The discussion included assessments of fdr, jfk, George H W Bush and will, as well as their russian counterparts. This is about one hour and 20 minutes. We have a great panel. Philip will chair the panel. He has written a terrific book on the end of the cold war, the principal author of 9 11 commission report, and many other books. He is right now in the middle of writing a great book on sort of decisions for war in ways that illuminate old crises and old decisions, like going to war in 1898, or wilsons decision for war in world war i. He is brilliantly reassessing these decisions, and were looking forward to his next book. At the same time, he is doing about a dozen other things that none of us can keep track of. And that we dont always know about. I amsurg to say that we need to wait for james wilson to show up. [laughter] he is probably up there somewhere having a very good nation. If we get send the search party out a very good conversation. [laughter] thise of the messages of [indiscernible] so far, it has been a great time. [laughter] it is rather intimidating when you are sitting next to him but he who can refer to his book. [laughter] glad you could join us. Alright, let us go ahead and get started. This is a panel covering the. The periodcovering on the crisis phase in the cold war, from the 1980s expanding to the end of the cold war is self and the beginning of the early 1990s. The disintegration of the soviet union. With a perspective of u. S. And russia relations. We will start with a perspective from the point of view of the Reagan Administration with james will and. James . James thank you. Do i go up to the sure. James thank you so much, philip. I was looking through a few files the other day and came upon a quote that i think might apply to the subject at hand. And that is, the problems that the devil that bedevil american policy, or not like headaches. With those, you take a powder, and they are gone. Instead, they are like the pain of earning a living, they will stay with us until death. We have got to understand that all our lives, the danger, the uncertainty, the need for alertness, for effort, for , forpline, will be upon us we are in for a. The only question is whether we will know it soon enough. I think that line, as dean actions and said at the harvard as the dean acheson said at ,he harvard club of boston applied very much in 1998 when the deputy secretary talbott sent it on to secretary madeleine albright. It very much up lies to applies to the topic we have been discussing. Incidentally, it also probably applies to mel ressler and me, of me when ition 12 years ago, walked into his office, trying to finish up at the university of virginia in the history department. I was living in a house without a Firm Prospect for employment. But it all worked out. I am extremely grateful to the uva history department, to my dear and really good advisor and to the Miller Center, for having me and for having me back. Now, to the point that jeremy said, about, knowledge i think what the Miller Center does in terms of president ial projects, the recordings, the oral history, is tremendously important in this era when it is generally difficult to figure out what is real and what is not, what is authentic history, what is fake news. I am extremely fortunate to work with my colleagues in the office of the historian and particularly my colleague elizabeth charles, with whom i work closely on the u. S. Soviet volumes of Foreign Relations in the United States series, to be working on a similar project that puts forward i would say , 90 of the top level conversations and memoranda of u. S. Policymakers from 1917 to 1991 when it comes to u. S. And russia. I should say that the views expressed here on my own test they do not necessarily reflect those of the dup were meant of the state, or the u. S. Government. I will pick up on the heroic factor that others have raised last day, and try to talk a little bit about what i think the potential lessons are of Ronald Reagan and the soviet union when it comes to u. S. Russia today, and in the future. Simply read, i would say, dont wait for a gorbachev. Reagan didnt. There is a common misperception at the time, later, and even today that reagan came into union when it comes to office focusing entirely on building up u. S. And allied strength, deferred negotiations until a new type of soviet leader emerged. In fact, reagan attempted early on to engage with brezhnev and his successors and above and povhis successors, yuri andro chenenko. Ntin at times, giving real and to the role of history in Russian Foreign policy, the role of russian history and the lives of the russians we were dealing with. In a letter, he wrote in 1984, i have reflected at some length on the tragedy and scale of soviet losses in warfare throughout the ages. Truly, those losses, which are beyond description, must affect your thinking today. I want you to know that neither i nor the america people hold any offensive intentions toward you or the soviet people. When it came to policy decisions, just as importantly or more importantly, reagan put out on the table, zero options on intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty talks. He put that out in the fall of 1981. Bute was a wide perception it was a purely cynical thing, because the u. S. And nato did ground launched missiles. Reagan stuck to this position even throughout 1987, when a lot of people around him and nato allies and leaders put their political careers in a line, and were not so excited to go forward with gorbachev. Reagan put forward with the strategic reduction talks, a much more ambitious proposal than had been seen before in the cold war when it came to the most destabilizing missiles, icbms, and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles. In march of 1983, when reagan announced that the tedious defense initiative, he called up on the Scientific Committee to turn to the great challenge now, to the cause of mankind and