Good afternoon i hope everybody had a good thanksgiving break. Welcome back to washington, welcome to brookings im bruce jones the director of the policy program at brookings and its my pleasure to welcome you to our event for east Asian Pacific affairs. David stillwell is appointed as assistant secretary of state by President Trump of the 20th of june he served in the air force for 35 years beginning as a Korean League west in 1980 and retiring in 2015 as a Brigadier General he was the asia adviser to the chairman of the joint death of staff from 21 to 2013 you also recently served as the director of the u. S. Focus group. He was also an adjunct fellow thank you to your service to this country. As you can see from his background the david has been at the forefront of managing the policy questions the shape the u. S. And china friendship. Working tirelessly behind the scenes to build policy with china is also then keeping our wider focus on the region as a whole. Where we have a huge number of relationships, partners, allies, and interests that go well beyond simply the question of china. Assistant secretary still well and i and many years together at Work Together at the mount fuji dialog in tokyo tokyo. With thinkers coming together to discuss the state of the alliance. But also the question on the shared or non shared perception of the geopolitical challenges being confronted. And on surprisingly china was at the top of the agenda. David and i were talking in the green room and he was on stage with a number of other actors, people who served in the obama and Trump Administration. A certain amount of friction and and the tactical issues under each administration. What struck me more than that was the 30,000 foot perspective. There is no real to debate about the challenge that china proposes to u. S. Interests in the region. I suspected that debate is not fully settled in the, country it seems to me and the strategic areas of washington. Theres a stronger early consolidated view of the threat that china poses. Its not seen the same in the financial sector, the technology sector. I think that debate continues. The question on how the United States should respond. With any question about the changing role of china its the focus of the project that we are here to continue working on. To continue launching. We read a lot, the press, about the trade war with china. About economic and technology questions. Stricter offense and strategic questions are critically important as well and thats where david has been doing most of his work over recent years. Given his expertise we could have nobody better to help us introduce this phase of the global china project. And the paper of the hole. Which really focuses on the east asia region in some of these critical defense questions in that region. This is one part of a broader project running over 18 months that aims to establish a baseline for understanding and assessing chinas global role which is changing as we speak, and expanding as we speak, and putting christmas around the role of what its playing. We published play pages on strategic investigation. And we will have an additional paper on the emerging frontier technologies in the multilateral system. Today we are going to be focused on east asia, the papers on north korea, the east in South China Sea and Southeast Asia. Following a key not notice dress from secretary still will have a moderator discussion in that a panel at the office with on their research. Before a hand the floor to david to further notice to meet. Bookings disclose as the precipitation of its scholars. Scholars do that work on their own time in off the process there is an important part of our strategy. We disclose that on our website, you can go to scholars bioscience either affiliations. As of now we have scholars advising biden, harris, and buttigieg campaigns and scholars serving the Trump Administration. Part of a tradition at the working scholars has served in every presidency since fdr. I would like to thank the foundation for this. David thank you for spending time with us today. Over to you. Good afternoon its great to be here and see all these friendly faces. I would like to call out ryan house who recruited me for this duty i am grateful for him he is the d. C. And in beijing who taught me more about china than i ever learned so great to see you both, i hope i do not disappoint, topic today is on the idea of pluralism and in this job as i approach this job ive had to think through intellectual trappings for what we are doing here to accomplish and what my advice is to the secretary, trying to distill down into an idea or a single word, it is fraught with risk and i look forward to the debate. As we think about these things, wrestling with these concepts is just as important, i think, as it elucidated in them here. The wrestling for the event was very welcome and i thank you for the opportunity. So, this discussion today is about the peoples republic of china and a mostly its impact on the region and our response to that region and the world. A quick review of policy and in this theme of pluralism that comes to mind as we consider this challenge. First off, policy, i have been fairly public on what that strategy looks like. Just to restate, its obvious that this administration has made longoverdue changes to the policy in the region. China is a major consideration, but so is the relationship with a diverse set of likeminded of partners. Years ago when it began to grow from its ideological isolation and economic weakness, now forming an opening at time, emphasis on opening, requiring the Chinese Communist party to adapt to the larger region and world in order to benefit from the benefits of multilateralism. We understood it would take some time but were encouraged by progress in the 1980s, best demonstrated at a small dumpling restaurant in tinman that in 88 was privately owned. It was one of the first experimental private publicprivate it was a chance to use this human creativity and initiative in the chance to get rich through your own work and sell a product. In this case, dumpings. They had one product, one type of dumpling, that was it. The beer was cold, the food was good, the service was outstanding. The restaurant next door was entirely publicly government owned, where when you walked in you had to kind of wake up the staff to serve you and all that resulted from there. The point was that in the 80s, we saw this new idea, the energy of a Kentucky Fried Chicken on the west side of Tiananmen Square and it gave us great hope. It certainly did to me. Given those initial hopeful signs, our policy for many years was largely premised on a version of the golden rule, american officials hope that by demonstrating the benefits of openness we would move beijing to a more liberal path, leading to more economic and political openness. I dont need to rehash how that turned out, but it is clear that many of our a suction wrong. 20 years of antiassurances that they would continue to work towards greater openness has triggered an overdue rethink of our approach to prc its ambitions and our response. The administration is now addressing the prc as it is and not how we wished it would be. What we have seen over the past two decades is that liberal reform has slowed and in some cases reversed. As the prc gained greater wealth and power and became more integrated with the world, did not converge with the free and open global order as we expected. Instead they hope to reshape the International System to become more compatible with its own authoritarian practices. The Trump Administration has been clear that even as our relationships are competitive, we welcome cooperation where interests align. Competition does not have to lead to confrontation or conflict. We have a deep respect for the Chinese People and their is a long history of cooperation is trading partners and even allies in world war ii and that legacy, of course, is what got me interested in this, as i share the name of one of the key players in that. Our aim is to defend sovereignty, advanced regional interests and promote a free open and rulesbased order in asia and worldwide. Now that there is a great shift in policy, it has triggered some questions. If the responsible stakeholder notion has been overtaken by reality, what replaces it . We know that washington is against aggressive and threatening conduct by beijing. But what are we for . Whats our positive statement on all of this . Are we forcing