Of a diplomat is a sell them to solve a problem. You occasionally get the opportunity to negotiate an arms agreement that solves a part of the program, but even all of the arms control agreements between the u. S. And the soviet union never ended the tensions between the two systems, the two peoples, the different senses of ambition. We manage to we manage situations so they do not get out of hand. It is hard to define complete and total success when you are looking mostly at keeping the status quo or a slightly improved status quo. And it is hard to give credit for things that happen because people say they whether not happen anyway. It seemsthe jcpoa to me to have been a pragmatic attempt by the Obama Administration to deal with one of the Serious Problems of the iranian threat a potential nuclear program. It did not deal with proxies, Ballistic Missiles, it did not touch on religious minorities, things that people may have wanted to see included in the deal because the Obama Administration decided it would not be able to lump all of these things in one agreement and have a successful conclusion. They necessarily pulled back the scope of the agreement they were working on have success where they thought success was possible and where there was international consensus. You saw what happened there was a broad perception that said this was a failed agreement. I do not think it was a failed agreement because it was a good application of internationally coordinated sanctions on iran. It was an incomplete agreement that only dealt with a part of the perceived problem. That is the problem we have to deal with. Anne i think that is right. Not the official obama explanation, but i always thought of the jcpoa as a bet. It would take the Nuclear Issue off the table and in the next 10 years the old boys would die off. Obama administration towards the end of its tenure explored and talked about those things with iran, either it would be counter narcotics, whether it would be a scientific exchange, whether there were things we could do to bring them back. Re was no illusion that those were always seen way down the road. Can i ask you something on the jcpoa . I think it has some past lessons. There were mistakes made before and after the jcpoa, before in the sense that we started in oman that was critical to the success of the nuclear deal early on, but i think that already burned the gulf countries and israel to a certain extent because they thought we were trying to deal with the iranians behind their back and this was by definition going to come at their expense. So now we had to try different scenarios of trying to new encourage the gulf countries to negotiate with iran on their own or negotiate with iran behind our back. I think it is the case right now. Lesson of the jcpoa is that these two processes should happen in parallel. You cannot have a separate armscontrol negotiation and a discussion about the region in his subsequent stops. These things have to happen in parallel subsequent steps. Things things have to happen in parallel. Second i think after the jcpoa we also committed the mistake in order to alleviate the concern of the gulf countries he sold them billions of dollars worth of arms. That exacerbated irans a sense of conventional weapons asymmetry in the region, push them to double down on their support for proxies in the region, which for the which which the Trump Administration used as evidence that it was a bad decision. A bad deal. It is a self licking ice cream cone. If the u. S. Were to engage the iranians on aspects of missile development, regional behavior, of maximumathway out pressure, what should the regional priorities be . About to the iranian presence in iraq . Should it be about yemen . Should it be about afghanistan . If the u. S. Were to try to take this pathway on the regional picture, or even the relationship with saudi arabia, who needs to be reassured and what kind of reassurance what they find reassuring . The questions do not get easier. Have the gulf countries been schizophrenic recently. I think what they want is for the u. S. To sort of keep iran in a box and poke at them periodically. What they did not want and this is where the escalation in the gulf scared them, they did not want a shooting war. Became worried about that they became worried about that. Our response was inconsistent and incoherent. That precipitated terror ran an to cut their own deal. I think they are in a state of great anxiety right now about what our policy is. They do not quite know what to do about it. What thee interested other panelists have to say. Week. As in abu dhabi last i was speaking to the diplomatic the Defense College and in both places there was a lot of interest in the topic that and earlier. Entioned be made more effective and many of the questions were about, what can we do to bring them back in because the schism in the gulf and the search for strategic depth anywhere outside of the region specifically with turkey is causing competition in public parts of the region. There was a beginning of an idea how can we reunite the gulf . What does abu dhabi have to do to bring the countrys back in and form a unified position on iran . We do not want to do this separately. An intermediate step of continuing what this administration has done to try to help the members of the gcc unify themselves. Secretary new kuwaiti who seems energetic, but there is a mechanism that can provide a political push that may also provide us a more effective way to canvass the countries of the gulf, get them on the same page as us. As we look at these other strategic questions we half to address. The two diplomats did not identify any regional behaviors we should address. View was that would be yemen. I think of all of of lebanon and all the other places, that is still probably the easiest because irans a strategic interest is the least. Here is this country, it is sort of like keeping the iranians off the arabian peninsula. Not in government anymore, the strategic picture may have shifted in the last few years. Thatu can add to beginnings of security conversations with our european allies and with israel. How could we get back into negotiations or discussions on a Nuclear Weapons agreement, a 2. 