I handle the Asian Program here. Its my opportunity on behalf of carnegie today to host a pair of panels that include some of the people i admire the most in the field of contemporary china studies. We at carnegie and i think throughout the china watching community have had tremendous admiration for the leadership and the production of the china leadership monitor, which is organized by professor alice miller at the Hoover Institution of stanford university. They have established a terrific record for hearing the facts as opposed to trends, feelings, moods, and things like that. So whenever you want to touch base with reality, i recommend you go online to the china leadership monitor, and do precisely that. Today, were going to give you a sampler of their writings in the form of presentations looking ahead at the 19th Party Congress, which is just a very short time from now. We have the day broken into two panels. The first one will be the people you see here. Ill moderate. Michael swaine and alan romberg have been regular contributors to china leadership monitor as well as to many other making contributions in the field. And they will speak for the first period, until 10 45. James mulvaney was here a moment ago, but hes been called away by a family emergency and has had to leave. He will not be presenting this morning. But you can find his writings in the china leadership monitor and get the trend. He cant be with us, but we wish him well and what hes having to manage this morning. I wanted to mention, as you look around the room, you may see no one here actively working for the brookings institution. That is not a protest. They have all been called off to a mandatory retreat. They would love to be here with us as well. In case youre looking supfor somebody and you dont see them, its just one of those things that happen in bureaucracies. I would like to get started here on this panel, and the order we have for you, speaking first, michael, and then we go to alan. Thanks very much, doug. Really a pleasure to be part of this effort. I have been writing for the china leadership monitor now for, i dont know, how long . Quite a few years. How many . 152 years. Sometimes it seems like that. No. And yes, its a tough job. You know, its a very demanding schedule. The deadlines are really harsh. And but its been a pleasure writing. And my topic has been Foreign Policy, and i have usually focused on trying to sort of dig deep in chinese views in the open media on Foreign Policy issues, distinguishing between authoritative and nonauthoritative sources because so often in narratives and discussions about chinese policies, observers completely ignore distinctions between what the government actually says in an authoritative way and what all manner of other chinese say. Sort of jumbling it all together as if they represent chinese views. They do in some sense, but they certainly dont in the sense that they represent authoritative views. What i would like to do today is speak a little bit about what i think will be the Foreign Policy themes, continuities and changes and policy initiatives in the area of Foreign Policy that we might see in the Party Congress coming up later this month. Party congresses are usually not occasions for getting into the details of Foreign Policy. Most people will focus on them and well see that today, for implications for leadership changes and Broad National policy direction. But they do say some things about Foreign Policy. Some very important things. So what i have done is i have taken a look at the 17th and 18th Party Congress statements and developed since the last, the 18th Party Congress in 2012, so ill make some comments on the three general areas that the Party Congresses usually cover in terms of Foreign Policy. The first is general statements on the Global Environment that have an impact on Foreign Policy. These are sort programmatic statements about the nature of the external environment in the world and obviously its implications for china. Here, i think the Party Congress will continue to stress the development toward a multipolar world. A generally Stable International environment, and the concept of peace and development as whats called the underlying trend of the times. I think well see thats been highlighted in past Party Congress statements. I think well see this again or something similar to it, but this statement has always been paired with more negative concerns about the international environment. And those in the past have involved whats been called hedgemannism, which is code word primary for the United States, and power politics, local politics, hot spot issues that keep emerging. Imbalances in the world economy, which may be worsening, and then of course, traditional and nontraditional security threats. I think youll see reference to these kinds of factors as well in the Party Congress statement. Now, theres also been a reference in the past, in the 18th Party Congress, to something called neointerventionism. That, of course, has been dependency for states to intervene in the internal affairs of other states without having the inpenture of the united nations. This was prompted or highlighted for the first time in the 18th Party Congress, and it came about largely as a result of events in libya and syria at the time with intervention there by outside powers. Now, the concept intervention might not be as prominent in this Party Congress because you havent had as many new examples of this that have occurred since the last Party Congress unless you talk about the possibility and the fear of a u. S. Led military intervention in north korea. I doubt that that would be likely to be mentioned or cause the mention of new interventionism, but because thats usually occurred after a development, but its possible, i suppose. Now, in addition to these concerns that weve seen before, both positive and negative, i think the Party Congress will probably also highlight more recent potential threats to what it sees as peace and growing stability, growing growth, growth in the International System. And that will be this idea of growing imbalances in Economic Development and more importantly, what is seen as a troubling backlash against greater Global Economic integration and the forces of globalization. This is a theme that has been struck by chinese leaders in recent year or so that has become increasingly prominent. And beijing in this respect will likely present itself as a strong opponent of a trend towards protectionism and a proponent of greater economic integration and free trade. Which have become, as i say, theme, particularly since the election of donald trump and the rise of similar what you might call mefirst nationalism or nationalist movements in europe. And just to sort of high lielli this, just last month, the foreign minister said we live in a world that is witnessing profound changes in the International Landscape and change of power. Prominent threats, insufficient driving force for global growth, and a growing backlash against globalization. There are unprecedented challenges from mankinds pursuit of lasting peace and sustainable development. I wouldnt be surprised if some variation of this kind of statement appears in the Party Congress statement. Now, a second area getting more to the issue of chinese policies, in other words, how does china deal with this environment. I think you will see, again, in the Party Congress, a central focus in all realms on pursuing, still pursuing following through the double centenary objectives for china, which is, as we probably all know in this room, a moderately Prosperous Society by the year 2021. This was a project that was ratified in the report to the 