honesty and no naivete, and the way you helped conduct foreign policy during a period of enormous crisis in dwrunt states, constitutional crisis, people on the streets and dealing with one of the most intractable problems, i really must say it was an honor to serve with such great men, and thank you very much for sharing your perspective with all of us and putting it down for history. i think people can learn a lot from what you've done for your nation. with that, thank you very much. [ applause ] president obama visits new orleans on thursday to mark the 10th anniversary of hurricane katrina. you can watch live coverage of the presidential visit beginning at 5:00 p.m. eastern time on c-span. president nixon appointed four justices to the supreme court and others who were rejected by is senate. kevin mcmahon is the author of " "nixon's court." justice antonin scalia makes introductory remarks a this the event that took place in the supreme court chamber. this is 45 minutes. >> good evening. my name's don ehr. i'm lawyer here in washington and i'm also the chairman of the supreme court historical society publications committee and lucky enough to serve as a member this year of a selection commit fee for the griswold prize. and i'm pleased to welcome you to the 2015 erwin griswold presentation lecture. i have to make sure the cell phones are turned off, smartphones or tablets. erwin griswold was surely one of the most remarkable lawyers of the last century. distinguishing himself in many ways in the 65-year legal career. among other things he a knowned expert in tax law. of course, he was a professor for a long time. he was the dean of harvard law school for 21 years and solicitor general in an unprecedented and unsucceeded phenomenon being appointed by lyndon johnson, a democrat and being kept on for several years in the richard nixon administration which we're going to hear about tonight. he was also the supreme court historical society's first chairman. following his term as solicitor general, the dean or just dean as we called him to his face, joined jones day in 1974. after i started working there in 1989, i had the pleasure to work with him on a number of cases, small cases, nothing significant. a commercial dispute, probono appeals. that did affect -- i was quite taken with the fact it had no affect on the level of enthusiasm, effort and interest he put into the cases and i remember thinking since then what a remarkable model he was even late in his life of a lifelong commitment to doing the things that make the law work. when the dean died in 1994, jonathan rose, then a partner at jones day asked the society what the law firm could do to best honor the memory of the dean. jones day and the society agreed to award the erwin griswold prize to the author of the best book of constitutional law or supreme court history on a periodic basis. that award is given five times since then. first to gerald gunther for his biography of learned hand and then the biography of benjamin cardoza and edward parcell. and then to george mar rten for the volume c cb, the life and century of charles beryling ham and finally most recently to the biography of louis bran diaz. our winner tonight is profession zoo kevin j. mcmahon, the professor of political science at trinity college in kth klt and being honored for his book "nixon's court." the book provides a fascinating new theory and insight into what drove nixon's nominations to the court and how nixon's strategy there has affected political power and the shape of the court since then. we're assembled here in the courthouse through juice that sk scalia, a very good friend of the society and the society is today and long has been very grateful for his help and support. over the years, he's many times hosted dinners, introduced speakers, delivered lectures and always done so with his usual warmth and good humor. he was born in trenton, new jersey. received a bachelor of arts and history of georgetown. and his law degree from harvard law school. after a year as a sheldon fellow, traveling throughout europe in 1961, justice scalia went to work in cleveland, ohio, frl small firm then known as jones day. according to those at the firm involved at time as reported in the biography of justice scalia, quote he was highly regarded and would likely have made partner but he lefs in 1967 because he had long intended to teach. and at that time, he became a professor at the university of virginia and he moved his family to charlottesville. after four years in charlottesville in 1971, he entered public service in the nixon administration. first as the general counsel of the office of telecommunications policy in the executive office of the president. and there among other things worked on the formulation of federal policy for the then new tri of cable television. from 1972 to '74 he was the chairman of the administrative conference at the united states. focusing on improving the modest task of improving the federal practice of the bureaucracy. that's cleaned up and we don't have to worry about the bureaucracy anymore. the modest undertaking at the time. then in 1974 nominated and confirmed assistant attorney general in the department of justice where he stayed until the end of the ford administration in 1977. around that time, justice scalia returned to teaching, this time at the university of chicago law school. and during the next few years he was also a visiting law professor at stanford and georgetown. then a few years later in 1982, president ronald reagan appointed him to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit. and then just less than four years later june 24th, 1986, president reagan nominated him this time for the position he holds today as associate justice of the supreme court. he was confirmed september 17th