Contained. The Woodrow WilsonCenter Hosted this onehour event. Mr. Pomeranz its a great pleasure today to welcome back austin carson. He also has the distinction of being a title viii scholar. He has just written a new book, secret wars covert conflict in international politics. And it will be available for purchase after todays talk. Dr. Carson is an assistant professor in the department of Political Science at the university of chicago. He has published widely already. In the international organization, the american journal of Political Science, journal of politics and security studies. He has already launched on his second book project which is ambitious which analyzes the role of politics and secrecy in international organizations. He received his phd from ohio state and as i previously mentioned, he was a Summer Research scholar under the title viii program here at the institute in 2013. With that, i will turn the floor over to austin. Prof. Carson great, thanks so much, will. Thanks also to all of you for coming. Its great to be back here at the Wilson Center. I really appreciate the institute to support the Cold War International history project. And a shoutout to victoria and sydney for all your done to make it possible to come out here. I want to start my talk about this book with a simple but i think profound question. Which is, how have we, as an international community, avoided world war iii after suffering two catastrophic global conflicts in the first half of the 20th century . We have so far managed to avoid it. And the most common answer that scholars have given is it has something to do with the spread of democracy, with the emergence of international law, the development of Nuclear Weapons and mutually assured destruction, or the structure of International Systems for much of that postwar period bipolarity. One of the arguments my book advances is a sort of provocative but interesting claim, that a nonobvious reason for why weve avoided world war iii is secrecy. I essentially argued that factors like the spread of democracy or Nuclear Weapons are insufficient to prevent ideological and geopolitical disagreements from emerging among the major powers of the political system. Civil wars happen, smaller wars happen, and interests, opportunistic or defensive remain. And those clashes of interest invite militarized disputes and invite situations that could escalate to larger and larger scale of conflict. Limited war, as an exercise is very difficult. Its hard to restrain oneself when an adversary might not respect the same form of restraint. Limited war is often times messy. In this book, i argue that leaders believed that secrecy specifically about external no external military interventions, could help keep those inevitable clashes of political interest that can emerge and take manifestation on the battlefield, kept those clashes from becoming larger wars. Its specific use. Hiding external military intervention. So the focus is on covert forms of military intervention which i will talk about in a bit more detail, and as far as the secrecy dynamics that surround it. Using secrecy allows governments, major powers, to conceal aspects of conflict which would otherwise invite domestic political reactions or reputational reactions or miscommunicate among the adversaries in a way that would make limited war difficult to maintain. One of the things i developed in that book is the process is supported by a surprising and interesting form of collusion. What you will see later on in my discussion is a presentation of some of the raw materials, which show the degree to which the United States for example was aware of covert soviet or Chinese Military involvement in some of the most important wars of the 20th century. And despite knowing that, chose not to use that information as a political weapon and to stay quiet themselves about that facet of the war. One thing that this needs is part of how we have avoided world war iii has come at a steep price. What the book lays out doesnt wrestle with a time but begins a conversation about the requirement of outright deception, misleading, dissembling to the american and other publics. Not just trivial matters, but who was killing home during some of these killing whom during some of these conflicts. We might go now, and i might be able to show you evidence of the truth of the covert side of the korean or vietnam war. It means the stories we tell about those wars in the conventional sense is sometimes just not accurate. Its a bit to be wrestled with. While the book is historical, it raises hopefully some questions that are of clear relevance for today in a world of cyber conflict, for example, where the attribution or deniability of acts of aggression or coercion is at the center of debate about what to do with that form of conflict, and escalation dynamics remain a challenge for actors that are working in that space. So what i want to cover today is review some of the main ideas of the book, which have two components which have a conceptual or theoretical argument, and historical findings and narrative that i draw out in the book of the book. Then i am going to specifically walk you through some of the archival evidence. It showcases some of what the Wilson Center did for the project, which is provide some of the raw material for the claims i make in the book. And also because its fun to look at things that used to be secret. That is part of why my research is enjoyable. First i want to lay out the basic argument i make in the book. I developed a limited war theory of secrecy. I want to start first by stepping back and laying out some of the basics and define what the book is doing and what the book is talking about. I ask two questions specifically in the book. First, why do governments, major powers intervene militarily in an ongoing conflict . Why do they do it openly or covertly . The second question, why in instances of covert intervention, might an adversary collude in keeping that intervention secret . And its important to clarify