Transcripts For CSPAN2 Colin Dueck Age Of Iron 20240713 : co

Welcome to the Carnegie Endowment it is a great pleasure for me to welcome all of you to this Book Discussion of colin dueck age of iron with a marvelous analysis analysis of conservative nationalism. I want to extend a warm welcome to call it and our distinguished commentators. As you probably know, colin is a professor at George Mason University in a nonresident fellow at aei nextdoor literally at American Enterprise institute. This book is examines the concept of conservative nationalism that has been brought to public attention through the rise of President Trump in terms of both the history of ideas and how they have a manifestation especially medically so it is encompassing and granular and despite the gravity of the subject i can tell you is also a very delightful read. I read the book over the last weekend and i commend it to your attention. So its a pleasure to have you with us. I am also very grateful those that have agreed to join us we cannot ask for better commentators given their intellectual interest in conservativism and to making and implementing Foreign Policy in the United States a long career on capital here capitol hill where she worked at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also with foreign us policy and appears widely on television and Senior Vice President at aei where she continues to remain a senior fellow in Environmental Defense studies also with a long career in Public Service now ceo the center for new American Securities which i say with some jealousy and is doing incredibly Creative Work on operational issues for National Security. He was senator john mccains Foreign Policy advisor and worked at the state department and National Security council. So a very warm welcome to both of you is wonderful to have you here again. Let me invite call in to present the key teams we will have a brief discussion after an open the conversation to the floor and then i look forward to the interaction. Thank you. Welcome. Thank you very much for this invitation. Just so happens this Panel Includes three people all of whose experience and expertise and views i really respect it is a pleasure to be here. Without danny this book would not have happened and she may regret that but it is true. So im glad to be here. Let me say a few words about the central thesis of the book and what motivated me was the common argument over the last five years the Trump Administration represented something completely unprecedented in American History and that this striking rise of populist nationalism on the right for both sides of the atlantic is a cause for comparisons in the 1930s without those genuine causes for concern, i think it is overstated with american populism in american nationalism and form policy so its not pro or anti trump polemic but it is in context which i think is missing so american nationalism there is a foreignpolicy nationalism going back in the american case there is a civic nationalism that has an american creed with rule of law and limited government and that is within the nationalism so they thought to conserve that and when it comes to foreignpolicy the founders had some key principles that were consistent paradigm for generations the idea that the United States would stand for something and that is a distinctly american hope for us Foreign Policy we dont want to do it by force but as an example and the second element is the idea to maintain a free hand that there is no entangling permanent alliances from the foreignpolicy nationalism from the beginning of they saw the contradiction between those two that is a dominant bipartisan tradition well into the 20th century. So what really shifted was wilsons innovation during world war i he agreed you not only had to tie the new foreignpolicy paradigm that we call globalism to the possibility of domestic progressive reforms including the United States and economically in europe to indicate overseas but also make global binding multilateral commitments worldwide particularly under article ten with the league of nations that is a paradigm shift wilson understood and so did the critics which gave them pause so republicans and conservatives everybody agreed how to tackle or accommodate that tradition those internal divisions and debates i say theres 3 million groups over time conservative internationalists are skeptical when it comes to multilateral commitments to believe that you should have alliances overseas that is the position of Henry Cabot Lodge with the treaty of riverside debate bursae debate. And then to be overly optimistic and unrealistic and then there is a group on the other end of the spectrum with libertarians conservatives that the us really should avoid all together and trade peacefully but they should not have a military role outside of the western hemisphere so that tradition goes back as well a populist that is west from the mississippi and then theres a third string kind of in the middle with a hardline unilateralism without that elite discourse but conservatives over time have had a fairly strong willingness to spend on the military or count encounter concrete adversaries or al qaeda but they are at enthusiastic about those enthusiastic projects if you cannot convince them there is an end of one enemy that requires a response they will shy away. Thats the group over time so what you see is a pivot back and forth between activism and disengagement between the circumstances all factions agree wilson was wrong that they did not agree why but in the twenties and thirties they agreed the us should be detached from military affairs in europe. Pearl harbor led that debate for some time and then led hardline conservatives to support the more worldview overseas the think about senator goldwater he was not enthusiastic at all because conservatives supported this is because they were staunchly anticommunist so as welcome as it was the question was is what now here conservative internationalists george w. Bush settled that debate with the war on terror remorse of the most supported that for most of his administration but during the obama years your back to that. And then they ask what now. The big surprise in my opinion of the republican primary was a candidate could win the republican nomination against that tradition and donald trump led a frontal assault on the conservative nationalist tradition going back decades and he turned things upside down so they were marginalized and those in charge were deeply concerned im not suggesting that we personally read these documents but instinctively it is a nationalist. That draws from older tradition he had a particular nationalism on his own with 30 or 35 years and said over and over again that they were the free riders. Thats not my view. That is his view. He was quite consistent about that and said taking advantage of the United States and aim to somehow and what is a policy alternative as we saw in the primary with the military interventions of iraq and afghanistan frustrations with patterns of globalization and chinas middleclass as opposed to working americans and supranational organizations to have a sense of frustration turning that into a winning platform so the older version of american nationalism that i think we have seen a resurgence and that is part of the historical context. Now once we had the transition unexpectedly to the government because it came as a surprise to a lot of people in the room so what now . Of course there has been uncertainty from the beginning was severe personal challenges. In