We are honored today to host Lieutenant General h. R. Mcmaster, Board Director of the Atlantic Council and senior fellow at stanfords hoover institution, and the 26th assistant for the president for National Security affairs. General mcmaster joins us for a discussion of u. S. Grant strategy with a particular emphasis on u. S. Foreignpolicy regarding china and the middle east. There are a few who bring a more , as agic mindset historian, as a retired officer with 34 years of experience in the u. S. Army, and is one of our nations senior policymakers. , generalw book mcmaster lays out what he sees as a new vision for a better u. S. National firm policy. He advises the use of strategic empathy to better know and understand our adversaries and using that perspective to rather thanrategies episodic or shortterm engagements to solve longterm problems. General mcmaster has cited one of the great examples of Strategic Thinking and character and our foreignpolicy leaders as an inspiration and model for his tenure at the National Security council. As many of you who listening today know that general was one of the architects, one of the great leaders of the council and passed away at age 95 this august. He was a mentor to me, one when many others in the world. He actually focused on being a mentor and did not care about taking credit. Both of the cohosts for todays event, the scope crossed center for strategy and security, and this go craft a middle east Security Initiative there his name because they honor his legacy and strive to carry on his work. By that we mean work that would have a defense of nonpartisan commitment to strategy and would be embedded in everything we do with our allies and partners. At the same time he had a remarkable dedication to the mentorship of the next and heion of leaders, wore decency as comfortably as many of us where our shirts. So thank you again general mcmaster for joining us today for what promises to be an insightful and enlightening conversation. We are at the cusp of a new administration, but in the way you write, you are really writing about issues with crossover administrations over years. We are delighted to have with us today our moderator. Is a veteran of Foreign Policy and National Security reporter with experience in washington, as well as around the world. Israel,ypt, pakistan, palestinian territories united and im sure other places as well. Like all of you, as im eager to hear the generals insights, but also by his book. He writes in his notes to readers in the front that many were asking him to write a beenall that would have more lucrative but not as lasting. This may not be a tellall from a personal anecdote standpoint from his time in the white house, but it is a learn a lot book. I recommend that you all buy it and read it. This point its my honor to the program over. Soave my copy, so will we will be talking a lot about it. At thenored to be back Atlantic Council and with general mcmaster, whom i covered when he was National Security advisor to President Trump. Its great to be able to continue that relationship on the outside. Notes, weekeeping have a for todays event. I definitely encourage you all to get out there on social media and share what we are talking about today. And obviously, this is never ideal right now what we are doing, this a virtual conversation. We would love to see your faces, but we wanted to be as interactive as possible. You will see the q a stabbed at the bottom of your screen. Send questions throughout. We have folks that will send me some of your questions. We will try to cover as many as will quit thei introductions and dive right in with general mcmaster. Congratulations on the book. Its fascinating. A lot of subjects are so important. I see over my shoulder that the incoming nominee for secretary iste is talking some talking, so a lot to talk about. First i want to talk about the book itself. Specifically you talk about strategic narcissism versus strategic empathy. I wanted you to flesh out those intooncepts for folks foreignpolicy, people like myself. What has been the u. S. Grand strategy in recent years, and how do you see them moving forward now that we are on the cusp of a new administration . Lt. Gen. Mcmaster what a privilege it is to be with you and fred and the Atlantic Council. Its thanksgiving weeks i am thankful for the opportunity and the great work that the Atlantic Council has done, especially in the midst of this pandemic. I am reading and consuming or products and learning as i do all the time about how the Atlantic Council works. Great to see you as well. What i read about in the book is our tendency to do five defying the world in relation to us. And to assume that what we do or choose not to do will be decisive to a favorable outcome. To the loss ofs our Competitive Edge at the end of the cold war. A time when it was understandable to be optimistic. We had won the cold war, the soviet union collapsed. We had the lopsided victory in the 1991 gulf war. Bere was reason to optimistic, but we were over optimistic about this new world war that would emerge. We bought into three overlapping assumptions in the postcold war period. The guarantee the privacy of our free and open societies. Secondly, the great competition was a relic of the past and our military prowess, our technological military prowess would guarantee our security going into the future. And if there was any challenge it ff i would be fast, cheap, efficient and so forth. Thisue in the point that was a setup. It was a set up for being disappointed. Disappointed