Turkish, syrian border. These forms are essentially isis recordkeeping of foreign fighter, new foreign fighter joiners. Have bright of questions that include name, even mothers name, blood type but also include a lot of really interesting material on previous professions, education levels, religious knowledge, countries travel, people referred them to join isis, people who facilitated their arrival and a variety of other things. Thats the main data from which will be drawing conclusions to be there i get to the limitations of that date in a minute but i would just say the data were smuggled out of raqqa in march of 2016. We validated these data along with the Counterterrorism Center at west point, as well as some of the personal details that were not publicly available to my research and research from others. So last year we wrote a paper on this topic that looked at the regions in the world that had the highest per capita recruitment rate for isis all over the world, included western china, it included of course parts of north africa and the Arabian Peninsula we are looking at, in lebanon and in other places. The difference in this years report is not just that were focusing on two regions which saw some of the highest recruitment rates of foreign fighters to isis, including libya and tunisia which david will talk about but also saudi arabia. But also we try to supplement the data on foreign fighter registration forms with other useful information. So we use census data in a variety of cases is that okay, if fighters are joining isis and saudi arabia are reporting certain education level are certain level of work profession or skill, how does that correlate to the places they are from among the general population, are these representative of these people from the provinces they come from or is this a distinct phenomena we should look at . We look at census data. David did some interesting work look at protest data especially tunisia. I pulled in some data from 1980s onward on subnational origins of saudi terrorists, and im going to use some of that in my analysis. To incorporate a lot of this additional data. Let me say a few brief words about some of the caveats so we can frame our discussion and so are remarks at some context. The first is time. These fighters joint base hickam between 20132014. The landscape obviously looks a lot different today as the coalition is pushing back isis in syria and iraq. As i spoke to a friend, most people from the Arabian Peninsula basically left already and the foreign fighter rates decreased dramatically after 2015 when the saudi government especially started cracking down on isis attack stored to occur across Arabian Peninsula in kuwait and in saudi and in other places. This is also limited by location. The forefront of forms are recorded on border crossings between syria and turkey while of course as it although turkey was a huge Transit Route for fighters to joint isis. Of course there were other parts in iraq, lebanon, jordan were people able to join. We dont think they systematically alter the result of a region but it would manifest in other places so lebanese fighters, jordanian fighters, iraqi fighters, syrian fighters are not recorded in the data. A couple quick more points. Theres a point on the truthfulness i think we think the data are going to be more likely to be true than if fighters were being interviewed by journalists or researchers. Some of this information could be validated by isis of course, people who referred or people who facilitated one joining, but there are certainly elements that were omitted in these files and we had to work around that. We can talk more about that if youre interested in the q a. The last couple of points, this is only isis foreign fighter recruitment. Crucially whats missing is foreign fighter recruitment to other militias that were fighting especially in syria including what was wholly known as alnusra and i go into low bit about that in the Arabian Peninsula section. Just to conclude, last year we found provinces with high rates of equipment, all shared in common a certain kind of grievance they had with the federal government. The repressed regions of western china, generally underfunded and unsupported regions Like Northern lebanon and my colleague will talk about Eastern Libya, but this year will be found and im sort of paraphrasing tolstoy here, is that all happy provinces are alike, but all unhappy provinces are unhappy in their own way. We will swear to discuss i think what is important in the key take away which is while there is no consensus among experts on terrorism about what is a driving terrorism recruitment, i think when you look at the subnational regions of different countries, certain trends emerge and these trends are important and their distinct and we need to address them in different ways. So with that being said im going to pass it over to my colleague, david. Thanks. So im going to speak about what we found in north africa, or initial key finding which will be expanded further and forthcoming paper. But basically our analysis of north africa involved three broad conclusions. There was recruitment and provinces that shared huge structural aspects in common that are economically marginalized from the center of their countries economic, their countries economy where most of the good jobs are, where oil wealth is centered. And also the march politically, often the two go together, they are one and the same. Second, we found in most places this is the mobilization that comecome from places where thers mobilization in prior years for other Jobs Movement as well as for other nonjihadi outbreaks of anger over what appear to be structural issues. Best recruitment and mobilization which isis is the latest or perhaps now not the latest example of is predated by these other mobilizations. And finally where mobilization occurred, where its not a product of a long history of mobilization and outbursts of anger, whether jihadists or not, its a product of the arab spring which really was a massive