so much for everything you have done for Naval Aviation and the Conference Center and the likes. Thank you very much. Back here. To be captaindecatur was also of the third worship named enterprise. Whenever i wanted to conceal the enterprise identity at night, through deceptive lighting, the ais system the transponder we had i would put the name steamship. Thats a story for another time. History is important. I have a tough job today. Whenn be tough to go last a group of people especially historiansmposed of is talking about history especially because all of the good points get used up scratching them off as we go along. At least i get to do it in front of the former secretary of the navy and admirals who i hold in such high regard. I do know if i get something wrong, the rebukes will be gentle i hope from this group. I want to correct the record on one thing. Someone said the Different Navy communities hate each other. We actually just want each others money. [laughter] when it comes down to fighting each other, we actually do well. , its very today important at all three levels at the strategic level we reflect on it is the culminating maybe naval battle in the pacific. The last spasm of a japanese fleet which counted on divine intervention to try to win a battle against impossible odds. At the operational level, we think of it as the convergence of Japanese Naval forces in an attempt at the tactical level, we have seen it as the last chance that battleships will ever have to slug it out against each other created we see it as a triumph of naval power in its heyday. And as a collection of strike shining examples of heroism of the American Fighting sailor. There are plenty of lessons to be relearned and we have run a few of those out this morning. To me, our first reminder is that ultimately, operations at advance thended to efforts on shore. As wech admiral learn from yorktown, a key victory on the revolutionary war , the Safety Forces were led by the six army. As for other lessons, in the military and the joint force since im in a joint warrior, we use an acronym to describe the principles of warfare. It covers math objective offensive security economy of force maneuver union of command surprise and simplicity. Time of course does not allow for me to go through each of these as we as they relate to the battle. One that is not in that and should be as we know is intelligence. Cutting through the fog of war. It makes such an enormous difference and we covered the inference between midway that regard. The most popular one is unity of command. It leads to clarity of shared communications. Enhanced Situational Awareness and it was certainly lacking at this juncture of the war. We almost paid a bad price for that. Imagine to naval forces operating in the same part of the same theater under two different commanders and something that didnt come out as clearly today as it might have is a were effectively prohibited from talking directly to each other by their leaders. Largely due to ego. That nearly led to disaster. Lessons an additional out of a decision which was made with his knowledge of the facts at a time create any Nuclear Officer will tell you we have a saying that is the 50, 50, 90 role. 5050 odds an ensign of doing something right, 90 of the time he will do a wrong. We found that applies to admirals. [laughter] the real lesson there has to do with the culture. The setup that inhibited a better decision being made when new information became available. Have overlooked the importance of humility in complex decisionmaking including listening to subordinates and not getting caught up in the momentum in one direction when signs emerged that it might be the wrong direction or perhaps the right direction but its ok to divide your force. We know about the several warnings that korea force had returned back to the east. We heard about an amazing but understandable reluctance to get back in that realizing he was going to get smacked down one more time. Thelieve that through evolution of joint doctrine, we have put the unity of command to rest. We have a good handle on that one. Im not sure about the lesson of culture and humility because that is something that has to foren, its a good lesson any organization and it is the third most important thing that i would tell the class of 2020. I would also add in a plug that humility and culture, if you ever want to see it, go to enterprise and you will find a wonderful organization that espouses those. Underscored the importance of fossil planning. Superb planning in the advance of the straight. We have a saying in the military its not the plan its the planning. Of course, we saw that in spades. Especially in that important battle in the straight. Can you tell me what the incredulous said when hes of the japanese charging into the trap . What does he say . Literally, this is going to be good. [laughter] there are other lessons from this battle at the tactical level. Thenderscored disproportionate effectiveness of the submarine. Early in thempact battle in the passage and the naval commander as the japanese did ignores their presence at his peril. War, utset of the a good question for the navy today would be whether there are currently other underappreciated and underdeveloped assets that could be keys to conflict in the future which can be dramatically different from what we are currently expecting. Also reminded us of the incredible importance of having a technological advantage. In this battle, accurate fire battle withto the the u. S. Enjoyed such a spectacular technical advantage in radar directed gunnery. It alsospite underscores the vulnerability of ships on the surface of the ocean and this is man bites dog. I am a surface ship sailor. Nobody who loves navys like suspect. We somehow have to face it. Several ships in this battle were struck by torpedoes and sank almost immediately. Perhaps more importantly and we theussed at the end secondbiggest lesson