by strategic shots and surprises in the 2000s. The most among them was the horrible mask mortar murder of september 11. The most devastating terrorist attack in history. Were a determined enemy used airplanes to bypass our military prowess. And we had the unanticipated length and difficulty of the wars in iraq and afghanistan. Should ween debate, have invaded iraq in 2003 . We should debate who thought it would be easy and why did they think it would be easy . And we have the financial crisis of 2008. As the Obama Administration came in, the emotional impetus shifted from over optimism to pessimism. I do get is a fair criticism of the Bush Administration to say it underappreciated the risks and cost of action in the invasion of iraq. The Obama Administration underestimated the risks associated with inaction and disengagement. Code and are the the examples are the complete withdrawal in 2001. You go into a country and promote democratic ideals that the u. S. Might be a part of while shoving it down their throats. It is a balancing act. Lt. Gen. Mcmaster i think it is with this idea of strategic empathy is the first step. I am describing is strategic narcissism. Degreeally ignores his to which others, especially adversaries, enemies and rivals have over the future and how they have authorship over the future as well. I think the most important step is to view the complex challenges we are facing from the perspective of the other, and to make explicit assumptions about the degree to which we, the United States, and might minded partners can exert influence over the future. I also recommend that we frame these problems more competently by implying design thinking. By trying understand these challenges on their own terms and pay particular attention to the ideology, emotions and aspirations that drive and constrain the others, but view these challenges and the lens of our interests. Americans these days are very skeptical about inactive Foreign Policy. So we have to be able to explain this. What does it stake for them in terms of our security and prosperity and our influence in the world . Affect future generations of americans and citizens across the free world . I think making assumptions about the agency that we have an crafting objectives. So often we having engaged in ,ustained efforts abroad diplomatic and military, we have a clear idea of what we hope to achieve. War,hen this happens in not only is ineffective, but it may also be an ethical. Unethical. We dont have that just end in mind so that the book is a criticism of our approach to these challenges that we face, at its an argument for strategic empathy and a higher degree of strategic competence. Vivian you mention something about adversaries. A very interesting folks at act between the white house right now who are coming to grips with the fact that transition is upon us and they talk about how much has changed in the last four years since biden was last at the white house. Especially when it comes to china, but also with russia. How you engage without fully embracing . How do you keep them in check versus trying to work with them . Think thatmaster i the real answer to that is competition. To recognize that russia and want us to leave them in a way that is consistent with the interests of the free world. How do we compete, in a transparent manner. Theyre assumptions that i discussed earlier was that china had to be welcomed into the International Order and would play by the rules. And it would utilize its economy and government. I had the privilege of convening the Principals Committee of the National Security council quite early. I think soon after my arrival, weeks after my arrival to frame a china policy, a new china policy. Policiesught with me of that meeting and i read a couple of passages from the previous policies and made the the moston that significant shift in u. S. Foreign policy since the end of the cold war, the shift was long overdue. I know these labels are of limited utility, but cooperation and engagement with the communist party to the competition. And competition doesnt need to lead to complication. Andink cooperation engagement, and not competing effectively with the aggressive policies of the Chinese Communist partys have a path to competition, maybe in places like the South China Sea where china is in the midst to achieve the largest land grab in history. Withn if you are meeting these teams, what would you tell them specifically with regards to china . Where to begin on a practical level . Lt. Gen. Mcmaster the first piece of advice would be forwards, dont fall for it. And it is what i think is by the to be promises Chinese Communist party to have a shift back to this general approach of cooperation and engagement. I think the false promises will be in two areas. In first of these will be the area of environment and climate change, and that set of interconnected global challenges we face. Face, and the second will be in connection with north Koreas Nuclear program. The problem is xi jinping can pledge all he wants and say the right things about environment and climate, Carbon Neutral by 2060, but the Chinese Communist party is financing globally 70 coalfired plants a year. They will make pledges on north korea, but whereas we have a north korea strategy, china has a u. S. Strategy. That strategy is to reuse issues in the region, in this case the nuclear and Missile Program of north korea, as a wedge to drive and driveom allies the United States out of northeast asia and indo pacific rockley broadly. T xi jinping