outbreak of this anger and spread that anger throughout the region in a way that metastasized the problem. So to begin with it we look at the question of structural aspects, ill begin with what we found in libya, by far the clearest example, 80 of the fighters from libya came from Eastern Libya and they were all centered in two provinces. Eastern libya has a stoically been marginalized by the then gadhafi government which centered its Patronage Network largely across the country and funded tripoli in that area while simultaneously economically marginalizing the east. In particular it marginalized the area where we found amongst the fighters were looked at there were some deeper sense of under politics of people were underemployed, and our models people who are unemployed, people who report subsistent agricultural work, not i on the farm, but im doing agricultural work. People lower students in these north african countries, students face a particularly for Employment Situation upon graduation. In tunisia, for example, on average it takes six years to find a job. Also people report unskilled labor which is often unpredictable in these north african countries. We found it was 70 . We found a similar dynamic in southern tunisia which is another hot spot of equipment. And in the second highest capital, theres also 70 unemployment among fighters. And then in the suburbs of grand tennis we found a similar level of under plymouth and economic struggle which is important to know because its the capital of tunisia, its what a lot of the factory jobs and economic wealth is actually centered and if youre just running a large and aggression provinces, youre likely to miss that theres a massive internal inequality within these provinces. We found the fighters tend to be, supporters of the region. It was two to four times overproducing what we would have expected based on population. That neighborhood or city within the larger grand tunis metropolitan areas has an Unemployment Rate above that of the nation as a whole. As well as above the particular province that it sits in. Its an opponent rate was actually below tunisia as well. What we see is theres these hotspots of economic marginalization. That comes with political marginalization as well, the hotspot of protest activity during the arab spring. East of libya has a stoically bent aside of resistance at protests against the gadhafi government and militancy more broadly. And southern tunisia also has a history of pension with the Central Government of tunisia. So we found similarity of the structure. The second part is in each of these places theres a long history. In Eastern Libya its very clear. We can trace it back on isis mobilization were looking at in 20132014. Benghazi was the capital of the arab spring uprising against gadhafi and produce many fighters for that. If we go back to the records that were found in 2007 you get almost exactly the same percentage of fighters in that mobilization as were fighting in the isis records for 20132014. In 2008, the state department added cable, the report similar conditions and words of fighter equipment. In terms very similar to that are applicable to the 20132014. If you go back further to the 90s, you have the Islamic Fighting group conducting war against gadhafi a gain in uprising, again centered in the east, and then if you go for the back in the 70s and 80s, this region was really at the center of the Muslim Brotherhood opposition to gadhafi. So this civilization in Eastern Libya predates the particular isis claim to be building the caliphate. If we turn to tunisia, its a lot different. Its more widespread. However, we again see as i noted hotspots in southern libya, or southern tunisia, sorry, particularly has historical produced fighters in the early iraq conflict and other conflicts before, as the economy based on smuggling was the center of protest activity during the arab spring. And we have suburbs of grand tunis which again were sent a protest activity during the arab spring. That also proved to many of fighters before. In tunisia, there was a massive expansion that may have some aspect to do with the particular ideological pitch. But we are also just sitting fighters come from areas that are produced outbursts of anger for decades, largely due to the structural factors. Finally, as i noted when reduce the expansion, its largely about the arab spring. This was pretty clear in tunisia where the government felt a result of arab spring protests that were particularly high in the areas that were hotspots. In contrast, along the eastern coast of libya and its economic center, where fighters actually gain below the national rate, there were about a third as many protesters per capita as the were in grand tunis. In addition, we see on an individual level when you look at the data, about 7. 5 of the fighters who mobilized from tunisia were recommended by one figure who came out of shariabased himself in western libya where he was running a Training Camp. Thats again an example of how these dynamic arab spring really created the foundation that isis itself set itself to the top. So the basic conclusion that i will float for you here that were still looking at, is in many ways the counter messaging and the idea of countering violent extremism that is become a very important part of countering isis recruitment, doesnt make sense in much of north africa. Countering isis claim to be building the caliphate does not address the problems where there was recruitment for decades prior to isis rise. That some element in tunisia which also going to run into this repetitive mobilization of the anger areas that are being produced by structural factors. So we really to the extent where going to prevent the future possibility of a mobilization, as i could happen simply on counter messaging. Needs to address the structural issues. Thanks, david. In contrast i think the Arabian Peninsula has a variety of very distinct trends that are want to present today. Before i go into the three arguments i want to make on isis