countries to choose . We hear that a lot. Out of this, the word pluralism is not the complete answer to all of these questions, but i think it helps the frame where we are going with this and captures something essential about what we mean when we talk about diversion visions of world order. In dictionary terms, always start with the definition, pluralism is about the coexistence of multiple things. States, groups, principles, opinions for ways of life. In short it means diversity and openness. My point in diplomatic terms is that our foreignpolicy vision rooted in democratic pluralism at home supports a corresponding pluralism abroad, to. Thats in the Indo Pacific Region and across the world. We support systems covered by freedom, rule of law, and respect for the rights of ones neighbors. Just as our vision of pluralism at home is rooted in the sovereign rights of individuals, our vision of pluralism abroad is rooted in the sovereign rights of the states. This has been americas vision for generations. The challenge today is that the appreciation of pluralism is not universal and we must come to its defense. We have all heard about the new type of vision of Global Governance that denigrates pluralism, even though the existing system has served the world and china included very well in the seven decades since world war ii. For details, a pluralistic asia is one in which these diverse countries can continue to thrive as they wish. Secure in their sovereign autonomy, free to be themselves, as singapore put it. No hegemonic power courses them. In a pluralistic china countries pluralistic asia, sorry, they enjoy open and shared use of International Waters where airspace belongs to all and no one country can convert them into sole possession zones of exclusion. Pluralism, as President Trump said two years ago, countries in the region should remain a diverse constellation of stars, each shining brightly, none a satellite to any other. It is important to recognize that the region cherishes the vision for themselves. We know this, for example, from the recent outlook on the asiapacific, emphasizing inclusivity for respect for the regions nations large and small. We know it from the charter the calls from for upholding the principle of unity and diversity. We know it from the japanese free and open indo pacific vision and the south korean policy, the australian indo pacific concept. These focus on broadening ties to other nations based on rule of law and respect for sovereignty, with shared access to the commons and prosperity. The u. S. Supports pluralism around the globe. After world war ii, the United States led the creation of the poorest post International Order that was free to an unprecedented degree. Following this after world war i, the postworld war ii system was designed to benefit victors, giving all an equal voice in the international forum. The arrangements looked to prevent a new world war by ensuring that prosperity could be shared, as with all human endeavors. These things fall short of perfection, but overall this idea for the last seven decades has been a stunning success. As President Trump said in addressing the United Nations, it is an eternal credit to the american character that even after we and our allies emerged victorious from the bloodiest war in history, we did not seek territorial expansion or attempt to impose our way on the lives of others. Instead we helped to build institutions like this one to defend the sovereignty, security, and prosperity of all. The genuine winwin approach fueled the greatest explosion of prosperity the world has ever seen. It spread naturally around the globe to countries that opted to join the world economy. The opportunity was seized. Great powers did not dole it out as some sort of imperial largess. Its a view deeply ingrained in american thinking, fair play is about genuine arrangements. Everyone can benefit. Life is not necessarily zerosum. My being strong and prosperous doesnt require others to be weak or poor. This is also how we conduct national relations. Been up and we are weak or for something because some one else in the world makes money or has power. On the contrary, we think that these insights can benefit us and the power of others can make the world better place in the they will make things we want to buy and buy the things we make. Positive synergistic thinking is inherently synergistic area this is why the u. S. Never sought exclusive power in asia or the world. With the collapse of soviet communism, the United States became at least for a time the worlds only socalled superpower. But we didnt use that position to keep other countries down. On the contrary, we invested substantially in the growth of other countries, including china, japan, india, and others, to bring about greater wealth and prosperity elsewhere, not just your home. That is pluralism or multipolarity. We dont fear or oppose such multipolarity. On the contrary, we have cultivated it, sharing the burdens of keeping the world safe and secure. The u. S. Does not oppose growth in power and prosperity of other countries. We dont view it as a zerosum matter or at threat. As one historian records, but they were flying to the u. S. After normalization in 1979, the one minister asked why he picked to the u. S. For his first trip as leader. He said because, their allies are all rich and strong and of china wants to be rich and strong, we need america. There is a lesson here about chinas own experience with pluralism. China was on a better trajectory in the era of reform and opening when it moved towards greater pluralism in politics and policy. This is what i witnessed first in that scratchy dumpling shop. At that time many were fond of quoting the practical idea that it doesnt matter if the the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice. Realistic and open to several options, right . Maybe more fraught, the concept of let 100 flowers bloom. More pluralism and less authoritarianism would be better for the Chinese People in the world. A less authoritarian china would be likely less aggressive overseas. The increasing authoritarianism reflected in his new type of governance was in this region and beyond. So, from another perspective, beijings new type of governance, chinese officials have spoken for themselves. Then the foreign minister summed it up well in 2010 at the Regional Forum when he declared that china is a big country and you are all small countries and that is just a fact. For beijing, International Relations is about hierarchy and big makes right. Its not respectful pluralism were sovereign autonomy. Inside china, the communist party increasingly enforces digital and ideological homogeneity. As is increasingly apparent in hong kong and beyond, the chinese idea of governance is enforcement of uniformity. At the global level, what is chinas view of pluralism . Consider how it responded when a single nba executive tweeted an unwelcome opinion about hong kong. Clearly beijings campaign to compel ideological conformity does not stop at their borders. So, to wrap up, there is a choice before us. Addressing this idea of not forcing us to choose. I want to address this relationship between pluralism and choice. If a pluralistic world is one where countries have the freedom to be themselves, thats a freedom to make choices. Pluralism and choice go handinhand. Lets consider the commonly heard concern that countries will forced to choose between the u. S. And china. They will be forced by us to make a choice. When we say that the American Vision is pluralistic and inclusive, we mean it and the record shows it. We have no objection if other countries strive to deal with beijing and cooperative and cordial ways. In our foreign relations, though, all countries constantly make choices about policy issues, economics, trade, sovereignty, security, etc. These choices affect interests and wellbeing. We encourage our allies and partners to choose prudently in ways that protect their Sovereign National interests. It means the ability to live free of domination and to make ones own decisions. We are not looking to dictate to others and we want our allies and friends not to be subject to others dictates. Sovereignty is important, without it the freedom to choose at all can be lost. Choices that preserve sovereignty preserve the future and freedom of choice that we all cherish. A region in which countries maintain their freedom of choice is a pluralistic region and will be more prosperous and