Annual summer conference. It is my pleasure this afternoon to introduce earl hess. Earl is the stuart w. Mcclelland chair in history at Lincoln Memorial university in tennessee. He is the author of more than 20 books. I have a long list here. Actually, one of my favorite. Ooks of earls books i read in graduate school and is one of the finest and one of the very first books to explore soldier motivation and ideology. It is an outstanding book. But he has done any others that include pickets charge, a book on field fortifications. A book on Braxton Bragg as well. A lot of people dont love Braxton Bragg. Im not sure you will love him after you read earls book, but it is a fair and well researched, deeply analytical look. A number of awards, including the tom watson price for his books on civil war tactics, something he will be speaking about today. And i should note, this book fighting for atlanta, is published by the university of North Carolina press. That will be his topic. Let me welcome earl hess. [applause] mr. Hess thank you, pete, very much for that nice, generous introduction. Fighting for atlanta tactics, terrain in the civil war is the topic. The purpose is to understand one of the more important elements that influence the course of operations in the Atlanta Campaign. It is a followup to a trilogy that i did several years ago on field fortifications in the eastern campaigns. That was volume two of that trilogy coverage. Fortification in the Overland Campaign and in volume three, the petersburg campaign. The Atlanta Campaign was one of r campaigns in the savoy in the civil war that heavily used fortifications. Atlanta, vicksburg in the western theater. A word or two may be in general about the Atlanta Campaign for people who may not have that much familiarity with it. Very briefly. It is a major, long campaign. 100,000 union troops under william p. Sherman divided into three armies. The army of the cumberland, the army of the tennessee, led by Joseph Johnson until july 18 when he was replaced by john bell hood. And the third, the army of the ohio, pitted against the Confederate Army of tennessee, led by Joseph Johnson until july 18 when he was replaced by john bell hood. The Campaign Began near dalton, georgia, in the first week of may. There was almost continuous contact, and about nine or 10 major battles along the way until atlanta fell on september 2, 1864. Sherman drove 100 miles into confederate territory. A campaign of that length and size is unusual. The history of operations was affected by many factors, however i look primarily at one factor, field fortifications. Let me point out that when i did my trilogy on fortifications, it became clear to me that it is very dangerous to look at the history of field fortification without understanding typography as well as tactics. That is why the subtitle is tactics, terrain, and trenches the civil war. You have to add soldier life. To me, that is one of the more fascinating aspects in the history of field fortifications. How do soldiers live and fight in field works . Now then, very briefly, what do i mean by tactics . Well, it is a complicated topic. I have written a book about some of it so i wont go into a lot of detail here. Divide tactics into two major components. Number one, primary tactics. Those are the tactical formations and maneuvers that were designed to organize masses of men on the battlefield and on the march. But those maneuvers and formations were used by union and confederate. They were universal. And they did not change during the course of the civil war. I wrote a book on primary tactics, which pete mentioned a moment ago, published in 2015 called civil infantry tactics. A war infantry tactics. I dont cover them in this book because theres no need to. Instead, i deal in the atlanta book with the secondary level of tactics which used to be called grand tactics by civil war historian spirit i think that is out of favor. They call it operations today. This is the level of the field Army Commander. Do i attack or act on the outflank, do i try to the enemy . Higher level than the primary level. This is what is covered in this atlanta book because commanders, johnston, hood, sherman, they all had to deal with field fortifications in one way or the other. To put it briefly, sherman adopted what i like to call it a cautiously offensive mode of operation in the Atlantic Campaign. If that doesnt sound silly. I dont think it does. A cautiously offensive mode of operations. Sherman wanted to conserve his manpower and avoid costly frontal attacks, but at the same time put a lot of continuous pressure on johnston and hood so he could keep the ball rolling continuously for four months. One of the interesting aspects of the Atlanta Campaign that historians dont point out is that it took place simultaneously with the Overland Campaign and the petersburg campaign. Grant and sherman coordinated themselves. One of the things that grant told sherman, you need to keep johnston so busy in georgia that he will not send reinforcements to help lead. And i will keep lee so busy in to help lee. And i will keep lee so busy in virginia that he cannot afford to send reinforcements to johnson and both agreed to do that. That is one of the most uppermost things in shermans mind. We cannot let the confederates lay around or they will do something dangerous like that. One of the cautiously offensive ways that sherman conducted himself is he comes up against a strong confederate fortified position. He also fortifies in front of it. He holds confederate attention with sniping and artillery fire so they are distracted and he moves part of his army group to try to outflank johnston right or left and pry him out of the fortified position without having to attack it. This is a mode that sherman learned to do well through the Atlantic Campaign. Now and then he did attacks, but generally speaking he conducted his campaign with a wonderful balance of attack and