Transcripts For CSPAN3 Emergency Alert System Part 1 20180209

Minutes. This subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness response and communications will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to review our ability to timely and effectively alert and warn the public in the case of an emergency. I want to welcome all witnesses here this morning on issue that is vital to the protection of americans. Effective and reliable alerts and warnings. Numerous disasters and terrorist attacks weve witnessed over the past few months have illustrated that timely communication is critical in emergency situation and ability of critical information, the ability of critical information can help individuals protect themselves from harms way. While some of us grew up in Emergency Alert warnings through television, radio, and im old enough to remember when they told us to get underneath our desks because there was a siren warning, many alerts today are also received through mobile devices, internet and even social media. Considering the Technology Advances that have been made over the past decade, we have High Expectations for what our phones, tablets, and computers can do. At the very least, we expect that the alerts that come through our device s are timely accurate and only sent when necessary. During the chelsey bomb inning 2016, the new York City Emergency Management Department sent out three messages to the chelsey neighborhood. One to alert individuals to shelter in place. Two, once the situation was cleared. And the third one, to solicit the publics help in locating suspect. These messages help protect individuals at a time of uncertainty. It was also reported that they were received far outside the target area. While it is difficult to obtain 100 accuracy, i am glad that the fcc voted last week to require the delivery of alerts to 100 of the target area identified by the alert system with no more than 110th of a mile over shoot. This will help to deter warning fatigue. This will help to determine excuse me, this will help to deter warning fatigue. Unfortunately, there have been erroneous emergency laeralerts to the system which erodes this. We saw an example of this this morning when an alert that was supposed to be a test instead warned multiple locations on the east coast that a tsunami was on its way. In addition, erroneously Emergency Alert issued by the state of hawaii on january 13, 2018 warning residents and visitors of a Ballistic Missile threat threat inbound to hawaii has caused this same concern of ours. Because this incident occurred due to human error, i am interested in hearing about the training, certification to message or originators to ensure proper use of the system. In addition, im interested in knowing more about the safeguards that should have been in place and what, if anything, needs to be done on a federal level to make sure that this never happens again. In addition, to improve the response to terrorist events, i encourage the fcc to take action on multi media alerts, many to warn feedback, and multilingual messages. For example, if new york city Emergency Management was able to send a picture of the suspect directly to recipients phones during the chelsey bombing or if resip enlts were able to respond to the message to report that they saw the chelsey bomber, it may have led to a faster apprehension of the suspect. However, enhancements to the system will be meaningless if basic awareness of how to use the system is not met. Considering the current threat environment in the United States h evidenced by many instances over the past few months, including two terrorist attacks in new york city, one in october, and the other in december of 2017, the accuracy and efficiently of wireless Emergency Alerts is critical. That way when an imminent threat alert is sent americans can act accordingly to protect themselves and their loved ones. I want to thank you all witnesses for being here today to share their expertise with us and look forward to our discussion. The chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the subcommittee from new jersey mr. Payne for Opening Statement that he may have. Good morning. And id like to thank chairman donovan for holding this days hearing to assess our nations Warning Systems. Our ability to issue timely alerts and warnings is essentially component of the national prepared he hness. We know when the public is warned early, we can mitigate damage to our communities. Since the federal government began pursuing a National Alert capacity, capability over 50 years ago, we have leveraged advances in technology to push alerts out to a Larger Population for the public more quickly. At the same time, the federal government has undertaken efforts to educate the public about alerts, warnings, and how important it is to respond to them. Ultimately, for the public alerts and the warnings to be effective, the public has to be able to trust them h this is why last months false Ballistic Missile alert in hawaii was so troubling. Im concerned that a single employee was able to issue an alert in the first place and that it took nearly 40 minutes to issue a false alarm message over that platform. That said, false alerts are not limited to hawaii. During a routine test of the Emergency Alert system last month, a false alert announcing an emergency in mars county new jersey interrupted programming for subscribers last month. After Hurricane Irma in florida last year and alert issued in error by state employee directed residents to boil their water, causing hours of confusion. What these incidents have taught us is that we need enhanced training and guidance for state and local governments that are authorized to issue Emergency Alerts through femas integrated public alert Warning System or ipaws. False alerting can be very dangerous, as it can lead to alert apathy, confusion, and unnecessary panic. Nevertheless, we should not allow these incidents to cloud the success of otherwise trustworthy Emergency Alert and Warning Systems. Wireless Emergency Alerts have been partially effective in keeping people out of harms way, whether used to warn of in cleme inclement weather or manmade attack. Today lots of alert messages have been sent. And a lot of these were weather related and instrumental in saving lives during last years unprecedent unprecedented wildfires. But important to know that the Emergency Alerts were also sent after the Boston Marathon bombing and the chelsey bombing in new york to help Law Enforcement catch the terrorist sub suspects. As we look at Warning Systems, id be interested to learn what efforts are under way at the federal, state, and local weather to integrate emerging technologies into emergency warning procedures. I look forward to engaging both panels about what has been working well with ipause and to see where things are needed. With that, i thank the witnesses being here today. And i look forward to your testimony. And i yield back the balance