Recordings program. Quite wonderful to be here with everybody. Kent was with us for years and years, spent time at the university of south carolina. For the next 75 minutes, well share insights from the secret white house tapes, and well l in, to explore dynamics there but also to relate them to contemporary developments, to see what kinds of questions they prompt us to ask about contemporary dynamics, about the history they contain, about parallels to todays events, about the practice of democracy itself. Just a word about the recordings program. We were established in 1998, and the only we are institution of this kind doing transcribenalyze and the secret president ial tapes that president s made from 1940 so franklin, roosevelt through Richard Nixon. We do this work at the miller center. Well,it offsite as because so much work these days is browserbased. But we publish work through the university of Virginia Press and its electronic imprint. The president ial recordings digital initiative, digital edition, is ours. We also publish snippets of conversation, kind of the greatest hits, through millercenter. Org, and we will share many of those clips with you today. Toore we get going, i want acknowledge a few people who have helped us along the way. The National Historical publications and records commission, an arm of the National Archives and records administration, has been very generous in their support, and we appreciate their belief and confidence in us and the work that we do. Id like to acknowledge carrie matthews, associate editor and our program administrator. Carries guiding hand is evident in every thing we do. She keeps us honest, and makes sure there are as few mistakes as possible in our work. If there are any here today, that is all on me. To finally, id like acknowledge mark saunders. Mark saunders was the director of the university of Virginia Press, the founder and motive force behind its electronic friend. And a close mark passed away this weekend, suddenly. It is a tremendous loss for all of us. Mark had a great vision for our program, taking us from letterpress additions we were publishing with norton that worked out very well, but mark ushered us into the digital age, and we are deeply saddened by his loss. We will miss his guiding hand. But in the spirit of what mark wanted, which was for us to be an important voice in bringing this history to the United States, and encouraging Greater Transparency into the workings of the government and into the presidency, we will push on. And so we are pleased to be here today. To help us sort out the connections between past and hemmer will bee our guiding hand today. She is perfect for this job. She is an assistant professor in president ial studies at the miller center, a member of the president ial recordings program, and again a wonderful colleague. Ofs also editor and founder the Washington Post series made and the podcast past present. Running to nikki to here from the session she just moderated to help us. Prof. Hemmer i really look forward to this. Working with secret white house tapes is as exciting as it sounds, getting to be a fly on in wall in the oval office a time0s and 1970s, that big plots are being hatched and history is being made. We will hear from that, starting with marc, who will tell us a little about what the white house tapes tell us about endl ess wars, something that is incredibly timely. Of the also the author awardwinning book constructing them on monolith. Why dont you start us off . Prof. Selverstone thank you. So, the United States has been at war, on a war footing for 17 years, 18 years. Most conspicuously of course in iraq and afghanistan, but also in places as disparate as somalia, yemen, libya, syria. Collectively, these engagements have been known as the war on terror, or the global war on terror. Most recently, President Trump in his state of the Union Address referred to them as endless wars. Trumpesidents preceding recognized their endurance, and sought to at various points disengage in the midst of ongoing hostilities. They dont do so willingly necessarily, or even with the same amount of enthusiasm, but they sought to. Forcesnt bush, in the agreement with iraq, something , looked toto pursue extricate the United States from 2011, withember combat forces out of the and by 201109, u. S. Combat forces out of iraq. In the fall, into the winter of to begin theed departure of u. S. Forces from afghanistan, in the summer of 2011. And President Trump most recently spoke about withdrawal from syria, in an announcement on december of 2018, that has subsequent been qualified by the pentagon. This is not the first time in recent history that a president has sought to turn over the fighting in ongoing conflicts to local allies, particularly in the midst of the unpopularity of these wars, and with a specific timetable in mind. The associated term vietnamization, with the process that Richard Nixon pursued, to deamericanize the war, wind down the american profile in vietnam and turned the fighting over to the South Vietnamese forces. But this wasnt the only time americans looked to wind down engagement in vietnam. President kennedy did so, in the middle of his 1000 days. In the summer of 1962, president john f. Kennedy began planning to get american troops out of vietnam. Planning wereh produced in early 1963, were june, theninto may and presented to kennedy in fall of 1963. President kennedy was presented with plans to get virtually all United States combat troops, not combat troops necessarily at that time, they were military advisors, but u. S. Soldiers out of vietnam by the end of 1965. In an effort to kickstart that process, 1000 advisors were to be withdrawn by the end of 1963. We know abou tt this because of the pentagon papers, which has a section on this withdrawal. But we also know about it in much