[inaudible conversations] good morning, everyone, welcome to Carnegie Endowment for international peace. I think ive known just about everyone in the room one way or another and ill keep the introductions short. I handle the program here and its my opportunity on behalf of carnegie today to host a pair of panels that includes some of the people i admire the most in the field of contemporary china studies. We at carnegie and i think throughout the chinawatching community have had tremendous admiration for the leadership and the protection of the china leadership monitor, which is organized by professor alice miller at the Hoover Institution at stanford university. They have established a terrific record for hearing the facts as opposed to trends, feelings, things like that. So, whenever you want to touch base with reality i like to go online to the china leadership monitor and do precisely there. Today well give you a sample of writings in form of presentations working ahead in the 19th Party Congress in a very short time from now. We have today two panels, the first one 0 will be people you see here, ill moderate. Michael flynn and allen romberg have been regular contributors to the china leadership monitor as well as making many other contributions in the field and theyll speak for the first period until 10 45. James was here a moment ago, but has been called away by a family emergency and had to leave so he will not be here this morning. You can find his writings in the china leadership monitor and were sorry he cant be with us and wish him well and all hes having to manage this morning. The oh, i wanted to mention, as you look around the room you may see no one here actively working for the brookings institution. Thats not a protest. Theyve been called off to a mandatory retreat and would love to be here with us as well. So, in case youre looking for somebody you dont see, its one of those things that happen. Id like to get started, and the order we have is for you to speak first, michael. And then to alan. Thanks very much, doug. Thats a pleasure to be part of this effort. I have been writing for the china leadership monitor now for, i dont know, alan, how long . Quite a few years. How many . 172 years. [laughter] sometimes it seems like that. No, and yes, its a tough job. You know, its a very demanding schedule. The deadlines are really harsh and, but its been a pleasure writing and my topic has been Foreign Policy and i have usually focused on trying to sort of dig deep in chinese views in the open media on Foreign Policy issues distinguishing between authoritative and nonaauthortative. And they ignore what the government says in an active authortative way as if they represent all chinese viewers. They do in some sense, but what id like to speak about what i think will be the Foreign Policy themes, continuities and changes and issues in Foreign Policy that we might see at the Party Congress coming up later this month. Now, Party Congresses are usually not occasions for getting into the details of Foreign Policy. Most people will focus on them and well see that today for implication for leadership changes and Broad National policy direction, but they do say some things about Foreign Policy, and some very important things. So what ive done is ive taken a look at the 17th and 18th Party Congress and developments since the last, the 18th Party Congress in 2012. So ill make some comments on the three general areas that these Party Congressing usually cover in terms of Foreign Policy. The first is general statements on the Global Environment that have an impact on Foreign Policy and these are programmatic statements about the external environment and the world and obviously its implications for china. And here, i think the Party Congress will continue to stress the development toward a generally Stable International environment, and the concept of peace and development as whats called the underlying trend of the times. I think well see thats been highlighted in past Party Congress statements and i think well see this again or something similar to it, but this has always been paired with more negative concerns about the International Environment and those in the past have involved whats been called code word primarily for the United States and power politics, local conflicts, hot spot issues that keep emerging, imbalances in the World Economy, which may be worsening, and then, of course, traditional and nontraditional security threats. I think youll see reference to these kinds of factors as well in the Party Congress statement. Now, theres always been a reference in the past in the 18th Party Congress something called neointerventionism. And thats to intervene without having the united nations. And this was prompted really, or at least highlighted in the 18th Party Congress and came out as a result of events in libya and syria at the time with intervention there by outside powers. Now, this concept interventionism might not be as prominent in this Party Congress because you havent had as many new examples of this that occurred since the last Party Congress unless you talk about the possibility, the fear of a u. S. Led military intervention in north korea. I doubt that that would be likely to be mentioned or the neo interventionism because it occurred after a development, but its possible, i suppose. Now, in addition to those concerns that weve seen before, both positive and negative. I think the Party Congress would highlight more recent potential threats to what it sees as peace and growing stability, growth in the system. And that will be this idea of growing imbalances, in Economic Development and more importantly, whats seen as a troubling backlash against greater Global Economic intervention and this is a theme that has been struck by chinese leaders in recent year or so that has become increasingly prominent. And beijing in this respect will likely present itself as a strong opponent of a trend toward protectionism and a proponent of greater economic integration and free trade, which had become, as i say, a theme since the election of donald trump, and the rise of similar, what you might call me first nationalism or nationalisms in europe and just to sort of highlight this, last month the foreign minister said we live in a world thats witnessing profound changes in the International Landscape. Prominent traditional and nontraditional threat, Global Growth and a growing backlash against globalization. Theres mankind pursuit of longstanding peace and development. I wouldnt be surprised if a Statement Like this appears in the Party Congress statement. The second area, getting more to the issue of chinese policies, in other words, how does china deal with this environment. I think you will see, again, in the Party Congress, a central focus in all realms on pursuing following through the socalled double objectives for china as we probably all know in this room, a moderately Prosecutor Press society in 2021. And the 16th Party Congress in 2002, reaffirmed in a report to the 17th Party Congress in 2007 and reaffirmed yet again in 2012. The second is the construction of a strong democratic civilized hash harmonious. So these continue to be basic statements about chinese objectives, but i think these will be, as they have been within recent years, couched within the china dream, which is xi jinpings rej rejufiniization. And in terms of general characterization of chinas specific foreign policies in the 19th Party Congress, youll here hear the usual bromide, holding high the banner of peace, cooperation, mutual benefit, independent Foreign Policy of peace, following a winwin strategy for countries opening up sustainable balanced growth, et