Program to what extent it is a threat or not to its neighbors what might reasonably be expected in way of any kind of follow agreement perhaps any agreement is not feasible at this time. And so we have assembled quite a panel and im going to briefly introduce them and turn over the moderateing responsibilities to my director at the south asia center he in addition to directing our south asia center, of course, our iran program is part of the south asia center. He is a true rocket scientist. He managed the program in arms control disarmament in International Security at the university of illinois at champagne overu saw developing projects on south Asian Security issue ors. Hes also worked with Cornell University and he is a true rocket scientist. He had ph. D. With a specialization numerical accusics i dont know what that is. Buts thats brought and then we have a terrific panel. The go to men in washington on all things missiles mike senior fellow for missile selfdefense at the international for study and wi rks and dos area Iran Ballistic Missile Capabilities assessment, long bio you have it here. Hes the go to guy and then we have persuaded Melissa Dalton senior fellow and Deputy Director of the International Security program at the center for strategic and international studies. To come and provide perspective on particularly on the gcc point of view, melissa has long worked on these issue. Shes also served in government and were lucky to have her, and last but not least our own doctor aaron stein of the center for the middle east hes an expert on turkey, hes been following this situation in syria as well, and we look forward to his comments sop so thank you to the fund for supporting our program. If youre going to tweet, please tweet at the ac iran and im also delighted that cspan is joining us this morning. So with that let me turn it over to you. Tnches thanks barbra. [laughter] good morning and welcome to you all and it is my Blood Pressure pleasure to welcome our guest and [inaudible conversations] to this exciting panel. Mike are you going to go further so launch with you and the booth who is in the coolest coolest and you will do the reentry. Mike. Smg well dr. Once said my job to make a missile go up wherever he goes down in someone with elses department. What i wanted too was briefly talk not so much about the history of Iran Missile Program although we can address that in the question and answer period, but i wanted to look at what you know, the, this common claim that irans missiles are all developed they must be must stop allowing them to develop these systems because they could eventually deliver a Nuclear Weapon to increasingly longer ranges and in the future. And you know theres just sol broad generallyization how we define what it means to be Nuclear Capable. Now, of course o the reasons to be concerned this is a priority area as barbara mentioned a lot of discussion on going within the administration and with the european allies over how to address the missile issue. So let me start by saying you know International Standard , though, it is not recognized law for their determining inherent capability of a missile is threcialtd established by 1987 missile control regime established to export of technology that could help someone build Missile Systems that deliver a 5 a 00 kilogram payload to 300 kilometers. What we have seen today is people generally use that those threshold values to define what is, quote, Nuclear Capable. Well if we do apply those the eight current systems you know which is the largest most diverse arsenal in the region exceed that threshold. And thus are deemed to be Nuclear Capable. Other five all of which are some version of the 110, family of miss missiles currently lethal especially when shipped to hezbollah for use against israel they clearly do not bust through the 500 kilogram 300 kilometer range threshold. But its important to remember that capability does not is not equal to intent. So the empty guidelines should be a first step evaluating or assessing iran missiles. When u. N. Security counsel drafted resolution 2231 in july of 2015 to accompany the Iran Nuclear Deal that was reached earlier that month, the element of a intent was actually added to the resolution that addresses the missile issue itself. Whereas previous resolution talked about missiles that were, quote, capable of delivering Nuclear Weapons the 2015 resolution calls, calls upon iran not to engage in afnghts concerning missiles, quote, designed to be capable of delivering Nuclear Weapons. So, obviously, intent was captured, resolution 2231. So what does it mean to be designed a Nuclear Capable . Judging intent is subjective. But there are some technical clues, intelligence information, i think that can guide an analysis the soundest approach in my view to the various Missile Systems and assess design intention on the basis of technical capabilities and the lean yag of these systems from where did they come . In doing so who embarked to examine this in more details and should have a report coming out later this week or early next week on the iiss website i dont know if hard copy will be produced or not but we looked at this in it detail and we conclud that short range Missile Systems the baseed on the soviet export version of the b and c designed to carry conventional weapons not Nuclear Weapon. The export