Crises and decisions by going to 1988, or wilsons decision for war in world war i. He is reassessing these decisions. We are all looking forward to philips next book. Time, he is doing a dozen other things none of us can keep track of. Philip, thank you. Need tosorry to say we wait for james wilson to show up. He is probably out there somewhere having a good conversation. If we canhe is send the search y out. So far it has been a great time. [laughter] it is rather intimidating sitting somebody who can refer to his book. If we had grandchildren, they could sit on it. Glad you could join us. Lets go ahead and get started. This is a panel covering the the great second crisis phase of the cold war in the early 1980s, extending to the end of the cold war. Earlyhe beginning of the 1990s and the disintegration of the soviet union. Perspective on u. S. And russian relations, we start with the perspective from the point of view of the Reagan Administration with james wilson. James . Thank you. I was looking through a few files the other day and came upon a quote that i think might apply to the subject at hand. The problems the devil informed policy are not like headaches. With those, you take a powder and they are gone. Instead, they are like the pain of earning a living. They will stay with us until death. We have to understand that all of our lives the danger, the uncertainty, the need for alertness, for effort, for discipline, will be upon us. E are in for it the only real nation is whether we should know. Line applied very well to that moment. In 1958ed very much onn Strobe Talbott sent in to secretary madeleine albright. It very much applies to the topic we have been discussing. Us,robably also applies to me, his perception of me when i walked into his office. And six years ago trying to fish and up at the university of virginia. I was living in a house with no potential Firm Prospect of employment. It has all worked out, im extremely grateful to the advisor,epartment, my to the Miller Center for having the and having me back. The point that he said about common knowledge, what the millard center does in terms of residential projects, the recordings, the oral history, is tremendously important in this era. It is generally difficult to figure out what israel and what is not, what is authentic history, what is fake news. Im extremely fortunate to work with my colleagues in the office of historians, particularly my colleague Elizabeth Charles whom i work closely with him the u. S. Soviet volumes. To be working on a similar project that puts forward about 90 of the top level conversations and internal memoranda of u. S. Policymakers from 1917 to 1991 when it comes to u. S. And russia. Here are mypressed own and dont necessarily reflect those of the department, state, or u. S. Government. With that, i would pick up on heroic factor that led that have been raised, and talked a little bit about what i potential lessons are of Ronald Reagan and the soviet union when it comes to u. S. russia today and in the future. Amply put, dont wait for gorbachev. Reagan didnt. There is a common misconception at the time, later, and even today, that reagan came into office focusing entirely on building up u. S. And allied strength. Deferred negotiations until a new type of soviet leader emerged. Togan attempted early on engage with brezhnev and his successors. At times, giving real emphasis on the role of history in Russian Foreign policies. The russian role of history and the lives of the russians he was dealing with. In thinking through this letter ie wrote in february of 1984, have reflected at some length on the tragedy and scale of soviet losses and warfare throughout the ages. Surely those losses, which are beyond description, must affect your thinking today. Neither i, nor the American People hold offensive intentions towards you or the soviet people. When it came to policy decisions, i think reagan put option fortable zero an intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty. He put that out in the fall of 1981. There was a wide perception that it was a purely cynical thing because the u. S. And nato had yet to have launch ground missiles. He stuck to this, even throughout 1987, where a lot of put onend him had not so excited to go forward with gorbachev. Reagan put forward with the strategic reduction talks, a much more ambitious proposal than had been seen before in the cold war when it came to the most destabilizing missiles, icbms and submarine launch ballistic missiles. 1983, when reagan announced his strategic Defense Initiative, he called upon the Scientific Community to turn their great tones to the cause of mankind in world peace to give us the means of rendering the Nuclear Weapons impotent and obsolete. And this bigposals idea that went against a lot of conventional thinking throughout the cold war set the terms for the big debates between the u. S. And soviet leaders, even before gorbachev came to office. A the summer of 1984, this is period that i think applies to today, there is a pessimistic view of the next 10 years with the russians. In the fall of 1984, when there was no strategic arms negotiations going on, the soviets walked out of geneva the fall before. There is a wonderful memo that i recently discovered about the prospects for arms control in the second term. It was written by a magnificent Public Servant named james tenby. He started out by saying it is unreasonable to expect consensus to emerge within the u. S. Arms control and National Security field. For that to happen simultaneously with a consensus to emerge in the soviet arms control and National Security fields. What we need to do is to set the terms for what we would like to see five or 10 years down the realismh a sense of about what is possible. If you simply are just waiting for both sides to grind through the bureaucratic process, even with the best staffers, that is not going to suffice. Of 1985,w, in march. Orbachev