world, to give us the means of rendering these Nuclear Weapons impotent and obsolete. These two big proposals and this one big idea that went against a lot of conventional thinking throughout the cold war, i think it set the terms for the big debates between u. S. And soviet leaders, even before mikhail gober child mikael gober gorbachev came to office. This is a period the very much applies to today when i think it is fair to say there is a pessimistic view of the next 10 years with the russians. In 1984, when there were no strategic arms negotiations going on, the opiates had walked out of geneva in the fall before, there was a wonderful memo that i recently does covered to George Schultz, on the active arms control in the second term. It was written by a magnificent Public Servant named james timby who started out i saying, it is unreasonable to it consensus to emerge within the u. S. Arms control and National Security field, and for that to happen simultaneously with a consensus to emerge in the soviet arms control and National Security field. Therefore, what we need to do is set the terms for what we would like to the five or 10 years down the road, with a sense of realism about what is possible. But, if you are simply waiting for both died to grant through the bureaucratic process, to grind through the bureaucratic process, even with the best of rationalists, it is not going to fly. Of 1985,ow, in march inael gobe gorbachev comes , just after the nuclear arms talks had commenced in geneva. Just to be clear, we do not forget, the arms reduction achievements during this period, you have the Nuclear Risk Reduction enter completed, an upgrade to the hotline, the strategic arms reduction treaty, the open skies treaty, the conventional forces in europe treaty, chemical weapons convention, two very different weapons initiatives that are under study. Understudied. It is an extraordinary period that really gets launched during the middle of the 1980s. One momentarily crystallizes one moment crystallizes what reagan is trying to achieve when he begins to think i can trust this guy to really uphold his end of the bargain, and to the great surprise of some of the people around him, there is a very provocative saturday morning meeting in 1986, where even with the gentleman who were there, there was us then among the people around reagan in a geneva at their encounter, he was talking about this fusionsharing technology. And he said, maybe he is just trying to get this out of his system, let us let him do this. In fact, his ambitions were far beyond that. The letters he sends in july of 1986 to gorbachev laid out this 3phase agreement for the ultimate elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Even after he signs the imf treaty in 1987, he says lets go for the gold. I want to start agreements before the end of 1988. I will just close by name, i therere is a very is a way of looking at these individuals, reagan gorbachev, bush, yeltsin, through a lens of a heroic factor. That is not to say, to knowledge to acknowledge best chance of tubular one at tubular moment, this is not to say that we should not acknowledge the strength of particular ones at particular moments denigrates the contributions of others at other moments. I will close with something that has fascinated me and that is the last interaction with reagan and his counterpart in 1988 where reagans is, look, i know is that, tear down this wall. I understand that it had been perhaps unrealistic to have suggested that the berlin wall between down in its entirety. He understood that the division of germany and of berlin was a product of world war ii and the feeling on the part of the soviet union and many others, that germany should never again be allowed to be the strongest and most dominant power in Central Europe if he had that to reagan after that meeting, that you know what, in 2. 5 years, we will have reunified germany in nato, i think he wouldve laughed and mild and that, that would be great. Thought, that would have been something that would happen maybe in 25 or 30 years. Thank you. [applause] thought, that would i too would like to join the chorus of thinking the organizers of this conference. Merely recountot history but it would also try to for theessons from th future in the present. The subject of my book, gorbachev, and his relations with the United States. If some of this is diverging from mike eber, in order to take theunt of what i have emerging from my paper, in order to take account of what i have heard here, i would like to begin with a quote from a famous historian, robert carlyle. From the biography of great men. We know immediately, there was something wrong with that, the word men. We know that there are social movements, economic circumstances, but i think gorbachevs a classic example of an individual or leader who makes a decisive impact on history, and his lab or fee whose biography heads to explain that social impact. This is partly because he had the power to have such an impact , as the leader of the soviet union, a still totalitarian or perhaps posttotalitarian society or regime, in 1985. But it also had to do with his uniqueness in the sense that he do what other soviet leaders and do what other soviet leaders and his pure group would have done. If he had, we could say that he was reflecting the valleys they all shared, or we could say that he was reacting to the demands of the situation which they all face. But, no. He acted in his own idiosyncratic way. There were indeed only a few members of the pull it euro stayed with politburo who stayed with him all the way to the end. One of them resigned, his closest ally alexander from whom estranged, and dmitry medvedev. He was unique and exceptional, which is what i want to underline in line of the conflict so far. What struck me was how much continuity the paper givers have concerned in the 100 years between 1917 and 2017. Of course, there have been differences. Stalin is not letting