But as the director i want to kick things off. First with the big word of thanks to the atlantic counsel. Partner in helping to organize this event. Helping to do a lot of the important work with not only other regular tors, but also some of the foreign partners and friends at embassies across the city. I want to just give a word or tw on the institute of int International Law since i see students here. Found by the late john jackson. The focus over a decade ago was that on international trade. But over the last decade or so, the institute has grown to cover other issues as well. Economic sanctions, financial regulation, Monetary Affairs and international tax. We have one of the largest faculties focusing on these issues. And we like to do things in an interdisciplinary way. That takes an interesting take on International Economic and global affairs. That is integrate and analysis into real world affairs. Talking to many of the leaders. Here in washington who are on the front lines of managing and navigating issues that have global import. And we have just been very fortunate to have many of the leaders here. And todays q and a will be a continuation of the series of the conversation. Throughout the changes, our dean has been at the helm. Side by side helping the International Law faculty and the larger Washington Dc Community think through how our academic programming as a law firm can inform policy makers, Market Participants, diplomats, ceos and others. A particular interest in todays talk. Bill was before becoming a law professor, he was involved in government. And served as the Deputy Assistant general in the aus of Legal Counsel of the u. S. Department of justice. And before that he was the associate counsel of the office of independent counsel during the iran contra investigation. The gift that kept giving for a while. I want as a result i really did want to have bill here. Have the honor of doing the introduction for david. And to help shepherd us into the discussion today. Bill trainer. I want to thank you for that kind and generous introduction. And welcome you all to georgetown law and this very important discussion. Let me begin by thanking the institute of International Economic law for having put together todays event. Under chriss leadership i have grown to become one of the premier forums for policy discussion. I want to recognize him for having conceptionalize. And making it a reality. Over the last two years with the active participation of nearly a dozen renowned faculty members in finance, tax and trade. We have enjoyed cunning edge programming with ambassadors, general counsel, regulators and ceos. And were delighted to once again welcome reporters, cspan, students and leaders of the washington policy making community. And i want to say how pleased we are to be cosponsoring todays events with the Atlanta Council. Georgetown and the Atlanta Council share a common goal of promoting constructive leadership, and engagement in international affairs. In todays increaseingly complex world, its impairtive we do all we can to promote that. Constructive leadership and engagement in International Law and policy. And thats what its about. Sdp just a delight to have the atlanta counsel join with us here today. Now, david, were particularly honored to have you here with us today. Before getting into our q and a. Let me thank you for the Government Service you rendered. Thats something that we particularly value at georgetown law. And we value it always. But particularly on this very significant day. Today is the anniversary of september 11, 2001. And that date always gives one pause. To reflect on where we are as a nation. What we value, and what we stand for. The day provides collective moment of interspection. Sdp this is never been truer than it is today. And its never been more necessary than it is today. As we face enormous National Security and other challenges that will shape Global Economic governess. The international order, and perhaps the very future of the democracy. So its therefore fitting that we gather together today on the anniversary of 9 11 with the discussions. To examine the current and evolving u. S. Sanctions regime. As they pertain to russia, venezuela and north korea. All nations that are the subject of potentially serious political discussion. While russia, venezuela and north korea are in the news quite a bit these days, there seems to be less than optimal public understanding of the different sanctions regimes. Likely success and the National Security issues that drive the background. So, thats why were so honored and were just lucky to welcome david here today. David cohen served as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence agency. From 2015 to 2017. As the Agency Second in command he managed the cia domestic and worldwide operation. And over saw the modernization. He also led the Agency Performance of its five core missions. Foreign intelligence collection, analysis, covert action, counter intelligence, and foreign liaison relationship. In addition he led special projects focusing on the impact of new technology on the agency. And how best to work with u. S. Companies to advance the cia mission. And notably, in light of the conversation today, david served as the cia second most senior official during the russia hacking investigation. At the conclusion of his tenure, he was awarded the directors award and the intelligence medal. Which is the agencies highest