Spee5 we are delighted to have you here as president of csi s it is a great opportunity to welcome back ernie when he was secretary was very active with us and we are very grateful as he would talk about oil and gas and Nuclear Energy and about Nuclear Weapons but now we are lucky to have him still staying active and of course he is the cochair my former bosses the cochair with him and i asked he wanted to make remarks he said hell no. [laughter] thanks for being here charlie. Part to be partners with us to raise the important issues of our day. Just a safety announcement for an emergency follow my instructions with the next it taking us down to the street then we will meet at National Geographic and then i will have hot chocolate. I didnt think we had a more qualified individual to be energy of secretary than ernie. If you could design someone who was perfect for the job he knew government, the private sector and has the honesty and objectivity of academia to reflect on government and private sector and brought enormous energy to the job. Those were the golden years for us and of course working through pretty sophisticated at the time. I hope we have an opportunity to hear about north korea and iraq that you will find this a fascinating afternoon. Ernie mo knees spee17. Thank you although i thought you said the emergency announcement is coming tomorrow that maybe we will touch on that later. I appreciate the chance to be back here at csi s as a respected organization and of course t2 has had close ties with them as an enormous leader in Nuclear Security but to have that privilege to partner with him and or with him with the Global Security threats which he founded in 2001. And sam made extraordinary source of wisdom. Since you mentioned brent scroll coughed he was one of the introducers for my nomination the great sway in the senate but we are great friends and i have the pleasure to roam around with brent scroll croft each week and also Charlie Curtis dragging himself out of retirement to help us with the first. So last month i had the pleasure of speaking at the university of chicago the 75th anniversary of the first controlled trade reaction Chain Reaction it was the precursor to the Manhattan Project which had started technically but his work was critical for the Manhattan Project. At that time he was already recognized at that time the dual nature of this technology that on one hand the potential that were quite different from other instruments of war of the technology with beneficial applications so this duality facing from the beginning it really draws from a Common Technology base challenging governments and international institutions. Focusing on this for four decades and committed to extending the outstanding work with the Broader National Security community now being judged only by those metrics Nuclear Energy provides one sixth the energy it saves countless lives to say we have enjoyed that peaceful usage while affording the use of a Nuclear Weapon since world war ii but with that said we have had too many close calls and Nuclear Weapons states have grown. So now today we are challenged by a different nuclear age. First i will be using this calculation throughout the speech as a broad blockage for accident one and terrorism in my view that is the most likely catalyst even though deterrence remains. Amount it is not enough. Second the sophistication of north korea Nuclear Weapon program cannot be denied. Their advocate both russia and United States threatening to use Nuclear Weapons and scenarios to deescalate making the rounds in moscow and then to expand the role of Nuclear Weapons that is central to prevent nonstrategic attacks in large scale aggression. 911 heralded the age of terrorism unconstrained and that capability is spreading including those areas with rivalries and conflicts it is a separate set of conditions Going Forward which calls for reexamining Strategic Policies to force the postures and we need to examine our response as well as the dangerous state of u. S. Russia relations. With those diplomatic challenges we shall have a version of these remarks i will start the conversation with five broad messages than a few remarks of the day on iran and north korea. First the combination of advances of technology and nations to challenge traditional thinking in the risk of Nuclear Weapons use the priorities of investments. To maintain a safe and secured it is not sufficient risks and miscalculations are at the forefront of our thinking as an important driver. Second to prevent nuclear use is the objective of the Nuclear Policy and specifically when that surfaces we need to assess the recommendations by considering they lessen those dangers to reduce the risk of nuclear use or not. We could beheaded in the wrong direction but expanding the types of threats under the banner of deterrence likely makes the risks of miscalculation greater, not less enhance deterrence have a high burden to explain why those options are insufficient. The president already has options for Nuclear Deterrent but by what logic should we stress more usable weapons against the backdrop of our capability that remains second to none is less likely they will be used . By which logic to we remain on a Nuclear Exchange . What about command and control to have confidence