U. S. Foreign relations. After him will be professor of ukrainian history and the director of the Ukrainian Research institute at harvard university. We will start with frank. Frank first of all, i want to join others in thinking mel and will. It is an honor to be in this room with most with so many people whose work i respect so much. What i have done is basically extrapolate from the oped i wrote a light of some comments the people made yesterday, other oped, particularly mels question about irrationality. I also have the perspective of George Kennan. Its been easy for americans to feel irritated, angry, exasperated, resentful or disgusted with the russian government to whether that country is being run by lennon, stalin, khrushchev, or putin. The quashing of pole, and the most recent aggressions against georgia and ukraine. Not to mention the berlin in cuban crisis of half a century ago and the egregious interference in our election last year. It is therefore understandable, but also consequential. The strong emotions have often played an Important Role in how u. S. Leaders and the American Public have conceptualized our ostensibly rational and objective National Interest visavis russia. It is integral to all thinking. Emotions come into play strongly when we appraise something as important. This does not mean that emotions determine policy. Rather that emotion is used respective, unavoidably, to influence ideas. Roosevelt in effect offered stalin a strategic deal. He was willing to accept soviet domination in Eastern Europe. In addition to this political strategy, fdr, who possessed enormous selfconfidence, acted on his hunch that stalin suffered an inferiority complex. Roosevelt tried to play up to the russians pride and fear of humiliation. Quite different was harry truman. Only days after he became president , a barbarian invasion of Europe Europe that set off alarm bells for truman, who like reading history, and had read a lot about genghis khan. Truman already regarded the russians semiasiatic. Truman, who was anxious to show he was man enough to be president replied he was not afraid of the russians, nor of anyone else. Such emotional reactions and associations alone did not compel truman to talk tough. These kinds of reactions probably influenced the president s behavior in the short and long run. Truman viewed the russians as inferior to americans because, racially, they were a mix of tartars, mongols, and slavs, as he put it. Culturally, the russians were from the wrong side of the tracks. Emotional judgment that fed into a variety of decisions. I will mention just one that i think is a consequential decision that truman made. By september 1945, a deeply conservative secretary of war was appalled and frightened by the destructions rocked i the bombs dropped in japan pm stinson were that an atomic arms race would lead to an atomic war ending human civilization. He urged truman to reach out directly, bilaterally, and secretly to the kremlin to propose a stepbystep sharing of atomic information and to halt the further Atomic Development by both the United States and russia. The majority of germans cabinet, including the acting secretary of state, approved simpsons proposal. Truman pondered it, talked it over with his poker buddies, and decided no. He believed that the russians, because of their racial and cultural deficiencies, simply did not possess what he called the yankee knowhow, essential to developing an atomic bomb. Oppenheimer asked the president when the russians would develop the atom bomb . Truman said never. George kenners manifestoes crackled with the motion, even as they claimed the authority of cool reason. This isnt the emotional impact of the most famous passage, the most quoted. He wrote that threatening america was a Political Force not people with whom one could negotiate ordeal but a Political Force fanatic to the belief that, with the u. S. , there could be no motors for mindy that is desirable. Our traditional way of life be destroyed. The International Authority of our state be broken if the soviet powers to be secured. He exaggerated russias limited challenge into a frightening, existential threat. In later years, he would protest that his calls for containment were misinterpreted by people who pushed for a militarized response to containment. The emotional force with which he depicted the soviet threat made it seem only prudent to build up the u. S. Military. In terms of lessons, his frustrations with the outcome of his call for a containment illustrates one of the problems with excessive emotion. Sparking fear can easily get out of control. Think about his connection with truman, following the advice of senator Arthur Vandenberg when he suggested that truman wanted to get aid from congress. Truman had to scare hell out of the american people. That scaring led to the mccarthyite hysteria. In a more general way, hyper emotional responses can cloud our vision of National Interest and make objective scenes see more crucial than they are. Emotional thinking can lead us to underestimating the contingency, the mutability of development. Thus thinking can lead to hasty decisions. Emotions can reinforce the unrealistic premises of american exceptionalism. As the number of the opeds written by our participants pointed out, the cuban missile crisis ended without a Nuclear Holocaust in large part because kennedy was able to restrain the anger and fear within the xcom and within himself. A nation that feels humiliated, whether in france in 1871, germany after 1919, or rush by the late 1990s, there comes a force for destabilizing the