secure. I will close by returning to our policy. It has long been the view of america that the postwar International System is sufficiently resilient and adaptable to accommodate and gladly incorporate a strong and prosperous china that plays by the rules and has served the world so well. The system is capable of change and has adapted to many ideas and pressures not imagined decades ago. It is our hope that beijing will return to the path of reform and convergence with more respect at home and abroad for pluralism being a welcome sign. With that, i look forward to your questions and to the upcoming interaction. Thank you for your attention. Mr. Secretary, thank you, we are still on. Thank you for the fascinating talks. You gave us a lot to ponder. I want to get right to it before we bring the many other voices into the conversation and switch out with the panel. There was a specific word that you used in your excellent speech that i really noticed and wanted to follow up with. When you talked about the u. S. Endorsing or being happy with multipolarity. Wanted to ask you to tease out the concept a little. Not to challenge you, but for the sake of discussion i would argue that the u. S. Is not favored multipolarity if what you mean is several different power blocs in the world. What we have favored, since the cold war and thereafter is one power block that is dominant, that we lead, including nato, japan, australia, alliances, maybe india is even closer to us than it is towards any other power block and by that definition the United States would favor some version of global leadership. We used to call it unipolarity. Maybe its not quite that. My guess is that you meant Something Else by multipolarity. I wanted to ask you explicitly, whether you say that when you say that term, do you mean a world of multiple, separate power centers, or that we accept that china will perhaps become another great power, and maybe it still is, but we are still looking to maintainable a robust western Alliance System that would be preeminent . Quite thank you for the question. The presentation i think did pretty well. What i see, i think what most administrations see is a system that has benefited all for 70 years. We dont need to update it with some kind of new type of system that, as you read the documentation coming out of beijing is asking others of their own volition to comport to a process or an idea that does require, you know, compliance. The multipolar system im talking about is one that allows for, and encourages, strong european, strong asian, strong regions who, in our view of a system that has provided the greatest good and the greatest benefit to the most people, would continue and not be subverted by some new type of idea, that looks at the world in a different way. Read the governance of china and other things, i think im pretty clear about what im talking about their. I am happy to continue to explore that if you want. Well that leads to my next question, getting to the difficult topics in the news today about the strength of america in climate allies. Trump is on his way to a nato meeting. We have been talking a lot with reporters and officials about how robust his commitment is to nato. Earlier this year he said maybe the u. S. Japan alliance wasnt necessarily permanent. One interpretation of this is that he is a good negotiator and he wants more burden sharing and hes trying to get more of that from countries that you work on. Secretary asper was just in northeast asia talking with those countries. Another interpretation is that he really isnt sure how much he values these alliances and, frankly, if hes a reelected with another four years, theres no telling if these alliances will continue. Without getting too much into white house politics, whats the strongest statement you can make about americas commitment to alliances in asia at this point . How central and enduring are those commitments . Starting with tactical, if you look at my travel schedule i spent almost half of my time since ive been on the job on the road. My first two stops, my first three trips all dealt with our allies. Korea, japan, philippines, thailand, australia, plus Strong Security partners like suing singapore and others. They operate in accordance with and aligned with the administrations policies. So that perspective should not be drowned out by the call it noise that goes with the president s insistence that as this security background changes and as our partners have become wealthier and more capable of taking care of their own security, as well as our shared security interests, that they take care of that. They invest in that as a show of, you know, alignment. As a show support. A demonstration of our concerns about the changes that are taking place in the region. We can ask them to help them to help evolve these alliances, do more of their fair share. There is no reason for them to doubt our enduring commitment to that. Is that a fair distillation of where i do not want to say complacent or taking for granted, but i have personally two tours in korea. I have two tours in japan, six total years, one is commander. I have seen all of them, both step up to the challenge since my first tour there in 1980, and there could be abilities grow exponentially their capabilities grow exponentially. I see opportunities for further cooperation. And the ability to use their capabilities as well as hours in cooperatively. I want to ask one more question about allies, how to think about the different types of alliances we have in the asiapacific today. I want to bring in the audience soon, but can you help us understand the u. S. Japan and u. S. R. O. K. Alliances, the cornerstone of dealing with immediate threat from north korea and china. And also where our troops are in the greatest numbers. And the u. S. Australia alliances also very robust. Beyond that, i do not know which ones to call robust at this juncture. We have a u. S. Philippine treaty backstopped by a very Strong Security treaty. But it is not clear how committed each government is, especially perhaps the dutere government in manila to the alliance now. We have a u. S. New Zealand Alliance that is historically strong and still has areas of cooperation, often outside the region but has been in a different status since the 1980s. Then we have the u. S. Thailand alliance, formal alliance, but it is hard to think of it in the same category with u. S. R. O. K. At u. S. Japan. And as you say singapore, a very important informal secure Department Without a treaty. So how should we understand the u. S. Commitment to those different types of allies . To work in terms of gradations i do not think helps anything. But in terms of five security alliances in the region, Strong Security partnership with new zealand. And as you mentioned, singapore as well. To talk about, you have rhetoric and you know this living in d. C. You have the rhetoric and you have the facts. Facts are the relationships in the philippines, thailand, australia and other places, the activities have not gone down. The cooperation, the training, the shared capabilities are very much. You look at the philippines, we quickly weighed in positively to manage a problem nobody wanted to deal with in the region. Look at the facts and not necessarily the rhetoric, that will be a better way of measuring. Began to try and great them or put them in a hierarchy doesnt benefit anyone. My last question is going to get, openended to ask you to describe for us, of the various places we see china active and militarily concerning, the East China Sea, South China Sea, with all the reclaimed islands, military department and developments, the taiwan situation, is there anyone that for you now and i will give you the choice how you want to answer it. Either that causes you the most anxiety or heartburn or has you feeling the best. That we are working our way toward a more effective policy that seems for the foreseeable future is likely to be durable and keep deterrence there and give you the choice of glass half empty or half full in answering the question. The easiest way to answer that is to look at the South China Sea in 2015 and today. With increasing activity, freedom of navigation and those things that i dealt with when i was back a year ago, those thing do seem to have demonstrated resolve and capability. And asking china to live up to its commitments of a peaceful rise we know that the spratlys and militarization belie other intentions. I think what we