But as the authors discuss, understudied and on underemphasized. I dont want to waste too much time at the big long intro. I will only have an intro so i can highlight the work of ab next to me whos been doing really fantastic reporting for the wall street journal on the same topic and im going to quote from one of her stories from this year because it sets us up nicely where in a piece coauthored with her colleague dustin boltz she says, chinese spies are increasingly recruiting Us Intelligence officers as part of a widening sustained campaign to shake loose government secrets. Current and former u. S. Officials say china has also grown bolder and more successful in traditional spy games including targeting less conventional recruits and she quotes the now infamous statement by Christopher Wray the fbi that no country poses a broader and more severe intelligence collection threat in china they are doing it through Chinese Intelligence Services through state owned enterprises through extensively private companies do graduate students and researchers through a variety of actors all working on behalf of china. And finally, this is one of my favorite quotes from the piece by rob joyce he says russia is the hurricane it comes in fast and hard. China is climate change, long, slow, pervasive. I hope and suspect that of the three people on the stage here will have disagreements both on some of these statements between each other about this issue of chinese espionage about what we think we know about oregons elected ministry of state security. What some of the myths are that we believe that art true. Without further ado, im going to turn it over to the two authors, peter mattis and matt brazil. We will turn to them for 20 to 25 minutes and they will walk us through the book, findings, how to organize some of his Beautiful Partnership came about and then i will moderate a discussion with all three of them on these issues and then we will save some time for q a. I will plant the seed now that the q a period is primarily if not solely about actual questions. As you thinking of the long discursive comment you want to make i would ask that you email it to us instead of using precious time here we really want to hear everyones questions so we can hear about them. So be thinking of tight questions to ask when we get to the q a period. With that i will turn it over to matt and peter. First, thank you very much jude and afor hosting us today. Thank you also to glenn howard in the Jamestown Foundation as well as glenn and the Naval Institute press for believing in the project and carry it forward. A quick disclaimer, since i am in a government position, i am speaking solely on a personal capacity. Ive taken leave to be here, im off the clock. My views are my own and do not represent the Congressional Executive Commission on china its staff or any of its members. If youre going to quote what i say i hope you will at least acknowledge this is being said in a personal capacity and does not represent the people with whom i work for horror associated with. I hate to downplay expectations for the book. Its not a gripping spy thriller. Thats my intent. Its meant to be a bit of a reference guide. In a primer and introduction. In part because there is a real need to demystify chinese intelligence and not say there is this 5000 year history invoking sends a mystical body meant of intelligence operation and starts with the things that we can see and know. Unbilled outward from there. This is a starting point not the final answer. In that respect we tried to sketch out in our introductory essay if the grains of sand on a beach are the Information Products you want to gather the russians would have some marine surface in the middle of the night they would come ashore and pick up a few buckets of sand and go back to the submarine and be gone by dawn. The United States would partner satellite. Throwing some sensors along the approaches to the beach. Most notably National Security information is not a beach. You dont get to send a thousand bathers. It had a few problems with it. The chinese intelligence they dont use traditional methods of handling sources. And a lot of these cases if you go to the book and look at the hard espionage cases you dont see amateurs leading the way. When the Intelligence Services are there. The third point i think is important about this is it conflated any chinese entity with being chinese intelligence so when people said chinese intelligence acting in this way chinese intelligence meant something very different than what it means when we say russian intelligence. Or u. S. Intelligence. When we say Us Intelligence we tend to think the Us Intelligence specifically. Thats a pretty broad definition and certainly is in cognate with if we were to say u. S. Intelligence and say we include boeing and j. P. Morgan and every hedge fund and anything american does abroad. They must be intelligence because thats all we are doing it. The system is set up differently but thats the wrong way to do it. That speaks to why we chose a conservative approach about what we included. The other downside of this is that it creates the notion of every chinese person as a potential spy. Whatever you think of that proposition thats not really practically useful way for assessing risk if it doesnt help you understand what parts of the system are doing things. And has a notable feature of not really being true. To say that the Chinese Intelligence Services has had more success in recruiting Chinese People and chinese nationals abroad. That part you can see but to say that that has been solely the focus or if thats really