at the unite naval academy, but he told me that his retirement failed, that he was no good at it at all. so he is now the distinguished professor at the united states naval war college in new port, rhode island. he has written several books about the civil war. his books received the lincoln prize and the abraham lincoln book award. he also has just -- or actually done a biography of joe john so. that's what his was about today. let's walk joe simons. he was the a man who lacked the moral will to commit troops to battle unless he could be absolutely certain of victory unless the circumstances never obtained he seldom if ever sought battle at all. johnston does have his defenders. it made it impossible to defend it any where and the confederate president's tendency to promote and protect personal favorites and therefore also made a contribution to confederate. because johnson favored acting on the defensive and concentrating on a few vital points. his vurks that view was the more realistic one and his effectiveness was less his fault than davis's interference and lack of support. there's plenty of ammunition for either of those. incredibly johnson often seemed a reluctant warrior. it was where he was wounded pretty severely. after his recovery he went west where he delayed too long before trying and not very hard to rescue in 1863 and of course where he fell back repeatedly before william t. sherman and the crucial and perhaps decisive atlanta campaign. of all of these events the one that is at the heart of most of the controversy is that 1864 campaign from dalton to atlanta. let's do that first. it was johnston's failure to stop sherman that lead davis to dismiss him of his command in july of 1864 and replace him with john bell hood. it did not work out to well for the confederacy. it allowed johnson's defenders both at the time to that hood's campaign and the virtual destruction of the army of tennessee proved johnston's strategy had been superior. we all do this, all civil war students say if this, then, that. we wouldn't know what who you have happened had davis stuck with joe johnston. but part of johnston's justification was based on his insis tans that he was greatly outnumbered. johnston certainly knew what davis expected of him in this campaign. from this base dalton was supposed to advance northward to recover chattanooga and move into central tennessee. well, johnston was certainly willing to try but he insisted that he simply didn't have the assets to do it. in particular he complained he was short of calvary. it was probably true in 1862 and may still have been mostly true in virginia as late as 1864. he had some 12,500, so about 500 the times of mounted forces. the problem was for sherman that he parcelled his calvary. he could win a single victory. that vision so tempted him that he offense issued his primary duty of scouting and reporting seeking a clash with his counter part. that proved crippling. for an army on the offense needs a capable screen and johnston didn't need something to have one. instead johnston decided to defend his position. johnston hoped that once sherman attacked him and was repulsed from strong defensive positions he could then counter attack and launch that davis expected. they insist johnston was constitutionally incapable of mounting an offensive, that all he did was dig in, hope that sherman would attack him so that the disparity in numbers could be minimized. one of his famous quotations was that when johnson read about this in the papers he said what luck some people have. nobody will ever attack me in a position like that. dauntingly and appropriately named rocky face ridge, north and west of dalton. this was going to be the wall against which sherman broke his arm armys. as a result he was nearly on the western and atlantic railroad before johnston appreciated the threat and sent a number of brigades marching southward to block him. they got there just in time. the person hesitated and the battle fought three days in mid-may and held onto the line of the railroad. but of course he also had to give up those strong defensive positio positions. it is from chattanooga down to atlanta down to the fibrous core of this entire campaign. both armies needed it. it was an iron thread that was critical to both sides. johnston never lost a battle in all this but with the exception of kennesaw mountain where he acted he didn't win any either. more importantly by mid-may he had fallen back over the ch chatahoochie. it looked like johnson simply wasn't trying very hard. his casualties were less than tenth over the same period. these were the weeks of wilderness fighting the press of what happened in the trenches in 1914, 1915 in europe. it was evidence that the men were trying. johnston forgotten how do that. johnston's retreat was the last straw. confederate president believed he had practiced patience with john ton until it was no longer a virtue. the highly charged political environment, the news of johnston's repeated withdraws sharpened the antagonism between the champions of the administration. davis's political enemies and the confederate congress were lead by this fellow, senator from texas and close friend of joseph e. johnston. i simply lacked the will to fight. even