recruitment in the Arabian Peninsula i just want to note there are few countries where there simply were not in a foreign fighters data in the forms to draw any conclusions from, so automatic, the uae has less than five fighters in each one of this country and the overall data. My findings dont discuss the report will not discuss those three countries. Some supplementary information and qualitative work was done on recruitment in those three countries and we can discuss those in the q a but i generally want to focus on saudi arabia which had about 90 of the fighters that republican from the area as well as kuwait, yemen and bahrain. That is very interesting trend with regards to marginalization and im going to discuss those three and give what they think the policy educations of those are. The first of those is a new phenomenon. There are a few periods i want to make under this. The first is that we know isis has recruited a lot of young people to join especially in pairs into other terrorist organizations and document efforts but the Arabian Peninsula is distinctly more useful than the rest of the sample of isis equipments. The average age of isis biter from the Arabian Peninsula is over one year younger than the overall sample. When you dig deeply into this for i should say it is distinct from the demographic trends of the regions as a whole which generally you hold older than the arab world. When you dig more deeply into this you find that the regions with the highest rate of isis recruitment at the subnational level correlates very strongly with the proportion of those regions that have youthful populations. The youngest population as a proportion of 15 thirtynine over the provincial publication. The youngest ones are those that have the highest agreement and i did a bunch of progression to figure out which transfer most interesting about the overall provincial population, household income, for people being recorded, education levels was it under or over educated and the variety of other factors. The only factor that had a strong significant statistically significant positive correlation was the proportion of provincial population that was the ages of 1529. The second piece of this phenomenon that is new and important to emphasize is that the fighters they came from the Arabian Peninsula were much less likely to have reported to participate in a previous contract. The question on the form is have you participated in a previous jihad. About 12 of the overall sample of fighters that we looked at reported yes. So, places like libya, yemen, afghanistan, chechnya, bosnia and other places. In the Arabian Peninsula only 5 of the fighters reported to have participated in previous jihad. When you look at the correlation between provinces that were report there is no relationship people who participate previously in the jihad people who joined isis. All of this is strongly suggestive of the fact that the phenomenon on the Arabian Peninsula and the people who joined isis were new to fighting in complex and new to affiliations of the hottie organizations as a whole and when interviewing people they also would admit that this is very new and the two places where this is most acute was in bahrain and saudi arabia. Bahrain and saudis would say the places, the subnational origin of fighters in these countries were places that were new. Im going to discuss a little about the saudi case in a little bit. What is also interesting is where they are not coming from and the best example in the Arabian Peninsula is yemen. In the yemen isis foreign fighter sample from 2013 to 2014 only 26 fighters were at the national level, about 35 fighters from yemen as a whole. When you compare that to rates that were in the during the iraq war or people who were detained in one time and open yemen the rates are significantly higher. In the isis foreign fighter sample you have about 30 yemenis out of 3581 total fighters recorded. In the content ulowercaseletter had 110 yemenis being detained out of 770. Four times more yemenis being involved in a sample that is four times smaller. Nothing is happening here tonight prostitute why that is in the q a. All of this suggest the phenomenon is new and i think from a policy perspective need to seriously think about the efforts of the region undertaking the radicalization, not just arresting people who are perpetrating terrorist acts but more importantly figuring out ways to prevent future waves of mobilizations to occur. The second thing i will say is that it appears that not only do these countries have different motivations than north africa but theyre different from each other. The two cases i want to focus on here are bahrain and saudi arabia. Last years paper we talked about the mobilization of fighters from bahrain. I will say briefly that in 2011 there was a major arab demonstration in bahrain and the bahraini crackdown requires the use in sanctioning of very violent rhetoric against the majority population of the country which is shiite by the government which is a minority of the population which is to be. I think the mobilization of communities in bahrain that we see where fighters are coming from was encouraged by the government and cut down the file and a lot of those guys ended up joining isis. We talk more about this phenomenon in the question and answer but i want to get to an interesting case which is saudi arabia. The handout you have in the back of map at the bottom of three different maps saudi arabia. When i looked at their equipment is saudi arabia i looked at the historical rates of equipment and where were saudi fighters coming from went to afghanistan or iraq or when they went to bosnia or chechnya. I looked at three different subsets and the place where they were coming from were completely different than the places where saudi foreigners were coming from isis. Previously the fighters that were joining primarily Al Qaeda Affiliated conflicts from mecca, medina but this time around fighters are coming from the heartland of saudi arabia. This is an area where