reality the trump foreignpolicy is more a mixture of nonintervention and actually continuing foreignpolicy activism engagement it is a hybrid partly because of his own adaptations over time. He is flexible to a fault but there does seem to be a pattern how he handles foreignpolicy and thats an argument to make as well so if you will indulge me, he launches Pressure Campaigns against allies and adversaries on Economic Issues again security adversaries north korea the tele band, straightforward but then in a somewhat different way that is part of what youre seeing a maximum Pressure Campaign with iran and north korea for example then you see against us allies to increase defense spending not entirely new but away we have not seen before Pressure Campaigns on the economic front against china as a us competitor. That is a trump innovation. That was not nearly as high of a priority to really push china for prior president s on the commercial side. Finally against us allies on trade is new i dont think any other candidate would have done that pressure south korea japan mexico, eu looking for renegotiated trade agreements. So he goes up and down the ladder of isolation it could be quite sudden and unexpected and then he will lower it he will adjust and then settle or talk to almost anybody that tends to unnerve people and probably some of his own staff but over time if you tend to turn down the volume which is very high come its not an obvious that he knows the endpoint i dont think he knows his own Reservation Point but he keeps his options open that is different from saying with a rules based International Order i doubt you could describe it to you with the assessment with the diplomatic military to reserve the right and even to bolster some more than there were under obama so that cannot be determined a significant amount to even be increased and that seems to be the form policy. I would be happy to talk and discussion but thats what it looks like to me. Just a few final thoughts. I also talk about Public Opinion in the relationship of conservative opinion to the Trump Administration and to my surprise the distribution has not changed that much over the last five or ten years. Even though trump took advantage with one end of the spectrum with more projectionists and managed to turn that politically but the distribution isnt that much the average voter had mixed feelings but there is no less support than 15 years ago. He hasnt really changed voters minds is much as you might think but there is a difference to capture certain segment of opinion. For example most republicans had a negative opinion of putin ten years ago. There was mixed feelings ten years ago and corporations today most republicans supported nato ten years ago most supported today. So if you go down the list that is reality politically but having said that i do think there is a longterm shift the Republican Party has become more populist and culturally conservative white workingclass voters at the base of the party that will have an effect on your foreignpolicy including your trade policy. He is as much of a symptom as a cause he accelerated that so i would not assume that the longterm shifts disappear you cannot assume he is just a oneoff and as soon as he is gone everything will snap back to 2015. Im a little bit skeptical about that. So my conclusion would be that in the future conservative leaders would have the opportunity to make foreignpolicy cases to play a leading role, the public is open to it for the us activist in the world but some of the ships are real so there has to be Coalition Building and you have to figure out how to live within the same party. One way or another american nationalism is here to stay. Thank you. [applause] i did not even need to put on a coat to come from my office and i do appreciate your words of thanks. He very kindly says he would not have done this but i know that he would have because he was the first cohort of which we are really proud. And to the think tank for Health Related issues that we knew they would be productive and that aei is super happy about it with that legislative assistant. So this is a very sober and fine treatment of the questions. And what we like best about it but they with american conservatism. And absent the hysteria that carries pretty much every conversation in washington its good to have serious conversation that doesnt actually reference twitter in any way. I know who you are talking about as you reference in the title and then in the final chapter. And to be hardly optimistic that scoundrels will be honored in fame will vanish. But it is true but the reality is if you set aside what goes on with todays conversation or if the United States will honor article five the reality is a very a version we can debate when there has been an aversion we had a project several years ago in reaction to what we found of libertarian ideas at the forefront of what i would call isolationism dont think of them as a realist but the isolationist and for those that have that viewpoint on the left as well you saw that on display at the debate last night. But one of the things we looked at is American Public interest with engagement you see a very cyclical engagement interest drop. And if you go back to pretty much every the president ial campaign you could even go back to clinton, every single one republican and democrat , has been about turning inwards. In george h should be bush with the goal for that was done. Even barack obama that that was the slogan for the easily could have been donald trump. But in each instance we find they run on the slogans god is terrible america turns inward and then of course we end up entangled in a conflict in the middle east. And donald trump has been a different. No different than that. The other point to make that call and rightly describes his American Public view is consistent the only thing that changes is on particular issues of for example the American People think its not great to be in afghanistan numbers dont support that but during the Obama Administration when obama decided we need to send troops he gave are relatively rare speech talking about the importance and it went right back up again. The American People are willing to be led. They want their leaders to make a persuasive case to them. And when they do whether for an engagement or military commitment or economic commitment or make the case for disengagement to move away or nation building at home or avoiding foreign entanglement entanglements, whatever they chewed they go for that as well. I dont think that is fickle on the public but a general normal lack of interest. I always try to underscore we pay a lot of attention to this. Most people dont. That is just the reality. Thats not a bad thing. Where you really pinpoint something i call it an open question for the future a populist trend. This is really rooted to my mind much more than the tectonic shift within society rather than the sudden appeal of the Donald Trumps of the world. We had Political Parties that have remained static over the years and not the parliamentary system and then to decide now i will create a new political party. You have the relatively static Political Parties to find themselves over the years and then to feel that the party no longer represents their interest. And thats for you see the upstart coming from. Not just in the United States but all over europe, asia and elsewhere. That shouldnt be a surprise. But the underpinnings of that with the philosophies and Political Parties of the establishment more of a