encouraged as mary chestnut into the vitals of our distracted country. they both graduated in 1827. lee graduated second. johnson gara johnson graduated 17th. he wrote a long letter and all this kind of 19th century stuff. from then on the two of them simply never were compatible. they were not partners. they were on the same side but barely allies. davis might have been realized as long as he won battles. it seemed to me that he was unwilling to fight one. they all sountd like excuses and grew more labored every day. and johnston's enemies and there were many includiing braxton brg insisting that johnson actually had -- if you took them and added them up he has 150,000 men out there. he has absolutely no excuse not to be driving him back to ohio. the men in the ranks brag insisted and brag commanded that army before. on july 17th, 1864 he sent a telegram ordering him to turn his army over to bellhood. how do we assess joe johnson? he himself argued both at the time in a self-serving mem wore it was a carefully calculated to use up his army by beating his head against these defensive lines to extend his own lines of communication. sherman would grow weaker and he would grow stronger as he fell back until the moment came but the moment never came. some observers argued he was one of the few that recognized warfare was changing. contemporary evidence suggests that this was at least partly and maybe even mostly a hindsight. his initial instinct. he was a 19th century general so his instinct was to attack. it was only after sherman's various moves around it had forced him to fall back that he reconsidered what was happening and said this is kind of working out okay because sherman had to leave troops behind all the way back to chat chattanooga. he tries to attack my defensive position. this is a good strategy. they say things like dear mr. president, i desperately crave your advice. you are the most wonderful man and handsome too i might add. davis loved this. lee kept in touch. johnston wouldn't do it. i think it hurt him. much against his better judgment he was forced to give johnston another chance. in the spring of 1865, the last months of the war. the southern public desperately sought a miracle and a number of individuals called for johnston's restoration to command. they were grasping at straws. johnst johnston's rivals and in particular they noted that things must be desperate if the nation now looked to joe johnston as a savior. nevertheless if a deliberate slap in the face. it was that davis was the commander in chief of all forces. and i'm quoting the assignment of joseph e. johnston to the army of tennessee. congress is telling davis appoint him. the congressional act didn't require it but lee did recommend it to davis and not merely because of congressional. lee and johnston had been classmates and remained friends all that time. they have known each other for four decades. despite all that had happened lee retained confidence and in particular he knew that his name was almost to soldiers who knew he would not throw them into battle unless there was a good chance he was going to win. it outlined all of the shortcomings and concluded with this. my opinion of general johnston's unfitness for command into a conviction so subtle that it would be impossible for me to tell of an army in the field. he composed that intending to commit it in response but he didn't do it. lee convinced him that if nothing else johnson's appointment would boost sagging moral and it was a measure of davis's trust in lee and his commitment to the cause that he was willing to violate every personal instinct, swallow hard and make the appointment. the news brought no pleasure to joe johnston. when he got lee's order to drive back sherman he replied these troops form an army too weak to cope with sherman. of course davis had heard that before. the next day, the day after he wrote that response johnston who was living in south carolina had a chance to run into chestnut she wrote in her die write that nig night. he believed to bear the program of being the guy who finally had to surrender. in spite of that he did accept it. it is interesting to speculate why. the reality consists of isolated groups of soldiers and facing them is an overwhelming army under johnston's old nemesis. if johnson believed davis was setting them up for failure why did he accept it? most likely he was a soldier. this was his duty. he accepted the burdens given him by his government even such a government as the one headed by jefferson. perhaps two he saw it as a chance to prove he was a bigger man that davis. it was a chance to redeem himself of public opinion. the supply system didn't even pretend to function anymore. when he got command he wrote to the new secretary of war for support and all breckenridge would do is offer kind of a verbal shrug and write that he should make the best of it. for his part lee wrote to johnston to suggest he should try to live off the land as sherman's men did. that of course only added to the hardship of the citizens for they would now have to fear not only yankee calvary and confederate calvary as well. his horse men. the problem was that sherman was advancing so swift italy before southern troops would get there. there was