Cspan. Next, a forum on recently unveiled Nuclear Posture review by the Trump Administration. Leading off, remarks by defense undersecretary of policy, David Trachtenberg, followed by discussion with Nuclear Policy specialists. Live coverage due to start shortly. I am mike oh hanlin with the Foreign Policy program. Happy to have you to discuss the Trump AdministrationNuclear Posture review, came out february 2nd, following earlier National Security strategy of december and National Defense strategy of january. So the administration is doing a nice job keeping its clock work running smoothly. Prior to unveiling the budget request. Thrilled to have David Trachtenberg beginning the discussion today. He has one of the longer titles, but one of the more important titles in the pentagon. Principal deputy undersecretary for defense policy, a job jim miller also had. We will talk about that in the panel that follows with jim and others. For now, i want to introduce david who has been one of the administrations most important authors and voices on conceptualization, framing and writing of this document thats now available and all of you can access as youre aware on the net. About 70 page document, longer than the unclassified version of National Defense strategy. Has a lot of elaboration of Trump Administration thinking on a number of issues. We will hear about that today. David will give short remarks, then field some questions and then swap out a little before 11 00 mark for the panel discussion. Then i will moderate and introduce panelists when we get to that point. Let me say a couple more things about david. This is his second or third, fourth time in government. He was an important figure in the bush administration, working on interNational Security policy, which means he was thinking about relations with nato, other allies, thinking about their Nuclear Posture review of the early 2000s that he was contributor for. He hales by california, studies at georgetown, involved in a number of jobs in washington as mentioned earlier, including recently with short waiver consulting, job he held before joining the Trump Administration last summer when he was confirmed by the u. S. Senate for this job. Without further adieu, welcome mr. David trachtenberg. [ applause ] thank you very much. Thank you, michael. Pleasure to be here at brookings. Very much appreciate the invitation. Good to see so many people out here on such a dreary morning. Thank you for making the trek out here to participate in this. It is really good to be here. It has been awhile since i have been here. Always appreciate the opportunity to come back. One correction i would note to michaels very generous introduction, that is my title which was indeed Principal Deputy undersecretary of defense for policy has now been changed, it has been shortened by one word, thanks to National Defense authorization act which was signed into law a couple months ago or so. The word principal has now been dropped from all deputy undersecretary titles because theres only one deputy undersecretary. So now i have a better chance of fitting my title on a business card. So as deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, again, it is my pleasure to be here and to talk about this very critical, very critical issue, the Nuclear Posture review. As you all know, each post cold war president has early in his first term conducted a review of u. S. Nuclear policy posture and programs. President trumps first National Security president ial memorandum issued one week into the administration directed secretary mattis to undertake the fourth such review of u. S. Nuclear policy. The aim of the review was to ensure the United StatesNuclear Deterrence is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure allies. Department of defense conducted this review along with the departments of state and energy and in consultation with allies and experts from inside and outside the government. The resulting 2018 Nuclear Posture review establishes department of defenses priority as maintaining a safe and Effective Nuclear arsenal that can effectively contribute to four key goals, deterring nuclear and nonNuclear Attack, assuring allies and partners, achieving u. S. Objectives should deterrence fail, and hedging against an uncertain future. The npr also emphasizes that u. S. Nuclear policy will continue to contribute to u. S. Nuclear nonproliferation goals. Now these roles are consistent with past priorities of u. S. Nuclear policy. Indeed the 2018 npr maintains longstanding Nuclear Policies adopted by democratic and republican administrations. For example, new npr recognizes the need for the nuclear triad, and sustains the previous administrations plan for modernizing the aging u. S. Nuclear triad of land based, sea based, air breathing delivery platforms as well as supporting Nuclear Infrastructure and command and control. Consistent with the 2010 npr conducted by the prior administration, the 2018 npr declares the United States would only consider using Nuclear Weapons in extreme circumstances to defend u. S. Vital interests. In addition, the npr also reaffirms u. S. Commitment to arms control and nonproliferation by maintaining support for the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty, and by sustaining the extended deterrent for allies. Extended deterrence is critical to their security and promotes Nuclear Nonproliferation by checking their need to acquire their own Nuclear Weapons. Now each of the previous nprs has rightly emphasized that u. S. Nuclear policy must be responsive to the threat environment of its time. The 2018 npr addresses the reality that while the cold war has been over for decades, a much more challenging Nuclear Threat environment has developed since the previous 2010 Nuclear Posture issue. This is the reality that confronted the new administration when it began its Nuclear Posture review. Accordingly, the 2018 npr is grounded in a realistic assessment of the contemporary security environment. One that recognizes a return of great power of competition and the increasing weapons and doctrines of adversaries. For example, since 2010 the russian leadership has made repeated explplicit threats to u. S. Nato allies and others, brandishing russian Nuclear Weapons in a way we really had not seen since the height of the cold war. Russia is actively modernizing and expanding strategic and nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons and doing so in continuing violation of a landmark 1987 intermediate range Nuclear Forces or inf treaty. Like russia, china is pursuing expansionist moves at the expense of its neighbors, including key u. S. Allies, and doing so also through the threat of force. China also continues to expand its Nuclear Capabilities in both quantity and quality. Since 2010, china has announced the development of or fielded new icbms and theater range Ballistic Missiles, a sea launch Ballistic Missile, a new Ballistic Missile submarine and new strategic bomber. Chinas intentional act of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its Nuclear Modernization serves only to magnify uncertainty about its future intent. Also since 2010, north korea rapidly increased the pace of its Nuclear Testing and of theater, intercontinental