have seen, the issues of vietnam and vanguard banks notwithstanding, is china understands that we do mean what we say. And that our security commitments are as stated. Again, putting words to actions and that demonstrates trust both for allies and also tells beijing that can believe what we are saying. Great. Let me bring in some of the audience. Please wait for a microphone and mention your name. Well go with the fourth row. With the united newsgroup. Assistant secretary, you mentioned you visited japan and other Asian Countries to show your support. In that sense, do you plan to visit taiwan to show u. S. Support . That is an easy answer. You mentioned countries the u. S. Abides by the taiwan relations act and the three communiques. So im going to defer that on and note that we support that. And i will not refer to taiwan as a country, so, thank you. To the second row. Thank you, secretary stillwell. I want to return to the question of terminology. I was recently at the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum and the word multilateralism came up a lot. Today you mentioned the word pluralism a lot. Can you tell me how the notion of pluralism is different from multilateralism . Also does the notion of pluralism actually embrace the notion of a shared rulesbased grouping, or is it about unity in diversity as you also mentioned in your speech . Does it matter that parties share the same values . We wrestled with that for a while. I do not think you have to share the same values domestically. But you have to allow those values elsewhere. We would certainly like to see what we believe is the best method of governance, which is the open, pluralistic and a system that allows multiple voices to be heard. To get people voice to be heard, and choice, as we say. To us that is the most resilient. It may not be the most responsive as Winston Churchill says, democracy is a terrible form of governance but it is the best one going. It can be kind of muddled. But from my experience, having lived in several parts of the world, it certainly is the best one i know of. On the one hand, we encourage other countries to maintain that approach. At the same time, we cannot insist on that. We talked about sovereignty in this conversation as well. Sovereign countries make sovereign choices. That is not ours to dictate. How they deal with others i believe is something we should insist on. In a way that we are not dictating terms to others. The sixth row. Actually, the back of the room first. Thank you. You mentioned in your speech the u. S. Is not forcing other countries to take sides between the u. S. And china. But actually in the past various public speeches by secretary pompeo, we can see that pompeo just talked about 5g, huawei and the investments from china. And said the us could and said that the u. S. Could warn other countries that if they use huawei and money from china, then probably there will be some consequences from the u. S. If that is not asking countries to take sides, then how could you describe it . That is a good question and one that needs clarification the information has to do with ones own security. In a globalized world where the security choice of one person affects the security of others, the security choice of one sovereign country impacts the sovereignty of others. That is something to be concerned about. If we are going to share information with countries, we want to share it on systems that we know are secure. There is ample proof that says, not just mystic laws but other things that show that those systems, huawei in this case, have issues that do not guarantee that sense. These are things we took for granted before and now we are having to think more clearly about. Here in the sixth row. Thank you, radio free asia. My question is about hong kong. The president has enacted the hong kong human rights and democracy act. From your initial evaluation, is keeping hong kong as a separate territory still in americas interest nowadays. And then china has retaliated by suspending u. S. Naval visits to hong kong and sanctioned some u. S. Ngos. What is your sponsor your chinese counterpart . The agreement in 1997 or before that, the one that went into a force in 1997, allowed hong kong to maintain certain privileges that are distinct from the mainland, in terms of one country and two systems. We would like to maintain that because that is the agreement we all came to, 50 years of basically, autonomy. Anything that infringes on that, of course if you look at the Hong Kong Policy act and the followon human rights and democracy act, is as of that autonomy gets squeezed, we already have to, and with the passage of this new act, will continue to report on our assessment of where that autonomy stands. Is it sufficiently autonomous . Because if it is not, the law says we have to take certain actions that will affect the ability as a trading zone and other things. So, weve course would prefer that there is no violence. We would also prefer that beijing live up to its commitment to preserve the autonomy of hong kong, in accordance with the basic law and others. We have time for one more question. On the far side. Then we will wrap up. After we finish and mr. Secretary departs the stage, we will do a transition to the panel. Mr. Secretary, recently you and other senior u. S. Government officials made clear to our partners and allies in seoul that we had an interest at stake in their decision about whether or not to sever or renew or persist in their intelligence sharing agreement with japan. That agreement is now temporarily set bended temporarily suspended. South korea has said they could withdraw at any time and they hope japan will make forward progress on a trade dispute. Irrespective about the trade issue or any other issue, do you see a continuing role for the United States in communicating to our allies in seoul and tokyo that we have continuing expectations . Or do you believe we have now made clear opposition, and we no longer have anything else left to camino kate . Left to communicate . In a true political sense, i will pick both. You saw from my statement and those of others we do have an interest in maintaining this information sharing agreement. Especially with respect to north korean provocations. We were active, not in resolving this issue but encouraging both sides to acknowledge the importance of maintaining a Strong Security faced torward pyongyang. Both sides see the importance of getting the relationship squared away, which im happy about and continue to encourage. Talked about sovereignty during the speech, they are sovereign nations and i am in no mood or capability and no mind to somehow dictate terms. But to reason with both sides and help them understand our interest in the situation. We will continue to do that. Please join me in thanking secretary stillwell. Go ahead. Ok, great. We are going to move into the second half of our event now. We have a great panel here. You all have their bios so i will not go into great detail. Next to me we have richard busch, the cochair in taiwan studies here at brookings. Next to him lynn kwak is a senior fellow at the research instead of cambridge and a senior fellow at the International Institute of strategic studies. Evans revere a nonresident in your fellow here at brookings and senior director at the Albright Stonebridge group. On the end, Jonathan Strum sat the chair for Southeast Asian studies here at brookings. The point of todays discussion is to talk about a new series of papers that have just been published, part of our global china project. These papers explore chinas strategy and relationships in east asia. Each of the panelists here today has written a paper for this part of the project, exploring different aspects of beijings relationship in its own neighborhood. We are going to talk today about some of the common themes that emerge from those papers. I would encourage you all, though you will get the highlights in this conversation, to nonetheless go to the website and check out the actual papers themselves. Theres a lot of really rich analysis there that you will enjoy. To start i will ask each scholar to open with a couple of minutes of the highlights of the analysis in their papers. We will have a bit of a moderated discussion between us. Then i will turn it over to the audience for questions before we wrap up. Richard, . Five points. First, taiwan faces an existential challenge because the peoples republic of china wishes to transform