Policy. During the discussion, panelistss examined irans potential role in the history of hamas. The Virtual Event was hosted by the Washington Institute for near a policy. Thank you for joining me. At the outset of todays event on behalf of myself and my colleagues at the Washington Institute, i want to extend our condolences to the innocent victims of last weekends horrific terrorist attack by hamas. The 900 or so israelis and others from around the world including what appears to be 11 confirmed americans, to all of them and their families, to the people of israel, to all civilized people around the world outraged by what we have seen, the barbarity of what we have seen this weekend, i extend our deepest condolences. I believe there is an Inflection Point going on in the middle east at the moment. That is analogous to the Inflection Point of 9 11, and this will require us to rethink many of the presumptuous the presumptions, the paradigm with which we in the United States, many of us as experts come up coached politics approached politics and conflict in the region. I will introduce our panelists in a moment. We have a terrific group today, the first of a series of sessions that we will be doing at the Washington Institute to analyze, assess and offer advice to our administration on events in the region. Before i do, i want to take the 9 11 metaphor and expand it. Yes, in terms of certain aspects , intelligence failure, the speed, the scope, the audacity of what we saw this weekend, yes, the metaphor is apt. But in many ways i think it is so important to underscore that the 9 11 metaphor in fact isnt adequate. Certainly, if you are israeli, to comprehend the impact and meaning of what happened this weekend. Let me offer this handful of reasons. Six brief reasons why the 9 11 metaphor in fact is not adequate. First, the numbers. Proportionately to population, the numbers killed in israel were 10 times the numbers killed in 9 11. 10 times. Secondly, the intensity. Israel is a small country. You can drive israel in half a day. Compared of course course to the length and breadth of our great nation. While what happened on 9 11 was heinous, tens of millions of americans would wake up the next morning without knowing anyone who suffered that day. That is impossible in israel where there is not a single israeli family who can whip wake up the next day without knowing someone suffered and or someone who is deployed in the army as a response. Third, if you will excuse me, sexuality. The element of rape as part of what happened weekend underscores the depth of the depravity that we saw fourth, terrorists continue to operate on israeli soil and some are still there today, although i ink is about to come to an end. The length of time of this episode makes it fundamentally different. If, fifth, mass hostages taken across borders, and element never before played a role in the history of this conflict and that is extremely rare in any conflict. I had to go back to the first chechen war to find examples of largescale hostagetaking across borders. Sixth, as we eventually learned in 9 11, that day was the high point of the enemies action. We feared there may be more, but in the end there wasnt. America and its allies went on the offensive from that point on. I think we all recognize, and we will talk today and didnt get your days about this, what is going on between hamas and israel is potentially the first round of a much larger conflict, and that of course could change even more. So the 9 11 metaphor, useful but limited in its utility. I think we have to change our mindset to begin to comprehend what this does to the people and leaders of israel and people around the middle east looking at how the israelis respond. In addition to analogies about 9 11, there are many analogies to the october war of 1973, exactly 50 years ago. From this very table, i hosted an event on the question of strategic surprise during which none of my fellow panelists, myself included, anticipated what would happen 72 hours later. Surprise was great, and as in 1973, the israelis were not deployed properly to be ready for a surprise. But that analogy breaks down too. Sadat launched war to catalyze the middle east and the result was camp david. 45 years later, egypt and israel are at peace. Hamas didnt start this to catalyze peace. Hamas didnt start this to create a two state solution. Hamas didnt start this to energize a peace process. In my view, and we will get into this with my colleagues briefly, hamas started this to activate a multifront threat to israel, to fill a vacuum and palestinian leadership, and third, to stop the march towards Regional Peace , including the saudiisrael agreement about which there was much talk in recent weeks. Let me repeat, not only are we not seeing just another phase of gaza hamas israel conflict like we have seen in recent years, we are seeing something fundamentally different and we are seeing an israeli response that will be fundamentally different, too. In that, i know the hostage issues play a huge role, but in my view, if i have outlined what i believe hamas aims are, here is what i believe israels aims are. First, to decapitate hamas leadership and destroy residual military capability. Second, to instill confidence among the israeli people once again that the government of israel and the idf provides their security, confidence that has been shaken in recent days. And to replace in the minds of regional actors, friends, foes and would be friends, the perception of israeli vulnerability and weakness that was produced over the weekend, and replace it with the idea of israeli power, dominance and invincibility. I would not discount the psychological aspect of all of this. I think it is critical. There is a substantial military effort, one that wont be over soon, hovering all of overall of this. What you will hear in the coming days and weeks is the threat of wider circles of conflict, and inner circle that includes the palestinian arena, jerusalem, west bank, Israeli Arabs, the second circle of what i will call near regionals, hezbollah, syria, potentially a related security challenge in other places like