of my time. The gentlemen yields. Other members of the subcommittee are reminded Opening Statements can be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have panels on this topicment on our first panel antwane serves as federal Emergency Management agency. In his capacity he oversees public alert and Warning System. Miss missly lisa fowlkes. She managers the a laerts and warnings, 9 11 systems and Public Service. The full statements will remain on the record. And now welcome for five minute statement. Thank you. My name as mentioned is antwane johnson. On behalf of secretary kneel son and long, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the integrated public alert and Warning System also known as i pause and how it is used to save lives across the country. And effective and timely public alert and Warning System is critical to communicating threats to the public, providing people with guidance, during times of crisis. At fema, we manage our policies and two main components. Warnings and communications from the president in the event of catastrophic emergency through the alert a system, and do emergencies such as those issued last year during hurricanes and wildfires. That allows to send emergency messages to people in their geographic jurisdiction by Emergency Alert system broadcast through radio and tv and cell phones and broadcasts from other interneted services. Today it supports more than 5,000 territorial users. More than 26,000 radio tv and cable connections. 63 cellular carriers gate ways reaching millions of cell phones. Connections to nor Communication Systems. 73 internet vendors that go into the feed. And have done the connection for the exchange of disaster information between our countries canada. Since inception in 2012, there have been more than 3 million messages. These messages cover everything from Natural Disaster or shooting or missing children, help get critical information to the public. For an account manager received an Emergency Alert she evacuated 29 people from soccer dome just before a tornado touched done and ripped the roof off. In 2016, new york city sent a wireless Emergency Alert with electronic wanted poster to identify suspect in bombings in manhattan and new jersey, the suspect captured within hours. Last year they were used by officials to issue warnings in evacuation orders in texas, florida, and california in reespns to hurricanes and wildfires. Significantly since 2012, 47 kidnapped children have been returned to their loved ones after amber alert issued through the system. And members of the community helped Law Enforcement locate perpetrators. In addition to managing the i pause program, fema helps train users and for alerting authorities. Its important to note that while fema manages the i pause system, we rely on our state and local partners to originate communications to their jurisdictions as they are the boots on the ground that are best able to communicate the threats they face and provide specific protective action information related to their area. Following direction from congress in the i pause modernization act of 2015, fema has established a subcommittee through the National Advisory council. It includes members from state and local tribal and territorial governments, Communication Service providers, organizations representing individuals with access and functional needs or limited english and others. This is consulting with experts to consider new and developing technologies that may be beneficial to i pause and the nation. The subcommittee will develop recommendations on matters related to common alert and warning protocols, standards, terminology and operating procedures. Through this subcommittee we are looking at recent uses of the system, including use during the 2007 Natural Disasters as well as the false alert in hawaii to identify Lessons Learned. In addition to this whole review, key areas in which this is focused for the future. First, we have been engaging vendors of i pause Compatible Software to do better integration for consistency and warning messages and collaboration with the part flers we are continuing to promote adoption and use of i pause by Public Safety officials. And we make sure that state and local tribal and government officials are aware of our i pause lab for testing to ensure they can maintain proficiency and understand the proper use of the system. I look forward to continuing to work with congress and provide updates as we move forward with recommendations to continue to modern ooigs t modernize the procedures. Im grateful to opportunity to appear before you and happy to respond to any questions the subcommittee may have at this time. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Johnson. The chair now recognizes miss fowlkes for five minutes. Good morning, chairman donovan, Ranking Member payne, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss our nations Emergency Alert systems. As i recently testified before the u. S. Senate committee on commerce, science and transportation, the false Ballistic Missile warning issued on january 13th by the state of hawaii was unacceptable. It resulted in widespread panic and the extended period it took to correct the error, nearly 40 minutes, compounded the problem. Looking beyond the immediate consequences of the mistake, which were serious in and of themselves, this cry of wolf damaged the credibility of alert messages, which can be dangerous when a real emergency occurs. The commission acted swiftly to open an investigation into the matter. That investigation is ongoing. However, the fcc Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau prepared a preliminary report at the commission haste january 30th open meeting. I have included the presentation made at the open meeting with my written statement for the record. But, briefly, as a bureau reported, it appears that the false alert was a result of two failures. First, simple human error. Second, the state did not have safeguards or process protocols in place to prevent that human error from results in the transmission of a false alert. Moving forward, the commission will focus on ways to prevent this from happening again. Federal, state, and local officials throughout the country need to Work Together to identify any vulnerabilities to false alerts and do what is necessary to fix them. We also must ensure that should a false alert nonetheless occur, a correction is issued promptly in order to minimize confusion. Emergency alerting systems provide timely to the public and we must take all measures to bolster and restore the publics confidence in these systems. The commission is also looking into the recent tsunami issued on january 23 from alaska to better understand how the alert system performed. While the incidents in hawaii and alaska and other places are present in our minds, we must not lose sight of the fact that they have enhanced Public Safety. In the last five years they have used to issue over 35,000 