National Security phenomenon and i commend to you the work of the aei scholar he wrote a book called coming apart and he details the fact 15 years ago there were enormous cross relationships in the United States that people were not isolated in their bubbles and therefore with innovation the poor could marry the rich educated could marry the non educated now we have become much more fragmented with this populist phenomenon particularly with one group of people that are donald trump constituents. White collar less educated men that if you like society has left the behind. What they think is hugely important and could be a transformative driver. Could be. That might not be but this is something for all of us to think about. But all of these come together and raise questions that just are not about article five. They are not about the commitment of the moment or poland pays 2 percent are great one greece pays 2 percent it is a broader idea that is flexible the shifts over time and may in the long term have an impact for those who care about this or not vigilant. So with that i will turn things over to richard. Thank you for bringing this together. I thought i would give the few thoughts on the book and then a few areas of conclusions that first with a have laid out are absolutely right of the cyclical nature with the entrenchment as we get into the korean war and eisenhower retrench is and lbj and then ford pulls back so we can see that waxing and waning that maximal american exertion around the world but the biggest driver of this is they suddenly become the aficionados to get through another window that people say we have to constrain the definition of National Interest and then it starts to expand again. But the Carnegie Endowment<\/a> it is a great pleasure for me to welcome all of you to this Book Discussion<\/a> of colin dueck age of iron with a marvelous analysis analysis of conservative nationalism. I want to extend a warm welcome to call it and our distinguished commentators. As you probably know, colin is a professor at George Mason University<\/a> in a nonresident fellow at aei nextdoor literally at American Enterprise<\/a> institute. This book is examines the concept of conservative nationalism that has been brought to public attention through the rise of President Trump<\/a> in terms of both the history of ideas and how they have a manifestation especially medically so it is encompassing and granular and despite the gravity of the subject i can tell you is also a very delightful read. I read the book over the last weekend and i commend it to your attention. So its a pleasure to have you with us. I am also very grateful those that have agreed to join us we cannot ask for better commentators given their intellectual interest in conservativism and to making and implementing Foreign Policy<\/a> in the United States<\/a> a long career on capital here capitol hill where she worked at the Senate Foreign<\/a> Relations Committee<\/a> also with foreign us policy and appears widely on television and Senior Vice President<\/a> at aei where she continues to remain a senior fellow in Environmental Defense<\/a> studies also with a long career in Public Service<\/a> now ceo the center for new American Securities<\/a> which i say with some jealousy and is doing incredibly Creative Work<\/a> on operational issues for National Security<\/a>. He was senator john mccains Foreign Policy<\/a> advisor and worked at the state department and National Security<\/a> council. So a very warm welcome to both of you is wonderful to have you here again. Let me invite call in to present the key teams we will have a brief discussion after an open the conversation to the floor and then i look forward to the interaction. Thank you. Welcome. Thank you very much for this invitation. Just so happens this Panel Includes<\/a> three people all of whose experience and expertise and views i really respect it is a pleasure to be here. Without danny this book would not have happened and she may regret that but it is true. So im glad to be here. Let me say a few words about the central thesis of the book and what motivated me was the common argument over the last five years the Trump Administration<\/a> represented something completely unprecedented in American History<\/a> and that this striking rise of populist nationalism on the right for both sides of the atlantic is a cause for comparisons in the 1930s without those genuine causes for concern, i think it is overstated with american populism in american nationalism and form policy so its not pro or anti trump polemic but it is in context which i think is missing so american nationalism there is a foreignpolicy nationalism going back in the american case there is a civic nationalism that has an american creed with rule of law and limited government and that is within the nationalism so they thought to conserve that and when it comes to foreignpolicy the founders had some key principles that were consistent paradigm for generations the idea that the United States<\/a> would stand for something and that is a distinctly american hope for us Foreign Policy<\/a> we dont want to do it by force but as an example and the second element is the idea to maintain a free hand that there is no entangling permanent alliances from the foreignpolicy nationalism from the beginning of they saw the contradiction between those two that is a dominant bipartisan tradition well into the 20th century. So what really shifted was wilsons innovation during world war i he agreed you not only had to tie the new foreignpolicy paradigm that we call globalism to the possibility of domestic progressive reforms including the United States<\/a> and economically in europe to indicate overseas but also make global binding multilateral commitments worldwide particularly under article ten with the league of nations that is a paradigm shift wilson understood and so did the critics which gave them pause so republicans and conservatives everybody agreed how to tackle or accommodate that tradition those internal divisions and debates i say theres 3 million groups over time conservative internationalists are skeptical when it comes to multilateral commitments to believe that you should have alliances overseas that is the position of Henry Cabot Lodge<\/a> with the treaty of riverside debate bursae debate. And then to be overly optimistic and unrealistic and then there is a group on the other end of the spectrum with libertarians conservatives that the us really should avoid all together and trade peacefully but they should not have a military role outside of the western hemisphere so that tradition goes back as well a populist that is west from the mississippi and then theres a third string kind of in the middle with a hardline unilateralism without that elite discourse but conservatives over time have had a fairly strong willingness to spend on the military or count encounter concrete adversaries or al qaeda but they are at enthusiastic about those enthusiastic projects if you cannot convince them there is an end of one enemy that requires a response they will shy away. Thats the group over time so what you see is a pivot back and forth between activism and disengagement between the circumstances all factions agree wilson was wrong that they did not agree why but in the twenties and thirties they agreed the us should be detached from military affairs in europe. Pearl harbor led that debate for some time and then led hardline conservatives to support the more worldview overseas the think about senator goldwater he was not