Transcripts For CSPAN Joint House Hearing On Biological Security 20240712

Tweets. Pentagon and state Department Officials reviewed u. S. Readiness for a biological attack. The response to the coronavirus and foreign adversaries using chemical agents. They appeared before two house subcommittees. Theill come to the hearing Armed Services subcommittee on capabilities. Rules andnce with regulations, the host will mute all participants. All participants are asked to while notelves muted engaged in the discussion, which should limit echoes or other disruptions. In instances in which members yield back, but do not remember to remute themselves, we will do so. Members and witnesses are responsible for a new think themselves. It may take unmuting themselves. A timekeeper will monitor the time for the hearing. If you are on the computer, you can view the timer by switching your personal view to grade or active speaker and thumbnail view. You can pin the timer by hovering your cursor over the timer. With that, we are ready to begin. Please count down from five so the system displays your video, for fivese pause additional seconds while the recording begins and start proceedings. This joint subcommittee hearing with the House Foreign Affairs committee on asia and nonproliferation and the house Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence and emerging threats will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare recess at any point and all members will have five days to submit statements, materials, and questions for the record subject to length limitation in the rules. To insert something into the record, halfstaff email. As reminder, please keep your video function on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting themselves and please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking. Consistent with accompanying regulations, staff will only mute members and witnesses when they are not under recognition to eliminate background noise. And will quorum recognize myself for opening remarks. I will be followed by the acting Ranking Member mr. Perry, the chairman, and Ranking Members to phonic. I will recognize members in sonority seniority. Before we get started and before i do my opening statement, it would be remiss for us not to mention the president and the first lady, and know they are in our thoughts and prayers and hope for a speedy recovery, and also the tens of thousands of americans who test positive everyday for this virus. Toy are in our thoughts, and underscore that does underscore this is a virus that orsnt know democrat republican, doesnt know what god we worship, what our country of origin is. It is a virus and it does underscore the importance of this topic we are talking about today. It does underscore this is a butrally occurring event, what bad actors may see as they see a threat like this that has brought the world to its knees and has wreaked economic havoc domestically and internationally. I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. Both having the department of defense and state department underscores the importance of this and my focus has subcommittee chairman, under the guise of nonproliferation, we spend a lot of time talking about nuclear threats, but what we are seeing now is the real vulnerability to biological threats. Just to put that into context, weve not had an Aircraft Carrier brought to its knees by a kinetic missile, but we just saw in the past year, an Aircraft Carrier bratsk airport because of the virus brought to port because of the virus and that underscores what i worry about. I think about it in a couple different ways. Obtainery difficult to Nuclear Capabilities and Nuclear Technology. Hundreds of personnel and International Organizations like the iaea to reduce the nuclear threat. That is totally appropriate. We want to make sure Nuclear Technology and weaponry doesnt end up in the hands of bad actors, but if i put my doctorscientist hat on, the ability of technologies to alter viruses and do genetic editing, the knowhow and capabilities, are rapidly increasing and that is something that keeps me awake at night. We know there are bad actors, certainly post 9 11, many of us prepared, saw anthrax and other threats and we worried about smallpox and so forth. That is something in a bipartisan way, congress, working with the administration, should really think about. What are the things we have to do to move ahead . I look forward to the witness testimony and there are several and imthink about, going to be curious about from the witnesses. Covid19 and spend the billions of dollars and build the infrastructure to defeat this virus, i also think we should strategically be thinking about how we use those resources to also prepare for bio surveillance, to be ready for the next naturally occurring buts or biological threat, also think about how we have dual use capabilities as we build that infrastructure, to do bio surveillance for manmade threats. As we move forward, also, as we move forward, weve got the bwc, but i think we need stronger, multilateral organizations with likeminded allies. I would be curious how doj and state are thinking about creating those institutions. When i think about the ethic of gene editing and or thats going on the technology, we woul really having created the standards and norms to say this , but this ise dangerous and you probably are not to be playing around with genes. I think that is an appropriate place where the scientific community, congress are to put those standards in place, not just for the United States, but the International Community. Again, our thoughts and prayers are with the president and first lady and those thousands of americans. I would be remiss if i didnt but my doctor hat on for a second and as we enter the following winter, lets do fall and winter, lets do what we can to keep people safe. Lets avoid large, indoor gatherings that we have seen really do act as super. Spreading events and the most important thing that we can do right now as we enter the fall, everyone go out there and get your flu shot, please get your flu shot. With that, let me recognize the Ranking Member, mr. Perry, for five minutes of opening statements. Rep. Perry thank you, chairman. Thank you to our distinguished panel for offering your counsel today. The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the potential for increased biosecurity threats and what can happen when irresponsible actors disregard International Agreements for the sake of self prevention. The Strong International regime only works when its constituent members agree to make it work. We need to address the shortcomings of u. S. Multilateral engagements and determine where improvements need to be made. International Health Regulations went into force in 2007 and called on all nations to be compliant by 2012. By 2012, only about 20 of all countries were complaint and even today, most countries have still not complied with the 2005 regulations. ThiS Administration has taken a significant amount of criticism for questioning u. S. Engagement in institutions like the world Health Organization. Let me be clear about this, the World Health Organizations complicity in spreading the coronavirus should not be rewarded with United States indifference to its failures. Os strong affiliation with the Global Health security agenda raises concerns about the longterm efficacy. There is an obvious issue of a lack of enforcement in the International Community. Different levels of investment in bio security lends itself to a perfect permanent condition of moral hazard or select committees communities, like the United States, are compensating for the lack of investment by other states. There is only so much we can do alone. Key programs like the state departments bio security Engagement Program cannot use funds in countries like china, cuba, iran, north korea, sudan, or syria, despite the fact that several of these countries have experimented with biological weapons and are likely candidates for future offenses. Countries like north korea have a clearly offensive biological weapons Weapons Program with no end in sight. How do we confront the fact that we have an unreliable International Biological weapons control regime . More importantly, in measuring success against the spread of bio threats, what exactly does success look like when china dominates several key institutions . Providednds, china has a gift to nonstate actors that wish us harm. They have shown us on the world the impact that a potential bioweapon can have on the american economy, as well as our society. Threats to our way of life have multiplied exponentially as a result of the coronavirus, and this time we hearing will be confronting that uncomfortable truth. I am also grateful to have our witnesses before us today as they speak more about Synthetic Biology and gene manipulation. We need to find out more about the National Security implications that Synthetic Biology can posed to the United States, especially in light of the fact that several countries are working with extremely hazardous pathogens correction, in subpart laboratory settings. I do also offer my prayers