comes in just before that, the nuclear and space arms talks commenced in geneva. They persisted throughout the gorbachev era. We dont forget about the arms production achievements during this period. You have the Nuclear Risk Reduction center completed, and upgrade to the hotline, the strategic arms reduction treaty, theopen skies treaty, conventional forces in europe treaty, the chemical weapons convention, two big important president ial nuclear initiatives. It is an extraordinary period that gets launched during the middle of the 1980s. One moment that really crystallizes what reagan is trying to achieve after he starts to engage with gorbachev and begins to think i can trust him to really uphold his end of the bargain. To the great surprise is some of there ise around him, a saturday morning meeting where i think eric adelman there hesense among people was talking about this diffusion sharing technology. Maybe he is trying to get this out of his system. His ambitions were beyond that. He laid out this phase for the ultimate elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Even after he signs the inf treaty, he says his team must go for the gold. I must start agreement before the end of 1988. I will close by saying i think theres a way of looking at these individuals, reagan, gorbachev, bush, yeltsin, through a lens of hero of factor. Hero of factor. That is not to acknowledge the strengths of particular moments within the grades, the contributions of others at other moments. Something that has fascinated me is the last interaction with shevardnadze and reagan in september of 1988, where reagan says i know i said turned on the wall, itear down the understand. It had been perhaps unrealistic to suggest the berlin wall be torn down in its entirety. He understood the division of germany and berlin was a product of world war ii. The feeling on part of the iniet union and many others germany should never be allowed to be the strongest and most dominant power in central europe. If you had said to reagan after yearseeting that in 2. 5 we are going to unify germany and nato. I think he wouldve laughed and smiled and said that would be great. He also thought that wouldve been something that could maybe happen in 25 years. [applause] i would like to thank the organizers of this conference. I know that the hope of the organizers has been that we would not only recount history, but try to derive some lessons for the future, for the present. I derived lessons from the discussions about the history itself. The subject of my book and his relations with the night the subject of my book gorbachev and his relations with the order to take account of what i have heard and how it is affected my thinking. Usually in talking about gorbachev, i begin with a famous quote by Thomas Carlyle that history is but the biography of great men. We know immediately there is something wrong with that, the word men. We know there are social movements and international conditions, economic circumstances. Classicgorbachev is a example of an individual leader who makes a decisive impact on history and whose biography helps to explain that impact. This is partly because he had the power to have such an impact as the leader of the soviet union, a totalitarian, or perhaps posttotalitarian society, regime, in 1985. It also has something to do with his uniqueness in the sense that he did not do what other soviet leaders in his peer group would have done. If he had, we could say that he was reflecting the values they all shared. Or we could say he was reacting to the demands of the situation they all faced. But no, he acted in his own idiosyncratic way. There were only three members of that group who stayed with him until the very end. Not quitevardnadze, to the end, he did resign. , his ally. Ucca flat he was unique. He was exceptional. That is what i want to underline in light of the conference so far. What struck me about many of the papers is how much continuity the papers have discerned in the 100 years between 1917 and 2017. Of course there have been differences, stalin is not pulling, communist ideology is not the return to the trinity of subordinates. Cy, there are many differences. There are these interesting parallels from which gorbachev exception,n is the the search of the soviet union and russia under putin for a s dominance. Fluence, severalEastern Europe of the papers talk about how the soviet union and russia have seen the United States as hypocritical, proclaiming its adherence to ideals than ignoring them in its foreignpolicy practice. We heard several times about how the soviets and putin wants to be treated as an equal of the United States. We heard about how the liberal International Order is promoted and defended by the United States and has been an obstacle to them wanting to achieve what they want to achieve. We know the parallels and differences between version of and brezhnev and putin. It strikes me even more in this to beence that gorbachev determined and it yeltsin, is the great exemption exception. The determination to try to democratize his country, and to and the cold war and help build a new world order which would be based as much as possible on the nonuse of force. Thee is such an exception, question is how did the u. S. React to him in the person of president s reagan and bush . ,o what extent did understand to what extent did it try to meet him and help him as he pursued his goals . To what extent did it not do so in a way that might have hinderd his efforts to obtain his exceptional goals. In my book, and to some extent, my paper, i talk about reagan and george bush. Lmostcribe reagan as an a perfect partner for gorbachev. Strange to say at the time, after all he was an archconservative president and gorbachev was a communist leader. Reagan talked about evil empire, reagan talked about Defense Initiative in the hope that would scare the russians. Geneva,n they met at you see that they