Transcripts For CSPAN3 Assistant Defense Secretary On China

A Nonprofit Foundation in washington that deals and specializes in eurasia with terrorism and deal a lot with china. And we appreciate the people, this program or discussion today is going to be broadcast on cspan. Were very excited about getting the visibility throughout the United States and the critical importance of this speech is that randall schrivers speech today, comments are on the record. He appeared last year at the Jamestown Foundation China Defense and security conference. His comments were off the record at the time. So this year we keep progressing in how were advancing with secretary schriver and were trying to get more attention to this issue. But let me first of all say that a couple words about randy. He is has long been known in the China Community as a robust choice on china, leading strategic thinker on china. In 2008 he cofounded the project 2049 with mark stokes. Hes been very active in this region for quite a long time and has a wide and distinguished career starting off with the Consulting Firm Armitage International and hes gone onto different areas. Of course hes the ceo and president of project 2049, a Nonprofit Research organization dedicated to security trends, lines in asia. Hes also served as Deputy Assistant secretary of state for east asia and pacific affairs. He was responsible for china, taiwan and mongolia, hong kong, australia, new zealand and the pacific islands. Many of you have the bio for him. I think that one of the things that he has done in terms of being a robust thinker is and i think hes very proud of this and he has every right to be, is that in june 2019, he helped develop the long term in order to deal with chinas long term strategic competitor, he created a new position in the department of defense called the new deputy, assistant secretary of state for china. And that has been a very Important Development because its really kind of helped focus and synthesize the thinking in the pentagon on china and were delighted that randy has once again taken the time to come and talk to us. And so without further adieu, i turn the floor over to randy. Thank you. [ applause ] thank you, glen, really appreciate the opportunity to be back. I guess this is progression, being on the record, but i welcome the opportunity to have this discussion in public because i think its a very important and consequential time in the region and what were trying to do to compete effectively with china. So i appreciate being here on the record and being part of this discussion and congratulations on all the work that Jamestown Foundation continues to do including this conference. I was able to stream some of the discussion earlier and saw some old friends like russell and helping us to get our hands around these various challenges and particularly enjoyed the discussion enjoyed, or maybe i should say learned from the discussion on influence operations and how aggression china and johns comments on that. Im very pleased to be part of this discussion. I thought i would just talk a little bit about some recent developments, recent travels that i had and then embed that in our strategy that were implementing and then leave some time for discussion, questions and answers, and i will talk a little bit about internally how were organizing for this challenge as glen mentioned, the creation of this new position. I am just back from the region. I was last week in china, vietnam, and japan. And trust me, that is the right order to take that trip. A strategic competitor, an emerging partner and end with a close, rock solid ally. But i certainly learned that a lot of the trends that weve been tracking and observing are unfolding. I think the chinese did receive me at the normal protocol level and we did have a discussion about our defense relationship. They continued to say to us that they want the military relationship to be a stabilizing force in the overall relationship and of course that overall relationship is facing a number of stresses, trade issues and concerns about whats happening internally in china and whats happening in hong kong. But we continue to hear from them that they want the relationship to be a stabilizing factor. Were trying to better understand what they mean by that. But at a minimum, they seem to want to continue the highlevel engagement which we welcome. We want good channels of communication. We want the ability to talk about our intentions, our policies, hear from them about their own. But also try to advance our agenda that were working on with respect to risk reduction, trying to make sure the operating environment safer so we can avoid unintended incidents or accidents and still try to work on issues where our interests may align to include the challenges were facing with respect to north korea and the korean peninsula. So we had a chance to talk through those things and understand better where the chinese are on this. But i think what we also observed particularly as the trip continued into places like vietnam and japan that although theres some rebranding under way, that the ccp is trying to put a better face on the one belt, one road initiative. Theyre maybe not highlighting as much some of the activities in the East China Sea or the south china sea, but certainly what we see in the rest of the region is while the branding effort might be under way, the behavior and the activities are still quite robust and of concern to us. And vietnam, for example, the incursions into the vietnamese eez and putting pressure on not only the vietnamese but other International Private companies that would do legal exploration and extracting. In japan, they talk about an improving relationship and theyre focused on a possible xi jingping visit to japan next year. But in fact the same level of activity is occurring into and around the Senkaku Islands and in the East China Sea, the same