that when i talk about Covert Military interventions, and i think this is an important point for today, as much as it is for the past, covertness is the intention to conceal a sponsors identity such as military action. The intention is to keep it secret and not officially acknowledge it. It doesnt mean that secrecy is always 100 effective. Just to take an example for the book, the u. S. Intervention in laos during the vietnam war was at a certain point regularly reported in america, in american newspapers, and yet, when you read the declassified material from the leaders managing a program, they were bending over backwards and engaging in incredible linguistic contortions trying not to acknowledge the american role in laos. The doesnt mean their role was overt in my definitional use of the term. It means it was more of an open secret that it was an effectively kept secret. The book is framed by two sort of conventional intuitions or scholarly explanations for what secrecy is doing during war, what governments are doing with secrecy. One is the traditional Operational Security logic. Loose lips sink ships. Wartime secrecy is a resource that, one side uses at the expense of the other side to protect ones forces in the field or engage in surprise military maneuvers. The other is, especially in american context, is to handle antiwar or sort of reluctance to go to war among people. If a leader thinks they require an intervention, but you have domestic public that is either asleep at the wheel or is opposed to the intervention, secrecy may be a way to get around that. And i think there is a lot of truth to both of these. These logics, especially the Operational Security one, is consistent with and can accompany the logic i will lay out. They are too simplistic in doing viewing secrecy number one as it being at expense of an adversary. I tell a collusive story in this book that is interesting. And it certainly doesnt happen all the time but it is one that suggests there is something more complicated going on. I also think there is something more complicated going on at the domestic level. Domestic populations and reactions are not always a force for restraint. They can be something that makes it difficult and costly for leaders to act with restraint. So i develop a distinct logic for secrecy that is anchored in the process of fighting limited war, especially in the modern era. I use that answer of what does secrecy do in war to answer both of my questions. It is both a reason to engage in a covert intervention in the first place, and it is a reason why, if youre an adversary and you witness your arrival using a covert intervention its in your best interest to keep quiet. I will boil down into four points that hopefully will stick. Number one, i start by arguing largescale military conflict, escalation of military conflict, which i define as a Regional Convention conflict or above, and the Current International system is ruinously destructive. Basically all states all the time or most states most of the time try to avoid conflicts reaching that level. That is the sort of starting point of the argument. I date that particular reality, or at least the perception and appreciation of that reality, to world war i, Chapter Three of the book, sort of kicks off this historical story i tell. Secondly, i argue that control and not just the costliness, in the modern era, is incredibly difficult. Modern kinds of politics make starting, controlling war once you start a war, controlling the scope and scale of it is very difficult in the modern era. Two reasons. One is domestic politics and the problem of hawks rather than doves. If you are following the news out of india and pakistan last week, one of the specialists of one of the thing specialists of south asia was saying part of the force that i have pushed the hand of india or pakistan into different stages of back and forth over kashmir was the fear of looking weak. In a democracy, that can be a significant problem. Even in a nondemocracy, it can be a significant problem. If the military in pakistan lets say views a leaders decision as too weak in the face of a rival, that could be the end of the government. That can make control of the escalation after people start dying, difficult to control. The other is a communication problem. Its difficult to know if you would like to engage in limited war, if the other side is going to as well. It takes two to tango in a limited war. The book gets into something that hasnt been analyzed in the field of International Relations with as much care as i think it should be, which is how do governments, through their behavior or words, but mostly behavior, communicate their interests in keeping conflict limited . They are willing to get involved with an intervention, but they want to keep controlled and geographically limited. How do you communicate that to an adversary . The third point in the sort of theoretical argument is that covert methods of intervention address those two escalation control problems, the problems with domestic hawks and problems with miscommunication. One of the nice things it does is allow you to provide arms or military personnel to one of the sides that you support without humiliating a major power that might come in on the other side. That is, you dont do your intervention in a way which creates domestic constraints for those reacting to your intervention. First of all, it helps retain escalation control even as you enter into and put your thumb on the scales of the conflict. The second mechanism that i develop is a little bit more subtle. The thing that adversaries appreciate that their counterpart has three options of the modern system. They have, dont intervene, overtly intervene, and covertly intervene. As of now. When you witness the other side engaging in covert intervention, that communicates something to you. It says they are willing to do something more than nothing. Theyre also more restrained and doing the maximum. Which is overt intervention passed the interests of their local