your putin. Communist ideology is not letting your putins return to the trinity of the czars. Differences. Y the detente was different from khrushchevs. To some degree, or sealed and is the exception. Just to list a few of them that ever heard mentioned here. The soviet union and russia under vladimir putin, a sphere dominance, person in Eastern Europe, several of the papers talk about the soviet union and russia over and over again have seen the united dates as hypocritical, complaining if adherence and fealty to ideal and then a dohring them in it Foreign Policy practice. We have heard several times about how the soviets and now it in himself once to be treated as an eight ball wants to be treated as an equal by the united dates. Weve heard about how the liberal International Order is promoted and defended by the United States and has been a kind of obstacle to the soviets and russians are achieving what they want to achieve. We heard about the parallels as well as the differences between breszhnev and putin. It strikes me that gorbachev is Boris Yeltsin, are the exception. Both at home, in his determination to try to democratize his country, and abroad, in his determination to try to end the cold war and try to build a new postcold war order that would be based on the use of or nonuse of force. Is such an exception, the question is, how did the United States react to him, in the person of president s reagan and bush . To what extent did they understand the exception that he was, to the extent did they try to leave him and help him lead him and help him, as he pursued his goals . To what extent are they not do so in a way that may have efforts tos attain your goals . In my paper i talk first about reagan and then about george bush. I describe reagan as ironically an almost perfect partner to gorbachev, strange as that might team at the time. After all, he was in arch conservative president. Reagan talked about the evil empire, and the Strategic Defense Initiative in the hope that it would scare the russians. When they met in geneva, when you read the transcripts of their discussions, for the most part they are talking impatiently with each other, it is a rather general conversation. Sterile conversation. When november 1985s over, they had made a breakthrough. Reykjavik,s later in in 1986, they came very close to an agreement. We had to define it exactly as it means. An agreement to abolish Nuclear Weapons. Thehat year agreement, we their compatibility, the fact that they both would like to get rid of nuclear the their weapons if they can, unlike a lot of their colleagues in government, who had come to the conclusion that Nuclear Weapons keep the peace as horrible, as their consequences would be they were used. Goesof course, when reagan to moscow in december of 1988, and he is asked, what about the evil empire you to talk about . He said, that was another time, another eu are. In another era. When they finally meet at the Governors Island in new york, bush talked to gorbachev as if he was going to a cup or reagan left off, that she was going to pick up where reagan left off. Pushing him to do what he had promised gorbachev was he was going to do. By the time 1991 rolled around, bush, i would argue, had become in some ways im a and even better partner to gorbachev. I think the rich of felt more comfortable with bush, as if he were dealing with a more sophisticated and experienced, intelligent politician. You can read the conversations and you can see the warmth between them. You can hear chernayev talking about how stunning the connection between them, yet you a 1989, when bush comes in, and you look at bush and gorbachev in 1991, from gorbachevs point of view, bush was not measuring up to what been. Had i i talked to james about what might have been involved in achieving gorbachevs goal which was to sign a treaty in 1989 rather than in 1991. I realize it was complicated, but in my conversation with philip, he even did not like the puase. In the bush administrations dealing with gorbachev to reassess reagan and what he and George Schultz had accomplished with gorbachev. To gorbachev, this was really damaging and frustrating. He could not understand it. Thatlook back, i expect will agree with me, philip did not when i look back at it, it seems to have been a great miss takes, to the extent that it actually happened area you gentlemen may decide that it did not react but when i look back, and i read the memoirs, i see him waiting that gorbachev was trying to smother us with guy kindness, or that gorbachev these are almost the words. I would find them if i opened the book the gorbachev was more dangerous than his predecessors because he was in effect lulling our vigilance by being so reasonable. Seeming to be so reasonable. You have to remember by this time that gorbachev had transformed the soviet system, partyng about the conference in a 1988 that set the age for the mostlyfree elections of 1989. He had discarded the ideological underpinnings of soviet Foreign Policy. He had signed inf and moved to another, start him he had announced the drastic cut in the soviet financial forces in europe. He had begun to withdraw from afghanistan, although i realize he is not entirely out until the spring of 1989. He had recognized universal human rights. Yet, and what i understand to be the sort of summary of the four parts g for coping fourpart strategy for coping with the gorbachev phenomenon and with the soviet union in early 1989, i understand it to be first to appear confident about our purposes and agenda. This is the bush strategy. Second, signal relations with our allies as being our first party. Third, the place a higher priority on our relations with Eastern Europe and russia, and fourth, to promote regional ability and up lace like central america. In my paper, i wrote, notably absent from this list was what helping gorbachev to transform his country and close out the cold war. Hearing,ok forward to off, your version of this.