where they were putting all the effort action accurately captures a history. To sum it up with saying ab these are great classic cases that are detailed. Is it case officer agent relationship there is a country Meeting Point there are third country places for dropping off data. For a courier to pick up. There are people going to borders and getting whisked across and not having steps in their passport so they can go have meetings. This is traditional and classic tradecraft where this case runs from sometime late 1940s to 1985 that encompasses a pretty long history of chinese intelligence. I would also make the point that for years what weve seen from the Chinese Intelligence Services about the scope scale and potential impact because of chinas role in the world because of the security situation in east asia because of the future of taiwan because of a whole variety of things is the scope scale potentially impacting chinese intelligence operations that was a real threat it wasnt necessarily the operational sophistication, that, however its changing. Think you could look at the periods covered in the book and see fairly sophisticated revolutionary period of intelligence. The middle years of the prc not necessarily being all that great and more recently in emerging sophistication that is on par with a worldclass Intelligence Service. I attribute that to two things, the first is that when the ministry of state security is created in 1983 it basically was a bunch of survivors from rather a handful of survivors of the three chinese intelligence and a lot of Police Officers who were told one day that you now work for Intelligence Service. Not exactly the best way to train people or give them a lot of skills. So should we really be surprised that people who are trained for foreign intelligence have better luck with people who they can communicate with directly and more readily and have shared cultural references . I dont think predictable he surprising . But beginning in the 1990s and i think matt and i were fairly significant beneficiaries of this the ministry of state security and the pla actually started major publication projects to talk about the revolutionary history of chinese intelligence and bring out the literature and say this is what we did. In one of the biographies we cited, the author talked about a meeting we have in the early 1990s that said you need to write this book because our people dont know their history they dont know what they are a part of and we need to build that of the service. So we understand they are joining a long and glorious tradition and that there is a Long Associated with being Administrative State security professional. Forward to that book is written by the Administrative State securities generals office. And what are the lessons for you in the modern era and for the practice of intelligence. The other thing the Administrative State security did is essentially instituting a new Training Program they realized that if you rely on College Graduates who majored in languages or Computer Science he did necessarily have the professional skill set you would hope they have when they graduate. There seems to have been an effort sometime in the late 1990s and early 2000 and different parts of the mss to start recruiting people earlier and younger to say if you are interested in this career, here are the things you should do, heres the way you should study languages and heres the assistance we can offer so they spent their time in school much more productively and much more focused way to bring those skills into the service. Ive heard some i cant entirely confirm about creating different Internship Program so that young officers would get time and companies so if they were passing themselves off as professional businesspeople that they would actually look and talk what special businessperson. Unfortunately as some of the ditches that are discussed in chapter 6 illustrates, businesspeople dont have private meetings in their hotel rooms stuff they do it in the lounge or bar. The other reason but also for the some extent to the pla. The movement of cyberspace with a valuable storage as a real opportunity. With those technical operations. Previously with the industrial like infrastructure you had to have satellites, dish, a global network, Computing Power to do encryption beyond what a human being could readily uncover. Thats a huge capacity china was is cut off. Only in the seventies and eighties when it started to get fairly far behind. What it did was to see this opportunity of a public and private infrastructure centered around a handful of bureaus in particular that creates an easy one ecosystem for defense and offense. Contractors for the benefits of the private sector and the ability to keep people focused and on target and this is one of the reasons why everybody was yelling about the pla into thousands breaking into places and running off nobody figured out where that security was and that came much later largely because they were much more successful than most of the pla. In this movement is important to get a bug inside place you had to get it in a way to capture communications and a way to infiltrate the data. It is a complicated process. And that meant for the bug that was discovered in the state department 1999 you have to take a picture in the Conference Room know the quality of your picture to recognize the wood grain and the true color to recreate that to be accurately captured to fit in a constrained space you have to have a plan to get that data out so they arent just running and using up that energy. So that partisanship and the craftsmanship that