0. To pino discussion, in this it is going to be pretty clear that israel and the gulf states are going to want to move quickly as part of that or on a separate track toward Security Issues support for proxies, ballistic mode Ballistic Missile programs. There are two separate paths there. I think yemen as president macron was pushing for in the summer, may be a way into some discussions that could then be broadened where there is international i think the United States should be working with our traditional allies in europe, asia, and with israel to develop that consensus. We can help shape that consensus if we put an effort and to define longerterm goals. Do you think the iranians are willing to have serious conversations about proxies . Whenever i talk to iranian officials about regional activities, they tell me they support political parties. They are supporting democracy. It is not a breast merging of the iranians, it is apus merging of us for trying to put down is not a deaf ali it depends on what they get in return. When we are talking about proxies not all proxies are the same, especially the ones were very close to iran or have the alliance you have between two nato allies, it all depends on what kind of support we are willing to provide. This almost amounts to blasphemy if you say it out loud in the city, but i would argue if the iranians are able to buy fighter jets from russia, it would actually reduce their reliance llah. S below hesbo the proxiesnk about system, it ison different. I ran once restore the persian empire iran wants to restore the persian empire in a shift shiahhis time in formed this time. Yemen isnt a strategic priority. Or iran the question is what what they get out of it . If we define this the way the saudis have defined to this right now, which i think is problematic, the way of removing the card from irans hand, so iran cannot use the houthis, i think the iranians will try to be the spoiler. Way thatolves in a would help the iranians also get a ceasefire with the u. S. , then so may some economic reprieve, just enough to help them keep their head maybe that ishen something they can consider. When we think about diplomacy, if we still think about it in zero some terms, it is going to backfire. Terms, it is going to backfire. Think any of us any of this saudi, iranian rivalry can be completely resolved. I think it is an important question of how much can we expect it to be mitigated . Of a workingt relationship . Of i do not one to say the floor what should our realistic aspirational goal be for the nature of saudiiranian ties . It was that way for decades with the two pillars. Was before a different iranian government, but it is not inconceivable to me it is not inconceivable that you could go back to some kind of live and let live scenario, but you certainly cannot go aback to it under the current scenario go back to it under the current scenario for all the reasons that ali has outlined. The Obama Administration explored and talked about these, some kind of confidence building measures. One of the worries we havent talked about was the saudis and. Ranian influence we could get to some iranian confidence building measures, but it is impossible under the current situation. Is the waye argument to the u. S. Is trying to send the opposite signal to reduce our presence in the region. The Obama Administrations strategy was to let the region come to its own equilibrium. The question is what that journey looks like and whether the equilibrium that gets struck is one we find desirable or even acceptable. Weglas one of the issues have to deal with that is difficult is iran conducts policy on two different levels. It conducts a state to state policy, but it also conducts policy through proxies and support for nongovernmental groups in many parts of the world, including asia and across the globe. One thing that has to happen from the standpoint of the gulf, may be israel, and probably the Trump Administration is to draw this question into the discussion in some way. To a large extent, i think the with an to kill solemani drone strike was to show iran that there were actual consequences for iranian officials to their unofficial proxy lead policies, at least in iraq. Killing ofent the solemani has rifted the bandaid off this idea that we will in our policy separate between what iran does and what to iranian supported groups do. That will be one of the biggest problems in terms of addressing security unless iran can be brought into this discussion dry broader Regional Security through a broader Regional Security paradigm or it that conceives of a role for iran in Regional Security. For thisery difficult administration. I think that will be very difficult for the gulf state. I do not know enough about israeli policy toward iran and the gulf to know if the israelis can accepted, i think that is a big leap. Step. Not a first it has to come further down in the process. But maybe yemen is a first step into that much longer discussion. Would make two points at is i think if you look the iransaudi relations, i do not think they are bound to be enemies forever. Maybe they are bounded to be rivals, but not necessarily enemies. We have seen this in other regions of the world. You look at south germany and argentina and latin america, it is not an unusual setting. Brazil, solution argentina, and latin america. It is not an unusual setting. The question is how we get there. I argued that it is the same way complex or impossible to resolve issues when we put our finger on one side of the scale. The fact that we put our finger on the sunni side of the