Good afternoon. I call this joint hearing of the readiness and subcommittees of the House Armed Services together. I would like to honor the 17 sailors lossed in the uss fitzgerald. And also the ten uss john s. Mccain sailors. Each one of them is so special to every person here. Over the course of the past six months, our subcommittees have met with Navy Leadership to understand the causeative factos that have resulted in the death of 17 sailors. Our men remain confident that our navy remains the most powerful in the world. However, the navy is not alone in responsibility. As secretary james mattis stated in august, it creates unpredictability and makes us rigid. We can not deal with new and revealing threats. We know our enemies are not standing still, end of quote. Passing another temporary measure compounds the negative impacts for our military. Some of those impacts are highlighted by the demanding training and certification gaps necessitated by increased operational demand. Speaker paul ryan and chairman doory have been clear in promoting the critical need for a robust, yearlong, defense appropriations bill. I believe the primary responsibility of the National Government is to provide for the National Security of its citizens. That is true of our sailors, soldiers, airmen and marines. It is our responsibility as members of these subcommittees to better understand the readiness situation and have the navys strategic readiness review and comprehensive review in forming and assisting the department of the navy in correcting any deficiencies and short falls. This week, the Navy Announced additional actions for shipboard personnel involved in these collisions separate from these military actions. This committee remains concerned that Senior Officers that created the conditions for ships to not receive depo level repairs, the individuals who chose to repeatedly approve waivers of expired certifications and individuals that had the ability to balance and globally resource Operational Requirements are not being held accountable. Today, the secretary of the navy, the honorable Richard Spencer and chief of naval operations, admiral John Richardson, are here to testify to the navys strategic readiness review and the comprehensive review for our hearing on Surface Warfare at a crossroads. I remain concerned about the approach to correcting deficiencies and improve accountability. I hope todays hearing will address these concerns. I would like now to turn to our Ranking Member, congresswoman madeline badaio of guam for any remarks she my like to make. Thank you for second spencer and admiral richardson for being here today. Following several million happens in 2017, you directed several parallel reviews for fleet operation and readiness. The strategic readiness review and fleet comprehensive review are important steps to identify the challenges our navy is facing today. However, actions speak louder than word. We must ensure that the recommendations included in these reviews are promptly considered and acted upon to improve the readiness of the fleet and revent a repeat of the tragedies of 2017. Todays hearing is the first opportunity for members of this committee to discuss the recommendations of these two reviews. However, this committees oversight of these issues will not end with todays hearings. I hope that members of this committee can continue a frank and open dialogue with the navys leadership as progress is made toward implementing these reviews and recommendation. I think my colleagues would agree the u. S. Navy is the most powerful fleet in the world. However, in the light of recent global events and the escalation of threats around the world, we must ensure that the navy is properly manned, trained, and equipped to conduct the missions that may be asked of them. As highlighted by the four incidents of 2017, the high operational tempo and the lack of emphasis on ship maintenance and training have chipped away at the overall readiness of the fleet. One element of Navy Readiness that i am particularly concerned about is ship maintenance and specifically for ships operating in the pacific. Over the past several years, we have engaged Senior Navy Leaders regarding the navys readiness requirements in the western pacific. Specifically in depo level ship repair and drydock capabilities and capacity. In the fleet comprehensive review, the navy identified capacity issues at the ship repair facility in yokosuka, japan. To our witnesses, i look forward today to hearing how the navy plans to address the ship repair capacity issue in the pacific and improve the material condition of the fleet. Furth furthermore, i also look forward to hearing how that plan will align with the president s 2018 National StrategicSecurity Strategy to maintain a forward military presence capable of deturring and, if necessary, defeating any adversary, which will be balanced with an Economic Strategy that rejuvenates the domestic economy. In addition to supporting proper ship maintenance, we must also ensure our surface warfair officers and sailors are receiving adequate training to perform the missions that are asked of them. We must empower ship Commanding Officers to express concerns up their chain of command without facing careerending repercussions when they are tasked with a mission that they feel their ship or crew are not properly trained for. This is a management and a cultural issue for the navys leadership to address. To that end, i look forward to hearing your plans to ensure sufficient time is allocated for training and mant innocenintena pillars for restoring the navys surface readiness. I feel we will be a long journey to return to proper readiness levels. I assure you this committee will fry to help you where we can. Similarly, we will not hesitate to raise concerns and issues with you as we perform our oversight role. I believe the navy is in good hand and i look forward to staying updated on the progress of your work to restore readiness across the fleet. I look forward today, this afternoon, to your testimony. Mr. Chairman, i thank you and yield back. Thank you, Ranking Member badallo. I now turn to the gentlemen from georgia and chairman of the sea power subcommittee for any remarks he may have. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you for yielding. I want to thank secretary spencer and admiral richardson for joining us today and for being part of a very needed and productive process to go through to make sure we are making the necessary course changes to address this issue. Let me begin by quoting dr. James holmes, a noted Navy War College professor. He recently wrote an article called who watches the watchers in the United States navy. In this article he expressed concern about the apparent lack of accountability for the structural problems in the Surface Warfare community. He indicated that the navy is quick in citing senior leaderships loss of confidence in Commanding Officers but is at best circumspect when assessing fault to the system that drove these Commanding Officers to seek what he calls the norm normalization of deviation. This is apparent with the decision announced on tuesday to bring the Commanding Officers and other officials from the uss fitzgerald and uss mccain bth befo mccain for an article 2 hearing for negligent homicide. We need to reform the system that drove these officers to avoid initial incidents and reduce future normalization of deviation incidents. I think the navy has taken a good first step. There are a multitude of other issues that need to be reviewed, organization reform, manning deficiencies, material readiness and serious training reform. While the comprehensive review has identified the organizational problems, i think it is time to take bold steps in correcting the deficiencies that were identified almost 15 years ago. It is time to flatten the organization and centralize the title 10 manning, training, and equipping authorities at Fleet Forces Command. It is time to reactivate the secretary fleet and eliminate fourth fleet to ensure the navy retains an emphasis on deployment credibility. It is time we consolidate navy policy by colocating the three star type commanders at Fleet Forces Command and it is time for congress to end restrictions that contributed to the seventh fleet disorganization and allow the navy to effectively reorganize. I am particularly disappointed with the Manning Levels of our four deployed navy with the disparity with different ship classes. I do not understand why they are the worst manned forces in the surface navy. They need to be the best. With regard to training, i am concerned that as our ships become more technically challenging to operate, our Surface Warfare community has a malaise. With y we should require them to specialize in deck or engineering and allowing the Junior Officers to develop basic skills. They should consider adopting milestones similar to the commercial sector. The u. S. Navy needs to improve the Surface Warfare to pipeline to ensure Navy Officers are provided basic navigation and engineering skills. Finally, as to correcting material issues, i think it is time we start to take our process seriously and correct the material problems facing the four deployed naval forces. This process provides congress and our nation a snapshot of the material condition of the fleet. I am concerned that the classification that it provides fails to provide our nation a reasonable perspective of the negative consequences associated with underfunding the readiness accounts. Navy should be prepared to publicly articulate the risk of our surface ship maintenance. We need to ensure our navy forces are properly maintained with a competent workforce that has the capacity and skills to maintain the fleet. It is time we routinely rotate ships back to the United States that have been deployed for over 20 years. We have significant challenges that face our Surface Forces but with time and resolve, i am confident that we can right the Surface Forces that are perilously askew. As to dr. Hones question as to who watches the watchers, i want to answer that this committee will continue to drive toward accountability accountability and providing solutions to the systemic problems. We will watch the watchers. I yield back the balance of my time. Now, to the gentlemen from connecticut and Ranking Member of the sea power subcommittee for his remarks. Thank you, mr. Chairman and secretary spencer and admiral richardson for your presence here today. This is the fourth engagement that we have held on this topic since last fall, which is of the highest urgency given the unacceptable level of fatalities in noncombat settings which occurred in 2017. For many members, even though that hailed from districts far from the western pacific, these collisions strike home. In connecticut, two outstanding sailors, electronic technicians, dustin doyer and nap chu wen of connecticut lost their lives. It is the duty of all of us to ensure bold systemic change happens to protect our sailors from similar tragedies. Last week, a panel of young officers assigned to Forward Deployed ships in japan discussed the challenges