detested status quo. The aftermath of world war ii, acheson dulles and most of the u. S. Leaders understood the importance of giving west germany a stake in the postwar system in terms of economic integration and then to nato. Crucial as well were Exchange Programs with the west. Those who have done research in American Relations in postworld war ii period, many internal u. S. Memos from the 1950s to the 1960s filled with expressions of concern lest the German Government be feel offended by its division. As several of the contributors to our program have suggested, a principal factor in motivating russian feelings of humiliation and resentment as washington tries to block moscow diversions of influence. To offer some Historical Perspective on the expanding reach of american aspirations in policy, i want to briefly review what George Kennan wrote about the ukraine in 1948 and about nato expansion in the 1990s. In 1948, canon, director of policy staff, submitted policy memo desk staff memo 48. What should be the american objectives in the event of a total military victory over the soviet union . With regard to post world war iii boundaries, canon argued that the Baltic States should be allowed to regain their independence. He also acknowledged the desire of independence in ukraine and the push by ukrainians living in the United States. Nevertheless, he concluded that there is no clear dividing line between russia and the ukraine. Setting up an independent ukraine would be as artificial and destructive as an attempt to separate the american corn belt, including the great lake industrial area, from the economy of the United States. Moreover, he went on, we cannot be indifferent to the feelings of the russians. Any longterm u. S. Policy must be based on their acceptance and cooperation. As solution which attempts to separate the ukraine entirely from the rest of russia is bound to incur russia resentment and opposition and can be maintained only by force. Kennan suggested a federation in this post world war iii. Which would allow considerable ukrainian autonomy. Finally, i want to offer a respective on nato expansion based on a Cordial Exchange of letters between George Kennedy and strobe talbott. In 1997, he wrote, in planning to extend natos borders to match up to those of russia, we are making the greatest stake of western policy in the entire postcold war era. He predicted that it would inflame the existing nationalistic, antiwestern militaristic tendencies. Restore the atmosphere of the cold war eastwest relations and impel Russian Foreign policy directions decidedly not to our liking. Such expansion would stimulate rather than reduce the role of Nuclear Weaponry as a factor in relations with moscow. Talbot stressed the benefits in joining nato. The russians would have to look at nato not as a military enemy, but a fact of life on their border. The partnership for peace, he predicted, with time, the russians would accept the new reality. Two brief lessons. On force the, in the last two decades, russian resentment and feeling of humiliation and needing to change the situation with regards to the near abroad, that remains very strong. That is one of the reasons for putins popularity. The second lesson, should nato admit ukraine and georgia, that would inflame relations for a very long time. And finally, id like to conclude with a question that i dont see posed very much but concerns me as an historian as well as a citizen. Does the expansion of nato really serve the interests of the United States and the interests of the Nato Alliance . During the cold war, there was endless discussion about the credibility of nato and the u. S. Deterrent. With the United States really risk new york in a Nuclear Crisis in order to save hamburg . The difficulty of mounting a realistic, congressional defense along the germangerman border. Now it seems relative to ask to what extent has the expansion of nato undermined the credibility of article 5 . Even forgetting for a minute president trumps views about alliances and dark it meant till alliances, would the United States certifies new york to avenge and attack baltic nations . And how deep can we mount a conventional defense of the baltics when we found it difficult to mount a defense of west germany . Thank you. [applause] thank you for inviting me. Like everyone else, i am thankful to be here. I assume that most of you read my paper, so i will try to put a flushed out argument in a broader context to think about trends. Sometimes, you have to be careful what you wish for. I was trained as a modernist. Im thinking from a laundry perspective. It looks like a good place to start, talking about u. S. Russia relations, the creation of the United States, where you have both russia and the United States being on the periphery of the europecentered world. The first ideological trend they experienced together was allotment. But they experienced it very different. It is also a different relationship to stalins umpire. Rush moves into eastern and Central Europe and builds a good part of its european empire. There are people who go from one place to another but the reason why they and the u. S. Is the expansion of the russian borders and the russian empire. In that sense, ideological differences predate reagan and wilson. But given the difference in the 18th and the 19th and 20th century, they are not in direct war with each other. Whennly case known to me, russia trades territory for money is alaska. Russia has to have a partner whom it would trust. So it is very unusual, a very unusual part of the story. On the other hand, in the 