went into those devices with the skill ship that they had to do well the chinese didnt necessarily have those experiences because domestically they controlled those measures that was in the hands of the government not anyone else. But what it looks like today using code its in the Software Code not the delivery device it is a usb drive you have to come with ways to hide it but it is a very different set of skills and its much easier to teach where we are today now than where we were before this moment. Its very important to understand those institutions that are involved with large bureaucracies that work in particular ways and reward behaviors and they may or may not be as centralized as we tend to think like reading some of the cases in the book with that tradecraft that is quite useful and you see boneheaded things why would we take that seriously clicks and one of the answers the Central Ministry itself with those units with dozens of local state security bureaus all of these organizations hire on their own. So should be really be surprised if that looks slightly different of the Security Department clicks should be really be surprised given the breadth and variety that an organization that is this diverse so it brings up the important point that there is sophistication here but you wouldnt get to this point to understand that organizational makeup of how people came up and were Police Officers yes one first but then coming back to a generation of people of the Intelligence Officers first rather than Something Else. Also thank you to the Jamestown Foundation and those who sponsored us to complete this work which sometimes we felt we were hacking our way through but here we are. I will take you a tour of the history but the violent and exciting path that led to today. 1927 the year the Chinese Communist party split was the year of intelligence failures for the Chinese Communist party because they had nothing in place. They had assassins and protection people and a few spies but not a structure. So the coup detat came as a complete surprise and at the end of the year at the canton uprising in december its they said we failed because we knew virtually nothing about the enemy. With its first professional organization it got off to a rocky start with the first concrete spidering that is referred to today the three heroes in the dragonslayer mentioned earlier of the three people with lee as the ringleader, he survived more than a few years and went on to lead intelligence in the early years of the peoples republic. So the resulting structure that followed with intelligence people with the knuckle draggers of course and the analyst and people who do communications and Technical Work that resulting structure basically survived into the present and has changed a great deal but the special Service Section was founded at that time has successes that saved a lot of lives however when their boss defected over in 1931. That was a disaster and to this day like one of my distant relatives you cannot find a picture of him left so in 1935 although it was depicted as a time of brilliant operations by clever individuals actually there was a slow rolling disaster and in 1935 the special Services Section was abolished and this is about the time out to doan started to have Strong Influence over operations and his focus with the enemies was for within you probably heard of the futon incident that encouraged a great deal of the red army for those that were opposed to him thats at the chinese call the first of the left three deviations they dont say that were driven by malta doan himself but they were but those deviations is the Salvation Campaign 1943 and of course the culture revolution and in between those 1955 there was a gigantic purge of intelligence people when he decided the chief spies was a traitor because he hadnt reported a meeting with an agent now that left a legacy to solve problems and of course we see that today even though declaring the age of Political Campaign is over with dissenting to become chinas paramount leader of course we see the Anticorruption Campaign used to purge the enemies and left many others intact but the point is these purges have taken in the intelligence people and these different purges i just mentioned have cleaned out the ranks of Chinese Communist intelligence with very severe temporary effects. Part of that legacy that we see today is areas during the revolution with the peoples republic was a toxic environment for enemy spies for those who wanted to come in and inspire the current government. This was a continual drive and nearly impossible to penetrate eastern china during the beginning of the prc regime the exception was the ambush and 61 in tibet by us sponsored gorillas that resulted in the capture of 1600 pages of classified information you can find in libraries today but that was the exception to prove the rule was tibet was not on china. So this strong toxicity for counterintelligence that stops the prc from being a normal environment to infiltrate and spy has made it easier for the prc to recruit foreign spies themselves because those who go to china for study chinese or are tourist there is a baseline of surveillance there is a baseline of surveillance that everybody goes through and there are clear triggers to focusing on an individual if there is any indication if they are working with the chinese call a sensitive unit with technology. So it is easier to assess and recruit foreigners in china under these conditions and i want to do a footnote the two fbi videos people have made fun of many of you may have seen its called game of ponds we see it dramatiz