16th Party Congress in 2002, reaffirmed in the report to the 17th Party Congress in 2007. And reaffirmed yet again in 2012. The second is the construction of a strong democratic, civilized, harmonious and modern society by 2029. And so these two things have continued to be basic statements about chinese objectives, but i think these will be, as they have been in recent years, couched within the context of the china dream, which is xi jinpings concept of the rejuvenization of china. That will have a prominent place, i would imagine, in the Party Congresss statement. Now, in terms of general characterization of chinas specific foreign policies in the 19th Party Congress, youll have the usual bromides we have heard over and over again in Party Congresses. Holding high the banner of peace, development, cooperation, mutual benefit. Independent Foreign Policy of peace. Following a win win strategy for countries opening up sustainable balanced growth, et cetera, et cetera. Youll also hear, i think, a repetition for the desire for new type of International Relations and new type of power relations. Some have thought recently that these two slogans, particularly the new type of great power relations have been deemphasized somewhat in chinese leaders statements. And i doubt, however, they will be lacking from the Party Congress statements, because i think they still are a major element of chinas view towards dealing with the United States and dealing with developing countries, particular neighboring developing countries. And i also think that perhaps most notably, the 19th Party Congress will repeat the past 17th and especially 18th Party Congress statements of chinas need to, quote, fully up hold chinas territorial sovereignty, maritime rights, and interest in national unity. This, of course, refers to its disputes with its neighbors around its periphery, particularly in the maritime area, that have become more direct in recent years. And again, from a recent speech, in this case by state counsel in july on this issue, where he stated that china must unequivocally make clear its position on taiwan, the South China Sea, and other issues concerning chinas major core interests. Quote, we have drawn a clear line of what is acceptable and acted forcefully to defend our core interests as well as our legitimate right, unquote. So the emphasis on this issue remains. And i think very much it will be reflected in the Party Congress statement. It reflects the larger emphasis by the xi jinping regime, but this north, the defense of stability and the advancement of peace and stability alongside the protection of chinas rights and interests, using chinas greater influence in the International System to advance those interests. The same time, i think there will be efforts to emphasize multilateral diplomacy as has occurred in the recent Party Congress and the idea of reforming global governance, which has also been a theme in past Party Congress meetings. Now, in the defense and security realms in particular, i think youll probably hear the phrase which was, again, which was made actually after the 18th Party Congress on the search for a common comprehensive cooperative and sustainable security. In this regard, you might hear for the first time the actual placement of the Party Congress statements of the three principles to dealing with hot spot issues. These were announced, mentioned in 2015, and they include adherence to noninterconvenience in internal affairs and opposition against the practice of imposing solutions on others. Big theme in chinese Foreign Policy. Upholding a fairness and justice in opposition of the pursuit of ones own interests, which is kind of a dig, it seems to me, at the Trump Administration. Even though it predates that administration. And adherence to political settlement and opposition to the use of force. Now, i think regarding military policies in particular, the 19 Party Congress will probably reiterate the 18th Party Congress rather unprecedented statement about the function of chinas military and military modernization. Which said a Strong National defense and powerful armed forces are needed that are commensurate with chinas International Standing and meets the needs of its security and developing interests and that the Chinese Military needs to take a more active role in International Political and security fields. This idea of chinas greater military strength and its more activist stance overseas is a theme that will continue into this Party Congress, and there also will probably be a repetition of the emphasis on both maritime space and cyberspace security, which has also occurred in the past Party Congress. The reference to cyberspace was unprecedented in the 18th Party Congress work report and also that of space in the context of security. And then of course, i think there will be a repetition of the concept, the objective that the chinese should continue to build itself into a maritime power. Finally, although no details are usually provided in Party Congress statements, it might offer some individual references to specific policy initiatives associated with these objectives. One belt, one road, for think for sure will appear. The improving relationship with periphery countries, which was a major theme since the convening of the 18th Party Congress, could very well appear again. Increasing chinas increasing involvement in a range of multilateral events including ones china will organize and host, promote. Xi jinpings views, especially global views. You could get a reference there. The new relations in relation to the United States. An interesting question is whether or not it will mention china russian relations and the improvement in china russian relations and the Nuclear Crisis in particular. Im not sure about either of those. China russians relations have barely been mentioned in the past. They might be mentioned. The Nuclear Crisis in particular, im somewhat doubtful unless its placed in the context of these hot spot issue statements that i said before. In any case, what i see are probably a lot of continuities with some greater emphasis on globalization, et cetera, and free trade, open markets, nonprotectionism. But the real question i think in foreign and defense policy is not so much what themes and policies will be struck at the 19th Party Congress and the following National Peoples congress in the spring of 2018, but whether a stronger, more dominant xi jinping will emerge from the Party Congress to directly turn to a more assertive, even perhaps confrontational china, an on issues such as maritime disputes, activities in asia, taiwan, and possibly even north korea. Now, i dont subscribe to the view that xi jinping is primary a communist ought ocrat most concerned with strengthening ccp controls and pushing the u. S. Out of asia, as some observers think. Yes, he wants china to be more effectively using its growing presence and influence internationally to promote its National Development and its security interests, as i have said. But xi jinping and the chinese leadership, in my view, continue to recognize the imperative for china to maintain relatively positive, cooperative relations with the u. S. And the west. Like it or not, china is integrating into the Global Economy and the global regimes and highly averse to major shifts in the regional or global order that could threaten its continued stability and prosperity such as a confrontation with the u. S. Xi jinping and the chinese leadership also know they have yet to make a stable transition to a new normal of lower but highly beneficial growth rates and a more equitable and just Chinese Society with higher Living Standards and low er levels of corruption