and best wishes to the first family, to hope hicks, and to anybody that has been affected by the virus, whether they have contracted it or whether it has occurred in their family members, loved ones, or community. We are all dealing with it one way or the other. I surely thanked the chairman for the time and i yield the balance. Thank you, mr. Perry. Let me now recognize the chairman of the intelligence and emerging threats subcommittee and Armed Services committee. You, chairman. I want to begin by acknowledging and saying that the president and the first lady in the first family are in my thoughts and prayers. I know they are in all of our thoughts and prayers are now, and the people around the president S Administration who may also be experiencing the effects of the virus. We pray that they all have a quick and full recovery. Mr. Chairman, i want to thank my colleagues, the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on asia, the pacific, and nonproliferation. Particularly, chairman and Ranking Member yo. I know mr. Perry is standing in for the Ranking Member right now. Thank you all for hosting this timely joint hearing on virus security. I recognize Ranking Member stefanik, as was my colleagues on the subcommittee. Which, as weic have seen of late, is vital to our nations security. I am very pleased that we are holding this very important joint hearing. Emerging biological techniques, sequencing, gene editing, and Synthetic Biology are rapidly changing the scope and scale of biological threats, and can lead to an increase in biological weapons. Adding to the challenge, biological threats are easy to greet easier to create than other weapons of mass distraction used in concert mass destruction. Toy enable a rogue actor inflict major damage on a military power. Just last month, the republic of Georgias Health ministry suffered a cyber attack from abroad. The database that stores medical documents from abroad on the database that stores Michael Douglas and national covid19 meant medical documents and national covid19 medical information. Including those in the u. S. , u. K. , and canada. So these attacks and the current Global Pandemic underscore the importance of collective scientific research, preparedness, and security across interagencies, and with our allies and for national and economic security. In a time when the United States is struggling to respond to the spread of a novel, highly infectious pathogen, we must ensure the interagency is working together to respond to the current pandemic and advance the collective effort to strengthen biological security across the range of threats. The defense Threat Reduction agency, through its execution of the department of defenses reduction biological Threat Reduction program and its text technical analysis, has been receiving popular requests for preparedness and detection, including providing biosafety, bio security, and and bio surveillance support to a protection aid protection. There have been many good examples of the btrp training local professionals in countries like guinea, liberia, jordan, and thailand to diagnose and confirm the first cases of covid19 in their countries. Yet, in the face of known and emerging biological threats and the impact they could have on the National Security and economy, and as a pandemic that could arguably present the single grades threat to our country, was starting to spread across the globe. The president s budget address was delivered in february with a 36 cut to the cooperative Threat Reduction programs funding from last years enacted level at a time when the United States is struggling ot respond to respond to the spread of a highly infectious new virus. We are alarmed by the departments significant reduction in the budget request for a mission of detecting and confronting biological threats to the United States. Thankfully, the house has acted. In fiscal year 2021, National Defense authorization act, hr6 395 added back 135 million to the program. 89 million of that was additional funding for the cooperative biological Engagement Program. The department of defenses chemical and biological Defense Program was primed to be a key partner in the fight against covid19. Its medical Program Funds and manages efforts to develop medical countermeasures, vaccines, therapeutics, and pretreatment. Its physical Program Funds and manages efforts to develop surveillance and detection technologies, diagnosed diagnostics, ppe and decontamination systems. To prepare against potential unknown threats, cbdp bill expertise and capabilities to address novel pathogens, making it an ideal program to deal with the emergence of Novel Coronavirus. We are interested in hearing today whether the program was quickly and efficiently directed to participate in the National Response to the covid19 pandemic. So, these are obviously challenging times, and we need to double down on these programs. We need to make sure that we are in fact prepared for the next biological or chemical event that could affect the country, and make sure that we have all the tools and resources in place to respond effectively, keep our country and perhaps the world safe. Hearing morerd to about the efforts of both departments today, what we can do to help ensure your organizations have the resources needed to prepare for the emerging threats of today and tomorrow, and how we can ensure that your department is ready and able to act swiftly and decisively in the next crisis. I joined the host in thanking all of you, especially our witnesses, for joining us today. I yield back to the chairman. Thank you. Let me now recognize Ranking Member of the intelligence and emerging threats and capability subcommittee of the Armed Services committee, Ranking Members to phonic. Fanik. Phonic ste thank you, chairman. I would like to express my thanks to you and the ranking chairman. Thanks to the witnesses from the department of defense and state for being here today. The issue of bio security is one of national importance. As i have stated previously, while the department of defense faces urgent challenges daily, we can never afford to lose sight of the critically Important Mission of countering weapons of mass destruction, in particular, biological threats. The unpredictable nature of these threats requires that we continue to adapt our approach and every response iterate a response. We must learn from the Current Crisis and adjust our strategy to more effectively and proactively detect and respond to the next event. This will surely not be the last biological creases this nation crisis this nation and world faces. I am interested in how your organizations and the federal government written large can more effectively use new data sets and Artificial Intelligence to truly modernize our buyers surveillance efforts. We must bio surveillance efforts. We must mature our capacity to measure when and where a biological event may occur and monitor where a pathogen is likely to spread. This must be a global effort. Partnerships we have developed will be critical Early Warning beacons to inform our collective domestic response. Programs like the cooperative Threat Reduction, specifically the biological Threat Reduction program, are essential to maintaining our global footprint and the building of the relationships that protect our Forward Deployed Service Members and national interests. The current covid crisis has served as an affirmation that biological threats require a whole government response, not departments represented here today, but Inclusive Health and human services, homeland security, and state and local officials. The strength of the partnership between your organizations and quality of these relationships you develop with foreign partners and domestic agencies will underpin the effectiveness of our future bio security efforts. I yield back to the chair. Thank you, Ranking Member stefanik. Before i introduced witnesses, i ask unanimous consent that not Committee Members, if any, be allowed to participate in this hearing after all Committee Members have had the opportunity to ask questions. NonCommittee Members be recognized at the appropriate time. Let me introduce our witnesses. , Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for countering weapons of mass destruction, mr. David laughter. He oversees all cw md policy issues at the department. This includes preventing the proliferation of wmd related materials, the Defense Departments cooperative third Reduction Program and chemical, biological, radiologic and nuclear defense. Next, we will hear from the director of the defense Threat Reduction agency, mr. Val oxford. He leads mission to safeguard the u. S. And its allies from mass destruction. From the state department, we will first hear from acting assistant secretary in the bureau of oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, mr. Jonathan moore. We would from the deputy nonpreferred nonproliferation programs. He currently oversees a range of state Department Nonproliferation programs, including cooperative Threat Reduction and export control programs. Recognize each witness for five minutes. Without objection, youre prepared written