enthusiastic at all because conservatives supported this is because they were staunchly anticommunist so as welcome as it was the question was is what now here conservative internationalists george w. Bush settled that debate with the war on terror remorse of the most supported that for most of his administration but during the obama years your back to that. And then they ask what now. The big surprise in my opinion of the republican primary was a candidate could win the republican nomination against that tradition and donald trump led a frontal assault on the conservative nationalist tradition going back decades and he turned things upside down so they were marginalized and those in charge were deeply concerned im not suggesting that we personally read these documents but instinctively it is a nationalist. That draws from older tradition he had a particular nationalism on his own with 30 or 35 years and said over and over again that they were the free riders. Thats not my view. That is his view. He was quite consistent about that and said taking advantage of the United States<\/a> and aim to somehow and what is a policy alternative as we saw in the primary with the military interventions of iraq and afghanistan frustrations with patterns of globalization and chinas middleclass as opposed to working americans and supranational organizations to have a sense of frustration turning that into a winning platform so the older version of american nationalism that i think we have seen a resurgence and that is part of the historical context. Now once we had the transition unexpectedly to the government because it came as a surprise to a lot of people in the room so what now . Of course there has been uncertainty from the beginning was severe personal challenges. In reality the trump foreignpolicy is more a mixture of nonintervention and actually continuing foreignpolicy activism engagement it is a hybrid partly because of his own adaptations over time. He is flexible to a fault but there does seem to be a pattern how he handles foreignpolicy and thats an argument to make as well so if you will indulge me, he launches Pressure Campaign<\/a>s against allies and adversaries on Economic Issues<\/a> again security adversaries north korea the tele band, straightforward but then in a somewhat different way that is part of what youre seeing a maximum Pressure Campaign<\/a> with iran and north korea for example then you see against us allies to increase defense spending not entirely new but away we have not seen before Pressure Campaign<\/a>s on the economic front against china as a us competitor. That is a trump innovation. That was not nearly as high of a priority to really push china for prior president s on the commercial side. Finally against us allies on trade is new i dont think any other candidate would have done that pressure south korea japan mexico, eu looking for renegotiated trade agreements. So he goes up and down the ladder of isolation it could be quite sudden and unexpected and then he will lower it he will adjust and then settle or talk to almost anybody that tends to unnerve people and probably some of his own staff but over time if you tend to turn down the volume which is very high come its not an obvious that he knows the endpoint i dont think he knows his own Reservation Point<\/a> but he keeps his options open that is different from saying with a rules based International Order<\/a> i doubt you could describe it to you with the assessment with the diplomatic military to reserve the right and even to bolster some more than there were under obama so that cannot be determined a significant amount to even be increased and that seems to be the form policy. I would be happy to talk and discussion but thats what it looks like to me. Just a few final thoughts. I also talk about Public Opinion<\/a> in the relationship of conservative opinion to the Trump Administration<\/a> and to my surprise the distribution has not changed that much over the last five or ten years. Even though trump took advantage with one end of the spectrum with more projectionists and managed to turn that politically but the distribution isnt that much the average voter had mixed feelings but there is no less support than 15 years ago. He hasnt really changed voters minds is much as you might think but there is a difference to capture certain segment of opinion. For example most republicans had a negative opinion of putin ten years ago. There was mixed feelings ten years ago and corporations today most republicans supported nato ten years ago most supported today. So if you go down the list that is reality politically but having said that i do think there is a longterm shift the Republican Party<\/a> has become more populist and culturally conservative white workingclass voters at the base of the party that will have an effect on your foreignpolicy including your trade policy. He is as much of a symptom as a cause he accelerated that so i would not assume that the longterm shifts disappear you cannot assume he is just a oneoff and as soon as he is gone everything will snap back to 2015. Im a little bit skeptical about that. So my conclusion would be that in the future conservative leaders would have the opportunity to make foreignpolicy cases to play a leading role, the public is open to it for the us activist in the world but some of the ships are real so there has to be Coalition Building<\/a> and you have to figure out how to live within the same party. One way or another american nationalism is here to stay. Thank you. [applause] i did not even need to put on a coat to come from my office and i do appreciate your words of thanks. He very kindly says he would not have done this but i know that he would have because he was the first cohort of which we are really proud. And to the think tank for Health Related<\/a> issues that we knew they would be productive and that aei is super happy about it with that legislative assistant. So this is a very sober and fine treatment of the questions. And what we like best about it but they with american conservatism. And absent the hysteria that carries pretty much every conversation in washington its good to have serious conversation that doesnt actually reference twitter in any way. I know who you are talking about as you reference in the title and then in the final chapter. And to be hardly optimistic that scoundrels will be honored in fame will vanish. But it is true but the reality is if you set aside what goes on with todays conversation or if the United States<\/a> will honor article five the reality is a very a version we can debate when there has been an aversion we had a project several years ago in reaction to what we found of libertarian ideas at the forefront of what i would call isolationism dont think of them as a realist but the isolationist and for those that have that viewpoint on the left as well you saw that on display at the debate last night. But one of the things we looked at is American Public<\/a> interest with engagement you see a very cyclical engagement interest drop. And if you go back to pretty much every the president ial campaign you could even go back to clinton, every single one republican and democrat , has been about turning inwards. In george h should be bush with the goal for that was done. Even barack obama that that was the slogan for the easily could have been donald trump. But in each instance we find they run on the slogans god is terrible america turns inward and then of course we end up entangled in a conflict in the middle east. And donald trump has