they face maintaining readiness in the seventh fleet. They described high operational tempo, challenge of simultaneous training and operations an long hours. Their most powerful comments described a system in which they could not be certain they understood the risks they were taking. Following the collisions of the fitzgerald and mccain, an officer asked himself, im certified for my position but do i actually know what im doing. Another officer when considering the relatively incidentfree deployment he had just returned home from asked, are we good at this or are we just lucky . These anguished statements describe issues that speak to systemic problems in operation, training and management of our Surface Forces mu. They make dozens of recommendations for changes and reform needed inside the navy. After meeting with each of you, it is clear many of these recommendations have been or are in the process of being implemented internally in real time. I urge you to continue to make the implementation of these recommendations a top priority and to Keep Congress and the families of our lost sailors updated on your progress. Other recommendations, however, will need congresss direct attention and action. One of the areas where both reviews agree, is that congress has contributed to the systemic readiness issues in the Surface Forces. Recent bills have carried language that restricts the navy from realigning its equip functions under a single command. This has allowed an unusual situation to continue in the Pacific Fleet, which is responsible for both deploying forces and determining when those forces are ready to deploy and to do so separate from the rest of the fleet. As a result of your respective reviews and as they have made clear, this arrangement allowed ships to be deployed without basic certifications and without meaningful plans to mitigate the risk to our sailors. While there is disagreement in the comprehensive and Strategic Review, the best actual command and control structure for navy Surface Forces, it is clear continued congressional limitation is a hindrance to the management and readiness of the fleet. Before these recent collisions, congress had seriously considered changes to this respective language. In 2016, the house voted unanimously to remove the provision completely. It was later restored by the senate in the 2016 ndaa and appropriations bill. It is my hope we can once again work on a bipartisan basis to remove these restrictions from our funding bills and see these efforts through to the end. Your input here today will be invaluable in that effort. The other obvious Mission Congress can execute is to restore budget stability for the navy. We need repair work to move forward in a timely manner. We need to increase the supply of combat ready ships available to Fleet Forces Command rather than letting ship building plans lang wit languish. This is hardly the road map to a 355ship navy. I think i speak for my colleagues in saying we stand ready to assist our Witnesses Today to create bold, new, institutional complaining. We owe it to the memories of the sailors lost and their families. We owe it to the forward looking sailors that are asking themselves, am i just lucky. Thank you. We are grateful that liz cheney of wyoming is with us today. I ask that nonsubcommittee members be allowed to participate after all subcommittee members have an opportunity to ask questions. Is there any objection . Hearing none, without objection, the nonsubcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time for five minutes. Secretary Richard Spencer, we now turn to you for your remarks and briefing on the incidents. Chairman whitman and wilson, Ranking Member courtney and bordallo, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for having us here today to talk about our reviews and how we are moving forward. I would be remiss if i didnt start by saying, we should keep the sailors lost on the mccain and fitzgerald in our thoughts and prayers as we go forward. Over the past year, our Surface Fleet has continued to operate and train around the globe filling a Strong Demand signal to help preserve our National Security. At the same time, however, those operations have led to some tragic losses. Those losses demand that we take time to study, understand, make course corrections to ensure the safety of our most valuable resource, which is people. As you are well aware, we lost 20 sailors in major incidents in the pacific last year. The loss of any sailor is a tragedy. All of us in the department of the navy stand in solidarity and support of our fellow sailors and families. I am here today as the responsible one and accountable for our most valuable resources. To fulfill these responsibilities, i am directing change across the fleet and marine corps to correct the issues identified in our analysis of those intolerable events. Boeing t both the comprehensive and strategic readiness reviews sought to identify factors that led to last years accidents. They focused on causal factors and broader systemic and root causes. The strategic readiness review found that the discovered deficiencies were not traceable to any single policy or decision but were coup mumulative result decisions aimed at achieving shortterm goals. They found that accepting deviations which translates into higher risks had gradually become normalized and compounding accumulated risks. This must and will be corrected. As we move forward, success will not be attained overnight. My Leadership Team and i are working closely with the Navy Marine Corps team to examine, ado