the status quo of taiwans existence by making it a special administrative region, simmler to hong kong and macau. We know how hong kong is going. Second, from 1979 on, beijing had hoped it could convince taiwans leaders to agree to one country, two systems, through persuasion. That if they just talked long enough, and demonstrated to taiwan leaders the advantages, that sooner or later taiwan would come around. I think that taiwans democratization called that strategy into question. And china felt it had to deal with what it saw as pursuit of Taiwan Independence by two leaders. Coming to the third point, the situation stabilized from 2008 onward. Both president joe and president juan have sought to reassure beijing about its intentions. Ma did so in a flexible way and the other in a skeptical way. Beijing was willing to take mas insurance but is in turn skeptical about the others intentions. Even when ma was in office, beijing did not make much progress on its unification objective. Fourth point. I think at this point, and objectively, persuasion has not worked. So, consequently, since came into office, it has pursued another course. This is not military action but intimidation, pressure, isolation and interference in taiwans affairs and so on. In my view, this coercion without violence is a just right way to cope with taiwans refusal to move toward unification. This approach targets the selfconfidence of taiwans population. And if people in taiwan lose confidence in the ability to withstand the china challenge, then china wins. If taiwans leaders and citizens are divided on what to do, china wins. Now, we have an election coming up in a little more than a month. I think that if xiang wong wins that election, coercion without violence will continue. If the kmt candidate wins, the mayor, there may be a. Early on when beijing tests out a return to persuasion. But even under president han i think there will be pressure on han to move quickly to plug talks and 2 two political talks, and to making more progress on chinas goal. And we will see how that works out. Thank you. Great, thank you richard. Lynn, jonathan, you both wrote on Southeast Asia related issues. I will turn to you to next, perhaps lynn and then jonathan to and some of the highlights of your papers. Thank you, lindsay. I would also like to thank Brookings Institute for the opportunity to be here today per i think global china is very important in todays context. Im pleased to be a part of that. My paper dealt with the South China Sea. My broad argument was that chinas role in the South China Sea has largely been a negative one. Insofar as it has thought to sought to consolidate in seeking to consolidate its maritime and territorial claims, china has undermined International Law as well as acted to coerce and intimidate its neighbors. As you all know, china began its aggressive consolidation of its territorial claims in december, 2013 in the South China Sea, by converting small rocks into large artificial islands since then, things have moved quickly. By the end of 2017, china had operational naval and air bases in the South China Sea peered by 2018, it was escalating its militarization of these features. China says it is entitled to do as it likes in its own territory. It repeated that claim in its recent defense white paper. But the truth of the matter is that sovereignty of these features has not been decided. And in fact it is hotly disputed. In the case of at least one feature that china has built on, mr. Freese josh mischief mischief reef, a tribunal stated clearly that this feature which china has built on belongs, lies within the philippines exclusive economic zone, is a low tide feature that lies within the philippines exclusive economic zone, and therefore comes within clearly within philippines jurisdiction and control. So what is china doing building on this feature and claiming it is entitled to do as a likes on its own territory. So that is chinas territorial claim attempts and how they have undermined International Law. How about its attempts to strengthen its maritime lanes and control around features. This has taken several forms. First, china has encroached on coastal states, exclusive economic zones. This flies in the face of the tribunals ruling. This really made clear that insofar as china is claiming rights, sibley has no rights from the nine dash line. And none of the features in the Spratly Islands are entitled to the two hunter mile economic zone. China should not be encroaching on its neighbors exclusive economic zones. Second, china has increased its presence around territories occupied by its neighbors. So, this year china sent hundreds of vessels to swarm the area around philippines occupied to q island. Third, tiku island. China has specifically objected to other islands and the u. S. Naval vessels asserting presence in the South China Sea directly, in contravention of the United Nations convention on law of the sea. China has repeatedly insisted that the situation the South China Sea is calm and that the region is harmony in harmony. This should be exposed for what it is. This is a pure fallacy. The regions socalled calm and stable because countries are now resigning themselves to what they see they must resign themselves to, namely a situation where it might triumph over right. I would argue that an erosion of rules based order in the region matters to everyone in the international community, including here in the United States. Because when the role of law is undermined in one place, it is undermined everywhere. It undermines peace and stability in the region. Certainly this should concern not only countries who live in the shadow of this behemoth but also us here in the United States. In the context of the u. S. China rivalry, i think we should all be concerned about because perhaps the only thing keeping it from becoming a hot conflict, is that countries decide to compete within the parameters of International Law. I think that is what we should all be doing as an international community. Thank you. Great, thank you. It is great to be here and thank you for coming. Ive been an opportunity to live many years of my life in china and Southeast Asia in the past 20 years. I have noticed that southeast Asian Countries and friends and leaders and all of that, were very aware of chinas presence, the great power to the north. China not so much in terms of looking south toward Southeast Asia. What i have really noticed in the last five or six years as i come and go from beijing, is a rising interest in that particular region. This is not an accident. I think what we are seeing is a new sort of, i would not call it a grand strategy so much as a Foreign Policy orientation. Where shaping the surrounding region or neighborhood diplomacy is becoming more and more important to chinas broader strategy. And they themselves see it as a platform for their rise more generally. I also see it, and this is the title of my paper, that they see Southeast Asia to some extent as a testing ground, for practicing the ways of becoming a great power, in a region that is full of small and medium powers or very large countries demographically, like indonesia. In terms of the toolkit they are using in the region, you can see both soft power and hard power elements. The soft power elements sometimes have a hard edge. The soft power elements i would say really, focus on economic statecraft, in particular, and the belt and Road Initiative specifically. If you look at projects that are both under planning and also projects that are all ready underway, china has Something Like 250 billion to the region peered this is especially true in mainland Southeast Asia, in particular. There has been unease and pushback this is especially true in the mekong region in particular. We have seen in terms of back how Southeast Asia, malaysia and others are learning how to negotiate better on china. The art renegotiating contracts. Time is also learning from its mistakes and implantation. See a mutual learning china is also learning from its mistakes. You see a mutual learning dynamic. This is likely to make the belt and Road Initiative and products that are part of it more sustainable over the long term. The hard power as well stated by lynn, is primarily seen and illustrated in the South China Sea and the land reclaimation and building of artificial islands and so on. But what i have noticed when i go to the region, most recently, as a kind of thinking that maybe we focused so