Members and guests appear and guests. Tonight i have the honor of introducing a friend an academic colleague who also happens to be a bestselling author, columnist, speaker, commentator and senior Level Management strategist peter guest speaker has worked with president s and popes from here at home to south asia to iraq. For more than 20 years, our speaker has provided strategic and crisis communication counsel to companies, policy organizations, government agencies, not for profits, advocacy campaigns and grassroots groups. He served in many roles including executive director of Republican Party in new york date, adviser to the u. S. Chief of protocol at the vatican, planner for the department of state visits for former president bush and clinton to this tsunami ravaged south asia and director of communications for the Environmental Protection agency. Our speaker is currently an adjunct professor at the University Graduate school of arts and sciences. A charter member of the board of advisors at Hofstra College of liberal rights and sciences and opinion contributor to forbes and the host is sunday in america unserious xm radio. For seven months in 2004, he served as the Senior Press Advisor to the Coalition Provisional authority in iraq. Were at the department of defense from the joint Civil Service commendation. His experiences and his gene during a sevenmonth form the basis of this book, tough sell fighting the media war in iraq. Please help me give a warm welcome to bestselling author tom basile. [applause] thank you very much. I really appreciate the warm introduction. This is a wonderful turnout and im honored to be here with all of you given the state of new york citys subways and train i said i dont know if anyone will be able to make it tonight, but weve got a great room and again it is a great privilege. As you know, ron is a pretty quiet guy, very modest. But for those of you who dont know, and he has some of the most complex facing new york during his career particularly and is a great Public Servant and truly committed to keeping the city safe. Thank you for everything that you do. [applause] and i would just like to take a minute if all of our veterans and those who served in the United States armed forces would just stand and be recognized. [applause] thank you very much for your service to the country. It would be remiss at this point if i did not also think ambassador john bolton to the United Nations who honored me with a wonderful foreword for the book and id really appreciate his support for the book and for this Important Message. It is a great privilege to be here at this wonderful institutions. 15 president s have been members of this memorable institution since its founding in 1863. Members have played an Important Role in the National Discourse on a wide range of issues and they also managed to construct the statue of liberty, metropolitan museum of art. Its a great privilege to be here and it is fitting that we are in this historic room to talk about tough sell fighting the media war in iraq because this book is about history. How we make history and how that history is shaped and perceived not only by ordinary people, but by people who have the Great Fortune in many respects of being thrust into extraordinary circumstances on behalf of our country. But also increasingly the business of journalism, technology and politics. How we perceive the iraq war today was shaped by all of those things at a time in history when we are seeking several profound shift in the way people view the media, government and war itself. The most common question that i get is why do you write it . Why did you put it out . First, the shifts that may mention in the government ability or inability to counter them has ensured that the great work of thousands of americans who went over to iraq, who sacrificed much and took great risks to help create a Better Future for that country in many respects have all been lost to history. Second, if policy makers in todays day and age did not effectively articulate policy, and manage their message and counter the editorial filter, they will soon find themselves unable to execute and sustain them. In the case of our National Security policy in my opinion that faces america and the rest of the world at great risk. Certainly what was lost in the walltowall Media Coverage of the worst of the war was the very best of people. The real story about what happens during the critical first year after the fall of Saddam Hussein gives us a glimpse into the glory and imperfection of humanity as well as the very real evil that exists in the world in the face of god that can be seen even in our darkest moments. Third, over these last number of years, and ive watched as they have been lambasted by the media, socalled opinion leaders and politicians on both sides of the aisle in my view very unfairly. The civilian story and the story about civilian coalition in that first year has largely never been a great focus of attention. Would have been behind the in the palace has really been discussed. My perspective is a civilian bush appointee being thrust into the middle of the site for the peace in the fight to communicate about the war is willing to work with so many hundreds of my colleagues at this time. After all, here is in uniform are you the folks who participated in the iraq mission. Civilians inheres often like. Their uniforms convictions and it is my hope that by fairly evaluating the successes and the failures of the iraq mission, history would ultimately record the unbending purposive Many Coalition civilian is a triumph of american spirit and sacrifice. The book is chronological and its also very personal compass that tells the story from the day i got my phone call sitting in my office on pennsylvania avenue and 10 days later sitting on my luggage and 130degree heat awaiting the c130 