under those scenarios with a short decision time . Are we about to join those in russia who say we need to be prepared to escalate to deescalate what if the superpowers start down this road . These are the hardnosed questions to examine the npr. Third the United States and russia have a divergent interest the backing of the genocidal regime to increase tensions. The outcome of the investigation is also a factor but to remain convinced to resume a strategic relationship with russia next essential, interest Crisis Management and terrorist acquisition and more we did this at the height of the cold war and we must do it again to support this imperative to forge a bipartisan joint Congress Administration approach to secure those issues with russia know that the sanctions legislation puts into place congressional decisionmaking. We have specifically recommended a group of congressional state Department Leadership similar to the reagan administration. Fourth International AtomicEnergy Agency to safeguard the architecture it is doing a very good job to monitor iran compliance with the jc poa with the new verification tools indeed that is the heart of the jc poa and does not sunset over time we could consider involving the verification regime to a universal application and fifth we must make worldwide progress comprehensive commercially based fuel services with fuel supply and without this progress additional problem could present themselves in the future. So i will make a few comments on iran and north korea. Obviously we are on the precipice of a new crisis if the president refuses to approve the sanctions waivers and United States fails to meet its commitment under the deal. It puts a straitjacket on the activities with the jc poa misses the most important feature such as 15 year limitation of the tee11 where iran could have no more than 300 kilograms of uranium enriched. This is a very tight constraint. And then to cover every stage of their activities that is what is missed and deserves repeating the heart of the jc poa the International Verification provisions it is ironic iran has constraints on the Nuclear Program of any nation on the planet and the most demanding verification regime but the president could take action imminently to remove these with no alternative. Opponents are fixated on those provisions as they underplay or ignore the importance of the commitments that dont expire a permanent prohibition or the weaponization program through protocols with a time window to respond to inspection requests. And the requirement to ship all spent fuel for the reactor which was the heart of the plutonium pathway causing consternation. But yet 15 years is epsilon compared to the persian empire. That is a fact but it is manufactured. Fifteen years is a significant. In a political life of the country and iran demonstrates that with the protest that shine a light on the governments failure to serve the peoples needs. The nuclear deal was never meant to be the end of the road. We should be using this time to build on the agreement for the outcome with the Nuclear Constraints are lifted which we have done very little so far as we approach the twoyear mark of the implementation. European partners are stressing this and with that agreement in place we should be taking action of the proxies of the human rights record and other aspects of iranian policy without the complications of the nuclear issue. Keeping the spotlight on the failings of the iranian government and the countrys Economic Situation to turn up the heat with our regional friends and allies reinforces the failings of the recent protest. That needs to respond to more demands with the jc poa cannot be blamed with those economic shortcomings and we should not give leverage to those most extreme elements. And also draw lessons from the jc poa for broader fuel cycle considerations. Looking ahead we will confront more circumstances unless he can build enhancements globally to develop them from waste services. To make weapons capabilities easy to acquire and they should be strengthened. The slow but steady expansion of Nuclear Reactors internationally and the uncertainty surrounding the future of the u. S. Clear power make it more important than ever to identify and incentivize and implement that approach for Nuclear Security principles such an approach is economical with the spread of the enrichment capacity and irradiated fuel and ways from the stockpile of tony m. These must be backstopped with safeguards to take advantage of Technological Progress with the political and Financial Resources to back them up we are expanding substantially our efforts in this area to work with public and private partners so countries can have the benefits of these technologies without increasing proliferation dangers. The iaea bake is the foundational step in that direction as the commission concluded and reaffirmed a diminishing technology supplychain is a National Security concern to maintain nonproliferation and meeting our own National Security requirements. There is a big effort that is critical to reach the ultimate goals in the security arena. Finally on north korea while the threat is growing to alarm the rest of the world blurring the recognition Nuclear Weapons have disrupted the power of the most powerful conventional