been a different. No different than that. The other point to make that call and rightly describes his American Public<\/a> view is consistent the only thing that changes is on particular issues of for example the American People<\/a> think its not great to be in afghanistan numbers dont support that but during the Obama Administration<\/a> when obama decided we need to send troops he gave are relatively rare speech talking about the importance and it went right back up again. The American People<\/a> are willing to be led. They want their leaders to make a persuasive case to them. And when they do whether for an engagement or military commitment or economic commitment or make the case for disengagement to move away or nation building at home or avoiding foreign entanglement entanglements, whatever they chewed they go for that as well. I dont think that is fickle on the public but a general normal lack of interest. I always try to underscore we pay a lot of attention to this. Most people dont. That is just the reality. Thats not a bad thing. Where you really pinpoint something i call it an open question for the future a populist trend. This is really rooted to my mind much more than the tectonic shift within society rather than the sudden appeal of the Donald Trumps<\/a> of the world. We had Political Parties<\/a> that have remained static over the years and not the parliamentary system and then to decide now i will create a new political party. You have the relatively static Political Parties<\/a> to find themselves over the years and then to feel that the party no longer represents their interest. And thats for you see the upstart coming from. Not just in the United States<\/a> but all over europe, asia and elsewhere. That shouldnt be a surprise. But the underpinnings of that with the philosophies and Political Parties<\/a> of the establishment more of a National Security<\/a> phenomenon and i commend to you the work of the aei scholar he wrote a book called coming apart and he details the fact 15 years ago there were enormous cross relationships in the United States<\/a> that people were not isolated in their bubbles and therefore with innovation the poor could marry the rich educated could marry the non educated now we have become much more fragmented with this populist phenomenon particularly with one group of people that are donald trump constituents. White collar less educated men that if you like society has left the behind. What they think is hugely important and could be a transformative driver. Could be. That might not be but this is something for all of us to think about. But all of these come together and raise questions that just are not about article five. They are not about the commitment of the moment or poland pays 2 percent are great one greece pays 2 percent it is a broader idea that is flexible the shifts over time and may in the long term have an impact for those who care about this or not vigilant. So with that i will turn things over to richard. Thank you for bringing this together. I thought i would give the few thoughts on the book and then a few areas of conclusions that first with a have laid out are absolutely right of the cyclical nature with the entrenchment as we get into the korean war and eisenhower retrench is and lbj and then ford pulls back so we can see that waxing and waning that maximal american exertion around the world but the biggest driver of this is they suddenly become the aficionados to get through another window that people say we have to constrain the definition of National Interest<\/a> and then it starts to expand again. But the Trump Administration<\/a> is only a partially a piece of that. colon framed the intellectual reaction of Foreign Policy<\/a>. I thank you could make an argument with the assumption of overseas territories to significantly change the way they thought about american responsibilities in the world. But the more salient turning point is 1945. Here is where i think the Trump Administration<\/a> its much more than donald trump himself because it is more of an outlier with whom that they just dont agree. So what i mean by that is post 1945 built into form policy or principles. One is to maintain the peace we would have strong alliances underwritten that world war ii those that never came home but we are there because we have seen the alternative. So the other was you maintain prosperity for the open International Economic<\/a> system and the third was when possible to have a bias and the debate among conservatives and liberals and democrats and republicans within the party a lot of it is how you do this. So when do you promote democracy . What trade deals with whom . But there was not a lot post 1945 question about the fundamental function in part because that was a reaction to the first half of the 20th century with the rise of autocrats and that is the most devastating and nobody wanted to repeat that. But donald trump comes in and things are in the reverse as colon pointed out that is in the model of consistency but rather than seeing the american alliances not returning, this is a really bad deal for the United States<\/a> because the allies are getting rich in the us protection and not paying their fair share. The International Economic<\/a> agreements and free trade can exist on anything over 30 years and the trade deficits has really harmed the little guy. Then to see not terribly interested but there is some exceptions like venezuela. But its just not a top priority. And with obama you can see a similar trend in this direction. Obama wanted to dialback overseas. And clearly that was not an informed policy the trump in that sense was very different of what american foreignpolicy had assumed with a republican or democrat or conservative or liberal. But is complicated because the administration its hard to think of those as closed of what it should look like as the president. And then with that broad cyclical up and down. And there is the nationalist part we didnt elect pat buchanan or bernie sanders. So this populism or the starting point the good common sense of the American People<\/a> when appropriately applied can resolve really entrench problems and then to distort for its own purposes and by no means on the republican side to have very strong echoes they are out to get you and just with the common sense that the real American People<\/a> can overcome the challenges we face of this country. And how we protect americas interest. Republicans as recently as john mccain generally with the idea that americas idea people from around the world can buy into freedoms and things like that and the hardline nationalist view isnt an idea but a particular set of people or geography which is the United States<\/a> and that has to be protected to raise issues with Political Security<\/a> of the American People<\/a>. And the right with others. And americans overseas. So trump was obviously more concerned about north Korea Missiles<\/a> and those living on the Korean Peninsula<\/a> that is logical and straightforward but thats different than what he publicly articulated so to final things. On the polling with that what they vote on it is an interesting thing to see all the people who vote for donald trump that they were really irked by support by japan are now on the democratic side and then to and the forever wars. And a lot of these things resonate but is not to say a president couldnt take a very different position including ending the forever wars. And that the president so you can get people to express an opinion. And waiting even more