much on the land that we have forgotten that we have focused so much on the sea that we have forgotten about the land. That is not to say that both are not really important and there in extremely intertwined. But you definitely see, i think, china beginning to achieve its strategic goals in the region through economic statecraft. And actually even influence, course, the position of key asean partners like cambodia and laos, on the more strategic South China Sea issues. Let me sum up, i think the conventional wisdom is china will one day come to dominate this region. My answer to that is while the does not preordained, it tends. What does it depend on . First of all it depends. The countries of Southeast Asia have agency themselves and will responded for ways to penning on geographic proximity, the threat perceptions, history and opportunities they see with china. When you look at vietnam, it is on the front line on the South China Sea. It also is receiving a lot of investment from china. It is engaging china. My sense it of vietnam is it is trying to balance against china without provoking it. It is a delicate and careful game they have to play. We see relations with United States, japan and india, really taking off as part of that broader balancing strategy. Also indonesia, which i discuss in the paper, maybe we can discuss more, during the q a, has had a longstanding game of balancing major powers. And it is really taking advantage of the belt and wrote initiative force own economic interests. Finally, i would say that china faces what i think of as tripwires in the region. One thing i am following and tracking and concern about at the current time, is chinas effort to sort of reengage with the overseas chinese or the chinese the diaspora in Southeast Asia, which is a shift the chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, which is a shift as a bridge to implanting the belt which is a shift. This is a bridge to implanting the belt and Road Initiative for example. I think they should be watched carefully. China has to be very measured and careful or it could lead to a backlash in indonesia and other countries that i think it really cause problems for in the future. Thank you, jonathan. Evans, you have written a paper on north korea. Yes an interesting and often depressing subject. First, thank you all for being here today. It is not often i, come down from my mountaintop exile in new jersey. It is delightful to be here for this important occasion and think you for being here. North korea obviously remains one of the most impotent dimensions of chinese Foreign Policy. It is also come of course, a critical factor in chinau. S. Relations. I think the memory of what happened in 2017 is still very much with us. When, as the United States and north korea seemed to be approaching a possible military confrontation, not only did u. S. North korea at relations go up to the brink, but as i argue in the paper, so did chinanorth korea relations, for some interesting overlapping reasons. The chinese were deeply concerned that north korean actions, north korean provocations, north Korean Nuclear longrange Ballistic Missile testing, were creating the conditions for a possible military confrontation on its border. Beijing was not happy, predictably. They retaliated in very interesting ways, directly and indirectly, including rhetorically increasing their support for cooperation with the United States on the Korean Peninsula. But more practically, throwing their weight behind some very important and unprecedented International Sanctions that were applied on north korea during 2017. Then, as you remember early in 2017, something changed. An outburst of interesting and unprecedented diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula left seoul and washington and the driver seat, when it came to relations with north korea. Meanwhile, the chinese were sitting there nonplussed, wondering what in heavenss name just happened. A senior chinese official told us in beijing that there were real concerns that north korea was drifting out of our orbit quote unquote. There were also concerns uttered by chinese officials that the chinese were concerned about the possibility that north korea would start to cut its own deals with United States. And north korea without reference to chinas interest once again, not a happy thing if you are chinese official. The upshot is that china went in to a diplomatic overdrive. Five summits between kim jongun and xi jinping, three of them within a 100 day. Thing about that. Almost unprecedented dip met a outreach. The chinese were determined to do what i call them meant the five rs, repair, refurbish, renormalize, relations with north korea as well as reestablish their influence in pyongyang. And also remind south korea and the United States, and north korea, that chinas has interests in the patella a north korea in the north korea peninsula and was paired to do what was necessary to make sure others understood what those interest were. Denuclearization for the chinese has always been a second or third priority when it comes to north korea. The rhetoric is always there and you are familiar with that. But the reality is that the chinese have boys been focused on maintaining stability and predict ability to respect to their next door neighbor, mostly out of concern that the north koreans could, as they listed, and 2017 as they almost did in 2017, create a major crisis or even a war. I argue in my paper, including quotes from unnamed officials, that that priority for denuclearization has now slept. The chinese have moved closer to has now slipped. The chinese have moved closer to not only acknowledging north korea as a permanent Nuclear State but realizing denuclearization is almost certainly not going to happen. And therefore chinas going to have to learn to live with, however reluctant they may doing that, live with a Nuclear Armed north korea, probably in perpetuity. And while, the United States, is that because of a deteriorating u. S. China relationship, the high watermark of u. S. China cooperation on north korea, has long since passed. It passed in late 2017. We will be hardpressed to elicit chinese cooperation in the future. In pushing north korea, impressing of korea, imposing additional sanctions, especially in the United Nations Security Council on north korea. As a chinese colleagues sent me a few month ago, we are no longer going to be doing you americans any favors on the Korean Peninsula. The final upshot is that we cannot expect, as result of this repaired a refurbished chinanorth korea relationship, that china and north korea will make common cause in the months and years to come in a number of interesting and delicate areas, including air efforts to weaken the u. S. South korea lines alliance. They will try individually or collectively to drive wedges between the United States and our Security Partners in northeast asia paired ultimately u. S. And our Security Partners in northeast asia. Ultimately they would hope to push the u. S. Off the Korean Peninsula. They will try to taken advptage of perception in the region of declining u. S. Influence, u. S. Application of leadership and dominance in the region, at a number of u. S. Abdication and of leadership and dominance in the region, and a number of security alliances that are not in the best shape. And the time that we have, three issues i want to talk about. The first is trying to tease out implications for what you get out in your papers about what china wants, what its ambitions are in its own neighborhood in east asia. Second, the tools in the toolkit that we see beijing using. There are interesting commonalities that come out, even though we are talking about different parts of east asia. And finally, thinking about the choices and agency that other east Asian Countries have, because we often come at these questions from the china angle. By jonathan i think your paper points out well we ought to be talking about the strategic choices other countries are making as well. Starting at the top with the idea of what china wants, we hear a lot with about a china dream, a community of common destiny, which sounds lovely. But it can be hard to parse out exactly what that means. Jonathan, can you braek down for us in practical terms, if we are trying to figure out what a community of common destiny actually looks like, and how that might be a different sort of concept for any concept for an east Asian Security order than what we see