You raised to give his opening remarks of wanted to issue to present a co ambassador mark. Thank you. [applause] thanks for the introduction and thanks for the great work that you are doing. Welcome everyone. We are unique institution in foreign policy. We are congressionally chartered. Scholarship driven and we are fiercely nonpartisan and independent. I always say that special status rings with a special obligations, not duplicate what others are doing but instead to prioritize the most important issues and opportunities, and those places which we believe we can add value and make a difference. So there are few topics that more fit the bill while picking High Priorities in the subject of brings us here today and the discussions on iran, the middle east and u. S. Involvement in the region. Our work is focused on both ends of pennsylvania avenue. I can tell you that weve done more briefings and responded to more requests for briefings on this subject than any other in recent months. Our goal at the wilson sent this to do our best to provide informed insights into irans alliances in the region and the implications for u. S. National security. We are hoping in our work and in todays discussion to foster a more nuanced understanding of the regions geopolitical dynamics that i think what we all believe is a crossroads moment in modern history. I invite all of you to partake in todays discussion, process what you hear, ask good questions. This is an important time and this is an important topic. I think we can all since their geopolitical shifts underway to take her with recent parliamentary elections and ongoing war in gaza, and the gathering storm of attacks on u. S. Military and economic targets from irans axis of resistant. Resistance. The attacks have significant ramifications, not only for regional stability but i think for Global Development as well. Iran is an active partner in putins war plans. I think we know its making new investments nearly every day in many regimes around the world. So this is an important time, an important topic and to get things underway, marissa, im going to turn things over to you to introduce the first panel that will delve into iran, its allies and its role in the region. Good luck with todays discussions which i know will help us all better appreciate the multilayered complexities of iran, its leadership and again its activities and involvement in the region and around the world. Thank you. [applause] good morning, everyone. Its my pleasure to introduce our first panel. Fortunately which will be moderated by ambassador david hale who is currently a global soul at the middle east program at the Wilson Center and formally ambassador to lebanon, jordan and pakistan. On the panel come first ambassador jim jeffrey who was chair of the middle east program, ali vaez, Senior Advisor to the president and director of the of and project of International Crisis group, and last but not least mike singh who is managing director at the Washington Institute for near east policy as well as laneswig senior fellow. So over to you, david, to start the discussion. Thank you, thank yoy regretful robin wright was set to join us but, unfortunately, is unable to do so today. So im stepping in. But i want to just open with a quick comment as robin had intended referencing everyone, drawing peoples attention to the odni, the office of director of National Intelligence report that came out last week on iran with the assessment which is quite grim of the scope and maligned nature of iranian behavior throughout the region. Their continued commitment to work on et cetera to its Nuclear Program, and in particular its exploitation of the situation in gaza. For all of these will be topics for our discussion today. My own observation as a diplomat for 38 years at the state department is since 1979, our president s and our leaders have tried almost every single strategy you could think of in the National Security sort of rulebook from containment to engagement, maximum pressure to even a night of less benign neglect, none of which is actually worth in changing the nature of iranian behavior, its threat to u. S. Interest. So on that happy note i would like to start perhaps with you, ali, to talk about irans profile in the region to its network of proxies and allies, which takes to achieve those relationships as an opening sho shot. Thank you very much, david. Its great to be back at the Wilson Center and to discuss this timely subject with jim and mike. Let me make three broad observations in response to your question, as that of happy to delve deeper into any aspect of this during the q a. So first point is the war in gaza into force been a mixed bag for iran. On the one hand, the war has revived the palestinian cause in ways that was really unimaginable on october 6. And i ran has the socalled standardbearer of this cost obviously stands to benefit from this reality. Also the conduct of the war has resulted in degree of radicalization that also benefits iran if the objective is recruitment in the future. The war has also fueled resistance and highlighted western double standards and enforcing International Humanitarian law which also grants iran a victory in terms of its of discourse. It is also damaged israels image and, therefore, delayed certain normalization of relations that certain arab countries and israel, and that is beneficial to iran. But on the other hand, the horrible hamas attack on octobew and its in the odni report as will, iran did not have any foreknowledge. Ds go toward iran was going with the United States, space in the aftermath of an informal understand the both sites achieved last summer which resulted in the longest time of lawless attacks against u. S. Forces in iraq and syria. It has come the war has also put irans vulnerability on full display. Irans preoccupation with whats happening on its western borders resulted in isis exploiting