honor. Before becoming Deputy Director. He already had a remarkable record of public service. He served for six years in the u. S. Department of treasury. In two key positions. Responsible for following the money. From 2011 to 15 the Senate Confirmed under secretary for terrorism in Financial Intelligence. As under secretary he directed the Treasury Department policy enforcement regulatory and intelligence function. Aimed at identifying and disrupting Financial Support to nations organizations and individuals posing a threat to National Security. And he also directed two key regulatory agencies. The office of foreign assets control, and the financial crimes enforcement net work. He was also instrumental in developing and implementing the financial sanctions regime that brought iran to the negotiating table. That imposed cost on russia. And president putin for the invasion of the unrest in eastern ukraine. And the deprived al qaeda and other terrorist organizations access to funding. Led the Treasury Department to combat money laundering. And financial terrorism. Its really before that he was the Treasury Department assistant secretary. Its a remarkable record of public service. He has hes a unique person to be able to have this conversation today. Hes got an unmatched knowledge of terrorism. Money laundering and Nuclear Programs and a deep sense of where the issues intersect in the most dangerous corners of the globe. Although hes returned. This is the infomercial segment. He returned to focus on cyber security. Im so grateful that hes here today. Again i want to thank him again for his public service. And i have to say, i feel like we have a protagonist in a novel joining us on stage. Welcome, david. Thank you so much, bill. Well i guess its good to jump right in. As introductory question. We should have a framing question. Whats the state of play when it relates to sanctions, and how would you see the Trump Administrations conduct and use and deployment of sanctions as being different from that of the Obama Administration . First of all. Let me thank you chris for inviting me. Very excited to be here. And have the opportunity to talk about what i think are some of the most fascinating issues. The interplay of Foreign Policy and National Security and the tools that we have developed over the years to troy and advance u. S. Interest in the. Its great to be here. To do that. I that was a ridiculous introduction. Never ever do that again. So the state of play of sanctions is that i think as we sit here on 9 11, 2017. And is appropriate to take a moment to reflect on what todays anniversary means. It means something in the sanctions world. It means much more as a country. And im actually delighted to be able to talk about how sanctions can be a part of our Counter Terrorism effort. On this anniversary. Let me to answer your question, the as we sit here today financial sanctions in particular have become an accepted and imbedded tool of our National Security. And Foreign Policy. That is has been evolutioned over time. I think it was something that during the Obama Administration and really going back to the bush administration, a lot of effort was put into trying to change the landscape of the sanctions law and sanctions tool. So we can have something thats much more nimble and effective. So i think today you pick up the paper, whatever the National Security issue is. Whether its north korea, venezuela, russia, terrorism, syria, name your issue. Sanctions is a component of the conversation. I think one interesting, its a small point. Its an interesting reflection of this. There was legislation enacted earlier this year it was part of the big russia rkts, iran, north korea legislation. That made the secretary of the treasury a statutory member of the National Security counsel. When the established in 1950, youll know the answer to that. Several decades ago. It was a list of cabinet officials who were statutory members. Secretary of treasury was not. As a matter of practice over the years secretary of treasury and his dez knee. Has been present for meetings. And deputies meetings what have you. Its now a reflected in law that treasury is in the nfc. Theres a appreciation the sanctions tool is a key part of what we do. In terms of the what has changed between the Obama Administration and the Trump Administration, one of the things we tried hard to do in the o palm administration was to use sanctions as a tool for broader policy objective. We were very cognizant sanctions are not a policy unto themselves. Dont apply sanctions and hope something good will happen. You apply sanctions to troy to to do one of things. Either to effect behavior, to try and persuade whoever is on the receiving end of the sanctions, to change what theyre doing. Whether its a policy or conduct. And the other aboutive is to disrupt and disable. In particular you look at the Counter Terrorism financing sanctions. Its the principle objective was to cut off the line of finance. And so the best example in the Obama Administration of how we tried to do this was with iran. The sanctions that we impose on iran and continue to ratchet up and expand and i think ways that we should talk about, was all part of what we call the dual track strategy. On the one hand to continue to apply increasing pressure on iran. But to always on the other side of the track offer the opportunity for engagement. And as everybody knows, we got to a point where the iranens said