versions are about 20 centimeters shorter than nuclear version fielded by soviets. Soviets assign unique identifiers to the nuclear and nonknew nuclear version and speckly crafted for exports. These systems do exceed the empty c threshold unless carrying weapon but incorrect to claim in our view that the export versions were designed for Nuclear Delivery. Irans reason for acquiring the first place in mid1980s were for retaliatory attacks against iraq using conventional foreheads. But at the other end of the spectrum in materials of the intengt theres strong evidence that irans system was designed with a Nuclear Payload in mind. As well reported on a computer hard drive there were handed over by defector in 2004 demonstrate efforts to resign the reentry vehicle, the shahab to accommodate what appears to be a Nuclear Implosion device. Solid fueled and liquid fuel have the same baby bottle shaped nose cone and thus can also be said presumptively to have been designed to carry a Nuclear Weapon. U now the case of the is less clear because it appeared after the intelligence surfaced, and it was primarily put on the because it separates warhead unlike the sea and more aerodynamically stable using that baby bottle shape. But conclusion, though, they designed for Nuclear Weapons delivery is also supported by its origins from the north korean, shahab three which is name that iran gave it is imported can also be said to have been designed for news clear delivery. Is not entirely clear from where the nodang design originates from north korea or the soviet union. But we know both would have for delivery. External dimensions by the way are exactly scaled to those of a nuclear version of the b and not those of the import or exported b thats conventionally armed. Irans missile which made a debut in 2015 is a variance by lineage might be said to be Nuclear Capable or designed to be Nuclear Capable. Though it is a little less clear thats exactly the intent that the iranians had i think presumptive iferly we can assign it in that category. Iran tested missile and much harder to judge because theres a date of birth of really good information about this particular missile but it appears and i want to stress the word appears to be based on the r27 technology thats north korea used to build the unsuccessful musadan in any case if it is based on that particular technology it would be logical to assume or reasonable to assume that the original r27 was designed by the russians or soviets at the time to deliver Nuclear Weapons and north korea certainly had those designs in mind. And in addition iran is developed to satellite launch vehicles and this is real controversial part. But in my view it is not controversial at all. Now, both these carrier rocketss are optimized designed technology is optimized for satellite launching not as a Ballistic Missile. Neither rock et has been tested as a Ballistic Missile. And they would require some you know wrath arer extense movedificationings for use as a Ballistic Missile. For sure they use similar technologies allowing to carry Nuclear Weapons but it is a satellite launch vehicle. Its interesting, though, to note that no country is ever converted a liquid propellant satellite launcher into a Ballistic Missile. Its always gone other way around theres sound reasons for this and they usually draw around operational requirements. But nonetheless if we look at the north Korean Program it is kind of the best example. The two icbms theyre going and the 15 look nothing like use very different technologies to design features than the satellite launcher that gives you an example of why people dont just convert. Satellite launchers to missiles now girch central role that Ballistic Missiles play in iran defense it isly tun likely to give their missiles up, however, i think its important for us to focus on the Priority Issues opposed to those kind of on the margin. Now, departing a little bit from the discussion to so far just is leak to take an opportunity to say that you know iran has said that it does not require a Ballistic Missile capable of traveling more than 2,000 kilometers. We should take them at their word we should take them up on it. We should negotiate ban on missiles, travel further than 2,000 kilometers. I think its something they might agree to iranianing that ive spoken to seem to think it would be it might be acceptable. And in this way we can first step to limiting iran capable and foresaw what the administration itself worries about most. And that is a Nuclear Armed icbm from iran. They look at the situation in north korea and they dont want to see a repeat of what has happened there in iran in the future. Now, under such an agreement you would have to deal with irans satellite launchers i think there are ways to verify if iran is is willing to be transparent that their ises are designed for satellite launching and you could put restriction on some of the technologies they use to make it much more difficult to actually take your conspiracy from satellite launches and apply them and build a Ballistic Missile based on the technologies youre using for satellite launches so ill end there. Thanks everybody for coming thanks mike for that run down. I want to start by just laying out u how i think this problem says is conceptionized because it is turned bilateral in terms of the u. S. , iranian rivalry or