for me is that this battle saw the first use of a guided weapon. When a carrier became the first major warship ever sunk by a, causey. She fell prey to a single guided weapon. We have not been exposed to this very often since then. On those rare occasions when we have, it is not gone well. From frown and we found with the near loss if it werent for unbelievable damage control efforts of the uss stark in 1987 and it has only gotten worse. While our adversary technology has advanced, we have never had to face the supersonic weaving missile that has Sophisticated Electronics on board. Its not going to go well if we dont get it right very and we will have to find new ways of cifting to the engagements of such as the use of directed energy in the form of highpowered microwaves or Something Like that or we will quickly find we cannot operate in that space and if we cant, we will have to own up to the fact that we are aligned to a dated operational concept in the western pacific. Well have to find another way to present dilemmas to our potential adversary so we can shape their actions. I would ask, is our navy capable of doing this . Do we have the courage to face the facts . Shipurse, the loss of a gives us another important lesson which is to never rename a ship. If youre going to rename it, dont do it twice. She was originally named chicken bay. Then midway when she became an Aircraft Carrier. Then two weeks before the battle, she was told her name would be changed to say low. So another carrier could take the name midway. The crew hated this. Feeling it was terribly unlucky. One crew member said we will be on the bottom within two weeks. In big battles like this, its usually the elephants they get the attention. Namely the admirals who made the crucial decisions before and during the battle. Mostould also be, important and a reference to the last question of what was the most important lesson in this battle in my view, who made the critical decisions at the tactical level . Skill, bravery and improvisation on the part of the thousands of dedicated sailors who can carry the day in combat . Who were some of these heroes . Of whom we lost 1500 and this battle. There were the captains which we heard earlier who made the devastating attack on 23 october in the opening rounds of the battle and forced the admiral of his flagship. It is nothing like putting the other guys admiral in the water early in the battle and you can argue that perhaps Something Else that shaped his decisionmaking later on was the fact he had gone swimming in an intensely personal moment. Who can say what was running through his mind whether that shaped some of his decisionmaking later on . Mcclintock, Naval Academy class of 1935. The other captain was also of the same Naval Academy class. Both officers were avoided awarded the navy cross. We didnt say much about commander of bessemer alabama who spent one year at georgia tech before deciding he couldnt handle it and went to the Naval Academy. [laughter] graduating in 1933. He was the air group 15 commander aboard the essex and he said the single kill record in u. S. History at nine aircraft while encountering japanese. Admiral and told him he only wanted him to fly on big strikes because he was so important and not on routine combat air patrols around the ship but when a japanese raid was detected inbound and there were only five , helanes on the flight deck asked the air officer if he should go flying. Air officer said yes. He got in his airplane, starts it up and was told no youre not supposed to go so he gets out of the airplane. And the wordar off comes down yes you are supposed to go get back in the airplane. Welcome to my world. Fortunately, he did. When he and his wing man came back, he had to land the hellcat on langley because the flight deck was not clear. When he landed, he only had six rounds left in one gun that was jammed and he had to be turned out of the arresting gear. He was awarded the medal of honor for his actions. Somewhere in the mix was a young pilot named and subject taylor who hadnt finished college. Much less annapolis who often flew on the wing and it would be interesting to talk to andy about what jack would have him say about david mechanical. Ofk was awarded a couple distinguished flying cross is for his work in world war ii as was barbaras dad. I met jack. I hosted him aboard the enterprise which was an amazing moment for me and him. An amazing, calm, clear ride, levelheaded and dashing man to his final days. Like so many others he was profoundly influenced by his experience in combat. He took what he learned about managing risk and getting things done and taking care of people and created an incredibly profitable company. Im really glad he named enterprise. Theres another ensign brooks of pasadena flying an avenger who spotted japanese ships approaching. The admiral responded to his report by saying now theres some screwy young aviator reporting part of our own forces. When challenged to confirm the report he said the ships he had spotted had to go to masks and he saw the biggest meet all flag on the biggest ship he had ever seen and he attacked them with depth charges which is all he had. He was awarded the navy cross are pressing home to attacks. Then there were the four destroyer captains whose ships fought so heroically off the battle of samarra. Bravery that is the stuff of legend. It wasnt just the Lieutenant Commander of the uss johnston Naval Academy class of 31. As the destroyer cruised closely johnston, her gallantry in battle was so intense, her crew watched as the japanese captain of the ship diluted them as he drove by. There were three others. One was from tacoma washington. Attended the university of washington and was commissioned from the Naval Reserve in 1929. To your dad was born. He told his crew as they fight against overwhelming odds. We will do whatever damage we can. Imagine telling your crew that before you go into a major