caution. A cautiously offensive mode of operations. Joseph johnson, very conservative defensive mode of operating. Dig in on good ground, hope they federals will attack, and do nothing. Passive defensive. Johnston rarely thought in terms of counterattacking against sherman. And he didnt even do very much to harass the federals when they tried to cross the three major rivers. To be crossed during the Atlanta Campaign. And he was ready to evacuate strong positions at the first sign of a u. S. Flanking operation. He conserved his men, and his men loved him, but he gave up tons of territory quickly. He frustrated jefferson davis, that is why davis fired him on july 18 and replaced him with john bell hood, one of his core commanders, who talked big about the need to counterattack and on july 20, 22nd, and 28. He attacked, failed, lost 11,000 men and reverted to relying on massive earthworks and a passive defense like johnston had. We will talk more as we go along about that. Terrain. Well, the terrain of the Atlantic Campaign is fascinating. How many have visited this region . Wonderful, i am glad to see that. More than i anticipated. This map will show the general theater of operation. I would like to divide the geography of the Atlantic Campaign into three primary zones. The first zone goes from dalton, georgia, about 30 miles south of chattanooga, down to the etowah river. Works, i will be utterly delighted. There we go, it worked a little bit. It doesnt seem to be working when it hits that slide, though. River. Wah it is right here, right in the middle of the map. Between the etowah and dalton is largely appalachian terrain, characterized by large ridges that are wonderful defensive positions. We will see some photographs. Rocky faceon top of ridge, it is unassailable by a frontal attack. All the problem is they have gaps in them every few miles. All sherman has to do is find the nearest undefended gap to right or left of johnstons position, and he can outflank his position easily. My argument is this first topographic zone is good for the federals. It facilitates their movement. Sherman is able to move through zone number one pretty quickly, in only three weeks time. On maybattles at dalton 8, cassville may 19. Once the campaign crosses the etowah river and enters the second zone between the etowah and the chattanooga, piedmont country. You are out of appalachia. Piedmont designates a topographic terrain that is halfway between the mountains and coastal plain. Rolling terrain. It so happens that in this part of the piedmont, there is not much development. Only a few small farms. A lot of ground that is covered by thick woods and brush. Very bad and few roads. This terrain favors johnston and the confederates pit once you this terrain favors johnston and the confederates. Once you find out what road sherman is taking coming you block it with troops, you stymie him. When sherman enters this zone on may 23, rain begins to distend, turning the roads into reverse of mud. Sherman is stuck. The second zone is the worst phase of the Atlanta Campaign for the federals. Zone three favored the confederates. It took from may 23 until july 9. So, sherman is worried. He is worried johnston may use delay to send troops to grant. That is why he orders a massive assault at Kennesaw Mountain on june 27. 15,000 troops dont even dent the confederate line, and he loses 3000 men in the process. Learned his lesson from it. But generally, sherman has to pry the confederates out of each fortified position in zone two. Once the campaign crosses the chattahoochee river, it is a different story. It is shermans advantage in the terrain game. South of the chattahoochee is still piedmont country, but it is welldeveloped. Lots of farms, plantations, the big city of atlanta with 10,000 people only 10 miles south of the chattahoochee. The federals dont have much difficulty in maneuvering trips through this. Atlanta is defended by a massive ring of earthen fortifications that we will see photographs of. Sherman has to deal with that. But he will do that. The three rivers are part of the terrain. I remember a long time ago, the historian Richard Mcmurray giving a talk in which he said that the three big rivers of the Atlanta Campaign were major impediments to shermans operations. I completely disagree with him. Those rivers, and that is the , just south of the resaca, and then the second one is the etowah south of kingston and cassville, and the third is the chattahoochee, short of atlanta, they were natural barriers, yes. Sherman however had little difficulty crossing them, primarily because the confederacy had not bothered to contest the crossings. They did not position significant numbers of troops to harass the federals as they tried the difficult task of crossing those rivers. Passive defense by johnston, even by hood. There were a couple of exceptions to that, yes. But for the most part, the crossings were largely uncontested. The federals had good pontoon bridges. They had people who knew how to lay them, too. The rivers were no impediment. Now then, to the main event. The main course. These were just the hors doeuvres so far. The Atlanta Campaign, big topic. This is a photograph taken in april of 1866 of union earthworks artillery position. Mountain itself. Little kennesaw. The little hump on the right is pigeon hail. Pigeon hill. Union earthworks in the foreground, it eroded and degraded, yes. Temporary field fortifications made out of local material eroding as time goes by. Army commanders let me give you a little preface about how field fortifications were constructed in the atlantic Atlanta Campaign and elsewhere. Generally speaking, a generic explanation. Number one, the first step, the Army Commander decides where we stand. Johnston has to make a decision on this ridge of cassville on the kennesaw arrange. Then he tells his chief engineer to go out and stake out the line. The chief engineer has to look at the topography, he has to figure out how to place the trench as close to the military crest of the slope as possible. The term military crest refers to the spot on the slope where you can see all of the ground in front of you, so there is no dead space that the enemy can advance on that you cant see him. The military crest can be near or oftentimes it is different from the natural crest. You have to be smart enough to tell the difference between the two of them. They literally stake it out. They take stakes. Like a construction project. The next step is for the infantry troops to line up there. You issue them shovels and spades. And corder masses are responsible for the entrenching tools, they have to be issued every day. You do not yet have these little individual shovels that you do in the modern world, and world war ii for example. 