and submarine launch Ballistic Missiles. At the same time, north korea has repeatedly made explicit Nuclear Threats to the United States and our allies in the region. While Irans Nuclear future remains uncertain, its malign activities and aspirations in the middle east are not. In contrast to these developments in the past decade, the United States has built no new types of Nuclear Weapons or Delivery Systems other than the f35 for the past two decades. We have instead sustained our Nuclear Deterrence with extension programs, keeping systems and platforms beyond, decades beyond their designed service life. Former secretary of Defense Ash Carter rightly observed that if theres an arms race under way, the United States clearly is not a participant. It is clear that our attempts to lead by example in reducing the numbers of Nuclear Weapons in the world have not been reciprocated. Since the 2010 npr, prospects for great Power Military confrontation have expanded, while both russia and china increased the number of their Nuclear Weapons programs. The intentional strength in u. S. Nuclear policies did not lead the rest of the world to follow the same path. This is not a unique conclusion reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture review. The u. S. National Intelligence Council recognized this great difference in the u. S. And russian approaches to Nuclear Weapons back in 2012, concluding, quote, Nuclear Ambitions in the u. S. And russia over the last 20 years have evolved in opposite directions, reducing the role of Nuclear Weapons in u. S. Security strategy is a u. S. Objective, while russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of Nuclear Weapons in its security strategy. End quote. The 2018 npr responds to this increasingly challenging threat environment not by changing longstanding tenets of u. S. Policy that have bipartisan support but by emphasizing the maintenance of those capabilities needed to effectively deter war in the current environment. It also seeks to clarify u. S. Policies to help remove the potential for mistaken calculation by potential adversaries that limited Nuclear First use threats or escalation, and provide them with any possible useful military advantage. Correcting the potential for such calculations is now a key to maintaining the deterrence of nuclear war. In this regard, i would like to address three of the corresponding outcomes of the 2018 npr. Quantification of Nuclear Policy and recommended supplements to deterrence capabilities, all of which have been subject to considerable news accounts and what i would consider to be considerable mischaracterizations inch of the public commentary. First, let me say that 2018 npr returns deterrents of Nuclear Attack against us, allies and partners is a top priority of Nuclear Policy. Given the security environment and changes in that environment that i have highlighted, this is a prudent, realistic, i would argue necessary change. Second, to strengthen deterrents of nuclear and nonnuclear strategic attacks, the 2018 npr clarifies u. S. Declaratory policy regarding Nuclear Weapons. Doing so does not expand circumstances for nuclear use or lower the Nuclear Threshold as some commentators suggested. Rather, while maintaining a measure of ambiguity, it provides some clarification regarding what might constitute an extreme circumstance that could lead to u. S. Consideration of possible nuclear response. This clarification enhances deterrence and raises the Nuclear Threshold by reducing the potential for adversary miscalculation. As potential adversary nonNuclear Capabilities become more and more lethal, u. S. Policy must make clear attacks that have catastrophic effects on the American People and our allies must also be deterred. Finally, in addition to prioritizing deterrence, adding clarity to extreme circumstances, the 2018 npr also recommends two Nuclear Programs to strengthen u. S. Capabilities to deter attacks and to assure allies. First, the modification of a small number of existing submarine launched Ballistic Missiles to include a low yield option. Second is the pursuit of nuclear sea launched Cruise Missile. Despite the awesome capabilities of our existing nuclear triad, russias actions indicate that moscow may hold the mistaken belief that its numerous and diverse nonstrategic Nuclear Arsenal provides useful options for limited first use Nuclear Threats or employment. We believe the two supplements to the u. S. Arsenal presented in the npr are important to help correct this misperception and convince russia and any other potential adversary that the United States and its allies will not be coerced by the threat of limited Nuclear First use. The other point i make is neither of these capabilities, these two supplemental capabilities is a new capability. The low yield option for submarine launched Ballistic Missiles involves relatively minor modification to an existing war head, and the sea launched Cruise Missile is a capability that the United States possessed for decades until recently. In addition, neither of these capabilities will require underground Nuclear Testing, and both are compliant with all u. S. Treaty obligations. These capabilities are intended to strengthen the deterrence of war and assurance of allies, thereby helping ensure that Nuclear Weapons are not employed or proliferated. We must recognize that effective deterrence is about tailoring our capabilities to a potential adversary calculations, regarding use of Nuclear Force to ensure that it can never appear to be a useful option. We must assess our capabilities relative to the doctrine, exercises, statements, threats, behavior of potential adversaries. The capabilities recommended by the 2018 npr are tailored to raise the threshold for nuclear use and to do so with minimal changes to the u. S. Nuclear posture. We believe the policy announced in the npr is a reasonable response to changes in the current security environment. Let me be clear. The goal of our recommendations, the goal of recommendations contained in the 2018 npr is to deter war, not to fight one. Modernization of the u. S. Nuclear deterrent, adoption of tailored Defense Strategies with flexible capabilities and clarification on the role of Nuclear Weapons all send a strong deterrence message to potential adversaries, while also reassuring our allies. Finally, the 2018 npr helped ensure our diplomats speak from a position of strength. Russia has little incentive to negotiate seriously about Nuclear Reductions without a robust, ongoing u. S. Nuclear modernization program. Indeed, russian leaders have said as much. As secretary mattis recently testified, russia is unlikely to give up something to gain nothing. Critics that face that expansive effort are undermining americas greatest bargaining leverage and the prospects for future arms agreements. The 2018 Nuclear Posture review is one of several important reinforcing u. S. National security documents meant to guide u. S. Policy in an increasingly complex and challenging world. Much as we might prefer otherwise, u. S. Nuclear weapons are the bedrock of american and allied security. As colin gray has said, Nuclear Weapons are a regrettable necessity in the real world. After the slaughter of two world wars, they have