statements will be made part of the record. I will first call on mr. Laughter for this testimony. Good morning. I too want to extend my thoughts and prayers to the president and first lady. Mr. Oxford, is your microphone on . Yes, sir. . Can you hear me better now i want to also extend my thoughts and perch of the president and first lady and all those impacted by covid19. Tonk you for the upper present on behalf of the department of defense and highlight some of the critical work we are doing. I want to acknowledge dods sincere appreciation for the continued support that Congress Lends our mission. As the Deputy Assistant secretary of defense of defense for countering weapons of mass destruction, i had the privilege to work alongside my colleagues here today. Our Strong Partnership enables the broad u. S. Government effort to reduce wmd threats, including biological threats worldwide. s mission aligns with the objectives and National Security and defense strategies, as our secretary espers priorities, namely to increase the lethality of the u. S. Monetary, build alliances, and improve dods efficiency. We draw guidance from strategies such as the national bow Defense Strategy and the Global Health security strategy. Dods focus on protecting the health and readiness of u. S. Forces, countering the destabilizing effects of outbreaks on u. S. Interest, and ensuring that dod remains focused on priority defense objectives to meet Emergency Needs during an outbreak makes us a complementary tool in the u. S. Threat reduction arsenal. To address dailys dods. Ns. Positions this shifting dynamic includes naturally occurring outbreaks and accidental or deliberate release of biological agents. Covid19s global reach and destabilizing influence has further altered the Threat Landscape, potentially inspiring nefarious actors to replicate covids impacts do deliberate use of a biological agent. My team develop strategic guidance for cwmd activities. To mitigate the impacts of such threats, regardless of origin. We work closely with other dod stakeholders and cordoning through groups such as our effort council and the covid19 task force. Works with key interagency and International Partners as we develop priorities for countering biological threats. These partnerships allow us to leverage each others capabilities and lessen the dod, poolingen on resources and working towards common objectives is vital to ensuring the greatest Threat Reduction impacts are achieved. Ctrs biological Threat Reduction program has provided a command training to over 30 countries to improve theri ability to do their ability to detect, diagnose, and report biological incidents. When other partner nations have leverage previously provided ctr capabilities to bolster their abilities to detect and diagnose covid19. To close, i want to thank the subcommittees again and look forward to your questions. Thank you. I will recognize mr. Oxford for his statement. Distinguished members of the subcommittees, thank you for your continued support. I am proud to appear today with my colleagues from both dod and the state department to update you on collective efforts to protect the u. S. National interest in a rapidly evolving globalized threat environment. It is an honor to represent the workforce, whose commitment to our mission and strong relationships with our partners here today makes our organization successful. Today, we find ourselves in a president at times as we respond to the Global Pandemic unprecedented times as we respond to the Global Pandemic. We must think about the future Threat Landscape for gene editing, dna sequencing, and Synthetic Biology. They potentially could launch future attacks with little warning or attribution. As we capture Lessons Learned from covid19, we have to accept the fact that others will also be learning and that the very nature of the biological Threat Landscape has changed forever. One of the lessons we have learned over the course of the last six months is that partner nations have benefited greatly by the training and equipping they have received through the dods ctr program and btrp. Btrp facilitates the detection and reporting of diseases caused by dangerous pathogens. Including diseases such as covid19. Dtrp works with over 30 foreign partners to reduce biological threats by enhancing bio security, biosafety, and bio surveillance capabilities. The pandemic has demonstrated that Health Security is a critical part of National Security. Countries need an effective bio Surveillance System to detect, diagnose, and report outbreaks of dangerous pathogens. The u. S. Relies on the bow Surveillance Systems of other nations to provide Early Warning of an outbreak before it reaches the homeland. Some recent examples of btrp s success in respond to the btrps efforts allow local officials in thailand to detect the first case of Novel Coronavirus outside of china on january 13, 2020. Within a month of a request from the u. S. Ambassador fishery in transferred a supply of ppe to the National Institute of health and hygiene morocco. The equipment went directly to protect moroccos Frontline Health care workers in the fight against covid. Stated thefisher Equipment Transfer as part of over seven years of close re and then between dt government of america. This partnerships focus is on saving lives and mitigating threats. Morocco has reported 126,000 cases with 2200 deaths. Scientistsd developed a diagnostic testing capability for covid. This enabled georgia to implement extensive testing to inform outbreak control. The center was lauded by the georgian government as being integral in controlling the covid outbreak. Within georgia, they have reported 7100 cases with only 46 deaths. Btrp continues to receive foreign partner request for support related to covid. Hadf september 18, btrp fulfilled 40 requests from 18 countries, plus the african union. By building a partner nations capacities and capabilities, it builds their sense of National Pride and increases their willingness to work with the u. S. In other ways. By providing partners with better selfsustaining solutions, the u. S. Demonstrates that we are the partner of choice rather than our strategic competitors. These Partnerships Act as force multipliers in the competition for influence and reinforce the strategic messaging that the u. S. Has their nations interest in mind. Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions. Thank you, mr. Oxford. I will now recognize mr. Moore for his opening statement. Mr. Moore good morning, chairman, Ranking Member stefanik, and other esteemed members of the house. It is an honor to be with you here today, together with distinguished colleagues from the state department and department of defense and dtra. I look forward how discussing discussing our bureaut plays a role in this process. We also host the state Departments Office of can i have you hold the microphone closer . Thank you. We also host the state Departments Office of International Health and bio defense. That is the capacity in which i am here today. I will focus my remarks on our efforts to prevent detect and respond to prevent, detect, and respond to Infectious Disease outbreaks. Covid19, which has had an impact even on the president and first lady and millions of americans, highlights the importance of u. S. Leadership to enhance Global Security and pandemic preparedness. It is this is crucial to stopping outbreaks at their source and protecting u. S. Health and safety, promoting Economic Prosperity and defending National Security interests. Our team is working through and on covid19 together with interagency partners, advancing u. S. Government priorities through diplomacy. Beyond covid19, oes combats a range of other Public Health threats, including ebola, influenza, dengue, polio, and antimicrobial resistance. The covid19 pandemic is a global challenge. The department of state remains committed to working closely with our partners as part of a collective global response. We are using all of our means to slow and stop the pandemic. U. S. Health diplomacy has two primary areas of effort, promoting transparent information sharing and disease surveillance, and encouraging a multi sectoral approach to building Global Health security capacity, including patient other nations, nongovernment organizations, International Organizations, the private sector. e deeply appreciate Congress Appropriation of over 1. 6 billion u. S. Dollars in covid19 supplemental funding to the state department and u. S. Agency for national development. We have used these funds to provide a broad range of assistance specifically aimed at helping government, International Organizations and nongovernmental organizations fight the pandemic. The assistance is saving lives by strengthening Public Health education, improving the quality and cleanliness of health care facilities, and increasing laboratory disease surveillance and Rapid Response capacity in more than 120 countries, as well as providing humanitarian economic support to mitigate impacts of the pandemic. Investedates has more than 10 billion to bring safe vaccines to the world faster. Oes has developed state department messaging. Has the first to know about the coronavirus, the Chinese Communist party had a special responsibility to inform the rest of the world about this threat. Instead, they withheld information and censored medical professionals, scientists, and journalists. The ccp has since used the pandemic to further its geopolitical agenda by highlighting its donations of masks and other supplies to reshape the narrative and distract from its role in the crisis. Both russia and the ccp have made grandiose and responsible claims about the creation of vaccines, raising serious questions about quality and efficacy that we are addressing through active public diplomacy. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. If we prioritize investments, we can contain outbreaks before they become pandemics and mitigate and prevent second and impacts. Ld oes plays a key role in pandemic prevention, including through support for the Global Health security agenda. Ghs a, which is still a work in progress, is a partnership of nearly 70 nations, International Organizations, and nongovernmental stakeholders. Oes annually coordinates u. S. Expert implementing agencies to provide carefully targeted programming in priority countries to make Global Health security improvements along specific metrics. At the approach to combating outbreaks is reflected in the United States 2017 National Security strategy, 22 national bio Defense Strategy and the 2019 Global Health security strategy. These are just a few examples of oes wideranging engagement ons Infectious Disease risks, which are crucial to countering biological threats. We greatly appreciate your interest and look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. Thank you. Let me recognize mr. Dash for mr. Ning statement for his opening statement. Thank you for inviting me here today to share how the department of states purity of National Security and nonproliferation works to address some of the most urgent and charging biological threats to u. S. National security. I am honored to appear before you come alongside my collects from the oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs bureau and by my collects from the department of defense. Through diplomatic efforts and foreign assistance programs, the interNational Security and Nonproliferation Bureau works to prevent rogue states, terrorist, and other malign actors from obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction. This National Security and Nonproliferation Bureau has been working hard for nearly 20 years to address challenges posed by the full spectrum of these threats, whether they are deliberately spread, accidentally released or naturally occurring. The covid19 pandemic is a grim reminder of how much damage a single pathogen can cause to u. S. National and interNational Security. Diplomacy, our interNational Security and Nonproliferation Bureau strengthens multilateral frameworks, including the biological Weapons Convention and the australia group. I note that the chairman made remarks on this very issue. This year, as the president of the g7, we are leaving the International Community in making significant progress on biological issues, including issuing g7 statements on the international covid19 pandemic. Pandemic in response. In the global partnership, we have let efforts to launch a dedicated bio security Capacity Building initiative. Has investedisn significant resources into combating the four range of wmd and related Delivery System ver 450 including o million of the past 15 yards towards mitigating biological threats. We have a long and rich history of bio security Capacity Building, where we have trained thousands of foreign partners on bio security in over 50 countries. Threat reduction investments long preceded the pandemic, yet, there contribute into slowing spread. We recognize the early early on the threat that the pandemic posed to interNational Security and begin to quickly incorporate covid19 topics in our trainings, leveraging remote and Distance Learning platforms to deliver critically needed help in a timely manner. We are also in the process of programming an additional 18 million via our nonproliferation and disarmament find towards controlling this pandemic and preventing future catastrophic biological events, as well as adding additional experts to our efforts and expanding the offices we have working on these issues. Representative perry noted that there are limitations to our authorities. I will note that we did propose overcomeuthority to these limitations. We are not alone. We are deeply grateful for the decades of Close Partnership we have enjoyed with our department of defense colleagues. Future, we arehe also working harder to keep pace with the rapidly evolving changes in biotechnology. I note that several of the members indicated concern about this very issue. Let me assure you, the four range of u. S. National full u. S. National security departments are working on and analyzing these efforts. Our National Security and Nonproliferation Bureau is using our diplomatic and Capacity Building tools to prevent the application of dual use technologies to do harm, such as the development of. Biological weapons for example, the chairman noted moments ago the importance of standards and norms to address this issue. In thisndeed working area and have had multilateral dialogues on this issue. In conclusion, we are very proud of the work we do to combat Infectious Disease threats using our diplomatic and foreign assistance tools in support of u. S. National security. We deeply appreciate the support of the congress to provide us with the necessary resources to carry out our Threat Reduction mission. We recognize that our work is far from over. Thank you, chairman, members of the committee. I look forward to your questions. Thank you for your testimony. I would now recognize members for five minutes each and pursuant to house rules, all time yielded is for the purposes of questioning witnesses. Because of the hybrid format of this hearing, recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between democrats and republicans and between both subcommittees. If you miss your turn, please let our staff know and we will circle back to you. If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone and address the chair verbally. I will start by recognize myself or five minutes. Mr. Douffxford and talked about the advances in technology. I look at what we have been able know,with biologics, you conditions, cancers that we would have to treat. We now have therapies and Precision Medicine to often cure some of these cancers and other ailments. I think the vast majority of scientists are pursuing and using this technology for the advancement of common good. I also know those same gene editing techniques and so forth can certainly be used to cause us harm, as well as inadvertently a scientist that may be looking for a cure may inadvertently create something that unintentionally causes harm. In myuched on, as i said opening statement, you know, how do we create these norms and standards for at the core use of this ethical use of this technology in a multilateral way . Also, working with our corporate sector as well. Obviously, our pharmaceutical sector and others are looking for novel therapies. Right now, i get the sense that there really isnt the standard norm. Maybe you can start off from the dod perspective, how we do this in a multilateral way. Forhank you, chairman bera, raising this important set of questions. Indeed technology is advancing very quickly, especially in some parts of the bio sector. We face these problems across with technologies. Almost all technologies have applications for enormous good and can cause substantial harm. We have been working on the issue of norms and standards for over a decade. What we have done is try to work through, amongst other instrumentalities, the National Academies and corporation with National Academies in other countries. We have engaged other International Organizations to try to address the subject. We have also worked in partnership with other governments. We have included working with the corporate sector, and we, for example, we work closely with partners in india. Those outreach and trainings that we do in india, we include both the government sector and the corporate sector, as well as bios, as we try to build security, including through building norms. I think building norms is always challenging. It is probably at least as challenging at the moment in the midst of the pandemic. I take the chairmans point that this is a particularly important area. We will continue to increase our efforts in this area. Chairman bera great. On there touched billions that we have already provided in Global Health security funding and some of the covid19 supplementals. No doubt, as we look to defeat this virus, both domestically through Vaccine Distribution and develop, but also globally, maybe i will look at some of the dod colleagues or mr. Moore, if you want to answer this. As we are spending that, how can we do that in a very strategic way that allows us to Start Building the surveillance tools . What should those tools look like . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Very important. I would just add on the biotechnology front that we view it as a promise and peril scenario. There is a whole love promise a lot of promise. There is a lot apparel, which the human of peril. From a vaccine standpoint, as you asked, it is vitally important that we continue to work as an interagency together. We have also got to provide information, flow information across International Organizations. Those that have been mentioned previously. It is unencumbered upon us incumbent upon us to share the information. We work with partners and allies and expected dependable, clear information to come back. Thats vital. If we are not sharing information, if we are not doing it effectively and clearly, we run the risk of having more severe outbreaks, as the Technology Advances and as the globalized economy increases. Mr. Oxford, do you want to add anything . An implementing organization, we are in position to help train, educate, and enforcement of the norms that would be created. I point out that in todays biological threat world, it is hard to distinguish between nationstate, nonnationstates, and their proxies in terms of who is responsible for these actions. Getting to norms is a much more complicated issue in a past where we had mostly nationstates where we would worry about this. Now, we have a much bigger Playing Field to try to figure out. That complicates attribution and accountability for these kinds of things. I think it is a noble goal, but it is much more complicated in the diverse world we are facing. Chairman bera great. I see my time is up. I may recognize the acting Ranking Member, mr. Perry. Rep. Perry thanks again, mr. Chairman. To our panel, thank you. My question is for mr. Oxford. You just mentioned some of the nonstate actors. Russia,now, in 2018, russian agents used the soviet developed novichok class nerve agent in the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in the united kingdom. It was used again against opposition figure alexey navalny. Its hard to prove, right . We are pretty sure, but its hard to prove. Kind of like the coronavirus in the Wuhan Institute of biology. We got some virology. We got some strong opinions about it but its hard to prove them. How can we or the International Community enforce accountability for state actors who do such things . Mr. Oxford that is a really tough question, as you know. Thats why i mentioned accountability in my previous comment. A lot of this can be denied. The actual scientific evidence, you know, was not necessarily shared immediately with us. We have people in this country that were provided some of the samples. This is about agreements on information comeng so we rapidly together as allies to put the blame where it is necessary. It is a very hard problem, given that we have to spend enough time and effort in this country and bio attribution. We have spent years on nuclear attribution. We have not spent any time on bio attribution. Watching what happened to scrap all and now Sergei Skripal and now, alexey navalny, we tend to think that happens over there, so to speak. The u. K. Is a close friend and ally. I find that exceptionally concerning. I understand. I am sure you are thinking about it. I just dont know if you have any answers. Did you have something to add . Yeah,ould just say that, the further use and seemingly acceptability across the world has to be confronted. Said, thereoxford is significant effort being put into this particle incident across the u. S. Government and across International Community. Efforts are underway to at least. Ork on the International Norm you mentioned threats. From the biological threat perspective, although much information would be required at a higher level, we can say at an unclassified level that russia, at least the state department, has said there is no way to confirm their appearance to the biological Weapons Convention adherence to the biological Weapons Convention. I am pretty sure that china is not adhering to it. It grows and grows in concern. The help of congress and across the interagencies is a vital to get after these threats. Rep. Perry i know its difficult and thats why we are here. We appreciate your efforts in this regard. Any hope any help we can offer. Do you have anything from a recently arrested canadian woman crossing into the United States and mailing the president of the United States and sheriff in texas a letter containing ricin . We have seen the Islamic State procure, i think if there was a mustard gas attack in Northern Iraq 2015 and 2016. When i was in iraq, the stuff was fairly prevalent. It should be no surprise how they found that. Two in those instances, i am just wondering what the status of the illicit chemical weapons trade or bio weapons trade or availability of things like aren, and how you guys working with either overseas counterparts or among each other to, you know, maybe not even overseas. Canada is right across the border. What are you guys doing with those type of things and whats the status of that trade . In the middle eastern area, what we have seen through the counterterrorism activities, we have been able to take most of the chemical expertise of the battlefield, so to speak. They have tried to resurrect periodically. Ricin has been attempted multiple times. Usually, it has never gotten to weapons grade. There is the need to look across a spectrum. The terrorist groups have had this intention. They just havent had the expertise. We need to make sure that they dont gain that expertise. Uff. Perry mr. Do we have worked very closely with International Partners against his particular threat. We also have programmatic elements working in key states o address this specific set of nonstate threats. We have integrated our concerns of wmd into broader International Diplomatic discussions about counterterrorism. We do strengthen International Chemical and biological precursors. In general, i believe the evidence is that much of these andrts uses chemicals precursors that are procured within state. Most of it appears homegrown. My time has expired. I yield. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Can you hear me ok . Chairman bera yes, we can. Very good. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I want to thank our witnesses further testimony on the important work that you are doing in this area on behalf of the country. I want to go back in my opening statement, i talked about the concerns i had about the significant cut to the Reduction Program. Theared to the 2020 levels, cooperative Threat Reduction program was cut by 135 million in the president s budget request is here. Within that program this year. The cooperative biological effort engagement effort was cut the most by over 55 million. Given the pandemic in which we find ourselves, we are alarmed by the department of defenses significant cut to this mission of detecting and confronting biological drugs to the United States. I want to begin, director oxford, this is a program that clearly supports. Would you bel work able to perform if congress is in fact able to restore the fund levels . Y 2020 enacted what other work would you be able to do with her the bio Threat Reduction program, which was cut the most . I want to know how the of theents perspective importance of the Program Evolves over the past six month of the pandemic . Lets start with director oxford. Mr. Oxford thank you, mr. Chairman. We have looked at the programs. We would be able to restore activities in 22 countries with entire 15 of those would be within the btrp program. We can provide the committees of what specific examples of what countries would be restored. We would be able to restore activities on a regional basis with uconn, satcom, as was africom. We would be able to restore some of the regional emphasis in this area, which gives us broader coverage across those regions in question. We would be able to restore in 15ities for btrp countries, as well as those regions are mentioned. We will go through the process, send, senate, and dealing with state appropriations, but it is our intent to restore that funding. On the question of the six months of the pandemic and how it has evolved . We doi could add that want to give appreciation for the longstanding support that this committee, these committees, pardoning, and both sides of the aisle have given towards cooperative Threat Reduction program. Biological that the Threat Reduction program has been operating for over 16 years in over 30 countries doing great work. Months, sohe last 16 the dod effort, obviously, the International Effort is led by her colleagues our colleagues. From a dod perspective, managed through the stability and humanitarian affairs office. Hey manage it over the course of the last six months, nearly 100 million in dod support to over 100 countries. As it relates specifically to btrp, most of the support is historical in nature. A lot of the training, lab support, has been, over the course of the 16 years, to these willing partners. The information flow is what is most final. I can say specifically, you know, for btrp direct funding to in response