to maneuver. And what could resonate as the drivers of a vote. Finally, the book concludes with the reflections of the future of conservative Foreign Policy<\/a>. With some of these groups and then this feels like we have a plan. The bolsheviks will not be there forever. And then the russians are long gone so who the hell knows. So thank you for having this talk. Looking at a simple team to make things clear and i knew all along i did not have the capture the intuition. And then you end up thinking and coming back to those mechanics you unpack in the book and for open discussion. But the substructure consists of three groups. Isolationist, unilateralist and international. And that for much of america postwar engagement. And those that have allowed us for the foreignpolicy that is activist and does this coalition handles fragmented through the isolationist that is what explains in some ways the structure of which of the analysis. So i have two questions. Nationalist and internationalist coalition but yet today that is the inheritance. It is no longer the old republic. But with that of the United States<\/a> so what is the future of the coalition . We dont have that luxury now. That we like it or not or wanted or not. And then if it is a product of the nationalist coalition if it is by trump there is a world out there and from the trump coalition. So what do you see for a future of this coalition . One is that it is it managed very well. As they run up against these inherited legacies that are destructive. And so that is one possibility. But the sheer role the president ial leadership and they say this in the book but eisenhower has a deal with the powerful midwestern wing to coopt them with their valid concerns you can imagine a future who skillfully bridges these caps on understands the average voter is not voting however what you are seeing is a real shift to demand some respect and then to some extent with trey there are some bluecollar republicans and it has hurt the over time. And its got to be recognize. And a lot will depend on the specific leadership. But these things can be managed but i actually think a lot of that depends on president ial leadership. And if for example moving into a phase with the better distribution of the economy in terms of incomes in those different groupings so how much of this is a response so the question im getting at is so are these primordial and so that they can move. But that wasnt completely relevant because the reality was so events matter. I think trump recognize politically in 2015 at that moment and with that potential appeal oddly enough but then to renegotiate the trade agreements. The lets not completely walk away from afghanistan. And there would be mass demonstrations and that is with the cult of personality. In the same thing with obama. With a conservative internationalist if there is some shocking military we would like to see a second trump term look radically different than the first and this is not unusual historically and it could change quite a bit if war occurs. So part of that problem that we have as we look inward is that the truth is there are two huge factors we talked about the had a very meaningful influence on these fluctuations. And the financial crisis is incredibly impactful. And from what i describe as a tectonic shift and probably would not propel somebody like donald trump so the second part is part of the cyclical nature when we disengage and then shut happens overseas. So then what happens when we take our eye off the ball that it has underwritten and to a certain extent prior to that and that they sucked us back in. I still remember when my favorite conversations my girlfriend was marveling how i couldnt stand the second bush administration. And she said no in the second term he is the president he would have been had 9 11 not happened. And that is exactly right. And that is the reality from what drew us back in and we dont gaze at our bellybuttons and that slight enthusiastic way we have the last couple of years. And with those serious threats not just the world order even the people that werent rich felt pretty rich. And then there were a few other factors out there. And we dont talk about nonproliferation anymore at all. And any one of those could cause what we talked about. Fear changes that ideological preference so with that threat that is the key driver. In 1845 you have all these guys who were not only cause isolationist the impulse was that they didnt want to maintain the National Security<\/a> state. With an army a huge federal bureaucracy collecting taxes from everybody because there were small Government Conservatives<\/a>. So those concerns were second tier because the big tear was communism. But there is still something bigger to worry about especially after 9 11 in part because it is connected to so many things. And military intervention was necessary. Now the small Government Conservatives<\/a> in the 19 nineties would try to chip away at the last vestige of the National Security<\/a> state that was no longer necessary so whether there was a war it could be china. But that existential challenge with those core things that we enjoy so a future president may have all the preferences that go along with the hard line isolationist because they think we should not be there but if the fear is great enough it will be reduced to the more expansive view of Foreign Policy<\/a>. So one question how did the three groups that you identified for conservativism in the manifestation . If they map on citizenship as a matter of political belonging and constitution and connected to identities . Is there any obvious mapping of citizenships in these groups . There has been and research to answer that with the idea you are more likely to find hardline nationalists and have a view of the United States<\/a> as a place. But not only that a religious and ethnic background with the cynic definition to argue there is that anglo protestant core. And that can be compatible if you think al qaeda is the problem but you are not likely to have that cosmopolitan so there is a relationship in that way. The only thing i would add to that is looking at the drivers of populism and nationalism that is linked which is the economic drivers of the Global Economic<\/a> crisis, the fed up and non representation and those that have spoken to those needs. But also the cultural aspect because the percentage of foreignborn americans today is higher than in over 100 years cresting over world war i and then to close the spigot and then opened up again in the sixties in those elite circles those diversity that embraces even on the left to see is a great virtue of the country it has felt differently if you tack on the these economic difficulties if you see the residence with the president its time for us to put america first. Because they cant. And canon is an important factor, its important for the chinese. As you start to spend more on social policies and social welfare nets and disinvest in defense as we have been doing for quite some time. If you have a population of which have more old people than young people and its impact sustain and pay for and work. And their parents dont want them sent off to do things and not enough children to sustain them. If in fact we become a nation that is not a nation of immigrants that is part of where the energy of growth comes from and innovation and success and if we stop and rely solely upon americans we are going to have the same problems. Im going to open up the discussion if you want to make an intervention just identify