ally. That can indicates a mix of resolve, because its nor the nothing, and restraint, because its something less provocative than the most extreme alternative. I think and i will show you some evidence of a second about evidence in a second about how that interpretation helps support and reinforce and provide a useful signal that one is interested in controlling the scale and scope of war even as one intervenes. And in the theory chapter, if you do pick up a copy of the book, you will see i draw some parallels to everyday life. I draw on sociology, my intuition from this was from a sociologist, irvin goffman, to describe war dynamics. But he also talks about the sort of fluidity and the viscosity of social life is not pointing out flaws that other people have, its looking the other way, its the art of saving face. A lot of what my story about covertness and secrecy is about, is in appreciation of the way that getting both sides of the opportunity to save face is an one of the ways to avoid a titfortat cycle of escalation. The fourth and last point and then i will move on, is one of the byproducts of this secrecy limited war process that i develop in the book is the unexpected uses of secrecy. Number one is the collusion stuff. If secrecy is serving the focus of Operational Security or protecting your own leader from a dovish domestic reaction, there is not a whole writ whole lot of reason why the other counterpart, the adversary, should keep secret about that intervention if they detect it. A limited war logic does. If they also share an interest in supporting their interests, but not having the conflict get out of control, theres a reason to collude in keeping secret or on the backstage, as i oftentimes called in the book, an aspect of where which my drive escalation. The other byproduct of this is the open secrecy situation. I mentioned laos earlier. What i argue in the book is that seeing your adversary even after their covert intervention has been exposed to a certain extent, maintain that fiction that they are not involved, can actually become a sort of grammar or mechanism to say, they still have this under control and keep away out of their conflict. That provides a logic for why even open secrets can be useful. Ok. So in the book, i develop this argument and make a historical, a sort of broad historical claim and a series of chapters devoted to individual conflicts. The Overall Historical coverage of the book starts with world war i. The endpoint is the u. S. Occupation of iraq, 10 years ago, is where i ended. World war i, i make an argument about how the nature of escalation, or the appreciation of how escalation works, changed world war i. It became much more salient. And the destructiveness of a conventional nonnuclear, but conventional global scale conflict was graphically and tragically displayed in that conflict. That sort of sets the wheels in motion for the development of new ways of intervening in the war which i talk about in the interwar period as a period of experimentation. Governments are just declare a war and acting in intervention and staying out but rather doing things without calling them war or doing it less covertly. That showcases the first case study that i look at, which is the spanish civil war in the late 1930s which featured a series of external interventions by italy, the soviet union, and nazi germany, which were members of the Nonintervention Committee but actually were actively participating in the war. They never owned their participation. They called them volunteers are effectively concealed them. That is the first chapter. I then pick up the pieces after world war ii and look at the korean war, looking at the external interventions and the secrecy dynamics in that conflict. I have a chapter on the vietnam war. A chapter at the end of the cold war, on soviet occupied afghanistan, looking not only at the u. S. Covert assistance to afghan rebels, but also covert soviet crossborder operations into pakistan, for example. And have a short chapter a short section on the u. S. Occupied iraq. There also two key themes about the sort of Overall Historical arc in these conflicts which i draw out, which is escalation control problems are recurrent issues. In each of these conflicts. And that most of these most important conflicts of the 20th century have a covert aspect to it which is important to understand. Ok. So now i want to review some highlights from two of the chapters, show you actually some of the raw material that i worked into the narratives in those case studies. And im happy to talk about some of the other conflicts that i have discussed in the book, but i am going to focus on the korean war and vietnam war for today. First, the korean war. External interventions that i analyze are in the United States, which intervened on the side of south korea. China, it is hard to describe their intervention. They relabeled their troops and called them the peoples volunteers, but they were clearly visible Chinese Ground troops that entered in 1950. And the soviet union, which very effectively kept its role secret and sent in pilots to fly lanes that engaged in the air war with the United States. My focus today is on the soviet role in the air war. Which is the origins of the book and dissertation that it is based on and one of the most interesting aspects i think of it. First i want to talk about some soviet documents. Some of these came from the Wilson Center. One of the soviet documents that we now have access to is a translated end of war report by the commander of the soviet air division that was sent to engage in the air war during the korean war. That included figures, internal report, for accounting purposes in the soviet military bureaucracy. He reported that the soviet aircrews, which entered in november 1950 and stayed active through the end of the war, shut shot down 1097 enemy aircraft during the war. Enemy being american aircraft. They suffered 319 soviet aircraft and 110 pilots that were killed. The missions they were flying were to protect bri