jordan if islamist extremists and palestinian reticles try to test the redeem, a test i believe the jordanians would win, and the wider circle. Iran. Let me conclude these remarks by noting that america has a vital role to play in all of this. What we saw this weekend was not just an israeli tragedy. It was the most significant act of terror against americans outside u. S. Soil since september 11. For hamas, a radical sunni group, one of the rationales for making Common Ground with the radical shiite groups and hezbollah and iran, they have Common Ground in the fight against the great satan and lesser satan. Israel is the lesser satan. America, israels friend, has always been the great satan. We cant run from that reality. Neither i should say can americas arab friends run from it. They werent the direct targets of hamas, but it israel if israel is weekend, they become more vulnerable. That explains the generic statements we have seen. When israel appears vulnerable, they will look for cover, reestablishing the fact and the image of israeli strength is in their interest which makes it in our interest. I look forward to discussing these issues with my colleagues. Today, we are focused on the inner core, the hamas attack im a israels response and implications. We will be having another event on thursday to look at the potential for escalation on the northern front, and further programming. Please go to the Washington Institute website to learn about that. I will turn to my colleagues. Im delighted from israel, joining us our International Fellow ehud yaari. Then our director of the reinhart program, dr. Matthew levitt. Sitting on my right. Then, on my left, im thrilled and fortunate that at the moment we have as a visiting fellow at the wasit didnt Washington Institute naomi newman, who was director of research at the israeli institute. She had responsibility to keep an eye on palestinian territories. On my far left geographically, not politically, is my colleague ghaith alomari, the gilbert senior fellow at the Washington Institute, an expert on palestinian politics. Delighted to have you with us. We will begin with my colleague ehud yaari. Ehud thank you for your wise comments. This evening, im not going to mince words. I take it from my mother, 104 years old, that this is the darkest moment she remembers in the history of israel since the darkest days of the war of independence in 1948. The second point is, we are already in the midst of a multifront confrontation. Different intensity on different fronts, but we are there. In my families home village, in the northernmost point of israel , they are telling everybody who doesnt have a good reason to stay there, to evacuate. The same goes for many, many other villages and towns all around the north. Sorry, my nephew just came from thailand and went to his brigade in the north. I apologize. If i may have an open disclosure , in the kibbutz, where my childhood friends from the Youth Movement centered years ago, thousands were killed. 40 babies, not even toddlers, were massacred. Many of them beheaded. What we saw there is disguised as hamas. That is what it was. This is how most israelis see it. Israel had enough information to know that there was an attack coming. Probably, i did not establish this yet. Finally, they didnt have the zero hour, just like on the people of the 1973 war the eve of the 1973 war. But they knew and they saw the preparations. And again, like 1973, we have two of what someone calls peacock generals, military intelligence decided who decided that our policy since 2009 of getting along with hamas through economic benefits and the occasional round of fighting, etc. , is working. They said no. They will be fine. What happened was the defense around gaza, 70 km, it is just a fence. It is a wall. It was unguarded by the gaza division, the firefox divisions. When you try to defend 70 km with three companies, it isnt going to work. And of course, it didnt. There was one place which gives an example of how we should have developed. In one of the now scorchedearth , beautiful, blossoming regions of israel, what we called the gaza envelope, 22, 23 kibbutz and villages which are now destroyed and burned down, only one remains almost intact. Because they had a young lady heading the local security squad, and she understood before anyone else in the army what was going on. She had the squad spread around the perimeter. And prevented the hamas killers from coming into the kibbutz and doing what they did elsewhere, going from house to house butchering people. This is why my mother says what she said. In the war of independence, we never had anything like this. Second thing. Why was the intelligence, why were the intelligence chiefs so wrong . Because since 2009, they came to believe it works. We allow gazan workers to come to israel, we provide fuel and money and they were married to this. Again, the 1973 conceptions. When the hamas facing israeli technological superiority and doubtful came over the fence with motorized gliders and tractors, etc. , there was nobody to stop them. In the distance, between the fence and the 22, 23 kibbutzim in the army positions, it is very short. It wasnt just two battalion commanders of hamas that crossed. Probably only two battalion commanders. There were many gazans coming. On the way they took some hostages. That is the theme. And it took hours to intervene. We had girl soldiers there. Manning the positions, that monitored cameras and sensors along the fence. At least two dozen of them were butchered in their positions. Because there was no buffer. That is something which is very difficult for any israeli to accept and understand. Now, i beg everybody, i believe, and i dont have proof yet, i will have it but this was orchestrated by the Iranian Revolutionary guard through the Quds Force Commander through beirut and tehran, etc. , in order to derail progress towards an israelisaudi normalization. The iranians perceive the move in this direction as a direct, serious threat. They did not want to take it. Now, hamas, i have known him since his days in prison, the leader of hamas in gaza. Many conversations with him in