today. What practical changes do you think countries in Southeast Asia would see, for example, based on the activities and some of the strategies we see china using toward its Southeast Asian neighbors now . That is a tough one. The community of common destiny as described, really stresses inclusiveness, winwin cooperation. There is a speeches xi jinping has given, say to the Indonesian Parliament about a community of, destiny between china and Southeast Asia in particular. , course there are concerns and i would say suspicions, that it all most look like that that it almost looks like the deep past. And are they trying to crate a tributary system of many, many centuries ago. I think that is overblown. And i do think that china is trying to create some kind of broad narrative that is different from the american narrative. For how the region can act together. And somewhat together to the excursion of external powers, like the United States. So that is, i think the key thing. Im not actually all that worried about a community of common destiny. Because i do not think it is very actionable. At the end of the day. And i do think, to some extent, china is more assertive chinas more assertive behavior which may or may not be trying to bring it about, has sort of lead to a counter reaction in the region. So you see, as i mentioned in my presentation, vietnam definitely diversifying its relations, not just to the United States but other powers and other countries in some ways taking advantage for their own purposes, of some of the elements of that community, for, say, their own economic goals. So i am navy just setting the table here. But i am very i may be just setting the table here but i am interested to hear what others have to say. Evans, to followup, north korea is an interesting case always. In this specific conversation, you talk about in your paper that china has looked at its relationship with north korea as both a buffer but also a vulnerability. In the United States we talk about an advantage the United States has strategically, that we have these close to curt he alliances and partnerships. That we have these close security alliances and partnerships. China has tried to have that relationship with north korea and yet it has been relatively fraught. What does that tell you about how china will seek to manage security relationships with countries on its own periphery . Looking around the room, i see feel your faces and some of you were in the room and we had her markle exchange but the senior pla when we had a Remarkable Exchange with the senior pla officer and i asked her what is the nature of your military lesson ship with the dprk . In a response military relationship with the dprk . In her response she gave me a long list of things north korea and china do not do together as allies. It was a remarkable answer. That. Tells me, among other things, that the relationship as close as lips and teeth has not been as close as lips and teeth in a long time. In my paper i have fun talking about the origin of that phrase. My paper i use a word, manage. The china use our managing as s they can with an irascible neighbor who often cannot be trusted or depended on, has Nuclear Weapons, is almost certainly not going to give them up. I would suggest that that relationship is really sui generis as you look around the region. Theres no one else the chinese have that complicated a relationship with look at 2017, every time xi jinping tried to chair a Major International meeting, in shanghai or beijing, north koreans managed to schedule a Nuclear Weapons test or missile test to commemorate the fact, driving the chinese crazy. The north koreans know that china is their lifeline. They also know that they have certain bit of influence in beijing and that they can get away with things. I do not know that i would use the chinanorth korea relationship as the basis for making assumptions about any other pair of relationships china has in the region. Fair. They keep. Weaving onto how china manages relationships. Moving on to how china manages relationships. Richard i want to turn to you first. We have heard about economic inducements, coercion. In the taiwan situation, taiwan is interesting because you can look at it, as jonathan said, as a test case for how beijing may try to wield certain tools of influence. One we have seen in the taiwan case, is thinking about how to try to influence domestic political debate, to hopefully see the mystic leaders align more closely with beijings to see domestic political leaders align more closely with beijings perspective. You mentioned for now we seem to be in this just right goldilocks intimate asian strategy. But we have an election coming up in taiwan. Here in the United States, the u. S. And taiwan relationship at times appears to perhaps be getting closer. Do you have any concerns that beijing may rethink exactly where it needs to land on this intimidation strategy and to what degree will it try to work more actively to try to shape the domestic conversation in taipei right now . If it happens that the president is reelected, and paul suggest she will be, i think it will require and polls suggest she will be, i think it will require reassessment of how well strategy and tactics work. Particularly the part about cooptation and trying to create allies within the taiwan t tau p system. Or did that actually work to xang wans advantage . I do not know where they will come out on that. My guess is they will double down on that and play for time. But some of the things, at least, that they are doing, can be deployed to ot er places in the region. Crating stronger business ties with local business elites, buying up newspapers to project a positive view of china, supporting politicians to their liking. That can be reexported, i think. And lynn, you in the South China Sea case, some of the things richard is discussing, we see similar kinds of techniques being used in Southeast Asia. To what degree, when you look forward in the South China Sea, do you feel like beijing feels confident about how well some of these, perhaps, inducements, have been working in the South China Sea . Perhaps if youre looking at the philippines now youre feeling ok about where things are, less so if youre looking at vietnam. How well would you assess that some of these positive inducements have these pohe south chinaents have sea right now . Let me start by looking not at the state level but at the population level. I think what has been interesting to me, as a lawyer working on these issues, is how much sway chinese arguments. They are not just any arguments, there chinese legal arguments. Theyre making a case on the basis of law. These arguments play very much of a role in convincing the local populace r Southeast Asia, many of whom have a local chinese community, they have been incredibly persuasive for these people. Even in the case of hong kong, when i first heard that aging was actually accusing the United States of being this invisible hand on protesters, i just thought that is absurd. Youre insulting the protesters because they are so many of them and they are clearly concerned about real issues that are facing there, i want that areheir country but that would not be the right word, or yes it might be in the sense. But, i thought it was such an impossible argument for china to be seeking to make. But ive heard so many people approach me asking about the hong kong issue and they said, once they heard that the u. S. Was involved or they read that the ou. S. Was involved, oh, that explains it, that makes sense now. Otherwise, why would all these protesters be on the street . Its not in their interest. So they do see the end is the hand of the United States. I think china has been quite effective they do see the invisible hand of the United States. I think china has been quite effective in using these arguments in the South China Sea and outside the South China Sea. Lots of people by the arguments china makes on the South China Sea. In terms of how confident is the you is china that its inducements, its positive inducements in the region have worked, i think china should be quite proud of itself. Because if we look at the philippines, the philippines has not insisted or talked about the award. It raises it once in a while but then it moves on. What the philippines now is looking forward to and hoping to conclude is a cooperation, they signed a memorandum of understanding for cooperation on oil and glassed Development Oil and gas