Emergency Alerts. Since we a was first deployed in 2012, the commission has taken steps to enhance alert technology. Just last week, the Commission Vote today require participating wireless providers to deliver alerts in a more geographically precise manner. Specifically, they must deliver we an alerts to the target areas specified by the alert by 2019. This will help channel alerts to americans who need them while reducing over alerting. Equally this will give them the assurance they need to rely on it as a valuable tool to help save lives. The recent order also requires that we an alert messages remain available on a format for wireless devices after receipt or until the consumer chooses to delete the message. And spanish and alert from 90 to 360 characters. These changes will strengthen the system and keep americans safer. We also work to advance the utility of the traditional Emergency Alert system. Just this past december for example the Commission Adopted a new blue alert code that will allow state and local officials to notify the public of threats to Law Enforcement and help apprehend dangerous spus spekts. This can be both over radio and television and we a. Over the past several years they have also worked closely with fema to conduct nationwide tests to accessory liability and effective nils. The most recent test was conducted last september. And our initial Analysis Shows improvements in most areas from the previous year. In closing, we look forward to partnering with Emergency Management professionals, industry and our federal partners, on the alerting capabilities that they need to use to Alert America public Warning Systems with confidence during times of crisis. Thank you. And i look forward to any questions you may have. Thank you, miss fowlkes for your testimony. I now recognize myself five minutes for questions. Scheduling votes somewhere between 11 00 and 11 15 and well try to get through all the testimony. I ask consent from jackson lee sit on our panel with that. Seeing no objection, welcome miss jackson lee. I have a question for both of you. And in any order which youd like to speak about it. As i mentioned in my Opening Statements, vital at the public have confidence in our an alert system they receive from the governmentme government. And i fear that the erroneous alert that happened in hawaii may have people opt out of the system. So as you continue to review what happened in hawaii, do you have any recommendations now . I know investigation is initial stages. But any recommendations you could share with us now after what youve been able to review what we can do to prevent that from happening again . At this point, the bureau and commission have not announced any specific recommendations. As you say, our investigation is ongoing. And the plan is once weve completed that investigation, we may have recommendations to share. Thank you, congressman. From the fema perspective, we are conducting after action review of the events of january 13th. And i think there are a number of things we can do to ensure that the erode of Public Confidence that has resulted from this mishappen on january 13th is improved over time. One of the things are doing within fema is taking every step that we can take to ensure that this does not happen again. Secondly, i think there is the opportunity for us to work with the Software Tool vendors that provide these applications to state and local governments for their use to improve those tools. And in fact we have met with and talked to the vendor that provides that Software Application to the state of hawaii as well as 47 other state and local governments. They will be rolling out this week improvements to their system or their software to prevent against these types of errors from occurring in the future. Secondly, we are revisiting our training to ensure that our training adequately addresses the type of error that took place on january 13th so Emergency Management officials are properly prepared to do that type of event, even when its in error. Thirdly, we would say broad Information Campaign both on part of state and local government to inform citizens what these technologies are and what they mean to the public when these messages are received. But we also think there should be a Broader Campaign that would include things like testing, exercising to make sure we include the whole of the community in the exercise program so the entire community is better prepared to deal with any threat to Public Safety that they may face. I understand you havent completed your investigation. Some of the recommendations things weve been reading about would include not having one person make the determination that this alert should be issued, having the alert be in two different places so even if it is one person, they would have time, they would have to go to multiple locations to send the alert. Why the same mechanism of issuing the alert wasnt used in hawaii to allow the public to know that it was a test, apparently it was not pushed through the system that the recalling of the alert wasnt pushed through the same system that sent the alert, used other mechanisms such as social media and whatnot. And my friend payne said took 40 minutes to happen. Something i read maybe the federal government is only ones that should be allowed to issue such an alert. Could you speak on any of those items here before the committee now . Thank you, congressman, chairman donovan. I would be happy to speak on those issues. The event of what took place on january 13th at 8 07 in the morning was certainly a tragic event. I think what we are seeing now, as you mentioned two factor validation of a message. We have seen that take place in some of the more in major cities. In fact, i think the next panel will speak to some of those best practices that are emerging throughout the community. Those type things where you have two factors or two person validation of a message before its sent works in our major cities where their Emergency Operation centers are well staffed and they have the personnel to perform that function. It doesnt work as well in rural areas where the chief of police in a Single Office may be the person responsible for sending the message to the public in response to any threat to Public Safety. But i do think where appropriate we will see those type best practices emerge within the community to factor authentication, Additional Software checks or validation checks in the software that is being used by state and local partners. I think what well see in addition to that is better training, will be prepared to work with our state and local partners in every aspect of that. In fact, i see that there is a natural progression from the guidance that we issued in 2015, the software venders, wherein the initial offerings of those tools that were made available to state and local government, for example, did not include a cancel function. Although the tool would allow them to originate a message, there was