to covid, its around 7 million. Much of it is ppe, but a lot of it is training. He goes back to the historical relationships of these countries where we provide robust training and information flow. That has been the focus, making sure that these partner countries know they have the reach back resource and that we oxfords team,or can provide that information to partner nations. Director oxford, let me go back to you. We appreciate all efforts to move forward on this covid fight. Can you tell us about the work you have been doing to help with effort r d effort . Describe what you have been able to do. Or have you been him struck because a lack of i think a lot of people have made comparisons between our response to a bowl of ebola versus the covid threat. Ebola was declared as a threat pathogen bydc cdc. We have used our expertise in several ways, using cares act money, we have been able to benefit from the. We have a Program Underway looking at Rapid Assessment of environments. Using wearable technologies, we are looking at identifying the onset of symptoms and illnesses. Our expertise has been applied but not specifically by the defense funding. My time has expired. Thank you. We obviously have some work to do in these areas. We should be able to use those r d funds at a time like this and we will work with you to make sure that happens. Ill back. Let me yield back. My goode recognize friend, the gentleman, mr. Larson. Rep. Larson thank you, mr. Chairman. First question, i think its probably for mr. Oxford. Just wondering if you can help us understand, with regards to the biological threat, kind of response,role is for and then what that role is in terms of contributing to the future thinking about what to do . Are you strictly responding to requests or do you have a role in planning and and proliferating the information about what to do when you plan ahead . We play two roles in the program. The years worth of work that we have done to prepare some of the nations, they were able to rapidly respond. They needed an infusion of capabilities. Morocco specifically, there were 199 Trained Laboratory technicians. With 100,000 worth of ppe, we were able to get them in a situation where they could start doing the response. We are not really a Response Program in that regard, but we were able to benefit from what we have done working with them. We are actually on the cuttingedge of all the research and develop. We are looking forward, as we have made reference to things like synthetic bio, we fully understand based on the Technical Expertise what the nefarious ways that synthetic bio can be used. We are also looking for the offense of advantage that we might gain by understanding the synthetic bio. We do have that forward look through the science and Technology Program that we operate. Point, if on that noted in your testimony, written testimony, you talk about how you are organized in euro in cooperation with the department of defense, rne, research and engineering. Can you discuss that a little bit . Combination of where emerging technologies meet, the discussion about Drone Technology and dissemination of biological agents, maybe you could touch on that, what we ought to be thinking about in the future. Thank you. Appreciate the questions very much. Very important. We are spending quite a bit of time and resources across the department. I mentioned research and engineering. They are vital to the efforts to ensure we have Going Forward what we need, what are war fighters need to fight and win a contaminated environment. They can bio Defense Program is vital to that. With respect to some of these technologies, they are concerning. The departments right size and fitted to respond to them. The way we are organized, at least across the cw md enterprise, quite robust. A number of organizations, as you can imagine, from the joint staff, our policy perspective, to combat and command services. We come together in an effort. Counsel,y of effort threestar level counsel. Dr. Oxford and i participate in the. In that form, we are able to flow these issues up for discussion and decision. It is an area that we can get full information across the department and make decisions at the highest level. We think that is vital to some of these issues that you highlight. Obviously, in this setting, a little harder to get into some of these issues. I know you recognize that. We are resource properly and we are right sized to go after this threat. If i could just follow up on a part of that. You obviously do not run Dods Research and engineering. There is another division. Its pretty high up in the org chart of the pentagon. Do you have that not the opportunity. Thisne come to recognize as a highpriority now . Is this something you have had to battle out with research and engineering in their list of priorities that they have already had . Airlyll, yeah, i speak for regularly with dr. Michelle rosa. Flows us that information on a daily, if not hourly basis. , they are to flex very agile. If we need to adjust to go after a threat, we can do. We do welcome the interest and support of congress in doing so. We welcome giving the support and interest in doing so. Thanks so much. Thank you. Let me recognize the gentleman from the commonwealth of massachusetts. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses. As a member of both Armed Services and foreign affairs, i want to thank you for having this joint hearing. Ask, you know, how theyre sharing that was mentioned by the witnesses before of information is critical. I want to ask, as the covid19 pandemic progressed, and military intelligence followed it, and saw that escalation, from a timeframe, what kinds of levels of alert occurred in january and february during the period . Was there a change in the level of alert based on military intelligence during that period . Andit occur in january february or february . Thank you for that question. In february, secretary esper identified three priorities to combat covid. First, to protect our people. Second, maintain mission readiness. Three, with that came, internally within dod, Different Health protection levels so pretty inly, as you will recall march as relates to the department of defense, we were level whichn reduced the number of folks present at their jobs so with information flow did happen and does happen, we pointed out all of us here today that information flow is vital. While the Intelligence Community can collect information and get it to policy to include congress, there must across of information the entire globe and it must happen from all parties in all countries. We cant expect just the United States sorry, go ahead, please. Was there a level of alert change the corresponded with that . As early as february . February arly as in march, was when the hpcon changed. Rep. Keating was there a change february . 1 alert in that would have been the first time in our history a pandemic raised itself to that level . Did that occur . Sir, i cant tell you the exact date. I would need to get that to you and provide that information to you and the committee. Lets assume that it might have. Transfer that immediately to our state agencies, our agencies of state, state department, and congress . Sir, as you know, the Intelligence Community is quite large so all the organizations have an intelligence portion to them so that information is shared across the Intelligence Community information generally a shared across the intelligence ammunity, so we do that on daily basis and we flow that information back and forth. His keating my concern congress was not notified in as timely a fashion to those back to so can you get the respective committees, tie down that date, and what the significance was . Understandingmy that there was a change. That it understanding was historic in terms of the first time a pandemic was addressed with that level of change, and im concerned about the sharing of information which was flowed to congress, other state department agencies, and the agencies appearing before the committee today because if we are going to do , it is critical. It was my concern that was not being done in a timely fashion so if you get back with us, i would appreciate that. With that, i yield back. Mr. Ross let me recognize recognize mr. Me sherman. There has been discussion by the first Ranking Member to the complicity of the who. It is a chord in aiding organization. It is not an Intel Organization. It has no way to know whether what china is saying is complete and true and transparent or not. Andknow who does have Intel Organization . The United States government and our intelligence is designed to know when china is not telling the truth. In fact, the president was informed this was breaking out in wuhan far more than the Chinese Government indicated. He chose to ignore that intelligence, just as he seems , much to theed unfortunate harm to himself and his wife, ignore the best advice on how to avoid getting this disease and unfortunately, misled millions of americans, as well, into not wearing masks. We spend many hundreds of billions of dollars defending ourselves from kinetic threats and very little on defending ourselves