This event hosted by the fifth determine of peace is an hour and a half. Good morning. Im alexander while other things at the institution of peace and id like to welcome you all today to this important discussion with the Inspector General john sob go and the Lessons Learned and the integration that affects combatants. Id like to welcome you for joining us online and the webcast and you can also follow the conversation on twitter at usip with todays hashtag. Thats at usip at cpi cpg i are. What check out the dew podcast and back slash podcasts. Which will conclude this event featuring leading voices and National Security. Usip was founded five years ago as an independent and a nonpartisan to be charged with resolving violence the conflict. Since 2002, or rule has worked closely with the Civil Society and a violent conflict to support the process. And it goes without saying with uncertainty on the impeachment process and how that remains true. What is certain is that the outlook of todays conversation with those combatants will remain if we get a Peace Process sooner rather than later. The report we are launching today is a Lessons Learned program. In some of the earlier versions and the first and only study to examine all 2001 Integration Programs and their effectiveness. We have an excellent panel lined up today and distinguish panel which should be moderated by scott worden our director of our program. First ive the pleasure of introducing to john sopko provide the keynote address. John sopko was sworn in as the effective general for the construction of president obama in 2012 and 30 years of experience the investigations as a prosecutor and senior federal government adviser and in addition to working for working on capitol hill where they held key positions in the senate please join me now and welcoming john sopko to the stage. View applause thank you very much for that kind introduction and good morning to all of you. A special thanks to the institute of peace and we have worked with them in the years that i have been in hoping the relationship continues. I stand here today at an interesting time and the current chapter of our nations longest war which in a few weeks will be marking the 18th anniversary and in my seven years i have learned that there is one thing that you never underestimate the unpredictable nature of the Matters Regarding afghanistan and i think you will agree with me in the past few weeks we have underscored that point. The subject today is the reintegration of the effects of again afghanistan. That will and is relevant to the future and the National Security interests of more no matter happens in afghanistan and in the United States with that time to come. If there is ever to be a true sustainable peace in afghanistan, reintegration of the taliban effort who will be necessary component. Again, whatever that incurs or years from now. That is why todays report by sigar is so important. It is the first independent, public, official u. S. Government report of integrating the over can battens into the Afghan Society. It is the seventh lesson that we have advisement that we handed out which links you to all seven reports and we began this lesson in this program and scott worden let it for a while until he went back to the institute of peace. We began that program with then general john allen and the u. S. Ambassador as well as other senior government officials. Who reminded us that our agency was the only Government Agency with the mandate to look at the whole government and the whole of government efforts in afghanistan. Like our prior reports, todays report is available in traditional and interactive format on our websites. Www. Sigar. Mill and the United States government we are the only one that will determine whats in a the track did for. Sigar took the specific investigation as they would say in part because in the spring of 2018, i was traveling and senior u. S. Military and diplomatic leaders in kabul expressing interest in more about what didnt work in creating combatants. The body of literature with practitioners called the er and the reintegration that you notice that they are reintegration. We also viewed reintegration as a topic because a large scale combatants is genuinely not seen as foreseeable in the future. The goal of todays report as to help u. S. And other coalition agencies as they prepare for that task of assisting with the reintegration of the 60,000 taliban fighters. As well as the numerous other non taliban combatants. In the event that the Afghan Taliban agreed negotiations reach a deal. The report which ironically actually started 14 months ago today. Relies on 51 interviews of u. S. An afghan other officials in a review of thousands of pages of documents and academic material as well as the rigorous period in that regard i am grateful to form a u. S. Special representative for afghanistan and james jawbone as well as day data ericsson and as well as others who appear in this report. We really do appreciate their work. We also appreciate the department of defense and the state treasury which also provided valuable insight and feedback. While this report is a cigar product it is really a collaborative effort for all of us. In that report, we have outlined four teed five bigs, ted le cids and 50 recommendations a policy makers. In an effort, to keep our remarks a little shorter these negotiations. I am going to just highlight a few takeaways from that report. First of all, as we all know, u. S. Goal in afghanistan is sustainable and a political settlement between the government and the taliban that brings us peace and stability. There has been hope that a u. S. Taliban for tomorrow will have