[inaudible conversations] we are thrilled to have you all here today to discuss the administrations review an important document that just came out on groundhogs day of this year following the earlier National Security strategy of december and Defense Strategies of the administration is doing a nice job keeping its work running smoothly on issuing the guidance prior to now the unveiling of its budget request. We are thrilled to have decent beginning our discussion today. He has one of the longer titles but one of the more important titles, Principal Deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, a job that jim miller also had and we will talk about in the table that follows, but for now i want to introduce david who has been one of the most important authors and voices on the conceptualization and training in the writing of the document that we now have available in all of you can access as you are aware on the internet. It is about a 70 page document much longer than the unclassified version and has a lot of elaboration you are going tyouregoing to hear about that. David will give some short remarks and then we will swap out a little before the 11 00 mark for the Panel Discussion than i will moderate and introduce the panel when we get to that point. Let me say a couple more things about david. This is his second or third or fourth time in government and he was also an important figure in the Bush Administration working on the policy which gets you thinking a lot about relations with nato and other allies into the Nuclear Posture review and hes also an important contributor. He hails from california by way of college and studied Foreign Service at georgetown, was involved in a number of jobs in washington as we mentioned earlier including shortwave or consulting a job he held just before joining the Trump Administration last summer when he was confirmed for this job so without further ado, please welcome david. [applause] thank you for making the trek out here to participate. It is good to be here and its been a while since ive been here and i always appreciate the opportunity to come back. One prediction i would note in a very generous introduction and that is my title which was the Principal Deputy undersecretary for policy has now been changed thanks to the National Defense authorization act that was signed in to law a couple of them is a goer so. Now i have a better chance so as the deputy undersecretary of defense for policy began it is my pleasure to be here and talk about this very critical issue in the Nuclear Posture review. As you all know, each postcold war president has in his first term conduct a review of u. S. Nuclear policy posture programs. President trumps first memorandum issued one week into the new administration and secretary to undertake such review of the Nuclear Policy. The aim of the review was to ensure the United StatesNuclear Deterrent is robust, flexible, resilient, ready and appropriately tailored to detour 21st century threats and reassure allies. The department of defense conducted this review along with the departments of state and energy and in consultation with allies and experts from inside and outside of the government. The resulting 2018 Nuclear Posture review establishes the department of defense priorities as maintaining a safe and Effective Nuclear arsenal that can effectively contribute to the key goals deterring nuclear and non nuclear. Assuring the allies and partners in achieving u. S. Objectives should they fail and hedging against an uncertain future. It also emphasizes the policy will continue to contribute to u. S. Nuclear nonproliferation goals. These are consistent with past priorities of the policy and indeed the 2018 maintains the Nuclear Policies adopted by both democratic and republican administrations for example it recognizes the need for the Nuclear Triad and sustains the previous administrations plan for modernizing the aging Nuclear Triad of the landbased and breathing delivery platforms as well as its supporting Nuclear Infrastructure and command and control. Consistent with the 2010 npr conducted in the administration, it declares that would only consider using Nuclear Weapons in extreme circumstances to the u. S. Vital interests. In addition, it also reaffirms the commitment to the arms control and nonproliferation while maintaining support for the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and by extending the deterrent that is critical to their security and promotes Nuclear Nonproliferation by checking the need to acquire their own Nuclear Weapons. Each of the previous has rightly emphasized it must be responsive to the threat environment of its time. It addresses the reality that while the cold war has been over for decades, a much more challenging Nuclear Threat environment has developed since the previous 2010 posture review. This is the duality that confronted the new administration when it began its Nuclear Posture review. Accordingly, the 2018 is grounded in a realistic assessment of the contemporary security environment. One that recognizes the return of Great Power Competition and the increasing salient of Nuclear Weapons in the arsenals and thof the doctrines of potenl adversaries. For example, since 2010, the russian leadership has made repeated and explicit Nuclear Threat to the u. S. Nato allies and others brandishing Nuclear Weapons in any way we really have not seen since the height of the cold war. Russia is actively modernizing and expanding its strategic and nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons and doing so in continuing intermediate range Nuclear Forces. Like russia, china is pursuing a the moves at the expense of its neighbors including the key u. S. Allies and doing so also through the threat of force. China also continues to expand its Nuclear Capabilities in both quantity and quality. Since 2010, china announced the development of the field into the orange plastic vessels. The new Ballistic Missile submarine and strategic bomber. Chinas intentional lack of transparency regarding scope and scale of its Nuclear Modernization serves only to magnify uncertainties about its future intent. Also, since 2010, north korea has rapidly increased the pace of its Nuclear Testing and of the intercontinental and Ballistic Missile launch vehicles. At the same time north korea has made explicit Nuclear Threats to the United States and our allies in the region. While it remains uncertain, the maligned activities and hegemonic aspirations in the middle east are not coming in contrast to these developments over the past decade, the united stateunitedstates has built no f weapons were Delivery Systems other than the 35 for the past two decades. We have instead sustained our Nuclear Deterrent with life Extension Programs keeping systems and platforms decades beyond their designed service life. Former secretary of Defense Ash Carter rightly observed that if there is an arms race under way, the United States is not a participant. It is clear that our attempt to lead by example in reducing the numbers and salience of Nuclear Weaponthe salience ofnuclear wed have not been reciprocated. Since 2010 for the prospect fora military confrontation have expanded while both china and russia have increased the number of their Nuclear Weapons programs. The intentional restraint in the policies did not leave the rest of the road t world to follow te path. This isnt a conclusion reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture review. The u. S. National Intelligence Council recognizes differences in the u. S. And russian approaches to Nuclear Weapons in 2012 that Nuclear Ambitions in the u. S. And russia over the last 20 years have evolved in opposite directions. Reducing the role of Nuclear Weapons in u. S. Security strategy is a u. S. Objective while russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of Nuclear Weapons in its security strate strategy. The 2018 npr response to this threat environment not by changing the tenets of the Nuclear Policy that have bipartisan support, but by emphasizing the maintenance of the capabilities needed to detour the war in the current environment. It also seeks to clarify the policies to help remove the potential for the mistaken calculation on the potential adversaries that limit the threats were escalation and provide them with any possible useful political or military advantage. Correcting such calculations is a key to maintaining the deterrent of nuclear war. In this regard i would like to address three of the corresponding outcomes of the 2018 npr. In the policy Committee Recommended supplements to the deterrent capabilities all of which have been subject to considerable news accounts in what i would consider to be a mischaracterization and much of the public commentary. First let me say the 2018 npr returns the Nuclear Attack against us, our allies and partners to the top priority of u. S. Nuclear policy. Given the security environment and the changes in the environment that ive highlighted, this is a prudent, realistic and i would argue necessary change to. Second, the nuclear and non Nuclear Attacks, the 2018 npr clarifies the u. S. Declaratory policy regarding Nuclear Weapons. Doing so does not expand the circumstances for nuclear use or lower the threshold as some commentators suggested. Rather, while maintaining the measure of ambiguity it provide some clarification. It would lead to the u. S. Consideration of a popular response. This clarification enhances deterrence in the raises the threshold by reducing the potential for adversary miscalculation. As potential long Nuclear Capabilities continue to become more and more lethal, the u. S. Policy must make clear non nuclear strategic attacks that would have catastrophic effects of the American People and our allies must also be deterred. Finally, in addition to prioritized and the deterrence, and adding some clarity to the extreme circumstances, the 2018 npr also recommends the programs to strengthen u. S. Capabilities to detour attacks and assure allies. First is the modification of the existing sub marine launch Ballistic Missiles to include a low yield option. Second is the pursuit of a Cruise Missile. Despite the capabilities of the existing Nuclear Triad, russia is actions indicate that moscow may hold the mistaken belief that its numerous and diverse nonstrategic arsenal provides useful options for limited first use Nuclear Threats or employment. We believe this to supplements represented in the npr are important to help protect the misconception and convince russia and any other potential letters. That the United States and its allies will not be coerced by the threat of limited Nuclear First use. The other point i would make is a meter of the capabilities is a new capability and the Ballistic Missiles and vaults relatively minor modification to an existing warhead. In addition, neither of the capabilities will require underground Nuclear Testing individual u. S. Treaty obligations. These capabilities are intended to strengthen the deterrence of the war and the assurance of allies, thereby helping to ensure that Nuclear Weapons are not employed or proliferated. The most recognized effective deterrence is about tailoring our capabilities to a potential adversaries calculation regarding the use of Nuclear Force to ensure that it can never appear to be a useful option. We must assess our capabilities relative to the doctrine, exercises, statements, threats and behavior of potential adversaries. The capabilities recommended by the 2018 our table to raise the use and to do so with minimal changes to the u. S. Nuclear posture. We believe the policy announced in the npr is a reasonable response to the changes in the current security environment. Now let me be clear, the goal of our recommendations into the goal of throle of the recognitis contained in the 2018 npr. Modernization of the Nuclear Deterrent option of the tailored Defense Strategies with flexible capabilities and clarification on the role of Nuclear Weapons all send a deterrent message to the adversaries while also reassuring our allies. Finally, the 2018 npr helps ensure that our diplomats speak. Russia has little incentive to negotiate seriously without a robust and ongoing modernization program. The russian leaders have said as much, and the secretary recently testified russia is unlikely to give up something to gain nothing. Criticcritics favorite eliminatg u. S. Systems in the face of an extensive u. S. Russia modernization effort are undermining americas greatest bargaining leverage and the prospects for the future arms agreements. The Nuclear Posture review is one of several important reinforcing National Security documents meant to guide the u. S. Policy in an increasingly complex and challenging world. Much as we might prefer otherwise, the u. S. Nuclear weapons are the bedrock of the american and allied security. Security. As colin gray has said, Nuclear Weapons are a regrettable necessity in the real world. After the slaughter of the two world wars, they have presented largescale cover power conflicr more than seven decades. In the competition from adversariesforadversaries, allie American People should know they have the will and the flexible resilient Nuclear Force is needed to protect the peace. Before turning things over to the Panel Discussion, let me take this opportunity to thank the brookings institutio institr the opportunity to come here today to briefly present the departments work and engage in a discussion on these issues that are tremendously vital to the nations security. I appreciate you being here and your attention and i look forward to your questions and site. Thank you all very much. [applause] questions, comments, suggestions. Recommendations . Yes sir. For escalating into the more conventional sized Nuclear Weapons . I dont think of it in terms of getting involved in an exchange. The way we look at this again is what we are trying to do is prevent in exchange for not engaging one and therefore it is incumbent upon us to think about how do we do that in the world has changed dramatically since the last was done and reflects developments by russia and other states that tend to suggest increased reliance on the possibility that Nuclear Weapons even in a limited way might have a degree of political or military utility so the recommendations we are proposing to include a low yield Ballistic Missile and a Nuclear ArmedCruise Missile are intended not to engage over box to fight a nuclear war or even suggest one could be thought anyway that is limited however one wants to define the term amid, but that is going to try to convince adversaries and to potential opponents that they should not feel that they have some exploited advantage by using the capability for which the United States has no counter. So, the very purpose of what youre doing is more preventio