from anything else. We did not have Civil Defense designed for either a deliberate or a naturally occurring plague. We did not have stockpiles of people hpe. The ventilators, though we quickly made some, and we did not have the capacity to do tracing. Factall, in spite of the that the National Security strategy recognized biological incidents the potential to cause loss of life and the threats are growing as the result of deliberate attack, accident, or a natural outbreak, which raises the question and i know we are not in a classified setting what is she Administration Operating assumptions or likelihood, or how we would likelihoods toge the four possibilities as to how this plague begin . We are began . We are told it perhaps came from the wet market and it may have come from the wuhan lab, which engaged in entirely peaceful activities and had a tragic release. It could have come from a wuhan lab engaged in military activities that had unintentional release and least likely, it could have come deliberately from a wuhan lab. Do we have any operating assumptions . Are all of those possible, though i think the deliberate release is highly unlikely . Does the administration think is the cause of this . It is an important question. In the are community and the u. S. Government, are still working right now presently to respond to this crisis, as you sayingerman are you anyone of those possibilities as possible and the u. S. Government doesnt have much of an opinion as to the cause . Do the other witnesses agree . Thank you for the question. You have mentioned four possible scenarios and in discussions in an open forum. There are varying levels of possibility. What we do know is the virus described as covid19 was described in academic research. It was published several years ago including in the peoples republic of china identified as existing in animals. Notic a virus of zoo i origin. Rep. Sherman the idea that it is engineered is probably dismissed, and ill quickly ask, normally when there is a catastrophe the first thing anybody does is close the barn door. China has said this has come from a wet market. There are wet markets all over china. Has there been a massive change in how exotic animals are sold for human consumption throughout china . Mr. Moore that is an extremely important point and something in the purview of the bureau at state. Wildlife trafficking is a huge problem. The peoples republic of china continues to be the largest beensherman hasnt changed from early 2019 to late 20 how these markets operate . Not the fundamental permanent change in blocking of wildlife trade including its sale in which trades. It is a practice that exists in other countries as well and we are working to end it. Rep. Sherman thank you. Rep. Bera let me recognize the gentleman from michigan, mr. Levin. Thank you so much, mr. For convening this important hearing. Spiraled out of control in the United States. The New York Times reported when new york citys cases were skyrocketing in march. The whole world can see this happening, including those who wish to do harm to our country so let me pose this question to mr. Oxford and mr. Moore. Do you think there will be heightened interest on the part instate and nonstate actors biological weapons and if yes, how would the department of states and defense respectively prepare for that possibility. I apologize, sir, the i apologize, the transmission was in concise. What exact question would you like me to respond to . You think there will be a heightened interest on the part of state and nonstate actors in developing and biological weapons against americans and if yes, how will the department prepare for that possibility . With regard to the development of biological weapons, i think that would be better addressed by my colleague from the isn bureau. Questions a difficult to address in an unclassified context. I guess what i can say is that we continually review these issues. Two days agoussion with our colleagues who are experts on these issues. I take your point that the pandemic, as i testified to, n enormous challenged interNational Security and it must inherently be the case that or adversaries, terrorists states, would take that into account in considering how to evolve their weapon systems. Me ask another question. 2017, the cdcs presence in china has decreased 47 personnel to 14. Foundationl science also closed their beijing offices during this time and on top of that, the department of agriculture transferred the transfer of animals out of china in 2018. Past four years, weve gotten rid of a bunch of people who it seems to me would have been helpful to have in place as covid19 was emerging. At the very least, i think it would be helpful to have th reliable sources of information as to what was happening on the ground. Why does the u. S. Have experts like academia epidemiologists in other countries and how does this help prevent threats . From a Defense Department perspective, and implementing organization, we are not responsible for where cdc and others operate overseas so i would have to yield to the state department or go back to those other departments that do those kinds of things. Lets hear the state perspective. We would be pleased to offer who detailed timeline of was assigned under the authority of the chief admission in beijing at what time. I think the context for individual agencies sending staff there or reducing staff there has a lot to do with their needs, budgets, and of course, the viability of the work they can actually do. One of the constraints we face with regard to the peoples stillic of china as we have not received all the data we would need to receive, initial samples of the virus who have that have been soft since the beginning of the pandemic, even at the end of last year. That is extremely problematic, as is the work of the peoples republic of china to prevent the Health Organization from as public concern. Rep. Levin i think it is extremely problematic for us to talk about what the who should do when we withdraw from it. It is extremely problematic for us to reduce our capability of scientific and diplomatic and Public Health expertise in china and around the world during a Global Pandemic, and with great thanks, i yield back, mr. Chairman. Rep. Bera thank you, mr. Levin. The chair recognizes for five minutes. Shes having some technical issues. Ok. Im told there are other members suggest ould imld we recess right now, waiting to hear back from committee staff. Mr. Chairman, this is represented in larsson, im the only member in the right now and representative beras voting and we are trying to get staff to answer your question about his return. Perhapsrecess right now and come back in a few minutes. Ill ask another question that i have right now. Until we get her back on, i will give it to her but in the meantime, let me go to mr. Oxford. There might have been direction to not spend Program Funding on the covid19, which troubles me. Though it specializes in developing countermeasures and vaccines, therapeutics, and pretreatments. What do you need from us to ensure that you have the ability to rise toes needed the challenge of emerging threats both today and tomorrow, and is there work you could be inng now to help the country the covid19 fight that you dont currently have the ability or position to do . Thank you, mr. Chairman. For your first question, there is no prohibition or preclusion. The primary focus is on statutory requirements to develop and deliver capabilities and insure the war fighters ability to fight and win in a chemical or biological contaminated environment. The covid19 support provided to the services interagency is a combination of subject matter, expertise, leveraging existing contracts to expedite the delivery of capabilities, assisting with testing and from helping to create detection, diagnostics, methods tont, investigating vaccines, the bio Defense Program continues to elaborate with the whole of government partners, industry, and academia. It is important to note the bio Defense Program is a Research Development and Acquisition Program and not necessarily a response capability, but i will say to your followon question, that the congress has been exceptionally helpful to the program. Historically, and over the last number of years, and so the support we would ask for is continued support for the program. We appreciate the information flow between our department and i think i can say the same for the state department and between our staff, it is exceptional and we look forward to continuing the communication flow. No additional authorities you are looking for asking for rhino . Right now . At the moment, we are good. Our staff has communicated historically and i hope they can continue to do that and if we do identify an issue or an authority necessary, we will be absolutely certain to bring that to you and your team. Rep. Langevin ok. Thank you. That concludes my questions for right now. Has the minority returned yet . Mr. Chairman, this is rick larsen, still the only member in the room. Rep. Langevin thank you, mr. Larson. I yield them out to the sandberg now if she has returned. I understand she