its distraction and conducting an attack on iranian soil from the east. Also iran has suffered multiple cyber and covert operations in this time which again highlights extreme degree of probability they have at home. It has also highlighted the reluctance of iran to sacrifice any of its strategic assets for anything short of the fence of its homeland. And i think that weakens the credibility of irans deterrent. Second point is the Overall Concept of irans regional strategy which boils down to four defense based on having these proxies and partners away from iranian borders that would deter an attack on iranian soil has proven simultaneously to be successful and yet perilous successful because the strategy has basically allowed iran to axis of visits to project power all the way from the indian ocean to the mediterranean through the red sea, and the axis operated in a much more coordinated fashion did anything we have seen in all these years. And yet, the fact that iran aids and assist an arms these groups of course creates a degree of complicity, regardless of how much iran wants to say theres plausible deniability and these groups operate autonomously. And that renders iran vulnerable to retaliation against itself and on its soul. We came very close to that several times during the trump administration. We came very close to that after the tower 22 incident back in january or february. And this completely undermines the concept of the existence of the four defense strategy, which again is the protection of the homeland. Final, third and final point i want to make at the beginning is there are two elements that help with deescalation and one that risks further escalation on the current circumstances. The first is that a certain degree of deescalation that happens by default simple because neither iran nor the United States wants further escalation in the region. And again tower 22 is a good example of that. Even i would argue if there was no channel either through intermediaries or the channel we now know exist in oman between iran and the u. S. , even if there were no channels, because neither side wants further escalation or expansion of the conflict i think this would lead him to act cautiously as they did in aftermath of tower 22, to avoid direct entanglement. Second point is the degree of domestic constraints in each of the territories of the stakeholders involved is inversely correlated to their appetite for risk. So for instance, i ran the regime is facing economic discontent, societal unrest, and, therefore, does not want to take major risks in its regional foreign policy. Same applies to hezbollah. And i would argue even to certain degree the militias in iraq, they are in a good position right now at home and they dont want to do anything that would upset the apple cart. But none of this applies to the houthis whose stock at home has actually increased as the result of the escalation to have engaged in. And finally i think the main risk which im worried about the most is that i think although the tower 22 incident did not end in grief, but it has increased the risk of miscalculation. Ive had a conversation with american officials and iranian in the past few weeks which indicate that perception or implication of what happened is almost mirror image of one another. He was seems to believe that the much more assertive reaction to an incident in which three servicemembers were killed has restored deterrence because now there are four weeks of quiet in that area. And, therefore, i think if there is another incident like this, use the likely to even respond stronger. Thinking that this works. On the iranian side the problem is that because no iranian assets was directly targeted, they have interpreted that the u. S. Has no appetite for risking too much. And its also i think creates possibility of miscalculations in the future, especially when you have an actor like the houthis over which iran does not have as much command and control as is the case with some of these militias in iraq a special and a sonority we have a high number of casualties. I leave it here and look forward to conversation. Thank you, ali. I am struck by recalling the history that when the United States suffered attacks by iranian proxies directed by irgc in beirut, Marine Barracks bombing at the two embassies we didnt did retaliate at all. There was a lot of talk but there was no actual action. I think the iranians have a long mory and iof behavior on our pam touching on your last part about how we react which makes me to mike. And how do you see the evolving pattern of iranian threats to u. S. Interests and the various respsetes over the years . Thanks david. Its going to be with everyone and i thought ali did a great job with this sort of description of what iraq has been up to in the region and the scense strategy, which i think its important to understand that, in fact, to read as a strategy in the region, that the things were seen for a grant or not some sort of just random aligned asked with a different together in a pattern. Think our putting less in pattern and it is a more randomness did you mention the marine bracks bombing, our filter retelling a the french retaliated. Relation they missed. But they retaliate. President reagan did retaliate and think most of the arena and maybe later was concerned in the late 1980s. So weve had highly variable responses. I think what weve seen is that the u. S. Has never i think had a very sort of decisive strategy towards iran. Iran has never been the Number One Party for the United States and the reason i would argue that we change our strategy over time. When i cam National Security council, and i was iran director, what of the things i could do was to determine what had come befeeri . One thing come would wait in which Actual Service incumbent differs from say whatn you lean in in a Public Policy school as you know david and as jim