no ability to cancel the message. So in 2015, we worked with the Vendor Community and issued recommendations to them on things that they could do to improve their Software Applications. We are likewise doing the same thing with the Vendor Community and looking at other opportunities that they may have to improve their tools to ensure that those types of errors that occurred on january 13th do not occur again. Thank you very much, mr. Johnson. My time is running out. Can you tell me in 15 seconds, you were talking about how were going to expand the ability, have multilingual alerts. Be able to push out photographs. Weve expanded the amount of characters that can be on an alert. Do we have a timeframe for those things . Are some of those things in place right now . In the future, how long would you see that coming to fruition for us . The rules that the Commission Adopted regarding the extension of the character limit from 90 to 360, as well as the requirement that participating wireless characters support Spanish Language alerts would go into effect in may of 2019. The geotargeting rule that was adopted just last week would go into effect in november of 2019. And the reason for this is to allow time for the industry to do Standards Development testing, and then whatever upgrades they need to their networks and devices. Thank you very much. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from new jersey, mr. Payne. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Mr. Johnson, you know, in light of the incident in hawaii, is fema considering implementing any additional requirements, such as ongoing training, multiperson alert verifications or false alert plans . Are state and local governments seeking to become alert originators as well . Thank you, Ranking Member payne. With regards to the requirements for a state and local territorial or tribal government to gain access to ipaws, there are basically four steps that any alerting authority would go through in order to become an alerting authority. First, they must have a valid software that interfaces with ipaws. And that software has to meet certain Development Requirements that we have established with the Software Tool providers. It has to go through testing. And should have demonstrated that it is capable of processing a common alert protocol. The second requirement that we have for state and local officials is that they enter into a memorandum of agreement with fema to establish whats called a common a common operating group or a c. O. G. That group is similar to a distribution list that allows the state and local government to share information inside of the system. The third step if they wish to become a Public Alerting Authority, they have to enter into a memorandum of agreement that defines the Geographic Area that theyre requesting this Public Alerting Authority for as well as the types of messages that they intend to send through the system and the dissemination channels over which that information would go. The last step is our thats required of the state and local governments is that they take our is247 a course, ipaws training administered by the Emergency Management institute. Since 2013, we know that there have been well over 20,000 people that have taken that training. In addition to that memorandum of the requirements of the m. O. A. , we also require that every person that interfaces with that software that touches ipaws also take that ipaws is247a training. We make Resources Available through our lab that is located in indian head, maryland, so that they can maintain proficiency in the use of the software. That afrfords them the opportunity to create test messages in a safe environment and return the results to them so that they have a clear understanding of how that message will appear over radio, television as well as wireless Emergency Alerts on mobile devices. Are you are you planning additional requirements with respect to ongoing training and that type of thing, you know, with this, you know, the human error that was the cause for the false alarm in hawaii . What is the redundancy that we can look for so we take that out of the equation as much as possible . Thank you, congressman. One of the things that ill share is that we were already undergoing a complete review of our training courses that are hosted by the Emergency Management institute. We will likewise double back and conduct additional reviews of that training to ensure that these types of scenarios or similar type of events that occurred in hawaii on january 13th, as well as others that weve observed across the country, are properly factored into our training offerings and we will look into making additional training beyond our is251 course which is a more advanced training that we encourage alerting authorities to take. We are looking at revamping that and considering Refresher Training on an annual basis as well. Okay. Well, mr. Chairman, time is just about up. So ill yield. The gentleman yields. The chair recognizes ms. Jackson lee from texas. Let me thank the chairman and the Ranking Member for their extended courtesies and thank the witnesses for their presence here today. Although we are asking questions in a very calm manner, this had to be a hairraising on fire incident. In fact, it could have generated enormous loss of life by peoples own panic. I guess if it had continued long, most of us remember visibly seeing a panicked parent putting his child in a manhole. That will be a constant memory. Certainly if it was a real incident, we know that people would be seeking any way to save their lives. One of the things that i wanted to take note of is if you all can comment, though youre here on the communications aspect, working with state Emergency Centers on how people do evacuate. I did not get a sense from the video that people were even evacuating in any sort of orderly manner or even knew what to do. But ill put that on the table as a concern. But let me indicate that the individual employee has broken his silence and said that he didnt it was real. He didnt hear any words exercise, exercise, it was real. And he maintains that. Id like you to respond to that, but i also want you to respond to these questions that as i understand the facts, that once the mistake was realized, the employee who initiated the real world alert was prompted to send out the cancel message on something called alert sense, but at no point did the employee assist in the process. Has any of your agencies looked extensively as to why that did not happen . And then secondarily, since this is such a massive notice and hawaii is so positioned in the pacific and i understand there was a call to the Pacific Command or that it is well connected, because he indicated that there was a missile alert, that there were no safeguard measures to withdraw the alert. If you would answer the questions about the employee not respond to employees but that there was there is representation that it was a it was an incident