yourself and ask. A very stimulating and reassuring discussion, so thank you to all of you. So, trade sovereignty is not only not going to go away anytime soon but most probably going to intensify not only in the u. S. But throughout the world. So, the question is dont we need now as people who are concerned about interNational Security<\/a> and u. S. National interest dont we need now to start thinking about how intensification of trade sovereignty. This is one of the most striking unexpected chains over the last five years. U. S. Trade disputes with ally on the merits strategically or economically we should be grappling with our allies to coordinate so as often is the case there is always a kernel the wto could use reform and that needs to be addressed. I dont see the well coordinated effort to do that. What i see is picking fights with allies and then resolving the fights and saying weve got to deal. The germans are very worried, so i agree that there is a trend toward trade sovereignty and protectionism is with that shift there seems to be support in the countries that was the problem they dont put their foot down but that is the problem because they hear about it if you are a farm state you will have been complaining that itthencomplaio hurt you so ideally you would have them coordinate work allies against china. Two things one i actually dont see this as a historical shift as you are describing because i think that its always been a lost gold betwee betweene elites and by that i also mean members of Congress Voting<\/a> on these matters and in the public. Having sat through god knows how many debates in china. Its between the leaders and the people and there was a lot of hesitation because people think differently about it. The mentalities we were elected to lead, not to be in front of the mob. Now as computers have deepened about what it is people really want because nobody really understands what its about and people are still confused about how donald trump got elected thats washington for you and its not that there is any narrowing. The second point that its important that we never, ever talk about his age. I am not as spry as i once was. Why do we view the organizations createneed the organizationscrer ii are somehow, that they dont require reform or nato or the United Nations<\/a> or the wto or the world bank or the imf World Peace Organization<\/a> to meet the challenges of intellectual property climate change, whatever it is. That is a huge problem and nobody talks about these reform issues. I think that you are right the skepticism of trade isnt going to go away one because skepticism trade and trade agreements become a proxy for discomfort with what globalization has brought so you dont get to vote on container shipping or integrated International Financial<\/a> markets or Broadband Access<\/a> to allow thethat allowthem to be exportee borders. You dont get to vote on automation. But i think it is a severe challenge because theres two remedies to this. Thursday it nor everybody that is harmed by whatever economic phenomenon is the issue. And then theres the other sort of conceptual the attractive one which is we are going to retrain the people in manufacturing and devoted service jobs or work as programmers in seattle or whatever. But its especially to those that are not yet tradable goods nor can they be automated away by the Artificial Intelligence<\/a> and things like that. So when you have all the people making these decisions who are 99 secure that the effects of these economic phenomena will lowered prices on these things it is hard to say are we really going to have a system that effectively take the man or the woman thats been working in manufacturing in North Carolina<\/a> for 30 years and now is going to either find the same sense of purpose by working in the stripp mall even if they get paid 50 cents more per hour or ideally becomes a programmer in seattle its just very hard to see how that actually works. Which raises the question. You mov move the mouse or once production of National Boundaries<\/a> and there are consequences to that shift and those have stated choices and yet we have to manage the consequences which are not easy solutions. And you can make everything worse if you say the answer is to protect the industrys battle so is the wrong answer. You can recognize the challenge and have empathy with those that are affected and then come out making matters even worse. A quick followup on that which is politically trump showed that you can have a narrowly Winning Coalition<\/a> with a protectionist platform and that may have been a vote moving issue with the working class voters in pennsylvania and michigan. So they copy success and when i see a debate like that, the one obvious it seems like the Democratic Party<\/a> isnt going to take the lead in standing up for free trade so you may get a convergence. You mentioned the conservative nationalism is here to stay. Do you see the same trend shift in europe . Second, are your views on the definition and nationalism cant have double or not compatible in public virtue of nationalism . Its a very important book. I liked much of it. For example, the office of staunch defense of National Sovereignty<\/a> he suggested there is an element that is a western political tradition that says we havent sent anything better than the nationstate to allow experiments in selfgovernment. I think that hes right about that. Nations dont come together for the most part of abstract social contract theories. It is bound up with the Classical Liberal<\/a> ideas that were not true worldwide. To think that eight u. S. President has the right to go to the un and give a speech initially. I dont know why they would have the right to do that. Why is it americas business of the internal affairs. Its here to stay and its not about Foreign Policy<\/a>. I would say immigration is a sheer number one. Theres a book i would recommend to yoit to you if you are interd that might sound like an imposing title. And he goes through the cases suggested into the single biggest cause of the rise of populism securely in europe is the issue of mass migration and the feeling of traditional majorities that are no longer going to be the majority encouraging the rise of new parties of the right and since those arent about to add and there is the migration across the coming centuries, so if that is true given that you already have a large percentage so those parties are not going away. They tend to be more skeptical with certain National Sovereignty<\/a>. Some of them are very pro putin so if you can have a cultural conservative. Would it be true to say it is yes to stay what is the future of the nationstate . What is the nationstate . Of course we have the competitions make adjustments on the margin but because the viability of the nationstate . I think there is such a thi thing. In the nationstate as a matter of fact but nevertheless there is a state and the nation. We like the fact it tends to be bottomup and we like to keep it that way but it is historically the american nationstate. One of the things the war revealed under the leadership is the single United States<\/a> but he insisted on and embodied the determination with the ability to defend its territory and integrity so it is an idea but also a place. Thereve been a tendency to say that the nationstate is fading and disappearing because of economic independence, governance. I would say the nationstate has come back with a vengeance and we know there are areas that dont have effective control of the territory