nothing for it. in addition to the logistical problem johnston had to deal with all of the personal baggage and there's a lot of it by now including his own that several generals in his command theater brought with him including this guy. i'm really astonished that's about generals we love to hate. we have nobody talking about brag here. let me take a few kicks. back in 1864 brag had written several secret and rather poisonous letters attacking joe johnston. brag frankly resented it. johnston didn't know about it. they learned about it only later. brag found himself under johnston's command. that's embarrassing. brag begged davis to get him out of it. davis refused. learn to work together. and johnston rather than seek some measure of revenge for brag's back stabbing instead ordered d.h. hill to reenforce brag. that lead to another because hill hated brag too. almost everybody did. he asked to be excused from this. he has made me the scapegoat once and would do it again. and they did. with hill's support they inflicted a sharp reverse on one of the columns taking a thousand federal prisoners offering only 134 casualties. on march 19th and 20th. a small village in bentonville he fought his last battle. four years of war and especially the war from tennessee reduced the once powerful to a shadow of itself. the men advanced and they do advance. they advanced on a four division front. even in the paintings that survived the standards are only about ten yards apart. they had become the size of companies. still, the attack had both surprise and momentum and for a moment it was 1862 again. the yankees fleeing. it's a moment that didn't last. the federals brought up reenforcements and brought up a defensive line. they bumped up and had to recoil. despite repeated assaults that line held and near midnight -- i wanted to add this. here the statue on the battlefield. i might just adhere as an editorial comment this is kind of where they belong on the battlefield. here is johnston on ground that he contested although a is he saying charge that way men, he is saying look, a line of retreat. sorry. bentonville was in the a c confederate victory. in some respects it was a satisfying day. his tactical plan had worked. sherman would have to advance more carefully now. he could not spread out and advance to spoiling the country side. he would have to advance in concentrated units during the counter attack. of having accomplished that much johnson should have moved off to fight another day. instead he stayed. his army endured several probing attacks. johnson's official explanation was he needed time to evacuate the wounded. he also hoped that a kounlter attack would wreck itself. another fact may have been his reluctance to reenforce the criticism that he always was too ready to retreat. so he stayed for a day and then on march 20th having made his point and recovered his wounded he ordered the army to fall back. johnston boasted that the courage and enthusiasm disproved the lies that hood had written in his report that the men in the ranks had forgotten how to fight. the battle in north carolina did nothing to believe the force in the lines around richmond and petersburg. throughout the campaign johnson believed lee was holding his own successfully outside richmond and that his responsibility was to protect lee's rear and keep open that vital railroad link between the two armys. in his view it was possible that the two armys might yet combine and turn one on the other to compete grant and sherman. even as johnson fell back lee was planning a desperate stroke of his own east of petersburg. lee hoped that the capture would compel grant to pull forces back and buy time for the rebel defenders. like the grand charge of johnston's army the well planned attack on march 25th was a little more than a hope and failed to achieve the broader goal. afterward grant accelerated his efforts on lee's right stretching it even further. it was only a matter of time now before those lines broke. on april 10th johnston learned lee and his army had evacuated. they are flared a new hope that would lean on the move perhaps the two armys could be unified and these two west point classmates could together still turn this thing around. he was thinking and received an order from jefferson davis to meet with him at greensboro. they turned the army over and went off to meet the president. after an all night ride johnston arrived in greensboro at 8:00 in the morning on april 12th. there he learned that lee had surrendered his army three days before. he didn't record his feelings at the time but he later asserted that from that moment he assumed the war was over. consequently he was astonished only minutes later when it would turn out to be the last cabinet meeting of the confederacy. davis greeted his least favorite general with what amounted to a pep talk. things weren't so bad. southern soldiers could still be recalled and a new army could be formed. the war could still be won. johnston was appalled. he replied it seems unlikely to him were in the desperate c condition of the fares. after this initial meeting johnston met separately with several members of davis's entourage. we know was prone to the most high in the sky scenarios. he even agreed it meant