again Peace Process which could lead to a piece of it. While there is no u. S. Taliban deal at this time, we have the afghan political settled it and the ongoing fighting as donors from supposing the efforts overtime. Our teams close examination of those efforts led to our first recommendation. That is not as long as the taliban continues, the u. S. Should not i, repeat not support a comprehensive program with former fighters. Because of the difficulty of protecting and tracking former fighters. This report as i mentioned and examines the five name 2001 efforts in afghanistan. It assesses their effectiveness or lack thereof. Further, examples of psychopaths in they provide the real reintegration. They also examines the opportunity and constraints for efforts for now and the future to do quesadillas of reintegration and come up as well as review the rear reiterate youre on reintegration. I review all of these efforts that any reintegration effort its very likely to fail in the absence of an agreement between the taliban in terms of how we reintegrate this kind of interference. Why is that . Its quite obvious, our review points out that the reintegration effort is more likely to have a greater chance of success to formally hostile parties to demonstrate a high level commitment and a mutual trust and will allow the fires to peacefully participate in a program. Without this, the fighters joined the program the and their families face enormous risk of retribution and during the war if not impossible in times to provide protection and that risk of retribution and security generally is a key reason that programs did not succeed. Other factors with a very weak economy and livelihood opportunities with former fighters and Afghan Government to implement those programs. Additionally early efforts to de mobilize the militias failed in part because those forces or at the same time partnered with those militias for securities and other sources. U. S. Forces dependence then the commanders and groups are supposed to expand. Based upon our review of the documents Program Evaluations in the independent studies have found mass programs did not lead to any significant number of reintegrations into society and does not leave the reduced sin of violence. We would not be reading a lot about whats going on in afghanistan. Our report also highlights that from 2009 onward, the u. S. Viewed reintegration primarily as a tool to fracture the taliban. That approach we understand that approach and unintended and damaging consequences and basically undermines the reintegration efforts the reconciliation there is no evidence in splinter the result in the current environment suggest that the program would have any greater chance of success then those efforts. Moreover, given the legacy of prior programs, and renewed program we fear could in fact i have to trust needed to establish a truly lasting Peace Process. Because the past is often prolonged, one goal of evaluating previous reintegration efforts was to thrive lessons and recommendations a future efforts. Should the conducive environment present itself. Ive weve seen in recent weeks of galveston moved quite rapidly and quite unexpectedly. The whole dramatic engagement by the United States and the government in recent months suggest that it would be prudent for all of us and particularly u. S. Policy makers to consider now what reintegration would look like following a Peace Agreement to the Afghan Government in taliban. Rather than waiting a day after the report we recommended that the u. S. Only considers supporting that reintegration effort that first the Afghan Government and taliban sign a Peace Agreement. And a Peace Agreement that provides a framework and there is a significant reduction of overall violence and if there is a strong monitoring and system in place and i think we need to highlight the department of states today of raising serious concerns about corruption in afghanistan and theres a reason why. We need strong monitoring with the program on really integration. Our report is very clear that any Reintegration Program, even under the auspices of the settlement is still facing significant challenges. One of the biggest problem we highlight is the poor state of the afghan economy. Job listen us for example will present a major hurdle for successful reintegration. Unemployment now stands at 23 and a 30 Unemployment Rate for the one fifth of 20 of the afghan population between the ages of 15 and 24. An estimated 400,000 afghan youth enter the job market and four fires to come in from the cold and join society. They will need access to a stable job or they then may return to entering they more profitable but illicit economic sectors such as organized crime, kidnapping and narcotics traffic. Additionally we have the Peace Agreement with some portion with seven of gang refugees which expected to return. They are now and he ran and afghanistan. The world bank the afghan return from pakistan and iran of 700 trying to displaced the driver or conflict. These vulnerable groups in the already anemic economy as well as the capacity of the Afghan Government to provide social services and great jobs and humanitary aid. Adding tens of thousands of armed of gain and taliban soldiers and their families will support and only exacerbate this challenge. It will also be critical of efforts to be directed not only the taliban but also members of state aligned militia and other armed groups that are fighting. Attacks failing to do so would give the taliban a rationale for not participating as they will likely seek to protect themselves against their former rivals. Accordingly, successful reintegration will continue economic for