are talking past each other and are impatient with each other. It is a rather sterile conversation. They both feel by the time geneva is over that they have made a breakthrough. It turns out they have, because a few months later they come very close to an agreement. We have to define it wouldnt means, they didnt define it exactly, an agreement to abolish Nuclear Weapons. In the near agreement, we see their compatibility. We see the fact that they would both like to get rid of Nuclear Weapons if they can. Unlike a lot of their colleagues in their governments, who have come to a conclusion that Nuclear Weapons keep the peace, as horrible as their competences consequences would be if ever used. When reagan goes to moscow in 1988 and is asked what about the evil empire used to talk about . He says that was another time, another era. In december 19 88, when reagan, bush, and gorbachev meet at Governors Island in new york, bush sounds as if he will pick up where reagan left off. He even jokes that if he doesnt do this, reagan will be on the phone from california, pushing them to do what he promised gorbachev is going to do. By the time 1991 rolls around, bush has become an even better partner for gorbachev. Felt morerbachev comfortable with bush, dont like he was dealing with a more sophisticated, experienced, extolling intelligent politician. You cant read the conversations without seeing the warmth between them. You hear about how striking, startling, stunning the connection was between them. 1989, thenok back at you look at bush and gorbachev in 1990 and 1991, from gorbachev s point of view, bush is not measuring up to a reagan had been. I talked about this to philip before, and to james about what might have been involved in achieving the goal to sign a stark treaty in 1989, rather than 1991. I realize this was complicated. In our conversation with philip, he didnt like the use of the word pause. The pause in the Bush Administrations dealing with gorbachev to assess reagan and what he and shultz had accomplished. Gorbachev from from gorbachevs point of view, it was frustrating, he couldnt understand it. Back, it seems to me to have been a big mistake to the extent that it actually happened. You gentlemen may decide it is in. When i look back and i read memoirs, it is said gorbachev was trying to smother us with theness, these are almost words, i would find them if i opened the book. Gorbachev was more dangerous than his predecessors, because bywas loading our vigilance seemingly beaten so reasonable. By this time, gorbachev transformed the soviet system when thinking about the conference in the 1988, which set the stage for the free elections of 1989. The archaeological underpinnings of foreignpolicy. He signed a disarmament treaty and move toward another. Inannounced the drastic cut soviets conventional forces in europe. He withdrew from afghanistan, although hes not entirely out until spring of 1989. He has recognized universal human rights. Be theunderstand to summary of the fourth part, thetegy, coping with gorbachev phenomenon and soviet union in 1989. I understand it to be first to appear confident about purposes and agenda, this is bush strategy. Second, to signal relationships is firstallies priority. Third, to place a higher priority on relations with Eastern Europe than with russia. And forth, to promote regional stability in a place like Central America. In my paper i wrote notably absent from this list was helping gorbachev transform his country and close out the cold war. I look forward to hearing your version of this. I understand there were reasons for choosing to do it this way. It seems to me in 1989, unlike was ridingrbachev high and doing well. In order to be further strengthened by the Bush Administrations picking up where reagan left off would have been a wonderful thing for him. In the long run, who knows how that may have affected his fate. When we get to 1990 and 1991, it is a different issue. Gorbachev amazingly accepts the reunification of germany as its membership in nato. He hopes this will be part of a change in europe in which nato and warsaw pact will lose their military nature and eventually disappear. And europe will come together in what he calls a common european home, which sounds like a propaganda device. He believed in it very seriously. He even thinks secretary of state baker on february 10, 1990, has told him that nato will not expand one inch to the east. Those are his words, but there is differences on what it meant exactly. Did expand. Nato background, iis guess i want to bring up the words of Margaret Thatcher, she weve got to help mikell, she says to matlock. She wishes bush would lead the way just as reagan had. Just a few years back, ron and i would have given the world to get what has already happened here. If the west did not come to gorbachevs aid, she added, history will not forgive us. I guess i would like to end with two questions. What to end with two questions. Could we have done more to help gorbachev . Either in 1989 when it would have made a difference, or 1991 when probably it was too late because things are coming apart in the soviet union . And then, going back to the conference, there was talk of about how someday, we dont know when, probably not soon, another heroic leader or different circumstances might come about when we have another chance to deal with a russian leader who wants to do things differently than they have been done for the most part in the last hundred years. What might we do that . Then . How might we be prepared to help them in a way that we couldnt or didnt or wouldnt back in 1989 and 1991 . So those of the best those are the two questions i would like to leave to be discussed. Meanwhile, i welcome our next speaker who may not agree with me. [applause] i want to join all of those that are complementing mel and will and the Miller Center eric i find that center. I find the opportunity to connect historical policy of