the war was over. continuation of the war now they all asserted would be nothing less than murder. he told him it was his responsibility he is the only serving general left in the confederacy. it is his job to make the president see reality. johnson agreed to try telling him we must stop fighting at once and secure peace on the best terms we can. he replied it was johnston's duty to make it clear to the president. so it was in that frame of mind that johnson attended the final cabinet meeting with davis at 8:00 that night. according to the notes that were kept by postmaster reagan davis began the meeting by addressing johnston directly. i have requested you to join us that we may have the benefit of your views. before inviting them to give their views however he offered his own opinion with the situation while serious was not fatal. i think we can still whip the enemy if the people will turn out. everyone waited for johnston's reply. after a pause my views are that people are tired, feel themtss whipped and will not fight. they may be increased to any extent desierd. my men are daily deserting and stealing to aid in their escapes back to their homes. they regard the war. while johnson finished speaking it was quiet again. all the heads in the room turned to see how davis would respond to that. after a moment davis turned and said what do you say, general? i concur in everything general johnston has said. davis looked down. his hands fi jetted with a piece of paper folding it and refolding it. finally he looked up. well general johnston, what do you propose? johnston asked would he be given the authority to open negotiation to bring about an end to the war. daifrs doubted it would do any good. he gave johnston permission to try. but to try what exactly? what dais believed he had given johnston to do, given the authority to do was to negotiate an end to the war which meant getting sherman to agree to confederate independence. no wonder he didn't think it would do any good. once again as throughout their relationship the two men failed or perhaps refused to understand one another. back with his army johnston sent sherman a note saying they meet to disarm a -- which would permit the civil authorities to enter into needful arrangements to terminate the existing war. curious phrasing. the reference implied to recognition that there was such a thing as the confederate. still he was unwilling to give up to end the war on such neck a -- technicality. on april 17th, 1865 sherman and johnston met in the home near north carolina seen here in a modern photograph. by then each man had spent many hours thinking about the other, what plans might lurk in the mind of that foe of mine across the battlefield. they had served in the military together yet they had never met until this day. they went into the house unlike where you see in the paintings, the staff members hovered around and the two of them went inside alone. once inside sherman reached into his vest and handed johnston a telegram he received upon leaving coleav leaving camp. he read it, turned white and looked up at sherman in horror. he had been assassinated the night before. he expressed the hope that sherman did not think the south had such a hand. he replied he was confident but he was less sure davis's government had not played a role. to that johnston made no reply. then they got down to business. sherman offered johnson but he suggested they could go further than that and arrange the terms of a permanent piece. sherman asked if he had the authority to make such an agreement. secretary of war would arrive that afternoon and he could represent the rebel government. sherman said i cannot enter into any negotiation but breckenridge is also a major general in the army. you could treat with him as he represents the cabinet. well, anxious for the blood letting to end sherman agreed. so they met in the same house the next day april 18th. sherman had prepared a memorandum. it called not only for the disillusion of all southern armys and also the recognition of state governments. after some conversation and a few the three men all agreed and signed the document. johnson left the meeting believing the war at least was over. the political leaders in washington especially in the wake of lincoln's assassination were enraged by the deal that grant himself were sent south to bring sherman to heal to tell him he overstepped his authority. so immediately he sent johnson a note saying it would resume and he also invited johnson to another meeting where they would discuss the surrender of the army alone without reference to political issues. johnson knew that it would have only one result for what was left of his army was rapidly in the belief that the war was over. 4,000 of them had left just that day, seeking to share the burden of the decision. he asked breckenridge for guidance. he should at least bring off the calvary. of course if he did that it meant the war would go on and for how long? a week, a month and to what end? johnson was not willing to risk the blood of his soldiers so that davis could stay in office for another week. so he notified sherman that he would meet with him again in order to surrender his army on the 26th of april. given the long and often bitter relationship between jefferson davis and johnston it's hardly surprising that the president never forgave him. for what he considered an unnecessary surrender, to be sure lee had surrendered too. lee had been surround. he fought as long as he could and then accepted the inevitable. johnston had just quit. to davis johnston's surrender was simply another manifestation who had from the first been a reluctant warrior but whatever johnson's retrograde movements on the virginia peninsula in 1862 or his trading space for time in georgia in 1864, his decision to lay down his arms in 1865 was surely the reasonable act of a man who knew when the time had come for the killing to stop. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> got time for questions? i am told we have time for questions. a couple down here? microphones are on their way. whoever gets the microphone first. that's the rule. okay. right here. yes, sir. >> at bennett place, did not joseph johnson propose a set of terms to sherman before sherman pulled out his alternatives and did not sherman kind of look at them and say, oh, these aren't too bad and it was johnston's p proposals that kept the state governments in. >> johnston made the verbal recommendation to sherman. he thought, we're going to have instability and chaos. the war ends. no authority is in charge. people will run amok rioting and looting. the state governments are already there. he made the oral argument to sherman and sherman put it in the working document that he presented. i think johnston was a little bit far-sighted. he knew there had to be an authority of some kind in place and that, if it wasn't the state governments, it would be the military occupiers and he kind of wanted to avoid that. the argument was made that johnston was looking out for the citizens of the south in the post-war period. and that may be true. >> could you go over the ranking of the five full generals one through five? >> i hope i can do it from memory. cooper. samuel cooper from the class of 1815 was actually the highest ranking general in the confederacy. a lot of people overlook this. he never served in the field. he was a little bit long in the tooth certainly for those days. he did remain on active service in richmond for most of the war. he was ranked first. number two from the class of '24. somebody help me. albert sidney johnston, number two. he was jefferson davis' favorite general. he loved albert sidney johnson. he had been the first captain, commander of the corps at west point when davis had been a cadet. so he had reverence for him from the beginning. after johnson was killed at shiloh he appointed his son on his staff in richmond to kind of keep the connection with him. he was number two. number three was robert e. lee, class of 1827. graduating second. number four. joseph e. johnston, 17th from the same class and beauregard, was last, from i think class of '38. those were the five in that order. if two ever served in the same theater one would have command jurisdiction over the other. johnson had command authority in virginia in the field. but it was the idea that the law said i should be number one and you made me number four. that requires an explanation. by the way, the argument against johnston's position here was that johnston was quarter-master general and therefore had a one-star rank. it was a brevit appointment. the rank went with the job. anybody who was quarter-master general of the army became a one-star general but, when he left the job, he would revert to his statutory rank of lieutenant colonel. many people said, that doesn't count. he was a general but not a real general. so that was part of a mix as well. yes. will has a question. oh, i am sorry. >> let me ask you -- >> oh. the boss is going to ask me a question. >> based on the fact that a lot of people believe that johnston was just defensive minded on the way from dalton to atlanta, there was one instance at cassville that's interesting. >> yes. >> you want to comment on that. >> i will. cassville was -- he had planned carefully throughout, so he said both at the time and later that when the time came he would turn and strike. there was a moment when the roads diverge. the western atlantic railroad went this way and there was a branch off. you can't move an 85,000 man army on the same track. they had separated themselves. johnston had taken up a good position on the flank of the eastern-most prong of sherman's advance. he had it set up. he was going to attack. block with hardee, attack with hood. the shield and the sword. he had it all -- it was great. the orders went out and john bell hood who was to execute the assault wrote back and said, can't do it because my -- my viddets have reported a strong federal force coming on my own flank. well, it turned out not to be a strong federal force. it was a lost brigade. but hood said we can't do it, canceled it. so it was canceled. hood never bothered to mention that in his letters back to richmond saying, this guy won't fight. this was the moment when he planned to and didn't, but didn't because the person who was to execute the assault said it could not be done. so yeah. cassville was the great what-if of the georgia campaign. that's true. sam hood can explain all this this