greater color and texture because of the Kennedy White house tapes. So what i would like to do for you now is to play a combination of tapes, tapes we spliced together from meetings that took place on october 2, 1963, one of them a morning session, relatively small between kennedy and Senior National security advisors, and then an evening National Security council which a after Public Statement was made in the rose garden of the white house indicating the United States would be leaving vietnam by 1965, and that 1000 troops would be withdrawn by the end of 1963. The people we will hear from in this conversation are president kennedy, secretary of defense Robert Mcnamara, National Security advisor george bundy, and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, maxwell taylor. [audio recording] it is going well the first three quarters [inaudible] we can take over the forces, in conjunction with we need a way to get out of vietnam. To leave forces when they are not needed, i think it is wasteful and it, cates both their problems and ours complicates both their problems and ours. So that goes back to paragraph two, mac. Yes, it does. Well, it is something we debated very strongly. I think it is a major question. I will just say this, we talked to 174 officers, vietnamese and u. S. In the case of the u. S. I always asked, when can you finish this job in the sense that you will reduce the insurgency to little more than sporadic incidents . [inaudible] actually, thats not necessary. I assume theres no major factors, new factors entering well lets say it anyway. Doesnt w965, if it ork, well get out of the delta. [inaudible] were looked like we totally optimistic overly optimistic. And i am not sure, id like to know what benefit we got out at this time, announcing 1000. Influenced, the course of action. People, we dothe have a plan for reducing the exposure of u. S. Combat uerrillal to the g actions in South Vietnam, actions that the people of South Vietnam should gradually develop a capacity to suppress themselves. I think this will be of great value to us in meeting the very strong views of fulbright, and others that were bogged down in asia and will be there for decades. Prof. Selverstone so, many things that this conversation prompts, aside from Robert Mcnamara being the one pushing for this planning process. The intensive political nature of the withdrawal process, as much as it was key to the way folks were feeling in congress, to the flexibility of the timetable that kennedy seems to embrace, while the white house statement came out squarely and said we will look to be out by 1965. Kennedy seems to be hedging on that, if 1965 doesnt work, will simply get a new date. There are a host of other strategic, bureaucratic and economic reasons that kennedy is pursuing this withdrawal. One of the questions that does he really he get what wants . Thats something nikki and i want to engage with briefly. But initially, one of the goals of this withdrawal, other withdrawals, is to encourage your partners to fight better, to tell them, we arent here forever. That doesnt seem to have happened as a result of the kennedy withdrawal. The local partners didnt push on the way the administration wanted, so changes took place in the short time he was around to see that. We know from what took place in early 1964, that it was not sustainable. This is a question we need to ask, as we think about timetables for withdrawals. How effective are they . Are president s really able to sustain the domestic Political Support that they want to get from these . It is not clear that kennedy was able to do that, either. Is it really the case you are going to induce in local allies the capabilities and functions these withdrawals are supposed to provide . Prof. Hemmer that would be my question mark. You listen to the conversations, and you can see they are really thinking about this. They have a strategy. They have a set of theories. These are very smart people, engaging in what historians and americans would come to think of as the vietnam war. The same thing goes for some of the wars we are engaged in today. Is the answer that you cannot think your way out of these . What is the lesson to draw . Prof. Selverstone i would say, its a question i asked, too, the extent to which subsequent administrations have reflected nobody knows better than ken hughes, vietnamization. In kennedys case, i dont think they thought terribly hard about the timetable. Out,trhrew it particularly because the 1964 president ial campaign was coming up, and there was a real concern the u. S. Was getting bogged down in asia, as mcnamara says. But if you look at, say, the process president obama engaged in, the extended, monthslong review for afghanistan. The initial surge of troops in lateg of 2009, but in the , and wefall of 2009m, know about this through a series of wellplaced, welltimed leaks at the time, obama was getting his National SecurityTeam Together again and again. Would this be a surge of 10,000, 30,000, 40,000 troops, or more . Would we be going full counterinsurgency, trying counterterrorism . This is all playing out in the doing, and obama was something the Kennedy Administration did not to, to think much more rigorously about this and bring in the stakeholders. One thing neither seem to be sure of, the Kennedy Administration certainly, was to bring in congress. How do you get out of endless wars . Think harder about how you get into them, and have a better grip on that. Thekinds of questions about authorization for the use of military force, a major matter we look to engage on with these processes. Prof. Hemmer as you know, the vietnam war didnt end in 1963, or 1964, etc. It led to a real shakeup in u. S. Mcgee,s, and ian associate professor of president ial studies at the miller center, is going to walk us through somne of those insurgencies. Were getting now into the johnson and nixon tapes, and they get a little earthier. Theres going to be some swearing in these tapes, i just in the forthcoming segment. Good afternoon, everyone. Theres much more out there. [laughter] two short clips from Lyndon Johnsons secret white house recordings i want to share with you this afternoon. Discussingdoing so, the insurgencies in the 1960s, civil rights, antiwar, antipoverty activists compared to political insurgencies today. In doing so, i would like to step back from the standard left frame of politics. A profound challenge, but in many respects a functional political establishment in the United States. I would like to offer a about whatbservation that contrast means. My first clip comes from december 1956. 