galveston and the rest of the community. We know approvingly that a number of voters right now including the United States are working with the bank on plans for a financial and Technical Support of unison with the goal of improving afghans economy and the services of the Peace Agreement. In a post settlement scenario this was for reintegration and the population. Nevertheless, and lend me emphasize this. This is secretary pompeos organizing today that pervasive corruption in the Afghan Government institution paired with limited capacity could undermine tangible benefits and resources to as you sigar prior work that i have led that has shown that without adequate oversight and additionally by the Community Resources tended for soldiers and at the risk of being stolen by corrupt government officials and senior commanders. If benefits are provided but do not also reach the communities they live in. The resentment that follows may also undermine the information efforts. In addition, we have to face the reality of the feature of the Security Forces. The afghan National Security forces and the military of over 300,000. That will provide them the further complication. The taliban has shown interest to integrate of the Afghan Security force i dont have a seat on a desire he is one of the most contentious issues in the Afghan Government and the taliban with the u. S. Government. Failure to add to really result will threaten again the implementation of any successful peace between both sides. Again, since u. S. Funds will continue to support afghan Security Forces. Robust an oversight would be paramount to ensure the successful integration of our adversaries and successful and safe views of those funds. Some reintegration any taliban fighters who fight seasonally already part of the social fabric that may occur naturally and will continue just added into thousand one. And many talibans struggle beyond the resurgence e to obtain that military power. Tens of thousands rule reintegrate with a weak economy and the security and the tribal disputes and unresolved grievances. I ask a could have disgruntled fault with the terms of at peace. So in a piece of the settlement scenarios u. S. Policy makers must consider the conditions in which they support these funds with reintegration efforts. Including the weather of which they should be targeted programs or Weather Development programs are appropriate to address the issues up front. In addition, the u. S. Sanctions have limited assistance and certain members of the taliban and in control they need to have those individuals and areas excluded from the economic development. If a peace settlement opens the door for a system to reach previously accessible population. The community will also face hard questions about how and where they will direct that assistance. The logic justifies Reintegration Program will assume that ex combatants pose greater security risks then all other born herbal populations such as jobless youth. Its reasonable to observe that afghans will have recruitment groups such as isis and reintegration therefore should be a appropriately balanced of under other priorities. Finally, as quickly sigar as pointed out before in our High Risk Congress and issued earlier here, an afghan political settlement will not be into play of insecurity, corruption or weak government capacity. Something that u. S. Agencies need to take into account of the successful disagreement. And conclusion, it is often been said that its far easier to start a war then two and one. A sentiment that i view as an Afghan Government that we would all agree with. Even the political settlement is reached, of grandstands problems will not magically disappear. The moment the ink dries on an agreement. We have to be realistic. Thats what this report is saying and lets be realistic. A failure to reintegrate combatants of all stripes and to Afghan Society will only lead to the continuation of the years cycle that has led to generations of afghans growing up, knowing only of death and destruction. Likewise, which has led to many of the afghan supporters around the world continuing to sacrifice treasure in this recent land. Should a sustainable and political settlement be reached, some of which the success of that agreement in large part on the successful reintegration of the taliban and other combatants. As are reports of view an efforts in columbia this is not an easy process. Should the United States support such endeavors. We must learn from past mistakes. We must set the reasonable expectations and must identify and Employment Practices in all of this i hope is insisted by the report that will be released today. Let me end by just saying this. Im saying this as a sigar and the great team that has given you this support. This is an outstanding team. First of all, im going to ask them to rise if thats allowed. He kate bateman led the team with this report and her colleagues were maryam and i always mispronounce your last name but please forgive me for my ignorance. Matthew reuben, or is matthew. Jordan sure you. Along with nick ally, tracey and of course last but not least joe who is in charge of our program. These people will be here today and some will be at the Panel Discussion and if you have any questions let me just say that ive worked in the government for 40 years. I worked on the hill and the department of justice law any department of comedy as well as sam none. Even its people like that team that makes me proud and puts the special in special general construction. Thank you very much. applause i do not want to take and im just a big mouth for the agency. I dont want you to take the time away from the great panel and i thin