was if china succeeds, it is not only bad for us, but really bad for the countries in the region. I hear often times these days, dont force us to choose. We hear this from some of our allies and partners. Dont force us to choose between beijing and washington. I think the response of the new biden Audit Administration ought to be, we are not asking you to do that. We are on the side of your sovereignty. Reopening of this the indo pacific is, about and i hope the Biden Administration will see this as a key element of continuity as they put together Foreign Policy. Vivian you mentioned nuclear. , they havet the u. N. Been lighting fires under countries around the world to take notice that Nuclear Armed countries are going toward more tense relations. Its not just china and russia and north korea. Even india and pakistan, there is a buildup. Talking to the Biden Administration, what can we do here . Even in recent days, the Trump Administration has been trying to get a new deal with the russians because there is a deadline. Table, get china to the how realistic is that and where do you see this going . Lt. Gen. Mcmaster i think this is immensely important. We dont want to think about it because it is unimaginable, the use again of the most destructive weapons on earth, but we face the dangers associated with nuclear buildups that could be destabilizing. With russia, these new weapons that Vladimir Putin announced, remember the speech he gave . Nuclear missiles descending on maralago, florida. This was a speech he gave. These socalled low yield Nuclear Weapons, under this theory of escalation domination. This is very destabilizing. In a way that ss missiles were destabilizing the cold war. Nuclear building up capabilities and has not been party to negotiations because these were largely bilateral with russia. Arms control itself should be an area of emphasis. But what we have to remember is an arms control agreement is not an end in and of itself. An agreement that improves security. You areer problem alluding to i think is proliferation. If north korea gets a nuclear weapon, who doesnt . The only hereditary communist dictatorship in the world. Its a country that has never met a weapon it didnt try and sell to somebody, including the Nuclear Weapons programs to the Israeli Defense forces that bombed it in 2007. If north korea gets a weapon, there will be a conversation. South asia is an area increasingly gaining interest. Between Nuclear Armed india and pakistan, tensions not going away. Of course you have the around problem. If they have the iran problem. About the complexity associated with a world in which so many countries have Nuclear Weapons and some of these countries are run by leaders who have an ideological bent that could lead them to justify the use of these weapons. We know that pakistan is getting pretty close to that several years ago. Certainly the nuclear diane dynamic in the middle east will be dangerous. Vivian with the buildup of tensions we talked about, tensions in the middle east still on edge, afghanistan, all these places we will get to iraq and afghanistan and a moment but your former boss, President Trump, always touted america first. He sort of tried to work with allies but has been received in different ways. He put tariffs on allies in the name of National Security and done other things that disrupt a lot of our traditional allies especially in europe. What can the Biden Administration do moving forward to build coalitions to renew things that americas part of the team . Lt. Gen. Mcmaster i would say first recognize that there has been a high degree of International Cooperation below the level of the president s offensive tweets, more allies and skeptical statements. Example,cisions for truce replacements without consultations with allies. Below that, there has been a lot of International Cooperation especially on the aggressive actions of the Chinese Communist party. Japan has done a great job taking a lead on wto actions associated with fair chinese trade and economic practices. India, australia, japan, the u. S. , it is invigorated. We have been sent a bank to xi jinping because hooves attack his attacks, the bludgeoning of indian soldiers on the himalayan frontier, european allies are much more cognizant in the postcovid period of the threat in the Chinese Communist period. Our partners in africa are also deeply concerned about chinas economic aggressive aggression. I think this is a positive time to come in and reinvigorate multinational efforts to overco me the challenges. China is one example. What we have to do is recognize alliances. Multinational corporation has to be for a purpose. Other International Organizations like the human , that council or unesco these are competitive spaces of themselves. There is no prize for membership. We have to compete within those organizations to ensure china and other countries hostile to the free worlds interests, dont turn those organizations against their purpose. I hope our alliances will be reinvigorated, but reinvigorated with a clear purpose. With the u. S. Nly in the lead, to rally in support of hong kong, you talk about taiwan in your new book, how do we approach that moving forward . Lt. Gen. Mcmaster i do. I think that there are probably counterintuitive actions we can take. Iina is effective, and what write about is they have a strategy broadly of coop us with the lure of process, actions access to the markets, loans. Once you are in and they coerce you to adhere to their worldview , all you have to look at is the nba. This