rvegts 1986, by a vote of 98-0. i'm honored to present justice scalia. [ applause ] >> thank you. thank you very much, don. i really welcome the opportunity to present the winner of the erwin griswold prize lecture. the reason being that erwin griswold was by dean at harvard law school and i -- not only that, but, don, one of the reasons i went to jones day in cleveland -- i'm a new yorker. cleveland. whoever heard of cleveland? i went out there to interview and on the plane on the way back who was sitting next to me but my dean? you know, the untouchable erwin griswold. he was great man. his only flaws as far as i have been able to discern is he was utterly incapable of small talk. utterly incapable. so you -- he gave you a headache with him. it was always something very, very serious he wanted to talk about. he was a great man. appeared before this court when he later joined jones day. in fact, he was one of a few people to appear before the court with any regularity. we did not have in those days when i first joined the court much of a supreme court bar. i mean, we have a lot of people who are members of the bar but not many lawyers who appear with regularity. this has changed. we do that now. but in those days,errwin griswold was one of the few. and he spoke highly of jones day and urged know go there because he was a clevelander originally. anyway, enough about dean griswold as i always call him. let me say a few words about today's recipient of the erwin griswold prize lecture award. professor kevin mcmahon is the john reitamyer professor of science at trinity college. he got the ba in economics and political science from the state university of new york at potts dam and phd from -- in politics, from brandice. his publications include reconsidering roosevelt on race, how the presidency paved the road to brown. published by the university of chicago press in 2004. that volume was the winner of the american political science association's richard e. newstot award for the best book on the american presidency published in 2004. his latest book which will be the subject of his remarks this evening is "nixon's court: his challenge to judicial liberalism and its political consequence." it was published again by the university of chicago press in 2011. i could continue to list professor mcmahon's many accomplishments but that would reduce the time left for his remarks. i hope you will join me in welcoming professor mcmahon. [ applause ] >> thank you. this goes up so i get to play with this toy. it's really a great honor to be here this evening and before i begin i want to thank the supreme court historical society for inviting me. the griswold prize committee which i think made a fine choice. justice scalia for his yen rous introduction. trinity college's new president is here. my editor at university of chicago press john tranitski. my parents are here. family members, other family members and friends have made the trip down. special thanks to my son brooks. and my wife pamela. so, as the subtitle suggests, this book is a political analysis of richard knox exxon's challenge to the liberalism of the warren court and the electoral and legal consequences of that challenge. there are many moments in the book. i'm only going to talk about three tonight and it's still going to take me about 40 minutes. these moments come from different parts of the book so they're not chronological. moment one is august 8th, 1968, which centers on that year's presidential campaign. moment two is october 21st, 1971, when richard nixon nominated two to the court. and moment three is april 20th, 1971, which was the day the supreme court announced its decision in swan v. charlotte and for the first time approved a lower court order requiring widespread bussing to ensure desegregation of a dual school system. for me, it's an important date because it helps explain the nixon justice department's litigation strategy on school desegregation. but let me first talk about the beginning of the book. i begin with a story about eddie winsick who owned a bar and grill on the east side of buffalo, new york. his full story is wonderfully told in "the last fine time." but for me, he represents the type of voter richard nixon was trying to attract in 1968. along with white southerners disgruntled with the republican party, nixon sought to appeal to white, ethnic mostly catholic voters living in the rich northern states. while these voters overwhelmingly supported kennedy in 1960, eight years later, candidate nixon spied an opportunity. while traditionally democrats, many of the ethnic catholics living in the urban north were culturally conservative, and in 1968, they were uncertain about the liberalism of the democratic party. and now to moment one. august 8th, 1968. which is the final night of the republican convention in miami. in richard knox xin's mind in the summer of 1968 america was no longer the place it used to be and in an effort to make it to the white house on his second try, he vowed to speak for the forgotten americans, those later referred to as members of the great silent majority. as nixon put it to the republican delegate this is night, these americans were the non-shouters, the non-demonstrators, they were good and decent people who worked, saved and paid their taxes. but in recent years, they had been ignored, left out of the national discussion and left to watch as crime soared, as the nation's cities burned, its youth denounced authority and its war in vietnam marched into another year without a plan for peace. nixon's words that night spoke to a variety of concerns but they centered on the issue that would come to define the campaign. indeed, a generation of campaigns. the issue attracted a variety of labels, from crime in the streets to law and order but it was probably best