to go windbag had for some indeterminate amount of time in a made up the fact i would only be gone for a fourmonth increments make them like this to be an okay supporter. But it is very personal and i thought about writing a street policy book about Public Diplomacy, how you communicate about war in the age of 24 hour news, social media, but it just seemed too impersonal, and almost seemed inappropriate given the work that was done. They were all so personally in what we were doing and the environment for so many of us do not inject in a heavy dose of what it was like for me personally and going through that experience. I also wanted the book in audiences so i write it in such a way that it told the story is chronological and very conversational. So there are plenty of stories when you read the book there are plenty of stories about this guy who with no training on 10 days notice from himself and died died with no flak last to know weapons training, trying to craft a message from middle eastern and western media about the works that thousands of americans were doing to rebuild the country in the opposite of the bombed out buildings and increasingly dangerous environment. We talk about the brightly clad children running in the dirt like so many, being told by special forces a member of our special forces to remember to roll down the car window throwing out the grenade. Middleage contractors dancing in the infamous disco, the children and the victims of the attacks. The women draped in black as they are clutching the picture is some of their family, dealing with the bad, dealing with rocket attacks, feeling real fear and of course seeing glimpses of hope. Those are all part of the experience. But in the pages is also a running commentary and for the first time the analysis of not just the news media. This is not just about the beefs up on the bias but the political institutional and philosophical challenges that hampered the ability to deliver a more balanced, more realistic view of what was really going on in iraq against the demands of the business of journalism and genuine media bias. Fighting are in our time of social media and fake news, cable wars and the president at war with the press in a press at war with the president. The indisputable truth in all this of course is that the government still has to make policy. Our communications change. Technology changes, the way that we talk to each other, the way that are influencers try to influence policy all changes. At the end of the day, the government still has to make that policy executed and sustained and that requires public support. But we experienced in iraq was in hiroshima bats support because of a failure to effectively fight and win the homefront war in the price. Policymaking is now more than ever about our willingness to push back, to participate in the daily block and tackle on every media, not just whether against the business of journalism and an increasing number of sources of eerie degrees of credibility. When we do this analysis, what we learn that iraq was really a war within a war within a war. What we witnessed in the rise of al qaeda and decisionmaking at the United States in the aftermath of 9 11 was a departure from the usual warmaking. As it relates to way they handled their diplomatic strategy to account for this. The administration of george w. Bush was the first such administration to have to deal with this paradigm shift. The challenges were philosophical, operational and compounded by this body and mind share at home. Attention they just have so made it even tougher. There is the philosophical war with a great deal of time over the last number of years debating whether or not we should have gone into iraq. The more relevant conversation for all of us and our country moving forward remains one should make the decision to go to war, what is the purpose for the desired outcome and how do you get there . You have several choices in the case of iraq. You could remove Saddam Hussein and leave, which i believe wouldve been a false choice. Do you believe the leadership and grabs an expatriate in you and expose of absolute authority, basically trading one dictator for another or three come you attempt to secure the country that would support not what some people have suggested some americanstyle democracy, but a more participatory tolerate governing search. The Coalition Provisional authority in iraq was developed to execute the third option. They tackle this extraordinary task with sacrificing much going largely unnoticed as the security situation worsens due to the rise of al qaeda in iraq in sectarian violence. Unfortunately, a government that has the mission went on often failed to aggressively defend its own policy. The issue of competing philosophies was apparent virtually every day. Secretary rumsfeld with this vision of a hightech military, which is fine, but that happened to be incompatible with the mission we had at the time and the Civil Affairs operation that needed to be done at the same time. My first day in iraq i got off the plane and put him a helmet. I got on the bus and they said by the way, the road between that International Airport in the palaces clothes because there have been too many ied attacks on it. I said great, this is exactly what i want to see. They called it the road of death and it wasnt the original name, but it got the point across that we had a problem even secure the road between the airport and where headquarters were. One of the ambassadors first conversation in the book was posing the ominous but astute question how do we get the u. S. Military to start shooting the looters . Because we needed to demonstrate that we were going to use force in order to ensure the country would be secure and restore some sense of lawful behavior. You also clearly had philosophical differences between the military and the