development. In the philippines is looking to conclude such a deal with china appeared i think the philippines is optimistic they will get china to agree to a deal that would implicitly recognize chinas sovereign rights philippine sovereign rights in the philippines on q,clusive economic zone. But whether china actually agrees to that is a different case altogether. I think china looking to the philippines should be quite reassured. Looking to vietnam, i think it s ould not be too perturbed either. At one stage in response to the Chinese Survey vessel in the vietnamese exclusive economic zone, vietnam sent out the coast guard. At one stage there was, there were reports that it was actually a Vietnamese Naval vessel. When i spoke to be enemies of hassles about vietnamese officials about this they said no that would be way too escalatory to send out a naval vessel to protect our waters. So vietnam even noticed most forward, it also has been quite restrained. It does not want to provoke china. One country we do not talk about often enough without Southeast Asia claim is in the south East China Sea is malaysia. I think malaysia, many thought that under the new Prime Minister, that malaysia would be less accommodating toward china and i have not seen that it all. In fact in some of the statements that officials have made, for example, Prime Minister mahathir has talked about how malaysia needs to maintain and equidistant between United States and china. As if they were equidistant. That surprises me. Recently we had a defense minister come out and say perhaps we should not be talking about asiapacific or indo pacific, we should talk about asia. But that really buys into chinas narrative of asia for asians, as opposed to to a rulesbased grouping that all country should adhere to. So there are some concerning signs, if one is concerned about the rule of law, but if i were china i would be rather happy and patting myself on the back now. It looks like it is going pretty well. There are some exceptions. U. S. Freedom of navigation operations and u. S. Assertion of maritime rights and freedoms together with allies and partners, that is an important about met recently era and we should not take away credit from that. That is pretty important. But by and large in terms of the longterm trajectory, china through positive inducements through coercion etc. Is in quite a happy state. Wow, that is uplifting. For who . I would like to turn it over to questions for the audience. Please frame your question is a question. Im the chairmp of the brazilchina chamber of commerce and a senior fellow of the center for china and globalization in beijing. And a member of the institute for World Economics and sound palo, brazil. Sao paulo, brazil. We have talked a lot about asia. I would like to ask if what is t applying to chinas relation with asia . President bolsonaro in brazil was against china when he was a candidate. And he was very outspoken about his thoughts negative thoughts about china. He recently visited china. And he came back so pleased with china that he said the chinese citizens will no longer need a visa to go to brazil. And he just received, two weeks ago, the huawei co in brazil, in his president ial office. The. I wrote an article saying that latin american and caribbean are going a chinese garden. Because china is investing massively into the region and helping these countries develop and grow. And prosper. Bolsonaro was of course cozying up to President Trump. He made a love statement to trump. But now hes making a love statement to president xi. Because of chinese investments, that latin america and the caribbean desperately need, like the president of the Dominican Republic told me, why ave relationsublic told me, why with china, isnt the same thing happening throughout Southeast Asia . Similarity between latin america and some of the partnerships chinas building there and what we are seeing in east asia. Who wants to take this one . There are certainly similarities. If we look at Southeast Asia, the agent develop bank estimates that the region needs to spend 5. 7 of its aggregate gdp up till 2030 to tackle property, address climate change, and address poverty as well. There are great develop much needs in the region. Theres a great need for it for structure development. As a result, i think this gives china, it opens of a role china can play. I think that is actually a good thing. I think that developments in all regions, not just my own, is important heard i do not think i think that is actually a good thing, that development in all regions is important. First there need to become entry options complementary options that will ensure belton road deals are transparent. Part of the reason there is so much concern over belt and rode initiative projects, is that chinas actions in other areas and on other issues have generated a bad taste in the mouth. So something that conceivably be a wonderful thing in helping the region has the shadow over it because of chinas bad behavior in other respects. I would start off with that t jtaq vation. Ensure belt and road contracts are transparent. I think the solution to this growing sense of competition between the United States and china, it is true china is going all over the world and investing. But it is also true that the United States invests all over the world. I think the idea is a cooperative effort by the United States and china to, United States saying how can we help . Lets get in and help. I cannot understand why the United States pulled out of tpp is there a question in there . Yes, what are the chances of cooperation between the United States and china in these developing counaries . One of my great concerns, i stated i was not too concerned about the commune it if common destiny because i do not to his particularly actionable. But i am very concerned about how china is averaging leveraging economic statecraft and that bela and rode initiative to achieve its strategic goals more broadly. Often to the detriment of u. S. Role. As you pointed out, we pulled out of tpp. And over the last year we have seen United States qrt p ajuahahe world as engagin predatory economic debt trap diplomacy which is true in some can cases. But what we have seen in Southeast Asia is better negotiation from southeast Asian Countries and moving toward engaged china in a tougher, stronger way. If you look at the u. S. Side of the equation, the trump a ministration has also done some interesting things on the economic side. For instance, a year ago they entered into an agreement with japan which actually gives more info structure financing Southeast Asia than china. But few people know that. With japan and australia, to help develop mechanisms and actual projects for high quality good governance, Good Environment lay sound infrastructure projects. I hope that good, environmentally sound infrastructure projects. I hope the ministration will accelerate the trilateral cooperation. But not creta bifurcated between china on the one hand and the u. S. And likeminded partners on the other. I would like to see them succeed in that effort and reengage china from a position of strength. One last question. In the back. Thank you for a very good presentation. I am elliott hurwitz, retired. There has been a great deal ofthe Panel Discussed extensively the role of the prc in the South China Sea. And the parameters of International Law. What anyone like to discuss the fact that the u. S. Is not a signatory to the law of the sea . Maybe the lawyer. We are not, as a Southeast Asian. Sure. The short answer is that even though the United States has not conceded to the u. S. United nations bill of the sea. , it goes to the principles of International Law. That is the direct response to your question. What i would like to add to that is my own question which is why hasnt the United States ceded to the convention . It would take away the large criticism that china has validly leveled towards the United States, namely ahat it is hypocritical of the United States to expect us to his seed when they havent. If anyone can tell me why it hasnt done it so far that is a sensible response, i would be pleased. The answer to the question is the u. S. Senate. We will leave it there. Thank you for joining us today. Gun Safety Advocates and members of Congress Held a protest against the nra calling for tougher gun laws and sharing stories about the impact of gun violence. No more silence. Good morning everybody. One more time good mog