described as the social issue. a phrase that captured the broader i mag la mags of anxieties that exploded on to the scene in the late 1960s and early 1970s. indeed, in the minds of many americans as one commentator as written, get to riots, street crime, anti-vietnam marches, poor people's marches, drugs, pornography, welfarism, rising taxes, all had a common theme. the breakdown of the family of social discipline, of order, of concepts of duty, of respect for law, of public and private morality. and strikingly, the institution allegedly responsible for causing much of the erosion of the moral fabric of american society was the supreme court of the united states. to its critics, and its drive to oust inequality and racial discrimination from the core of the american experience, the warren court had done more wrong than right. to them, its recent decisions had aided communist forces, abetted criminals, threatened to dislodge school children from the neighborhoods, unleashed a wave of pornographic smut, released murderers from death row, and loosened society's constraints on sexual promiscuity. it did it moreover in the name of the constitution, a document nearly two centuries old but in interpreted by the courts nine unelected wise men to keep up with the times, to live even though its drafters had died long ago. with decisions so easily typecast, as unflinchingly liberal, it didn't take much to convince voters unnerved by the rebellious spirits that the supreme court was at least partially responsible for the unrest throughout the land and if anyone needed a push to make the connection to two of the main contenders of the presidency stood ready to explain. as richard fix exxon reminded the audience, the court's decisions had the effect of hamstringing the peace forces in our society and strengthening the criminal forces. third party candidate george wallace was more blunt. referring the court as a sorry, lousy, no-account outfit and blaming it for just about everything plaguing the land. indeed, in the hands of nixon and wallace, the supreme court became a powerful tool for attracting votes. a device for a new electoral coalition. for example, the nixon campaign features a powerful commercial, like one entitled the first civil right of every american which to him meant the right to be free from domestic violence. nixon used the phrase the first civil right. strategically turns the notion of civil rights on its head. no longer were civil rights only about ending racial discrimination. they were also about combatting crime in the streets. hearing these words, liberals grew alarmed. with nixon's election, they feared his appointments would challenge and even perhaps even reverse some of the warren court's great decisions expanding rights. however, most analyses of the court explains the president did not succeed. in the view of liberal and conservative scholars and commentators, it was a counter r revolution that wasn't. it expanded rights in other areas. writing in 1987, her man swartz noted one would never have expected this in 1969. when richard nixon nominated warren burger to be chief justice. my argument is that nixon didn't fail. rather, his approach to the supreme court is misunderstood and misjudged. i argue two principles dominated nixon's thinking of judicial strategy and policy. first, electoral success was more important than advancing an ideological, consistent brand of judicial conservatism. more specifically, his policy toward the judiciary was geared less to constructing a conservative supreme court and more toward tempering judicialism with the hopes of dismantling the new deal democratic coalition and creating a republican majority. second, president nixon's definition of conservatism with regard to altering the supreme court was quite targeted. indeed, with regard to doctrine, it was designed to address two of the most important concerns of the day. law and order and school desegregation. it was not designed to unleash a conservative counter revolution against the warren court. and this leads to moment two. october 21st, 1971. excuse me. when president nixon nominates louis powell and william rehnquist to the court. first, background. the appointments to the court which garner a great deal of attention at the time are really a mix xur of different types of nominees. significantly, in naming four justices to the nation's highest tribunal in the space of two and a half years, president nixon had an unusual opportunity to affect constitutional doctrine. no president had placed four men on the court so soon into his first term since warren harding had done so in the 1920s. nixon was lucky for another reason. three of the departing justices, chief justice warren and associate justices fortis and black were liberals of the first order. when he nominates six individuals to the court. first, in may out 1969, he fills the court's center chair with the noncontroversial warren earl burger. ironic name given who he was replacing. newspaper reports concluded that burger was tough on law and order and moderate on civil rights. that record allowed him to win a quick and easy confirmation. selecting a chief justice with an image of being tough on law and order had great appeal to the president. consider two polls taken immediately before, just before burger's nomination and just after. a january 1969 gallup poll asked the following question. in general, do you think courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals? less than 2% of respondents answered too harshly. another poll placed significant blame for the difficult combatting crime directly on the doorsteps of the supreme court, specifically it showed that 82% of american men, 50% a great deal and 32% somewhat agreed that recent supreme court decisions had made it more difficult to punish criminals. filling the vacancy created by the resignation of fortiss and occurred in may 1969 was much more difficult for president nixon. he focused on finding a southerner but the first southerner he nominated was rejected by the senate. and what's striking about the rejection is 40% of republican senators voted against the nomination. he followed that up with a floridian, g. harold causededwell rejected by the senate. 