state department whose Foreign Service officers while they clearly have their own important priorities often didnt play well in the sandbox with the folks from the department of defense and certainly also the Bush Administration appointees from the white house. There was an operational bureaucratic wars well. The cpa is a unique combination of the department of defense, department of state, nsc, white house, cia, intelligence agencies all operating under our feet at all times. It is a textbook lesson in building in a very short amount of time a bureaucracy. By the way, no one is really done this before. This impacted what i did everyday because part of being able to craft a coherent and credible Outbound Communications strategy requires for planning purposes you have good internal communication as well. Let me give you an example. The establishment of Iraqi Security forces is one of the most important thing is we tried to do during that first year. The price were rightly interested in our progress. They obsessed over it. Of course they didnt understand or seem interested in the complexities of trying to put cops on the street and build an army and build these very Security Forces. But getting the facts from the different operations was so difficult that in one week the secretary of defense and ambassador were all going on tv using different numbers. You have to have message consistency or damage your credibility. The military also didnt have a tight rein on its people. I was shocked one day to learn that it was military it was the military policy that if the soldier got asked a question, as a member of the press they could answer it, which proposed a very significant problem when you see a field commander doing an interview on tv and they are giving incomplete information. Young enlisted soldiers for a particular object them of the press who love to ask questions about dungeness home . Dont you wish you were back with your family . Be pretty disgraceful on the media, that they wanted to get these guys to say of course they missed home. When the soldier stops missing hallman stops complaining about conditions, you know you may have a problem on your hands. Theyre supposed to do that. Nobody wants to be in the desert. We were all there to put ourselves out of a job. And then of course you have the report themselves who have long decided the administration and the military really have no credibility so they crafted the story they wanted with regard to the facts of the sources. Organizations also compete for resources and ownership. Im sure you see this in your organizations and businesses every day. We doubt but that position in iraq and it definitely impacted our ability to communicate about the war. Having the credibility to say i was there in all it with my own eyes was critical to being able to deliver the message back in the states in that very rarely happened. 2003 come in 2004 worked on developing a national surrogate operation in a hometown media project that looked soldiers and civilians both here and goes overseas on local television and radio stations around the countrys smaller markets to try and get the message out about what they experienced about their commitment to the mission of what was actually going on. We even used the military production attachment in the country to shoot footage of these folks doing their jobs, building the schools, working together with the district advisory council. Working on governance issues or just out fighting the terrorists. We package them up and send them off for distribution at the television station. The white house and department of defense couldnt figure out who would take ownership of the mechanics. Nobody wanted to own it. Would it be somebody at the Defense Department . Maybe someone in the office of Public Affairs they should be doing this. No one could quite figure it out until the program failed. So the operational war was impacting our ability to articulate a better, fairer, more aggressive during the year. It was also impacting the quality of the journalism. By the end of 2003, the press corps in baghdad had pretty much been stripped. We had a saying in the office but the one thing that all of the reporters was he never heard of any of them. They have stripped the bureaus be the normally a token presence in those bureaus and those personnel were then told they were not permitted to travel around the country. That meant that they sat in hotels as they waited for the daily car bomb to go off. They sent the crew out, victor footage on 24 hour cable news and that became the story that we started seeing them we started seeing that as early as the summer of 2003. Then there was this larger war to shape perceptions. Of course the white house over reliance on the wmd issue as a justification for war ultimately hurt our credibility with the public from the start. But you have to couple that with newsroom so the executives and editors who came from the vietnam era and the sad part of human nature. I dont know if this is developed because of our technology but the sad part of human nature always more interested in what went wrong and what went right and who died as opposed to who lived in the achieved. And then you see how these battlelines come into specific relief pretty quickly. We were dealing with the media that simply didnt leave the thing that we said. It was hostile to the president and they would report rumors on the street over the government explanation for virtually anything. To make matters worse, there were no senior Staff Members from the white house for department of defense Public Affairs operation to spend any amount of time in baghdad while i was there. As Public Opinion soured the Administration Strategy was to limit the number of people talking about expanding the universe and thats a very important lesson that we can take into the air, that we