afternoon about why john bell hood did that. another one? will. >> i have to confess, i have always been sympathetic to joe johnston. there is one case where i can't find a way to excuse his behavior. that's during the vicksburg campaign. after he retreats from jackson he sends orders to pemberton to come out from vicksburg and perform a sandwich routine on grant. >> right. >> johnston coming from the east, pemberton from the west. but johnston has apparently no intention whatsoever to act on those orders and pemberton comes out and gets beaten at champion hill. can you explain what was going through johnston's mind. >> i can explain it the way he would have explained it. it's hard to know at this remove exactly what intentions anybody had. it looks from the way johnston positioned his army that he was not on the cusp of launching an assault to relieve pemberton, but i think, if you back that up a few weeks, maybe a couple months, the problem is that johnston has command authority over two armies in the western theater. braxton brags army, the tennessee and pemberton's in the mississippi. he is supposed to coordinate the movements of these two. it's a command that he can't really understand because, for a 19th century general like johnston, a general's job is to command an army. if he shows up and tells bragg what to do he is superseding bragg in command of that army. so that problem existed from the beginning. finally davis interferes and sends an order saying, look, take 3,000 men and go rescue pemberton. and so off he goes. he said, look, 3,000 men aren't going to do anything against grant's 40,000, 45,000 coming from the southwest up toward jackson. the only way this is going to work is if i combine my forces with pemberton's forces. so he sends pemberton an order saying chaot saying evacuate vicksburg. this is long before vicksburg is besieged. he calls the counsel of war and he says, i have orders to evacuate vicksburg and march to join with joseph e. johnson so that collectively as an army we can attack grant. this is before the battle of raymond. so it would have been possible, perhaps. he says, i don't want to do it because i know jefferson davis wants me to hold vicksburg at all costs. vicksburg is the key, lincoln said. have to hold it. can't let it go. so he says, no, i won't do it. but -- he says, i can't just stay here because that's -- that's too passive. so what i'll do is i will go out and fight sherman at the big black river. so pemberton was doing what he knew davis wanted him to do. johnston was trying to do what, according to the theories he had been taught at west point had been told to do which is concentrate your forces in the face of the enemy. don't let the enemy get in between and pick you off one by one. when you say johnston had no intention of attacking, he did not intend to attack after the -- it was besieged from the outside. the moment was before it was besieged when pemberton could have come out into the field, joined with johnston and collectively, i don't know, what if again, collectively had an opportunity perhaps to turn back grant who had been in a pretty difficult position south of vicksburg without a secure line of supply. so that's the way johnston would have explained it. once pemberton refused his orders and said, i won't do it, that johnston was kind of trapped. i don't know if that's a satisfactory answer but that's johnston's answer. somebody down here. right here. did i get everybody else? okay. >> prior to johnston's wounding in 1862 at seven pines was his plan to give up richmond or plan to fight a decisive battle in front of richmond before that came about. >> great question. johnston's view was always to fight an offensive battle. people who know joe johnston including jefferson davis said i don't believe it. but the way to do it, you see, was to hold the citadel with a holding force. militia. smaller troops of artillery batteries, for example, and then use a mobile field force to strike at the advancing enemy. so he didn't want to fall back within richmond and let himself get besieged. he wanted to maintain the fluidity. he wanted to fortify the city so it could be held by a small group while he maneuvered. once the orders come back -- he is falling back to peninsula. orders arrive in richmond. billed fortifications around the city. what does that mean? that means you're going to fall back into the city and fortify yourself. that's only partly what he had in mind. but the fault here goes to joe johnston's inability or unwillingness to meet with davis, explain it to him. send him the regular letters like lee did, explain what he is doing and why he is doing it so that he might have gotten political support from the government to execute a strategy. instead of that he allowed davis to draw his own conclusion saying bein saying, well, he is fortifying the city. he must be going to give it up. as he's falling back over the chattahoochee river he sends orders to atlanta, fortify the city so it can be held by a small group so that i can maneuver. blah blah. davis concludes. he is not going to fight a battle. he is going to fall back into the city. we done? everybody is hungry. it's time for lunch! thank you. 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