32% this time of republican senators voting against the nomination. such dissent towards a newly elected president's choices for the court by members of his own party would be almost unthinkable today. nearly a year after the resignation, the senate confirmed nixon's third choice, harry blackman. who was burger's so-called minnesota twin and the best man at his wedding. like burger, blackman was said to be conservative on law and order and moderate on civil rights. and like the chief justice, he won quick and easy confirmation. fast forward to the fall of 1971. our moment two. nixon has the opportunity to fill two more vacancievacancies. in doing so, he was determined one would be a southerner. after the two failures. for the other slot, he was determined to find another nominee who would pack political punch, namely a woman or a catholic or another southerner. in reviewing these selections, you can really get a sense of how much president nixon wanted at least initially to use the choices for electoral gain because his conversations were recorded. for example, consider president nixon's desire to appoint a woman. it's certainly wasn't because he thought highly of women, at least not from what he said on the tapes. at various points on the tapes the president makes disparages remarks about women. for example, at one point he says, i'm not for women frankly in any job. i don't want any of them around. thank god we don't have any in the cabinet. whether these comments represent the stuff of locker room chat tore the boy or feelings, they did depreciate of naming the first female justice. indeed, the president himself was the most persistent sad voluntary cat on those tapes for appointing a woman to the courts. as he put it, i'm against it myself but it's got to be done. he continues. this is nixon's talking. basically, politically, it isn't going to lose us a vote. a lot of people will grumble and say, why the christ a woman? and to hell a -- to a lot of a lot of women it can make believers out of them. that's just what it gets down to. see my point? poll the country. 60% of the people at least would say okay to a woman judge. as far as those that vote against nixon appointing a woman is zero. but on the other hand, how many vote for nixon because he appointed a woman? 1%? maybe 10%. that there's the point. it's a hell of a thing. now, chief justice burger was not fond of the idea of appointing a woman to the court and threatened to resign but the president didn't care. he vowed to accept his resignation. regarding the appointment of a catholic, nixon aide patrick buchanan was the most forceful advocate inside the white house. for example, september 20th, 1971, three days after justice black announced his retirement from the court, buchanan wrote to the president, quote, not blacks, not jews but ethnic catholics. poles, slovaks, this is where the ducks are. we ought to now canvassing the best legal and judicial conservative minds in the italian american, the irish american and the polish american community and nixon was clearly receptive to the idea. responding to one of his memos in a recorded conversation, he is right and then endorsing somette lick stereotypes, he adds, you know, it's too bad we don't have an italian, an honest italian judge that i know of. wish we did. wish we had a pole. there ain't nothing in it for a protesta protestant. not a god damn thing. it can mean a lot to the catholics. when's motivating nixon's thinking here? well, in terms of electoral strategy, the president has to consider the possibility of another wallace candidacy. this is basically gearing up towards election time. and if wallace did run, naming a southerner or two would help him with a once -- in the once thoroughly democratic south but if wallace -- sorry. if wallace didn't run, naming a southerner, too, would help him in the once democratic south. if he did run, the choice of a woman or an ethnic catholic would help him in a battleground state strategy similar to the one that was run in 1968. in reviewing nixon's thoughts on the appointments, it is also important to note that the pool of potential nominees was quite limited. since nixon wanted someone who was qualified, particularly after the carswell rejection, reliably conservative and politically beneficial. and more often than not he had to compromise in at least one of those qualities. remember, at this time, the republican party has been in the minority for much of nixon's career. the democrats have dominated the presidency from 1932 with fdr's election up until 1968. on only eisenhower's the only president -- only republican president in between. so he -- with these vacancies, he quickly settles on naming a southerner and arkansas attorney named her shell friday and a woman. judge mill dread lily of california. lily also happened to be catholic and was married to an italian american. when hearing this bit of news, the president responded with joy. as a trial -- as a trial balloon, the administration released the names of six possible nominees. but the president had, in fact, already decided on which two he would appoint. friday and lily. once the list was released, however, there was widespread criticism. a liberal group, for example, called the six a bewildering asortment of immediate okayties. ted kennedy added that the list was one of the great insults to the supreme court in its history. among