1966. From december lbjs presidency has entered decline at this point. Facing increasing resistance to the war on poverty, the emergence of a stronger antiwar movement, and taking serious losses in the november midterm elections. During a long telephone conversation that day, with bill moyers, president johnson turned to the question of how to encourage Sargent Shriver to stay on as office of the director of economic opportunity, the agency managing johnsons troubled war on poverty. Notson indicated he was giving the budget that shriver wanted, and offered blunt statements about his perception of the tension between funding for the war on poverty and the activist insurgencies. This is a clear indication of an establishment figures perception of the periods activism and what he saw as its cause. [audio recording] pres. Johnson i am not anxious for him to stay. I would like for him to. I think hes the best man for it, and he has my support and my confidence and so forth. Would, whatever figure i give in the budget, i will, what i did last year. But i cant keep him from being the victim of bobby and ribicvoff and clark, and i cant keep him from being the victim of the commies out here yesterday. I think that is hurting poverty more than any world in the world. With commies, these kids long hairs, saying they want poverty instead of vietnam. I think thats what people regard as the great society. Prof. Mckee the second clip, spring of 1968. Senator mccarthy of minnesota and senator kennedy launched campaigns trying to channel the insurgent political energy, the long hairs and commies johnson referred to against the president. On march 23, 1968, president johnson spoke with chicago mayor richard j. Daly. This is the establishment. Theyspoke about how thought Bobby Kennedy could be defeated by their network of mayors, governors and members of congress. In 1968 isdence striking. [audio recording] pres. Johnson the committee, to a man, they said, we welcome a primary, let them come in here. Pres. Johnson you and dick hughes, pennsylvania, texas. I dont think we will lose a single southern state. I counted the congressmen last night. We have 160 and he has 8, from massachusetts and new york, and most of them are real extreme orm leftwingers, and in a way, it is a good thing. The more that i think about it. Were trying to hold off, trying to do everything, and i was trying to talk to him, because i was giving him some sound advice. Pres. Johnson you were, and every but he knew that. But yes, its just as low. He doesnt seem to be going anyplace. Pres. Johnson hes going to get a lot of publicity, a lot of media treatment. I said to him, all you are going to do is try to divide our party. Pres. Johnson hes always got three or four polls hired, but we have to have four men to be my board of directors on this country. We need you and dick hughes of new jersey, who is solid as a rock. Ofhave to get barr and tate pittsburgh and philadelphia. They are solid as a rock. If, we have ohara, at the moment trying to buy it off, but if we can take ohio, illinois, pennsylvania and texas, and new jersey. Hell, were in. Pres. Johnson thats all of it. I think it will be a landslide. Despitekee of course, their confident expectations of a landslide, lbj would withdraw from the race a little more than a week later. After that, kennedy would be dead. The thing is, johnson and daly werent really wrong. President Hubert Humphrey would capture the nomination over mccarthy and mcgovern at the convention in chicago, which of course was tremendously disrupted by protests. Discussing this more, id argue the outcome would have been no different had the contest in fact been between johnson and Bobby Kennedy. Ultimately, despite trying to channel this energy from the activists of the period, both Bobby Kennedy and mccarthy were themselves establishment figures peered one, former attorney general and brother of a slain president , and the other a senator. Both of them were trying to capture the antiwar, civil rights insurgency johnson reacted to. The establishment johnson and daly discussed in the second conversation. Partly this is the limits of the clinical strength of the insurgency itself. After all, nixon wins the election that fall. But also, they were not really of those movements. They were ultimately part of the establishment themselves, not really part of the activism or the insurgency. This is the broad contrast i want to draw to our current movement. We, too live in an era of insurgencies, but in contrast to Bobby Kennedy, eugene mccarthy, could trump in part position himself with some degree of authenticity to his core audience as an outsider figure, not only mobilizing but also representing populist insurgent resentment and anger against the countrys political establishment. What that energy actually meant of course, we can discuss and debate. Represents anders, varianbt ot of the same thing. So today, facing the 2020 election, which will test trumps continued ability to ride that populist, outsider momentum and energy, as well as the ongoing strength of that move