engagement. Reallyvor said it was just a determination that meant something. I cant believe the japanese didnt just go in and wipe us out. We confused the japanese so much i think it turned them and it was a great experience. Was one from zanesville ohio who graduated from the academy and 32. And another from chevy chase, maryland graduating in 1935. Only the badly damaged survived the battle. Hathaway jokingly told his executive officer we need a bugler to sound the charge. We talked about this morning the the the cbes. Of you notice all of these heroes came from every corner of the country. Michigan, maryland, california, washington, ohio, oklahoma. They did not see themselves as heroes. They did not see themselves as heroes. Rather they were just ordinary men out there doing the job for their country and for their fellow sailors. In that sense, the biggest of 2020 isthe class that it is the people like this who are our singularly most important advantage in any battle. Its the most important lesson for a young person who is leaving whether its the Naval Academy or rotc or boot camp to understand they have a legacy. They have heroes who have gone before them with they bond and they must live up to that legacy. Im sure that they will. The ultimate outcome of the battle was the end of any serious japanese effort that see in world war ii even as unfulfilled as we might have felt after the battle was over. Were other naval actions before the end of the war, the japanese ships ever left that were not badly damaged or sunk had the support did not have the sport or the will to become an effective fighting force again. Our own considerable mistakes which placed the battle in jeopardy were overcome in realtime by three things. The superiority of our forces in number and readiness at that time in the war, we had worn the japanese down to the point that they were outmatched. But a number of costly mistakes made by our japanese opponents and by the amazing performance and bravery of our sailors and their leaders in ferocious conditions. Theres apture new film about the battle of the midway. It ranks below that amazing action and importance because midway marked the turning point in the war. The latter was more of a culminating point against an exhausted opponent but we should not lose sight of the gallantry and skill and luck that came with it and wanted. One it. Thank you to the foundation for celebrating this battle. I have gotten a lot of horsepower and leverage in venues this week by referring to it. I will close eye repeating something jack taylor said later in life in an interview he gave. In which he humbly recounted his world war ii experiences. A spine tingling interview with one of our greatest generations. He said simply, what we have is worth protecting. All of us should be mindful of that as we enter a dangerous new age of threats to our way of life. By the way, jack also said if i were so old i would do it all over again. All i can say is so what i. Thank you again for joining us today. Thank you to a fantastic panel and thank you to our sponsors and to the tailors. [laughter] [applause] valuable military supplies. With field commanders, macarthur maps the drive to stop Communications North of their stronghold. The enemy puts up a bitter fight to hold on. Without the combined and closely integrated operations of army and navy in the philippines, the enemy might have succeeded in the desperate attempt to draw our forces back. But now, it is too late. Here, guarding our operations in the philippines, a vast american carriersce battleships cruisers destroyers submarines and swarms of planes. Patrol thousands of square miles of pacific waters. The navy awaits the enemy hoping that japanese seapower will come out of hiding for the first time in nearly two years. Aiding the actual landings in the philippines here is the seventh United States fleet commanded by admiral thomas kincaid. Fleet. North is the third a warning comes the japanese formations are approaching. Kincaid prepares to attack in two directions. Holding who has been harassing the enemy now sends down a task force from the north. Navy planes wing into the attack while policy engages the main enemy fleet, strong Japanese Forces cut through the island. They are trapped and pounded by kincaid. The enemy turns and runs. Damaged by guns and bombs. 24 japanese ships are sunk. Down. Emy planes shot 30 to 40 of the entire Japanese Navy out of action. The battle last two days. In desperate attack, japanese planes come our over our carriers. An enemy plane shot down. Of the six american ships lost, the carrier princeton is the most important. She still fights back. The magazine explodes. She was later sunk by american gunfire. Most of her crew was saved. Planes come on to another carrier. The greatest naval victory of modern times is one. Admiral nimitz reports. Our fighting men have won over the japanese and i am sure all of you share this feeling. They have displayed a combination of courage and knowhow that has no equal. Is butesounding victory another example of what they can do with the ships, planes and guns that people back home are providing. Successes are missteps along the road to victory. Our advance westward will not stop until the tokyo war makers are utterly defeated. This is America History tv. Covering history cspan style with lectures, interviews and discussions. With authors, historians and teachers. 48 hours all weekend every weekend only on cspan3. 1969, a black 4, Panther Party leader was shot and killed during a police raid. Bookshelf, antory attorney describes how he and his law partner took on the case described in his book the assassination of fred hampton how the fbi and the Chicago Police murdered a black panther. This event ated Northwestern University school of law in chicago in 2009. Thank you and welcome everyone. I am very honored to be here. I also want to recognize Fred Hamptons mother who was here tonight. [applause]