okay, were ready to talk. After a number of fits and starts where the sanctions were not intense enough to get them over the hump. They got to the point where they understood that it was in their interest to negotiate. Rather than to continue to defy the international community. So we tried to merge sanctions with a policy objective. Now in the Trump Administration, its still early. This may change as they sort of find their footing. Theres clearly a continued reliance on sanctions. Youve seen it in venezuela where they have issued a really two different type of sanctions. The standard additional sanctions that are designed to disable and disrupt. Recently just a few weeks ago some very interesting financial sanctions being the venezuela government ability to finance itself. Theres a lot of continued use of sanctions in venezuela. Talk in north korea. Theres some discussion of course of whether to relieve the sanctions on russia. What we dont see quite yet is a close tie between the use of sanctions and a policy object i have. I have tried to figure out what the policy is in venezuela. And other than as an expression of revulsion of whats goeng on there, which is a worthy and appropriate reaction. Its not clear to me that the sanctions that were applying are designed to achieve a particular out come. Like wise and we should talk about north korea as well. Unclear how the sanctions that have been discussed with respect to north korea are tied to what our north korea policy is. Thats in larnl large part because we dont know what the north korea policy is. Thats a distinction that as i said may cure itself over time as the Trump Administration refines and defines its policy. To a greater extent in the various. But thats an area where i think theres a little difference. We certainly do see at the moment an effort. Just today. Over in new york at the united nations. The Trump Administration is seeking to in effect stiffen sanctions, internationally. Tied to your earlier question. Number one, how important is the multilateralization of sanctions in order to achieve policy objectives and does it defer dramatically across Different Countries . Number two, does that multilateralization process inherently require more Strategic Thinking what it comes to policy objective . The multilateralization of sanctions is essential. For them to be truly effective. One of the reasons that financial sanctions work, to be totally candid, is that we have the worlds most important economy, most important financial sector, the u. S. Dollar is the current si of choice for a huge proportion of International Transactions. Those dollar transactions whether you are the transaction is between belgium and. Approximate its a dollar denominated transaction it will come through new york. We have a enormous positional advantage in developing financial sanctions here in the United States. We have jurisdiction that expands around the world. That being said. For the sanctions to truly be effective, you need International Buy in. You need other countries not just to be forced to have their businesses and their people subject in some respect to our sanctions. Sp some instances. You want those countries to embrace the policy objective. That was critical in the iran context. And you can see as an importance part of the discussion with north korea. So the going back repeatedly to the security counsel to get resolutions that impose sanctions. And that also importantly these resolutions dont just impose sanctions. They establish the international communitys uniform judgment. On what north korea is doing. That is an important aspect of developing this policy consensus. That you have countries around the world to magnify what were doing dmesically with what they can do in their own law. Im getting a sense of number of one, when youre trying to impose and persecute your international strategy. You should have a strategy. The question is what the strategy is. It can be to achieve a certain Foreign Policy objective. You implying that economic sanctions may not necessarily be the best tool to use if what youre trying to do is not necessarily change behavior, but to either express a program or punish. Just for the sake of punishing. One of the fundamental sanctions is theyre not punitive. The idea under lying sanctions is their administrative action. When the basic governing statute is the International Economic powers act. That gives the president the authority to issue an executive that then delegates the authority to impose sanctions. Its an administrative process. The office of foreign assets control and Treasury Department is Administrative Agency that actually applies the sanctions based on the executive order that the president signs that sets out the criteria. But the idea is that if the person who is subject to the sanction changes their behavior and is no longer doing whatever it is that got them sanctioned, that they will be the sanctions will be lifted. Delisted. And every year delists hundreds and hundreds of people and companies because they have made the case they are no longer doing what it is that got them sanctioned. So, bearing in mind the idea behind sanctions is to change behavior. It isnt a great tool to punish. And frankly i think confuses the use of sanctions and in some respect impairs the ability to get International Consensus around the use of sanctions. If its viewed as purely a punitive tool. To that end, and this gets back to the init