the justices, there was concern, as well. according to one news report, justice harland whose retirement created the second vacancy and who was often described as the court's conservative conscious so outraged he seriously considered writing the president a letter of protest. a liberal justice after reading some of judge lily's opinions promptly got drunk. within the administration, there was also concern. during the vetting process, white house lawyers had raised questions about the qualification of the two nominees. and also, about their commitment to conservatism. however, the president was very attracted to their political symbolism, believed them to be sufficiently conservative and intended to appoint them. but then the aba standing committee on the federal judicial rated them both as unqualified for the court. friday by a vote of 6-6. and lily by a vote of 11-1. in the past, nixon probably would have sent the names to the senate anyway. but things were different now. it was time to search again. still, he was angered by his -- that his opponents denied him an opportunity -- had denied him the political payoff he had hoped for and he viewed the lily vote as overkill, an extra turn of the screw. and starting the process over, the president focused much more on the quality of the nominees and not the politics of the nominees. and quite quickly he settled on a resistant but very well respected louis powell of virginia who would be the southerner and william rehnquist of arizona. who didn't offer much in the way of political symbolism but was highly regarded for his intellect. before deciding on rehnquist, however, the president pursued another southerner. senator howard baker of tennessee. and in a wonderful revealing phone conversation with attorney general mitchell, the president agonized about whether to appoint a once reluctant baker or rehnquist. for 53 seconds richard nixon did not say a word in that phone call. as mitchell, attorney general mitchell waited for an answer. president nixon was clearly mulling over what a baker appointment would offer. the need to decide brought uneasy, almost pain as he sighed several times. as he said to his attorney general, rehnquist has a hell of a record. first in his class. law clerk to one of the great judges of this century. and practiced law as a lawyer's lawyer. and with that statement, the decision was made. he was convinced by his own argument. howard baker would stay in the u.s. senate and william rehnquist would become the fourth and final nixon justice. in prior conversation, however, the president still yearned for political payoff. with regard to rehnquist. at one point he was upset to learn that rehnquist was a wasp. joking that he should switch religions. and another point, the president joked again suggesting rehnquist get a sex change operation. nixon aide responded, takes too long. in the end, nixon's liberal opponent had denied him the big political payoff that would have come with naming a woman or aette lick catholic to the court but helped cut a path for rehnquist to become a justice, a justice who would prove to be one of the toughest and enduring critics in the 33 years on the bench. the appointments typically get most of the attention, particularly the failed nominations of carswell and hanesworth. in terms of scholarship around the nixon presidency. and they help explain why many expected nixon's court to be more conservative than it actually was. however, specific actions of the administration are perhaps even more revealing and this leads us to moment three. moment three is april 20th, 1971, which, again, was the day the supreme court announced its decision in swan. and first some background. president nixon's first solicitor general as we heard earlier was erwin griswold, the person for which this book prize is named. i suggest that this appointment was highly significant. after all, griswold had served in the same post during the johnson administration. in keeping his predecessor's solicitor general, truly an unprecedented event in the history of that office, nixon signaled that his administration's litigation strategy would be more about taming warren court liberalism than igniting a conservative counter revolution. to be sure, in his second term with the appointment of robert bork as solicitor general, nixon suggested he would pursue a more aggressive litigation strategy but here i focus on the first term. consider six major cases, six major cases and now you focus on the political significance. argued -- that were argued in the first four years. roe v. wade which as you know deals with abortion. cone versus california dealing with free speech and profanity. dran bridge versus williams dealing with real fare rights. san antonio versus rodriguez concerning the right of drags. furman versus virginia and miller versus california, a pornography case. in each of those cases, the nixon administration chose not to file a brief. but the president was quite interested in the area of school desegregation and leads us back to april 20th, 1971, first it's important to note that the president relied heavily on the distinction between dijori segregation and defacto segregation. meaning by law and obviously defacto segregation meaning segregation in fact. with regard to dijori segregati segregation, this is more of an issue in the south. very important issue in the south. and the defacto segregation issue was more of an issue in the north and the west. with regard to the dijori segregation in the south, the president accepted desegregation of the schools as an fa the ti compli. the president sought an alternative route. devising a plan of deferring to the courts that sought to lessen the presumed electoral burden of implementing the law. in other words, he did not want ownership of civil