cetera, et cetera. I think youll hear repetition of new types of power relations. Some thought that these two slogans, have been deemphasized somewhat in chinese leaders statements. And i doubt, however, that they will be lacking from the Party Congress statement because i think they still are a major element of chinas view towards dealing with the United States, and dealing with developing countries, particularly neighboring developing countries and i also think that perhaps most notably, the 19th Party Congress will repeat the past 17th and 18th party statements of china need to, quote, firmly uphold chinas territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests and national unity. This, of course, refers to its disputes with its neighbors around its periphery in the maritime area that have become more direct in recent years and again, from a recent speech in this case by state counsel in july on this issue, where he stated that china must unequivocally make clear its position on taiwan, the South China Sea and other issues concerning chinas mainly core interest, we have drawn a clear line of what is acceptable and acted forcefully to defend our core interest as well as our legitimate rights, unquote. So the emphasis on this issue remains, and i think very much it will be reflected in the Party Congress statement. It reflects the larger emphasis by the xi jinping regime which began under the advancement of peace and stability alongside chinas rights. Using chinas greater influence to advance those interests. At the same time, i think there will be efforts emphasized both lateral diplomacy in the recent Party Congress and the idea about reforming global government which has also been a theme in past Party Congress meetings. In the defense and security realms in particular, i think youll probably hear the phrase, which was again, which was made after the Party Congress on the search for a common comprehensive cooperative and sustainable security. In this regard, you might hear the for the first time the actual placement of the Party Congress statements of the three principles for dealing with hot spot issues and these were announced mentioned in 2015 and they include adherence to noninterference in internal affairs and opposition on the practice of imposing solutions on others. In chinese Foreign Policy, upholding fairness and justice of the pursuit of ones own interest, which is kind of a dig, it seems to me at the Trump Administration, even though it predates that administration and that political settlements and opposition to the use of force. Now, i think regarding military policies in particular the 19th Party Congress will probably reiterate the 18th congress about Chinese Military, military modernization where it said a Strong National defense and powerful armed forces are needed that are commensurate with chinas International Standing and meet the needs of its Security Development interest and that the Chinese Military takes a more active role in political and security fields. This idea of chinas greater more mo moretory, and cyberspace security which has occurred in past Party Congress. The reference to cyberspace was unprecedented in the 18th Congress Work report and also space in the context of security. Of course, i think there will be a reputation of the concept, the objective that china should continue to build itself into a maritime power. Finally, although no details are provided in Party Congress statements, it might offer individual references to specific policy initiatives associated with these objectives. And one road, i think, for sure will appear. The improving relationship with he periphery countries which was a major theme since the convening of the 18th Party Congress could well affair again. Increasing chinas increasing involvement in a range of multilateral events that china will host and organize for votes and government issues, get a reference there. The new type of power relations before in relation to the United States. An interesting question is whether or not it will mention chinarussian relations and the improvement in china and russians relations and crisis in particular. Im not sure about either of those, chinarussia relations have barely been mentioned in Party Congress in the past. They might be mentioned. The dprk Nuclear Crisis in particular are somewhat doubtful unless its placed in the context of these hot spot statements that i said before. And that case, what i see are probably a lot of continuities with some greater emphasis to globalization, et cetera, and free trade, open markets, nonprotectionism. But the real question in northern and defense is not so much what themes in the policy will be struck in the 19th Party Congress and the following National Peoples congress in the spinning of 2018, but whether a stronger, more come nant dominant xi jinping, or more confrontational china on maritime disputes, u. S. , and possibly north korea. I dont subscribe to the view that xi jinping is primarily an autocrat with pushing the u. S. Out of ray shah, as some think. Yes, he wants china to be more effectively using its growing presence and influence internationally to promote its National Development and security interest as ive said, but xi jinping and the china leadership recognize the imperative for china to maintain relatively positive cooperative relations with the u. S. And the west. Like it or not, china is integrating into the Global Economy and the global regimes, and highly averse to major shifts in the regional or global order that is threatened, such as confrontation with the u. S. Xi jinping and the chinese leadership have yet to make a stable transition to a new normal of lower, but higher beneficial growth rates and equitable positions. And china must carry through major Structural Reforms that demand a continued focus on domestic environment for years to come. It would be exceedingly foolish, in my view, for china under xi jinping have that posture after that 19th congress. And and over time, i think this is probably likely. As argued elsewhere. This will require, in my view, new approaches to Regional Security and more extensive cbms than what weve seen hopefully leading to a balance of power eventually across the region. U. S. Policy needs a strategy to deal with this changing situation and we havent seen one yet. I hope one emerges in the not too distant future. Thank you very much. Thank you, michael. I guess ive got an early test of propositions enumerated for when President Trump and his entourage arrive in beijing shortly after the Party Congress. A lot involves whether there will be more aggressive, a less aggressive phase of the communist party under xi jinping, and fortified leadership going forward. This audience will have lots of good questions and challenges shortly. Next were going to turn to alan romberg. Hes written the bible on contemporary u. S. Taiwan relations, and chapter and verse, what happens with its relations with the u. S. And others as well. I recommend released yet . Youre in the process of editing. And ott the brink of the precipice, and look in granular detail in whats going on in taiwans relations with the west and today, its our privilege and honor to have alan here to tell us some more. Thanks very much, doug. It is my privilege and honor to be here. I think that the as michael indicated, dr. Alice millers leadership. I think weve been able to do some useful things through the chinese monitor. Its through my updating, things as i see them. As far as the Party Congress is concerned, despite all of the issues which michael very astutely identified, the congress is going to be overwhelmingly, in my view, focused on domestic issues, both political as wel