without the exercise exercise. How that could be possible. Number two, how it could be possible if youre prompted was that discovered that you were prompted to send out a cancel message on alert sense . Was that not done or is that automatic so the person or employee who was obviously in shock, whatever their condition was, that the alert goes out automatically, that it should be canceled. And then, were there no safeguard measures to withdraw the alert . If you could answer those, i would appreciate it. With respect to the employees statement that there was no exercise, exercise, exercise at the front and end, we actually sent agents to hawaii to speak to personnel in the hawaii Emergency Management agency, and from the information that they have given us, as well as other discussions that we have had, including other people that were in the room, there was at the beginning and at the end exercise, exercise, exercise. Now, the warning officer who is transmitted the alert has refused to talk to the fcc. But in a in discussions with hawaii Emergency Management, he submitted a written statement in which he claims he didnt hear the exercise, exercise, exercise at the beginning or the end. Now, the problem with the alert was wasnt the exercise, exercise, exercise, the problem was with respect to their script. It said this is not a drill. Which wasnt consistent with hawaiis Emergency Management agency. He claims, at least according to that statement, that thats all he heard, and so he thought it was a live event and ergo initiated a live alert. With respect to cancellation and correction, just to explain the cancellation piece only stops the alert from retransmitting. So, for example, on wea, if you have your cell phone off and they issue a cancellation then your phone wont get it. So the cancellation in and of itself, which they were able to do, didnt solve all of the problems. The bigger problem was that from the preliminary findings that weve made is that hawaii Emergency Management agency never contemplated the possibility that they would ever issue a false alert and so they did not have protocols in place, Standard Operating Procedures to address that. With respect to the wea and eas, they had to figure out what code to issue. They talked to fema personnel on what was about a 45second phone call. Then somebody had to go log in and actually write the correction message. Because they did not have a template for that. So that was really the problem with the delay in issuing the correction. They never contemplated that they would ever have a false alert, so in this instance when it happened, they werent prepared for it. Do you wish to comment . Thank you. Your question about an automatic withdrawal of the information from or the message from the system. Right. Because they had to write, as she said, they were sending out emails and posting it on their personal facebooks as one of the ways they were responding. The cancellation of the message which we know took place within minutes, as she described, that automatically takes the message out of the network so that its not rebroadcast. That is a deliberate action that the employee had to take to cancel that message within the network. The followup message to send out a corrective kind of a corrective action type message was also a deliberate action that the hawaii Emergency Management agency was not prepared for. Typically, we exercise for success when it comes to the types of messages that we send and the deliberate actions that we would wish the public to take. In this case, i would say that if there was any confusion on the part of emergency on hawaii Emergency Management as to their authority to send that message or if there was any question as to the type of message that should be sent, and in this case it was a Civil Emergency message that was issued to correct the error that had occurred at 8 07. When there is that type of uncertainty in the community, that points back, in my opinion, to some of our training offerings and thats where were going to address this through training and increased awareness and working with our federal, state and local partners. Those are all deliberate actions on their part that they must take and be prepared for in terms of addressing any type of error that occurs with some errant message that is put out in the system. Im going to yield back. I want to thank the let me thank the witnesses and the Ranking Member and the chairman for their courtesies. I want to pose this question on the record, not for an answer. Im maybe getting pieces of this but to me it appears that this should be raised to a federal level establishing protocols. This was i think one of the more frightening incidences that happens in a state when a state is left to their own devices and protocols, of which they did not have, and this could have been catastrophic. So i yield back with that question posed. Thank you so very much. I want to thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony. Members of our subcommittee may have additional questions for the witnesses and i would ask that you would respond to those in writing. This panel is now dismissed and i ask the clerk to prepare the witness table for the second panel. Thank you both very much for sharing your expertise with us. Thank you. Id like to welcome our second panel to todays hearing and thank all of you for your participation. Mr. Krakauer serves as assistant commissioner for strategy and Program Development at the new York City Emergency Management Department. He currently serves on femas National Advisory Council Integrated public alert and warning committees. Id now like to yield to the gentleman from new jersey, mr. Payne, to introduce our next witness. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I have the distinct pleasure of introducing director peter t. Gainer as the director of the rhode island Emergency Management agency and was appointed by the governor in january of 2015. As the director, he serves as the policy adviser to the governor on Emergency Management matters and serves as the liaison between the federal Emergency Management agency and all local Emergency Management officers throughout the state. Welcome, sir. Mr. Scott burgman serves as Senior Vice President of Regulatory Affairs at Cellular Communications Industry Association and is responsible for coordinating federal regulatory issues for the association affecting the Wireless Industry, including spectrum, broadband and Public Safety policymaking. Mr. Sam mathine i had it, sam, is the chief technical officer at the National Association of broadcasters. He is also a member of the fcc communications security, reliability and interoperable council and a member of the academy of Digital Television pioneers. The witnesses full written statements will appear on the record. I thank you all for appearing today and sharing your expertise with us. The chair now recognizes mr. Krakauer for five minutes. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about Emergency Alerts and warnings. We take this issue very seriously in new york city. And have invested considerable resources in it over the past decade. Thanks in part to funding from the urban Area Security initiative. New york citys optin emergency Information System notify nyc began in 2007 and to date has sent out more than 10,000 messages. New york city Emergency Management maintains a cadre of public warning specialists who work in our 24 7 Operations Center around the clock. The majority of our messages are translated into the top 13 languages spoken in the city, including american sign language, nearly 675,000 people have enrolled in notify nyc and we have begun to see large increases through our recently released mobile application which allows users to get messages based on their present location, has a mapping interface so users can locate their location relative to the emergency and streamlines the enrollment process to promote user adoption. While were very proud of notify nyc and continue to market and promote it across the city. In a city of 8. 5 million residents its not enough. To expand our reach during the most critical emergencies, new york city relies on the federal wireless Emergency Alert system. New york city helped test the system with fema, the fcc and the Wireless Industry in 2011. It has activated the system eight times since 2012, three times during hurricane sandy, two announcing travel bans with response to severe Winter Weather and during the terrorist bombing at chelsea. Our experience shows us the power of the system but also highlights the shortcomings. We appreciate the attention the fcc has paid to our concerns, adopting rules that permit the inclusion of links and telephone numbers, improved geotargeting requirements and will soon allow longer messages and messaging in spanish. However, the new rules are not as comp lens i harehensive as w hope. For example, missing from the fccs latest order is multi media alerting and multi lingual alerting beyond spanish. The law still permits consumers to opt out of receiving wea messages from localities which we strongly oppose. We must have the ability to imbed multi media in wea messages. This major gap was demonstrated when the nypd needed the publics assistance to locate the chelsea bomber before he detonated another device. The city issued a citywide wea with instructions to call 911 if seen and a statement, see media for pic. Since theres no capability to include images in weas, unlike the tens of millions of video pictures sent on a daily basis, recipients needed to find a different source to see the photooh. To quote a recent memo, we cannot continue to rely on the public taking this extra step. The Law Enforcement community can no longer afford to depend on a wireless Emergency Response system that is lagging far behind what technology can offer. The Chelsea Bombing highlighted this weakness in the Emergency Alert system. Millions of new yorkers were given no other option but to take additional time to search for his photo. That time is often a commodity we cant afford to waste. In surveying new yorkers after the fact we found only 45 of message recipients took the extra step to look for the photograph. Todays wea system is onedirectional and doesnt permit users like new york city to determine how many devices received the message. Nor does it offer the public the ability to respond to a wea, to provide information back to us. The ability to rapidly collect and aggregate deidentified, but location specific information would allow for more efficient deployment of scarce resources following an emergency. When the system was first created by congress it required that the public have the right to opt out of receiving messages from all originators except for the president. A common tenet among Emergency Managers is all emergencies begin and end locally. The local alert originators need the unfettered ability to reach messages during an emergency. False alerts and poorly targeted messages lead to consumer optouts and prevent people from receiving future messages that may save their life. We encourage congress to change the law to allow the optout provision. In closing, the wireless Emergency Alert system is one of the greatest advances in public alert and warning in our countrys history. It has been used thousands of times across the country to protect lives and property. It is a cornerstone element of our public alert and warning strategy in new york city. However, the capability offered by wea has not kept up with advances in technology and how people use their mobile phones. Wea needs further enhancement to support todays threats and hazards. New york city looks forward to working with congress and our federal partners and the Wireless Industry to improve this important tool. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Krakauer, the chair now recognizes mr. Gainer for five minutes. Ranking member payne, its a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the critical importance of reliable alert notification Communication Systems at the state, local and federal levels that we depend on to successfully achieve our mission. These systems, plans, policies, shape their use in the personnel that train, maintain and operate them are a core function of preparedness response. Im the director of Emergency Management for the state of rhode island. Im the chair for the states Interoperable Communications committee responsible for ensuring alert communication and systems are properly governed, aligned and integrated. I have submitted my full statement to the committee. I want to briefly describe for the subcommittee first a snapshot of the warning alertsin the state of rhode island, second, what we have done since the hawaii false alert. And finally some insights and recommendation for a stronger, more resilient alert and warning Communications System nationwide. First, let me describe our system from the local level up. In 2015 the state of rhode island invested in a commercial mass notification system called code red. Using the Emergency Management performance grant we purchased on behalf of all communities, 39 communities and selected state agencies, a singular common system in order to remove duplication of effort, improve operational efficiencies and save precious local, state and federal funding resources. Authorized trained agents at the local level can watch any alert within their jurisdiction. The state has the capability to launch on behalf of any single municipality an alert of any hazard. In august of 2017 we completed a long overdue update of the states Emergency Alert system plan and system. We have spent Significant Energy to make sure plans, procedures, equipment, training, safeguards and testing are up to date and fully operational. This remains an ongoing priority for the state. We continue to rely on other core federal systems such as femas national Warning System and National Radio system to ensure