weapons i might just add to make a comparison, the Oklahoma City bomb was about 2 tons of tnt versus the four orders of magnitude from the world war ii bonds not to mention additional radiation issues. This cannot be talked about anything resembling the same way. But now kim jongil has taken that Diplomatic Initiative with pr gains participation in the upcoming winter olympics. We have been living with a Nuclear North Korea that could strike her since in the asianpacific region that threat has become more acute as korea has systematically advance the technology. We have to stop thinking as a provocation as a systematic and Successful Development of those technologies. There would be a significant benefit with a reduction of tensions to forgo any testing. But there is not a long time to capture the benefits. More likely than not it will require direct talks with the north koreans on the path to negotiation if there is an opening for such talks is not clear some believe the new years day claim of Nuclear Warheads and Ballistic Missiles have already been proven to open the door to a freeze on nuclear and longrange missile test we need to find a way to probe them on that point to exploit that if there is one. It is also imperative to focus on those steps of miscalculation including the risk of nuclear use but devastating forces on both sides of the 38th parallel. Or iran where it made sense to keep those negotiations confined to the Nuclear Program and with peon yang to address those issues for the talks to succeed United States and china must share a vision of those security arrangements to form the foundation of the Korean Peninsula to share a vision with beijing on consultations south korea and japan framework and key parties like russia. So with the Real Security concerns those are tough questions of reunification of the Korean Peninsula the future regional posture is a critical piece of the puzzle but sufficiently to encompass those disc is low discussions have taken place. There is no doubt the United States continues at that sponsor ability to set the right course that posture set in the coming days and weeks will determine the decisions on the dpr k for decades since the nonproliferation treaty both parties have reaffirmed the legal obligation to work with other Nuclear Weapon states to divest themselves over time. It is essential with the npr to back that up with concrete steps to achieve that goal. The best way to reduce and eliminate is to define then walk the path to eliminating Nuclear Weapons. When there is a lot of room for diplomacy. Thank you spee17. You have given us a lot of wonderful material to guide us. But you mentioned several times the Nuclear Posture review. I think the question largely is the development of micro Nuclear Weapons does that require us to build comparable weapons for the terrorist . What do you think about that . Let me repeat those four orders of magnitude because they have to be remembered it is still a Nuclear Weapon number one. And i think the test is i dont know what is in the npr but if there is something in that direction then i hope using sufficient analysis as to why this contributes to stability or reduces the possibility of use, i have not seen that argument made convincingly. We have a deterrent there are many ways to reposition my answer is i am open to hearing what i have not yet heard to convince me that is a viable path. Traditionally we said we dont want to build a warhead but what happens if we think our opponent is building a warhead . So we need to see that proposal. It has to be made very clear a deterrent against the use of any Nuclear Weapon from our allies. My failings may be did not appreciate this before but that verification agreement is eternal. That is interesting could you amplify on that . Certainly there is a layered set of verification measures that are completely unique to iran. So in the negotiation at least when the head of their Nuclear Program and i were brought in that early on we had to establish whether or not the International Community has a high distrust of the program. The facts on the ground tell you that. The fact that u. S. And russia post ukraine tell you that. So right up front it was clear there would need to be extraordinary verification measures for any agreement. So 20 years of surveillance of centrifuge parts in 25 years of uranium supply chain verification but i ran commits to the Additional Protocols that is what gives the iaea the opportunity to inspect the Nuclear Sites of which they have to be suspicious that is a voluntary agreement but iran is required to be in the protocol forever but there is more. With that Additional Protocol as exercised now, there is no time limit if they say the facility which could be military gives us cause then we have reasons. Great. There is no time limit for when access is granted. In the iran agreement there is a 14 day period in which i ran in the iaea must work out the terms of access if they cannot reach those days then ten more days for the access to happen or they are in violation. This is a very, very powerful constraint and almost never injured in discussions so imagine that is the type of constraint we would give up to unilaterally walk away from this agreement while i ran complies. So if we do walk away what do the other p