is not on can you hear me . I have you now. Go ahead. I recognize you for five minutes. Thank you to the witnesses for being here. I appreciate your time and presence. I have a question about staffing related issues. A former c. I. A. Officer, i am aware of the importance of detecting threats before they harm americans and the threat of biological security, as well. We have to get ahead of them before they do significant damage and we have to work with partners so no matter where a threat arises, we can contain it. Of responding to these threats are understaffed, it is hard to get ahead of the problem. Members of thel panel. National security agencies have suffered from vacancies in the given howears and long federal hiring can take, likely for years. If limiting zika limited impedingited staffing your work . And a specific callout, do trouble recruiting staff with the specialized skills needed to reduce biological severity security threats and i open that up to the panelists . Thank you, congresswoman. It is an ageold issue, employing the right staff. I would say from a cwnd perspective, we have a talented team. Professionals from career civilians of professionals from career civilians to government contractors. It would be hard to speak across the department, but we are right sized. Forre always on the lookout talent, so we will continue to do that and continue, if we can find talent, to bring them in the doors. Ill defer to my other colleagues. Operate a highly technical organization. Hours recruitment our recruitment and retention strategy is healthy but we continue to look for additional talent as necessary but so far, rates are going steady so in a chem by a defense we operate as well as our rnd organization r and d, it is very sound. Bureau,half of the oes outstanding and expert team of civil service, longterm colleagues, and Foreign Service colleagues unusually twoyear excitement assignments. In recent months, we have been able to add to staffing and bring on permanently a number of colleagues, including fellows and the American Association for the advancement of science. Standinga long relationship so we benefit from their Technical Expertise. For the team is doing an outstanding job dealing with covid on the homefront and of course working on it professionally. I would echo the remarks of my colleagues. I think vacancies have not been a substantial challenge in our part of the department on this issue. We have been increasing our staff. Weve added experts using a special authority the department has provided in this regard, and weve added to the staffing of the offices that deal with biological issues. I think in general, we dont have staffing challenges. Have a Great Partnership and fellowships to bring Technical Expertise, but recruiting technical specialists is sometimes a challenge and that is probably the one area where, at times, it has been a bit of a challenge for us. Rep. Spanberger thank you very hopefor sharing that and i you can recruit to the Staffing Levels necessary. I will ask for the next portion, because it will direct what my followup question is. By a show of hands, to your teams participate in war game exercise to try to prepare for potential biological security risks . If you could just raise your hand if you do, because my follow up question depends very much on if it is divided. Two from here. With the majority participating in wargames, do you and your colleagues brought upon the modeling and simulation analysis to think through what quickly changing threats could look like and how to respond . What have you learned from these exercises more recently . Andt relates to covid19, my time is limited so if one of you wants to take this one, i welcome you all to choose who goes next. Congresswoman, this is mr. Oxford. One of the things we do to sustain capability overseas with the people weve trained in bio response, we do exercises periodically to make sure they are maintaining readiness. It is one of the ways we transfer the responsibility of the ctr program to host nations. The exercises and training are an aspect of understanding the retention is there. Thank you very much and thanks for the extra time. I yield back. Thank you. Additionale are no members who have questions. It is always difficult in this hybrid, in person format and on top of that, votes getting called. I will make a closing statement and see if the chairman would like to make a statement, as well, but maybe a closing question. The issue of bio surveillance, it is something of thought a lot about in terms of pandemic of how we uses, naturally occurring technologies out there, social media, search words, google, etc. All of a sudden, you see a jump in people searching incidents of fever or flulike symptoms, etc. Some of that can be Early Warning systems for us to pay close attention. Wireless their monitors, etc. Or thinking about how in the midst of the pandemic, but what are Early Warning systems for naturally occurring threats that are already widely in use. Folks comment on how we should be thinking about that . It is an exceptional question and and all of the above approach. Weve all talked today about the information sharing. That is vital, fundamental if we are going to ensure we are detecting, interdicting, specifically on this issue detecting threats and flowing that information globally. Is working with our interagency colleagues like we do on a daily basis here. It is also working with our International Friends and doliffs, and i know phil had mentioned the that is an effort that can provide information flow to dozens of countries around the world, so the all of the above approach is necessary and it has to require information flow. Mr. Chairman, as you recall, i talked about regional approaches. When we started the ctr program, it was mainly nationstate programs. This allows for information sharing across regional boundaries so enhances the protection with the regions as opposed to looking at this solely by country. It really does help in the broader understanding. I think the chairman raises a very good point, that we have a whole set of emerging tools that can greatly add to information sharing and bio surveillance. We learned during the pandemic how to expand the toolset that we have two additional tools. Uganda and, in africa, theire are cell phone tools we use now. We are taking to advance trying to take advantage of the set out there and the chairman noted there is infrastructure being billed to deal with this built to deal with this pandemic and new technologies being integrated in the bio surveillance. This is a good example of how we need to build out our capabilities and data flows to capture all of the information available. Thank allly want to four of our witnesses for their service to our country and again, make sure everyone is safe and we will get through this, but lets get through this in a more resilient way and a stronger way and a way we can protect from the next pandemic. I know the chairman is still on and if he wants to make any closing statements. Andhank you, mr. Chairman, thank you for your joint collaboration and putting this hearing together. Certainly it was an important hearing. I want to thank our witnesses portfolios, of your whether it is weapons of mass , the witnesses in your portfolio, these are essential capabilities you bring to the table that are important to the nation and the world. We have work we will continue to do together. We need the plans and procedures in place to respond effectively and rest assured, there will be some future event we will have to confront and we want to make sure we are as prepared as possible to respond with speed. Nd agility necessary keep people healthy and protect the country, so with that, i thank you for the work you are doing. Members may have additional questions and i ask that you respond in writing expeditiously. I have no further questions and yield back. Rep. Bera thank you, chairman langevin. Our thoughts and prayers are with everyone around the world who is impacted by covid19 and with our president and first lady and the first family. With that, i want to thank the witnesses for being here this morning and the hearing is adjourned. [gavel] has toptv on cspan 2 nonfiction books and authors every weekend. Indepth, astern on twohour live conversation with Harvard University professor jill lapoor. On afterwards, foxbusiness host lou dobbs talks about the trump century or code century. Mp watch book tv this weekend on cspan 2. The house agreed friday to a and thecondemning qanon group conspiracy theories after several members of congress were threatened by the groups followers. The vote was 37118 with one Voting Member present. 1154. The speaker pro tempore without objection. Ms. Jayapal mr. The gentlewoman from washington is recognized. That have spread on the internet over the last several years. These conspiracy theories undermine public trust in our democratic institutions, and our election process. And that is why i am pleased to support this important bipartisan resolution by representatives malinowski and riggleman. Qanon initially alleged that prominent americans are engaged in a secret plot to