we have multiple communication paths. Since january 2018, the hawaiian false Ballistic Missile alert was issued, we redoubled our efforts to review plans, procedures, policies, redundancies, training, authorized users, the functionality of equipment, intraoperability to be sure we understand potential gaps of all alert, warning and Communication Systems. We have revalidated our internal launch and approval process to ensure prescripted messages is across all platforms, to include recall messaging. This process continues today. In new england, at both the state and federal level, we are in the process of reviewing past practice for alert and warning procedures, such as those outlined in femas national Warning System Operations Manual to make sure that the published guidelines and instructions are logical, executable, and reasonable after what happened in hawaii. As outlined in the manual, threats posed by national or manmade disasters or attack make it imperative for state to have access to reliable means of communication with which to warn the public of impending emergencies so they may take preventive actions. We support the premise and are working diligently to make sure we have a safe, reliable Warning System. In conclusion, in addition to reviewing and validating our systems, we have created a technology trap. This problem is similar to the military with their gps and digital mapping. Will our soldiers be able to navigate with a pencil and a paper map and a compass should the gps be disrupted. Can we as Emergency Managers communicate in a world where any combination of cyberattack, power disruption or natural hazard takes out our digital alert and warning communication networks. Are we ready to communicate and warn in an analog world. Can we communicate without cell phones or the internet . The harsh reality of this is if you cannot communicate, you cannot govern. Some recommendations. First, ensure fema warning alerts are aligned to present day danger. Clearly defining responsibility between all levels of government for alert and warning. Second, develop a National Operations how to better use systems like the general mobile Radio Service and the Travelers Information Service with a focus on how to network these systems with state and federal systems in order to enhance our ability to communicate, alert and warn the public. Third, encourage additional Training Exercise at every level to ensure leaders and operators are familiar with every detail of every communication, alert and Warning System, procedures and shortfalls. I would encourage a more robust and regular nationwide Training Program focusing on the fundamentals of communicating in a degraded environment. And finally, review the dhs security Clearance Program to ensure the right decisionmakers throughout every level of the Emergency Management system have the correct clearance level so matters like threat breaches and critical timesecure communications can seamlessly, rapidly and securely occur. Thank you, chairman donovan and subcommittee members for the opportunity to prepare in front of you today. Thank you. The votes are called. Well try to get tli yothrough your testimony first, then come back for questions. The chair recognizes mr. Bergmann. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the critical and successful role of wireless Emergency Alerts. Tti and the Wireless Industry commend congress for passing the warn act which established the wireless Emergency Alert or wea. A partnership between the Wireless Industry, government and Public Safety officials. Since this launch five years ago, wireless Emergency Alerts have become an essential tool for americans, hundreds of millions of americans who rely on their mobile phones every day. Today wireless providers who serve over 99 of u. S. Subscribers participate in wea voluntarily. More than 33,000 wireless Emergency Alerts have been sent. Helping to locate those in danger, and warn of imminent threats or disasters. Cti members are deeply committed to ensuring that wea remains a trusted, secure and effective resource for the american public. So the recent false alarm in hawaii underscores the importance of our collective efforts to ensure the functionality and the integrity of our Emergency Alert systems. With that in mind, my testimony today will address the vital role that wea plays, the ongoing efforts to improve capabilities and the importance of maintaining the systems integrity. A decade ago congress recognized the value of wireless Emergency Alerts to reach americans wherever they are. As more than half of american households are wireless only, wea has become an essential tool for Public Safety. As part of our broader National Alerting system, federal, state and local authorities transmit emergency messages to fema. Fema authenticates and formats those messages and sends them out to the various different alerting systems. And wireless providers deliver authorized wea messages to a particular Geographic Area as determined by alert authorities. Wireless providers do not control the content of messages and do not exercise discretion over whether to send them. Because local authorities can target specific Geographic Areas, theyre extremely effective at reaching those americans directly impacted by an emergency. And weas unique sound and vibration help ensure everyone can be aware of the alert. Wireless Emergency Alerts have helped to address terrorist threats, locate suspects, like in the 2013 boston bombing and 2016 Chelsea Bombing, theyve helped return abducted children and have warned millions of people in the path of Severe Weather events. We continue to expand and improve weas capabilities. In the past year, the fcc expanded rules to add content, adding additional characters, Spanish Language, blue alerts and downloadable content through imbedded links. As well as supporting additional testing by state and local authorities. The Wireless Industry has supported these enhancements because our members are committed to the proven lifesaving success of wea. Just last week the fcc adopted an order that further improves weas geotargeting capability. Today wea alerts can be targeted down to the cell sector level, a significant improvement over the original county level targeting. The new approach will take advantage of innovative devicebased solutions to further target those alerts. The Wireless Industry is undertaking significant standards testing and deployment work to support this capability. The fccs deadlines are aggressive, but the Wireless Industry will work intently to implement them. Finally, the false alert in hawaii underscores the Public Confidence must maintain or must be our highest priority. Alert originators must send warnings appropriately and judiciously. Fema must authenticate messages quickly and accurately, and providers must deliver them to the targeted area. We commend this committee, and chairman pie, at the fcc, were working quickly to identify Lessons Learned from the false alert. And we appreciate commissioner rosenworths call for additional best practices. While there will be many Lessons Learned, this event does demonstrate the technical capabilities of wea function. Policymakers and the public should have confidence that in the event of a real emergency, wireless Emergency Alerts can send information rapidly and effectively. Let me also stress that the Wireless Industry is keenly focused on the security of our networks including those that support wea. Through a combination of technologies, policies and best practices, we work closely with our government and Public Safety partners to further our common goal of a trusted wea system. Cti is proud of the political role we play, and were committed to working collaboratively to maintain Public Confidence. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions. Thank you, mr. Bergmann. Chair now recognizes mr. Matheny for Opening Statement. Chairman donovan, Ranking Member payne, members of the subcommittee, my name is sam matheny. Im the chief Technology Officer at the National Association of broadcasters. On behalf of the thousands of free local television and radio broadcasters in your home towns, thank you for inviting me to testify on the Emergency Alert system, how broadcasters fulfill their role as first informers and how innovation will allow broadcasters to do even more to keep viewers and listeners safe during emergencies. Broadcasters take seriously their role as the most trusted source of news and emergency updates, whether its preparing listeners and viewers for the coming storm, directing them to needed supplies and shelter during the disaster, or helping rebuild in the aftermath, local stations are part of the communities they serve. And broadcasting is sometimes the only available communications medium in an emergency when Wireless Networks fail. Morning consult recently found the American People turned to broadcasters in times of emergency by a factor of more than three to one. Broadcasting is unique for the following reasons. First, broadcasting covers virtually everyone. Broadcast signals reach more of the u. S. Population than any other communications medium. Broadcasting is localized. Local broadcast stations can deliver market specific information as well as National Alerts. Broadcasting has no bottlenecks. An Emergency Alert can reach millions of people simultaneously without concern over network congestion. Broadcasting is redundant. There are numerous independently operated stations in each market that deliver alerts. And broadcasting is resilient. Stations often operate with backup equipment, generators, and fuel supplies to stay on the air. Broadcaster information is actionable. Radio and television can provide enough information to enable people to understand what is happening, and what steps they should take. Finally, broadcasters are trusted. They are members of the local community and speak not just as an authority, but as a neighbor. But broadcasters do more than just deliver messages to the public. Broadcasters are also the backbone of the Emergency Alert system. Working with the government since the 1950s, broadcasters have operated and evolved a nationwide Wireless Network to deliver Emergency Alerts. This daisy chain of broadcast stations ensures that Emergency Alerts can be delivered independent of internet connectivity, and even when Power Outages may disrupt other forms of communication. In fact, broadcasters serve as primary entry points for Emergency Communications to the public, and are thus part of the solution from beginning to end. Because broadcasting plays such an Important Role in this Critical Communications infrastructure, it is vital the Government Support and foster broadcasting. Id like to briefly outline three key areas for your consideration. First, broadcasters are in the final and most complicated phase of the incentive auction, the repack phase. Nearly 1,000 television stations will be moving to new channel assignments, and this will also impact over 700 fm radio stations on colocated towers. Broadcasters need the time and money required to make these moves successfully and without impairing the publics ability to access Emergency Alerts. I ask for your support of the viewer protection act, and the radio Consumer Protection act, and urge their passage as no station should be forced off the air due to lack of funds or unreasonable time constraints. Second, broadcasters have been working with the Wireless Phone manufacturers and Service Providers on marketbased solutions to activate the fm chips that are in smart phones. Our market efforts have been successful with one very notable exception, apple. We believe apple should be encouraged to activate the fm tuner in future models of their iphone as it will improve peoples access to Vital Information in times of disaster. And third, the next Generation Television standard, atsc 3. 0, which was recently approved by the fcc, has many features that will improve Emergency Alerting, including the ability to wake up sleeping television sets. More precise geotargeted alerts, and sending rich multimedia files, such as radar weather images, evacuation maps and even video files with detailed explanations of the emergency and what to do. New regulatory hurdles should not be placed in our way. In conclusion, in emergencies large and small, our nation and your hometowns benefit from a strong and vibrant broadcast industry. Fema calls broadcasting a redundant, resilient, and necessary alerting pathway. I agree. Thank you for having me here today, and i look forward to any questions you may have. Thank you, mr. Matheny. The subcommittee now stands in recess subject to a call of the chair. Well reconvene right after votes. Thank you. The subcommittee will come to order. I thank the witnesses for their Opening Statements. I now recognize myself five minutes for questioning. Mr. Krakauer, i wanted to ask you about new york city issuing a wireless Emergency Alert during the Chelsea Bombing as you testified about in your Opening Statement. Thank you. How effective was the tool for new york city, and our Public Service agencies . So i think it was a very effective tool. Our first two messages were highly targeted to several square block area in the chelsea neighborhood. The first message was at the request of nypd directing people in the area to shelter in place. When that secondary device was discovered. The second message went to the same area, and directed people to shelter in place order had been lifted because the bomb squad from nypd successfully contained the device. The challenge, we received even though we highly geotargeted it to the chelsea neighborhood, we received anecdotal reports from other parts of manhattan, one case in new jersey, to people far outside that target area did receive that message. That concerns us from a warning fatigue perspective, people who receive messages that are not aimed for them or not intended for them are more likely