rights enforcement. the onus should lie elsewhere. still in the end as a historian concludes, this approach made nixon the greatest school segregator in american history. and the president after his presidency, president nixon was quite proud of the fact that so much desegregation had occurred and had occurred quite peacefully. at the same time, president nixon was seek to take advantage e laekt ral advantage of the aftereffects of this enforcement. hoping to build enduring electoral coalition devoted to advancing principles more in line with his own. consider his reaction to swan. the reporting on the case suggesting the court had rejected the administration's stance. for example, "the new york times" had a banner headline that read supreme court, 9-0, backs bussing to combatting school's dual schools, rejecting administration's stance. the editorial writers at newspapers around the nation agreed concluding that the decision was a major defeat for the administration. however, the perception of the decision within the nixon administration within the justice department was starkly different. as solicitor general griswold later wrote, the position he argued before the court was the view that was taken by the justices. quoting griswold, at the white house, attorney general mitchell reported to the president the important thing is that we are not faced with this defacto question. and not faced with racial balance. in turn, nixon did not openly reject the decision as one might have expected from reading "the times" med line. in private he okay knowledged that it could have been worse because the court could have taken an aggressive stance on defacto segregation but it had not and in devising a reaction, the president wanted to send an opinion his personal opinion didn't matter. rather, now that the justices ruled, it was his job as president to carry out the mandate. in the north, the president pursued a more obstructionist line emphasizing the difference of segregation in response to lower court interpretations of swan. but the administration's litigation strategy hardly matched the president's rhetoric. put simply, while he hoped to convince the court that he did not -- that it did not need to order as he put it instant integration, he was not willing to stand if front of a schoolhouse door. what us did it all mean for evaluating nixon's strategy? i reach two main conclusions and then offer more global conclusion with regard to presidents in general. the first conclusion deals with president nixon and the development of constitutional doctrine. here i'm really focusing on politically salient decisions. given his specific focus on law and order and school desegregation was he ail your? consider the 1974 bussing decision, the 1976 death penalty decision in greg versus georgia. in those two politically charged cases, the court with all four of the nixon appointed justices and the majority essentially delivered the results that were consistent with the views of the nixon and the ford administrations. my second conclusion deals with president nixon 'electoral politics. here nixon's judicial strategy i argue was a success, as well. his 49 state landslide victory in 1972 represented the largest popular vote victory of any republican candidate since the party was formed in the mid-1850 ds. in capturing nearly 61% of the vote president nixon not only attracted southern supporters and urban northerners who would later earn the misleading label reagan democrat. i suggest this term is misleading because they were nixon democrats before they were reagan democrats. nixon achieved this electoral success in part by pursuing a judicial centered social campaign that spoke to concerns -- to the concerns of members of his great silent majority and helped construct a republican majority at the presidential level, a majority that would endure for a generation and provide support for conservative movement intent on transforming constitutional law. consider the extent of this success. if you look at the presidential elections, 1972 as i said of 49 state landslide. 1976, even with watergate, and ford's pardon of nixon, jimmy carter wins just 50.1% of the vote. in 1980, ronald reagan wins 44%. sorry. 44 states and nearly 51% of the vote in a 3-man race. in 1984, reagan wins 49 states and nearly 59% of the vote and in 1988, george h.w. bush has a comfortable victory with 55% and 40 states. in my more global conclusion is simply this. at particular historical moments, presidents may be powerful agents of constitutional change. thank you. [ applause ] >> thanks a lot for that great and fascinating discussion. i want to point out for those of you that found it enterta taintg and tantalizing the book is available in the book shop. it's available other places, too, but there are a limited number of signed copies down there and you could probably get him to write more in the book if you goe and buy it. i invite you to do that. the last thing to do in here before we adjourn to the food and the drink is to make the actual presentation and i want to invite the appropriate people to come forward. obviously, justice scalia, professor mcmahon, and also professor morel of washington and lee, the head of the committee and also i want to invite up kevin orr who is the new partner in charge of jones day washington office. some of you will remember kevin orr if you watch the news and just returned to us from about two years as the manager of detroit where he has made the news probably more than he wanted to but -- >> for a number of different ways. >> we are really glad to have him back and i want to give this. this is the embodiment of the prize and i want to ask somehow to assemble ourselves and pose for a picture if we can get organized to do that.

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