90 of the trench digging in the Atlanta Campaign, union and confederate, done by infantry troops. There is not enough black slaves available to johnston or engineer troops to be able to do all of that. The basic trench, you dig a trench at least three feet deep into the ground, you pile the dirt in front of you to form a parapet, a bank of earth that shields you. Often, before you do that, you can have the time to gather some loose trees and rocks and pile them up on the ground in front of where you want to dig so when you pile the dirt on top, you can add quick height and get better protection. That means you are basically waist deep or so in the ground and the rest of your body is protected by a built up berm. If you have time, you improve this basic trench with all sorts of embellishments, i like to call them. A traverse. It is a wonderful invention to protect yourself from flanking fire. Flanking fire is called in filleted. Erms on if the enemy gets artillery in a position where they can shoot along your trench line, against your flank, you are in deadly trouble. The only thing to do is to dig a trench and a parapet at an angle to the mainline. Look at this photograph of resaca. Taken in april of 1866. Here. Averses are there are four of them. This is the main trench line. It is marked. If you have the time to do it, this is the best way to deal with fire. You can hold on, protect yourself from flanking fire, and hopefully, stay in place. Another embellishment that is widespread in the Atlantic Campaign is the head log. You want to put some sort of log on top of the parapet to protect your head while you are firing. And you raise it above the parapet by a block. A couple inches of a slit between the top of the parapet and the bottom of the head log, you can stick the musket through, see through it, and find through, see through it, and fire. The best thing to do is to cut down a pine tree. They are straight usually. They are softwood, they are easy to cut, and they are light to lift up on top of the parapet. The best head log is 810 inches wide. One day, i counted the rings in a sawedoff pain tree, and i estimated that a pine tree 810 inches wide is about 3040 years old. Imagine a pine tree sprouting up from a seed in the days of Andrew Jackson in northwest georgia. 40 years later, the confederates are nearby and cut it down. That is what we are talking about. I could not find a photograph of a real head log using a pine tree, but this is the best i could find. Confederate earthwork at atlanta occupied by the federals. There is a head log. Can you see it . It is not a pine log, it is a building timber from a house. That will do, too, of course. A couple guys sitting on it. Building timber. You can see the blocks of wood there. Look at this. [indiscernible] enemy artillery knocks it. [indiscernible] microphone . Earl i will try. You cant fire from it if you are down deep in the deepest part of the trench. The firing step is raised up a couple of inches from the bottom of the trench so you can step up onto it and be able at a height to fire under the head log. And you step back and the deeper part of the trench to save yourself. This is a pretty sophisticated form of trench. It is not a basic trench anymore if you have a bank head in it, and if you have a head log in it. And also, if you have more time and you want to maximize your defensive position, my gosh, you do some clear cutting of trees in front of it so the enemy cannot sneak up on you. 50 yards wide, 200 yards wide, whatever you can do. And it may seem kind of ironic but in addition to that, you obstructions to replace the trees. Different kinds of obstructions that are designed to force an attacking enemy to stop at short range of your firing line. So that you can shoot them down better in their Forward Movement and their Forward Movement has stopped. There are several categories of things. Before i point them out, i want to tell you about the ponder house. I think this is the most famous photograph to come from the Atlanta Campaign. Widely reproduced because of this ponder house, that is the white house you see there. Built by a guy named ponder in 1857 made of brick and stucco. It is near the northwest quarter of the atlanta city defenses, near a confederate fort designated as fort x. More popularly called fort hood. The photographer is standing on the parapet of fort x, looking at the ponder house. The ponder house ponder left his house in 1863 because his wife ellen was unfaithful to him according to the story. She was blatantly having an affair with somebody. And he was humiliated and basically abandoned her in 1863. Ellen stayed there until the spring of 1864 when she also fled before sherman got there so the house was empty. Used by confederate sharpshooters, perforated by u. S. Artillery. Another interesting aspect, ponder owned 65 slaves before the war. If you are interested in the history of west point, the first africanamerican to graduate from the u. S. Military academy was a man named henry flipper. He was the son of one of the ponder slaves. This photograph so widely reproduced. You can see lots of obstruc