naval and Maritime Militia and coast guard activities into japanese territorial waters or what they regard as territorial waters. So i think the rebranding is under way but the activities are still and the behavior is still of concern to us. And its really of concern because its embedded in what we understand to be longterm chinese Strategic Ambitions and aspirations. And when we talk about competition and why we believe were on the leading edge of longterm strategic competition, its really based on those different visions and aspirations, right . We talk about a free and open indopacific and although that sounds like a slogan and can become a mantra as we keep saying it, its really important to open that its founded on enduring and widely shared, if not universal, principles. Respect for sovereignty, support for International Law and international norms. Support for peaceful resolution of disputes. Fair, open and reciprocal trade. Thats what we mean when we talk about a free and open indopacific and, again, we see the chinese and the ccp with a different vision. Sometimes we talk about the chinese being opaque and difficult to understand and enmag tick. And at project 2049, as glen mentioned, we had a very sophisticated methodology in trying to understand the ccp. And im going to share it with you. Its our intellectual property but were going to share it with you. We listened to what they said, read what they write and watch what they do. And if you do those things, youll start to see very clearly a different vision for the future, Security Architecture for the indopacific region and one that could be a threat to those underlying principles that i spoke of, the respect for sovereignty and International Law and international norms. When we talk about competition, its a competition of different visions, but its also our belief that we need to maintain an edge to include in the military domain in order to promote and sustain the concept of a free and open indopacific along with so many other countries that share that same vision and same aspirations. We sometimes hear from countries they dont want to choose between the United States and china. We say, were not asking you to choose between our countries, choose between washington and beijing, but if you can support protection of your own sovereignty, if you can support International Law and norms, then were confident youll be with us, because thats all we seek. We seek strong, independent, and prosperous partners like vietnam and japan, not an erosion of those things that countries value so much. So as i said, our competition with china is embedded in this regional strategy. We released in june 2019 at the shangrila dialogue, our indopacific strategy report and we talked about the strategy being based on the three ps. We have our own branding, right . You got to make it memorable. So we have the three ps, preparedness, partnerships, and allies and promoting a networked region. Work a little harder for the third p but its there. Preparedness, thats about increasing the lethality of the joint force. If you look at our budgets, particularly the last budget and i can tell you the one that will come after that in the next fiscal year, youll see a shift in resource allocation. Youll see more investment into the types of things, such as hyper sonics, cyber, space, the kinds of things we need to maintain that edge i spoke about with respect to china. To when we talk about increasing the lethality of the joint force, were very clear that chinas modernization is a pacing threat for us along with russia and other strategic competitors, but its really china thats the pacing element for us. The second p, partners and allies, we invest a lot of time in these relationships. For us, its absolutely critical. The United States is of course a pacific nation. I know that having been born in hawaii and raised in oregon and looked pacific my whole life. But for some people, you need a little reminding that we are a pacific nation, but were not a resident asiapacific nation. Even as far as guam stretches or the aleutian island chain in alaska or other u. S. Territories, american samoa. Were still not fully resident in asia, so were very reliant on partners and allies for their own capabilities that they can bring to bear with respect to this emerging china challenge. We want more capable partners to look after their own sovereignty, deal with the security challenges and contribute. But were also very dependent on partners and allies for basing, for presence, for access opportunities. And so as we develop these partners and allies, all these things are in our thinking. So we work with very mature allies like japan and we look at how our National Defense strategy and their National Defense Program Guidelines align and what it means to implement and operationalize those strategies and what it means to promote the free and open indopacific and we also look at emerging partners as i mentioned, countries like vietnam, but also beyond that. Indonesia, malaysia, further to the west in the indopacific, india and what it means not to be an ally because many of these countries guard their nonalliance status. But to be a partner in promoting these principles, giving us the opportunities for training and potential access opportunities down the road. If you look at what it means to maintain an edge against china and have confidence that you could prevail on contingencies, ultimately it does involve dispersal, diversification opportunities and so part of our relationships are certainly oriented toward creating those opportunities for us. The third p, promoting a networked region, is a recognition that the security challenges in the indopacific are inherently multilateral challenges or increasingly multilateral challenges maybe is a better way to put it. When you think about protecting your 12 nautical miles of sovereign territory into your territorial