relationship however you want to define it and within this idea of the guidelines that all Ballistic Missiles particularly in the middle east all for an intengt and designed at least from the outset to carry wmd our weapon of mass destruction what they understand or at least the idea that these export versions of the scud even slight variation are relatively well done variations like how did you pronounce it . And so inaccurate from a u. S. Or western perspective they are entirely worthless as tools of war unless targets are extremely large they cant hit it and therefore the only feasible thing to do request them is to make sure your warhead and blast is big enough to cover up for inaccuracy therefore it is best suited for chemical either chemical or nuclear with biological tailing along there because how difficult that is. I think its important to challenge that assumption particularly as this administration wants to try and think through policy option itso in their words improve upon to include a separate multilateral tboarkted limit on Ballistic Missiles with with iran in mind. So i think the way to think about this is how many countries have Ballistic Missiles in the middle east. Their cousins and drones pulling off of that ill get into that. And more importantly how many can can produce these really tiferly simple scud offshoots. And then stemming from that, how frequently they have been used in conflict to their fore challenge initial assumption about thinking about Ballistic Missiles. And i have a small list but i have left some off but ill just start in the arab israeli world they can fire scuds at the israelis the first use of Ballistic Missiles since wold world war ii 1980s probably most familiar with iran, iraq war what we now call the war of cities. Same time period you have you have the afghan soviet war with use scuds large scale is by soviet forces. Praption afghans as well. You have the yemen civil war where you have soviets supplies and scuds you have after the canyon in 1986 u. S. Strike on on gadhafi assetses in libya libya decided to shoot in sicily. You have 1991, you had iraq firing scuds at israel and saudi arabia and one of the largest casualty incidents for the u. S. Forces would be one of the scuds land value u. S. Base. You have the 2003 invasion of iraq and iraqi use of both sort of modified two Ballistic Missiles an Cruise Missiles against u. S. Forces. You have reports of transfers at the stop at 110 from excuse me from iran to hezbollah and how that interplays with israel. The current syrian conflict where youve seen a lot of scuds and yemen as i said the civil war and uthis if yowpght to expand thatout you can look at the georgia war with the russian. The conflict so point of laying this out saying these tools about used relatively frequently since the 1970s. And states have taken notice. So if you did a march around the region if we just go off as we say in a totally agree iran has most advanced and diversified Missile Program in the middle east. And i think importantly has emerged as a Technology Supplier from missiles and therefore outside o of cartel, nevertheles have other states in the region who have ambitious programs themselves you have egypt. That continues Missile Program in production camibility. You have the syrians, despite this war that has been going on that has probably missile production capabilities and facilities. And you see repeated israeli air strike on what they say are missile bases. You have turkey like real country of expertise basically imported a chinese production capability for its missile. Calls bora you have the saudis which have imported chinese missiles on two different occasions. You have the united from the dprk at least twice. You have the huthis may be able to at least fabricate kits or addition asystemmable Iranian Missiles have have internal capabilities a little wishy washy to me. Thats just on the ballistic side and on the other side on sort of the Cruise Missile cousins i said breathing cousins you have a rapid proliferation proliferation their use in yemen today. Their use in 2006 by hezbollah israeli forces. Their use by iraqi force against the United States in 2003. And acquisition of more and more capable systems by a sensible american allies, and the saudis, with the purchase of european made storm shadow for air launch systems. So my point is, is that while we in the u. S. Rightly because of the history of, you know, shenanigan with a Nuclear Weapon in iran is pouked on iranian Ballistic Missile program. It should not be separated from what i think is a wrath ere obvious prolific race in the middle east. And so if you want as the Trump Administration earnestly says it to try in their words improve upon jcpla because theyre not satisfied with u. N. Security counsel resolutions of 2231 as the all encompassing catch for to limit further iranian launch of Ballistic Missiles. Then you have to begin to ask yourselves, what insen tifer does iranians have to limit their own Ballistic Missile capable when everybody us around them is inquiring. And is an overarching Security Framework that places limit on Ballistic Missiles in the middle east a good idea . And for now the u. S. Policy options have and towards counterforce so again, the export of more capable and more accurate systems to strike iranian targets before they get off the ground. And Missile