prison. He didnt want to have a fight in israel on his own. My assumption, i will have evidence later on im sure, was that the iranians and hezbollah were saying to him, through the people they were talking to in beirut, in case the knife is at your throat, in case the israeli army invades gaza forcefully, there will be activation of a lebanese front and to a lesser extent, syrian front because we see movements that they are getting ready to send rockets their, probably try to have rockets already. The lebanese front will have every day, rockets. Today, 15. We have attempts by a squad to penetrate into israel. What is israel doing . I think what they are doing now is they are trying to get the forces ready for an eventual major advance into the gaza strip. They have to decide on how to do it. They have plans. Where to do it. But in my opinion, no hurry. We had better prepare the ground and the air force is doing it. Let them do their job. When you enter, you have to minimize the capability of hamas to resist. About the hostages, number one, nobody knows the number. Neither israel, i think even hamas doesnt know. They have threatened to execute hostages in return for israeli bombing. Today i was carefully checking throughout the day in israel. The air force continued the raids on hamas targets in gaza and other places. I didnt hear anything else coming from hamas about that, but it is a real, serious possibility. I would end by saying that we have entered this confrontation in a situation where we had a government, mainly a Prime Minister, who is discredited, who is not trusted by i would say more than half the population. And now, four days after this horrible massacre, he still cant make up his mind about forming an emergency war cabinet with the opposition. Because someone like mr. Banville, who he appointed as minister of national security, wants to be in the cabinet and the opposition leaders rightly so, say no, we dont need this guy. So four days and we dont have a war cabinet. That is a signal of unity, of concentrated national effort. And people are wondering. I will finish by saying one thing. In my family and many others, Many International air flights to israel. You should have seen the flights coming in from bangkok last night. It wasnt just my young nephews. It was young israelis coming to their reserve units, going up north, going down south. Etc. If they built on the political turmoil created, i think they will be proven wrong. Thank you. Robert very good. Thank you very much. Matt . Matthew thanks, im glad to be here. Ehud, we appreciate your blunt and emotional input. I think people need to understand the nature of its hamas and its terrorist infrastructure and capabilities. And i think there is a disconnect because many people seem to have gotten to the point certainly in the years since 2007 1 hamas took over the gaza strip by shooting its weapons at fellow palestinians that they somehow changed. That it was no longer a group committed to violent jihad, but it was somehow more representative of palestinians in general. Certainly that is its propaganda. It is not. And what it was really about was a continued siege of gaza and occupation, and as it likes to say, defending jerusalem against terrorist attacks was named the alaqsa flood. In fact, in the years since it took over the gaza strip, hamas found itself in a position to do things it never could. Limited by suit suicide bombings, shooting attacks, targeting cafes, the types of things that it is only still capable, limited to in the west bank. In the gaza strip it realized that if it played the long game, it could build up an infrastructure the likes of which most terrorist groups dont get to build, by virtue of controlling space and having an effective safe haven. Being able to build up a storage of small arms, a collection of in the early days, imported and in the years since, domestically produced rockets and missiles, some of them which can go quite far into the west bank and tel aviv. And to build up a cadre of fighters they could use in large numbers at a future date. The many people who thought hamas would be coopted by governments, that it would be too busy paying the salaries of schoolteachers and collecting garbage to be fighting israel in a largescale war, who thought hamas would be deterred by virtue of the fact that there would likely be significant israeli retaliation, have been proven wrong in a very painful and bloody way. Today, we need to look at hamas as a militant and terrorist group, not only as one that can carry out your standard terrorist attacks, but one that could deploy at least 1000 people into israel, in coordinated attacks, an organization that successfully led a disinformation campaign, convincing israel not only that it could be deterred, as long as money came in and there were jobs, just last week israel allowed an additional numbers of workers to come into israel from the gaza strip, that things could be calm. Having riots at the fence and using those as cover for shootings at the west bank making people think that was the totality of what they were going to do, to play the long game. I think its important to remind, hamas is not about occupation or the lack of a two state solution. Hamas opposes a two state solution. Hamas is about creating an Islamic State in all of historic palestine including the gaza strip and israel. Its about the destruction of israel. That is something that people have lost sight of. The Israeli Air Force will be focused right now on trying to destroy as much of their military capability as possible. That will involve those shooting rockets but also hamas defensive capabilities. Here its important to remember the hamas tunnel system, not the one built into egypt for smuggling, not the one that was dug into israel before an underground fence prevented those back in the day so hamas, back when it was planning an earlier version of this weeks attacks, talking about the tunnels built domestically, so that when the day came that they were able to draw israel to a ground fight in the gaza strip, they would be able to pop up from places unannounced and ambush soldiers. There is also t