waters, when you think about protecting your eez, its really about domain awareness, right, and maritime security. That doesnt start or stop at 200 nautical miles. In fact you need queueing, information, and you need to be able to contribute the same to others who have a similar interest in protecting their own areas. So maritime domain awareness and maritime security, we think about how countries can move along a particular spectrum, seeing, sensing, sharing and contributing. Seeing, as it sounds, is the most fundamental element of knowing whats approaching or in your territorial waters or eezs. Sensing is beyond seeing, knowing something about it. What is it, what kind of vessel or element are you dealing with . Sharing means youve got to be networked, right . So you have to be able to have the ability to pass data and communicate information and then contributing being in a position to actually respond with some capability, whether its a coast guard cutter or aircraft or whatever it may be. So moving countries along that spectrum we believe will get us to a point where the network pardon me, the region is sufficiently networked to deal with the emerging security challenges. As i said, they are increasingly multilateral in nature, whether thats actual incursions from naval vessels, whether thats drug trafficking, whether thats human trafficking. These are all challenges that benefit from a more networked region. So we work on that. We still maintain those ties with china, as i mentioned. We do believe that its important to keep the channels of communication open. Were glad to have a willing partner to continue the dialogue, but we want more from our chinese counterparts. We want a more advanced dialogue on intentions and visions for the future, regional Security Architecture and we want more in terms of contributing on the real World Problems where we think our interests do have alignment. And i mentioned the korean peninsula. Were at a particular juncture there where weve made an attempt to restart diplomacy with the meeting that steve beegen and his team had in sweden. Well see where that goes. But in the meantime weve been doing our part to try to maintain pressure on pyongyang through the enforcement of sanctions so that they will come to the table with a particular mind set where they want to be productive, where they want to Reach Solutions with us and we think that its critical that all countries who have the capability to contribute to that do so. And what were seeing from china right now, unfortunately, is some slippage in the enforcement of the sanctions particularly when it comes to shiptoship transfers in their territorial waters. And so we want them and need them to do better on that front. So as we compete and, by the way, we say competitor. We dont say adversary or enemy, thats an important distinction for americans because competition can be done in a way that is benign and doesnt lead to conflict and can bring out the better in both parties if its done in the right way. We want to compete at a minimum, safely, and not spiral the relationship in a downward direction that would be dangerous for all parties concerned. Thats our basic framework. Were well into the Implementation Phase of that. To do that more effectively as was mentioned, we have created a new ship for you, underneath myself, the assistant secretary, i have four Deputy Assistant secretaries of defense and the fourth that was created as glen said is for china. Its for the china challenge because it goes beyond just the bilateral interactions with the pla. Its an office that will be directors under it that will deal with different parts of the defense enterprise and seek alignment within our department for the china challenge. Its one thing to have a great strategy, its another thing to have policy statements, but its another to bring the enterprise of the department of defense into alignment for the challenge. Well have directors that deal with other regions. Well have somebody on the china desk that deals with africa, somebody who deals with middle east and europe and russia and actually will help our Department Work on those issues rather than having to integrate at a very senior level. Well have people who deal strategy and plans. Well have people who understand china and are involved in china policy informing that process in a better way. Well have people who deal with ec and tech. Everything from the 5g challenges, protection of the Innovation Base in the United States, understanding chinas own efforts at acquiring technology and modernizing themselves better. That will all be under our china ship to we think put us in a better position to compete well and effectively and do so in a safe way. With that i may pause and see if that is enough to disperse some discussions, questions, comments, whatever may be on your mind. Thank you, glen. Thank you very much, randy. As i mentioned earlier in our previous discussion beforehand, i wanted to ask you about what is the pentagon thinking about china in the arctic, if you could address that. Well, we put out an annual report at the pentagon called the pla military power report and every year we select a special topic or two to include as special annexes. At this point were more in the observation phase and trying to better understand phase. We see certainly a lot of interests on the part of the chinese, joining the Arctic Council as an observer. Their own stated policy of the arctic silk road. They put silk road behind just about everything now or belt or road. But theyve near arctic state. Theyve declared themselves a near arctic state. The heavy investment in ice breakers. Theres some ambition there and i think were trying to understand the full spectrum of whats driving that ambition. Maybe resource interests, it may be new routes for commerce and it may very well be military in terms of whats a driver. And those arent mutually exclusive but w