knows is that you are never creating a policy a blank sheet of paper. You have a policy had to deal you can kind tweeted at the margins and delete and replications can you really we write the policy. What i found was in the early 2000s there wereany policy debates on iran in the wake of 9 11 but they really never resulted in much. It didnt rult any consensus on what should a policy towards iran be because the priorities from what i could tell was iraq in the middle east at that time. Even though you had arguably much more compelling evidence of iran developing a Nuclear Weapon, certainly a long track record of the rent a be involved in terrorism against the United States iraq was a clear priority in the second priority was the broader global war on terrorism in which iran was a part b really the primary part. Kind was a focus at that time. These debates never really resolve. A lot of talk of regime change, talk of different strategies but ultimately the policy towards the Nuclear Program at least was to sort ofru e3, the uk, franced germany to handle what we attend to other matters as you will recall. That may have changed around say 2005, when i read Sticker Program became a much greater concern where as irans support for terrorism he been our chief concern of its at least up until that time. Maybe even through say the early 2000s it was irans suppo for terrorism and it was our policy priority with regard to this particular threat. Even after that we settled into a strategy which was i think a strategy which is very familiar to everyone here, which was tt dual track diplomacy and coercion strategy, which was adopted by the Bush Administration and around 2005 with the aim of sort of compelling iran, lets abandon its Nuclear Weapons aspirations and come to the negotiating table with the idea that then perhaps we could have some kind of come some sort of accommodation or deal with iran that had eluded us for so many years between the u. S. And iran come since 1979. That policy was largely continued by president obama. We have since president obama had radically different iran strategy than president bush. I would say not actually true. That he changed in some ways, engage the special indirect outreach to the Supreme Leader of the rent by writing letters but fundamentally the strategy that president obama pursued at first was that same dual trazck strategy aimed at offering carrots and sticks in an effort to get iran to the table largely to negotiate over the nuclear all the while the backdrop was that we had obvious if the u. S. And iran sort of killing each other actually in iraq. But i would argue that never really was the focus of american strategy with respect to iran. It was a big sort of elements of the policy, think the was a sense if we could get, and she will have a few on this, if we could get a sort of strong and confident governor stittt the sr that problem in the longer run. And efforts to say she would not push backorder, she would not retaliate more directed against iran for what would say were not seriously contemplated, not seriously considered. I think whats change around the middle of the Obama Administration that balance of how we looked at the threat andd i would look at our own capabilities change a bit. I think the was a sense after sort of the amount of time weve spent i get in sort of proxy combat with the iranians in iraq, that, in fact, the threat was greater from iran than we anticipated. The made a lot of progress other nucl which suffered a lot of casualties in iraq at the hands of iranians or iranian proxies, but he think it was a declining also declining view of it. We have not had the success in iraq we hope for. President obama campaigned in part on that idea, that we werent successful and her back. So theres a real shift in our strategy towards iran, away fm that dual track policy and more towards president obamas sort of second policy of lets negotiate bilaterally with the iranians because we really werep worried this is headed towards war and, frankly, we dont want that war. We want to get out of the middle east to the extent we can. Not out of the middle east and a grand sense, thats exaggerat, but i think by that time the president obamas administration, 2011, 2012 there was a sense the risk is greater than the reward at that necessitated a change in strategy. That ultimately is what produced the jpo way and the jcpoa. This idea of this is the most risky most dangerous issue, nuclear issue, lets just sort of did it but to the side so we can then pursue the middle east strategy with what we want which is decreasing commitment to the region. Thats a strategy that in some ways have changed the United States still is looking increase our footprint in middle east for sure. Thats been a matter of bipartisan consensus but obvious if their approach towards iran has changed because theres been a few that that strategy of, well, lets engage in diplomacy to avoid war hasnt really been successful. Think thats not jusa republican view, not just a trump view but you can see that from the Biden Administration to some extent as well. The sense that the idea that a Nuclear Agreement and that would lead to a warming of relations between the United States and arrest as we sort of gone away. Are back to this idea of a dual track policy, and dangling the idea of diplomacy while pairing with threats. But i think perhaps ultimately a bit of a low estimation of what we can uim in the region and with respect to iran. So weve seen sort of these different eras of american policy iran but i would argue against and none of these eras was iran actually the priority for the United States. Iran was always in a sen a risk we were trying to manage. So even today is a look at whats unfolding in the middle east, yes, iran is at of all the Different Things that all he was talking about. Iran is at the center argument of the attacks in the red sea. Those attac