20th century we have at least twice the presence of American Military on russian or soviet territory. The first happened during the revolution back in the second this is thed subject that frank studied and i am working on now, the american bases. The revolution, world war ii, we are at where my focus enters the picture. I start the paper with this quote from stalin. Its the essence of leninism, stalin saying in 1924. When the world moves closer to world war ii, stalin is more comfortable. In negotiating with roosevelt and the United States and the soviet union of the 1930s and the 1940s, the capitalist country that is most emulated and more hostile to the soviet union. Then comes the cold war and the situation changes. Where would we put the start of the war . The discussion is there. But it is interesting that, at the center of the cold war from its start, its very beginning is what at that point was known as Eastern Europe. And it is Eastern Europe where the cold war in, which goes to the veryality of, definition of what eastern we see a lot of history repeating itself. Let me elaborate on that in terms of repeating, history repeating itself, and then point to differences that we have today. The first is between stalin and putin. We do not see another soviet russian leader that would accumulate as much influence and quite independent from institutions and bodies like politburo or whatever. It is someone who can really make decisions on his own with very little consultations with the people around him. It looks like the annexation of crimea is one of those cases. Putin is also a very strong negotiator. Stalin was no for, even writing, if he had a possibility to select negotiators, stalin would be on his team. Stalin was doing his homework. Stalin was in control of details. So an externally strong negotiator. Putin in many ways is the closest we can get in soviet russian history to appear in all of those accounts. Then he redefined Eastern Europe is identified as another area full of contention and a source of worsening relations between the two countries. The parallel is interesting in that back in 1945, stalin was returning to Eastern Europe. Long gone were the days of lenin where he was trying to organize the world by this new revolutionary principle. He goes back to the old imperial visions and fears of influence and becomes an important influence in his diplomatic toolbox. So russia is really in Eastern Europe for the first time in 19141915, trying to reestablish itself. Putin is again a return. The territory that was not exactly no mans land but not under the russian control for a period of time, you see russia returning there. And the United States is also relative again, all parallels have their limits by a relative newcomer in the region. It was certainly a newcomer in 19451946. And when we look at the recent changes in the in american policy, 2013 had the United States involved in Eastern Europe as well. That is another set of what i think of as interesting parallels. There are also significant differences between the Eastern Europe of today and sovietAmerican Relations back in the cold war. First of all, the borders of Eastern Europe are different. It is also not under occupation. It is not under moscows controller occupation, which is very different from what we see at yalta or posda. Another thing is it was not economically in great shape in 1945. In this economically, it is in a weaker position than the soviet union at the start of the cold war. Apart from the economic weakness, there is one more component that wasnt there in 1945. This is russian economic participation. There was a flight of capital and so on and so forth. The interconnection between the two economies and the economy where the United States is a major player. Russia is integrated to the degree that the soviet union in 1945 in 1946 again, another layer of a different situation that suggests or invites thinking about different approaches and Different Solutions to todays russianAmerican Relations and tensions, despite of all this historical perils i suggested earlier. What that truly means in terms of practical advice theres the whole concept of this sphere of influence. Normally, yalta is short for the world divided and influence. It made one of the sides in that cold war much stronger. Theres a good argument to be made, there was no other way around. To date there is no occupation per se, countries in the potential sphere influence have her own agency, what happened in ukraine, no one expected that. Indication one more that things can be decided at the very top and the societies of the region have their voice. I suggestion in that sense is that probably going back to the old policies of containment at this point dont make much sense. Also for all those reasons that i mentioned, and russian inclusion in involvement in the outside world. Personalities to stalinparing putin to and the future and whoevers in the white house, i dont think personal diplomacy is really the way forward. With the current is president , dont see any possibility of them outsmarting or charming putin in that sense. It looks like they belong to different categories. But there is a lot about the cold war and containment, maybe i would talk about cold peace, meaning much less confrontational approach to point. My other suggestion would the, i is too muchutin wedded to the policies he conducts today. We will see whether there will be any signs, i dont expect much. Negotiation and renegotiation of relations probably will have to wait until the new leadership not only in the white house but new leadership arrive