like subsaharan africa. But i would not count the nationstate out as a matter of fact if you are american i dont think you should. I think you should see the United States<\/a> as a nation that has responsibilities to its citizens and that is part of what we are seeing is hopefully the restored since of the nation called the United States<\/a> we have obligations to each other. At one point i think you should have asked the question of how gore described how Global Trends<\/a> are running up against the existence of states or however you describe it, and danny rightfully pointed out we have multilateral institution. If we look at europe in migration its not at europe as an entity hasnt tried to find the response to migration or the realistic response. The fact that even europe hasnt been able to do that i think its back to your original observation which is that we do have this inadequacy of the nationstate to address the global problems that we have but then that does ultimately come back to the observation which is we really do need to start addressing the question at the multilateral level and thats where the inadequacy of nationalism really implodes because it is going to be very difficult to convince genuine nationalists of the virtue. Not in terms of ethnicity but in terms of the constitutional commitment so in that sense if it became irrelevant in the political personality. Then the United States<\/a> can survive and prosper as a nationstate. Its when you start settling for the nationhood that you begin to see the competition within countries becoming difficult so there is a multilateral dimension to it, but i think many of these issues have to be involved within certain countries themselves. We took about two Different Things<\/a> in the ways. One is migration, why does europe have a problem with immigrant because European Countries<\/a> dont like to say with the exception perhaps a little bit of england into a small extent than id like to say here is what our country stands for because that sounds like i am right and you cant have that. So you dont get the sense of civic nationalism deny that sense of ethnic nationalism. We have not had that but increasingly i would say there is an element of conservatives dare i call them that Tucker Carlson<\/a> conservative who think of us as endless protestants and that is what makes america and therefore all of you immigrants no matter what they believe in the American Dream<\/a> or not in the constitution are never going to be part of it and with the playing of the National Emblem<\/a> they are not wholly american if they are referred to without some hyphenated attachment so we have these factors that are all exacerbating these problems and because of them we actually come together and agree how to prioritize any multilateral. I want to ask about the change of the shift in demographics especially towards the millennial santa generation in the completely connected world that affect the losses of nationalism going forward, and even now that more millennial shaping Public Opinion<\/a> towards the front. Anecdotally ive been teaching for 30 years so we see the shifts that are interesting and hundreds of students on the ground. It seems to be they are more skeptical than some older generations and what theyve grown up with none of it has been a positive experience. This isnt even the 9 11 generation anymore. I have her graduates with no memory of 9 11 so if it was an experience for you it might be a shocking need to do something. But the lived experiences the war iof thewar is dragging on ie greater middle east. And of course they have memory of the conclusion of the cold war which provides a big formative moment. By the way that is a cross party line. They change because of event and develop different views but i do think that its striking the millennial santa tend to be more skeptical. Its not the same thing as isolation. But i often have the students say to me is why do we intervene after all. Some element of cultural technological interdependence which would cause the outcome. Maybe i am just a natural pessimist, but i noticed that over time so that would be my short take on how millennial search engin changing the u. S. N on policy. That notion is more widely shared including millennial study them back when i was in college in the late 90s when it was all about the multinational corporations and multilateral organizations and the eclipse of the nationstate as sort of the Building Block<\/a> of International Affairs<\/a> and networks of the nongovernmental organizations and activists in d things like that. And certainly if you look at Something Like<\/a> this is, took the nationstate using other nationstates to put an end to the caliphate and even look at the Global Financial<\/a> crisis and then they had to use fiscal policy to help the financial crisis. It went up rather than down and in this moment it is being eclipsed in economics more than anything else. So theres this kind of reductive reality that for all of the desire for multilateral frameworks and realities of the corporations that could move opinion and technology to connect people around the world, it still is a nationstate that is the primary actor in International Affairs<\/a> and would agree that its not in terms of the multilateral frameworks. At a particular moment so that it gets a perceived bitter outcome in a different level. This is an issue that can unite it with a different faction right and centerright but i noticed you get a heated debate over the military intervention in syria, retrospective but when it comes to china even some of the more noninterventionist voices are down with the notion that youve got to do something and that can be a unifying argument. One of the things that struck me in this story about was toldd in the book was that you have trump that is the product of an isolationist which pushes us in a different direction from both groups. I want to thank all of you for coming to the endowment this morning and extend a special thanks for giving us an opportunity to host them and for spending time with us. I look forward to seeing you back here at some point in the future. We do have the book on sale outside of the room if you have an interest you could have him sign a copy for you but we have a few copies out there and you are welcome to pick up a copy. Thank you very much. [applause] i had grown women that were teaching me my body was a commodity and means to get things from men and completely acceptable to expect things in return from the companionship and things of that nature. I was told that it revolved around pleasing a man in some form. I was 13. You what your experiences unfold pretty openly. I dont think people try to hide the fact there were so many that it was a badge of honor to have not been in politics especially in washington and to what your news and fresh opinion on how things should be done next, kim who covered the bbc and financial time for 20 years talks about the decades long rivalry between iran and saudi arabia. This is one hour and 20 minutes","publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"archive.org","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","width":"800","height":"600","url":"\/\/ia802900.us.archive.org\/10\/items\/CSPAN2_20200319_000100_Colin_Dueck_Age_of_Iron\/CSPAN2_20200319_000100_Colin_Dueck_Age_of_Iron.thumbs\/CSPAN2_20200319_000100_Colin_Dueck_Age_of_Iron_000001.jpg"}},"autauthor":{"@type":"Organization"},"author":{"sameAs":"archive.org","name":"archive.org"}}],"coverageEndTime":"20240716T12:35:10+00:00"}