gulf is part of the issue reason this issue cannot be resolved. When we have tried to bring about some kind of balance like the Obama Administrations second term, it has been done in ways that have actually exacerbated the situation. At this stage i think it is very the onlyo think that deescalation that has occurred in the past few years in the region have been as a result of the uae thinking the u. S. Is unreliable. That is very telling. The only positive thing that has happened because of that not because of anything positive the u. S. Has done. John and i were in they mentioned the saudis have sent a message. I followed up later apparently the message was sent to through the iraqis. A b there should be a Security Dialogue between iran, saudi arabia maybe there should be a Security Dialogue between iran, and saudi arabia. It was because of u. S. Pressure. In the u. S. Interest, without any doubt, it would be to pushing others into some kind of dialogue. You have to start somewhere. Kissinger was initially not on board with the process, but let it happen. Thinking that the u. S. Has nothing to lose would still do its own diplomacy with the soviets, but let these other countries have their dialogue. See countries like oman and kuwait who try hard to figure a the realescalate, but obstacle is the Trump Administration. Why dont we go to the audience for a couple of questions. Wait for the microphones. Right here in the front. I am wondering would you identify yourself . Penn estate university. I am on the advisory board. My question penn state university. I am on the advisory board. You think the government in iran is getting ready to drink the poison . The reason i say that is going back to how many going back to drink the poison and make a deal. The past election last friday the voters were offered the populist. It was no doubt that the conservatives will have a takeover of everything. The gives the government capability of making a deal without having to explain anything, so like nixon going through china. Do you all think that is a possibility and if it is what should the u. S. Policy be to address that. . The macron. Ibook past the microphone. I am henry. I need have to ask i have to is helping out iran with the drones and it shouldnt we be talking to that nation as well . And shouldnt we be talking to that nation as well . On the domestic political iran, i doiron not think the system is becoming more monolithic. Once you get the conservatives in control of all levers of power, which is the movie we the same thinge, happened, there was political apathy by the middle class, they did not go out to vote. The system used that context to disqualify a lot of the moderates knowing the backlash would be limited. The department was taken never by the hardliners and then the presidency was taken over by an ultraconservative. Lot of infighting inside the iranian government. It did not turn it into a monolith. It is happening now is the system is closing down because it feels it is under siege from all sides. Maximum pressure from their perspective is not just an economic course. It is multidimensional. Jon said, survival is victory into they are trying to survive by trying to close down the circle of elites in decisionmaking positions. That does not mean they would not want a deal. In fact i think they wanted a deal with President Trump in september. There is a misconception about drinking the poison chalice in this town. People do not understand that when they drink the poison chalice, he did not compromise on the principles of the regime, but he did guarantee the survival of the regime. President trump signal to the iranians that the only deal acceptable to them is a deal that would come at the cost of the Islamic Republics survival and that is never going to happen. It does not matter who is in charge in tehran, so long as they believe they cannot get into a mutually beneficial relationship with a Trump Administration provenht iranians have the iranians have proven over the years, obviously they have gotten some help from outside syria, north korea, some cooperation from china russia overall, this is a nation of 80 million. It has topnotch universities. They have actually been able it has been forced to develop some indigenous capabilities that has created some degree of deterrent. You are you talk to israeli officials for instance after the attack on saudi aramco. There was some rethinking about the balance of deterrence in the region because this technique of cruise missiles and swarming tactics these , 15,000 drones if these are used against israeli critical sites like the chemical , itt or the Nuclear Plant is a major game changer. Creates questions for israeli officials like do we address this now or wait 10 years . At the risk of a major backlash that could happen after you take action now . Side, how far do push without the risk of getting yourself or your military leaders vulnerable, sub septa ball to retaliation susceptible to retaliation yucca we are in a pattern susceptible to retaliation . We should not expect the weaker party, which is iran in this case, to unilaterally capitulate or give away cap picture late giveaway capabilities it sees as necessary to National Security. Aboutk to your question the hardliners taking over iran. I think ali is basically right. So long as there is only pressure to pull down the regime, it will not amount to much. Is thing i would like to see a better articulated and more consensus u. S. Foreign policy on iran itself. See issaw and still divided opinions. Some people are hoping that economic pressure on iran will create a cause of the regime. The Islamic Republic will fall into Something Else will come in its place but it cannot be as bad. Some are looking for changes in iranian policies. Ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, support for proxies. These strategies for these two are different, but i think we are mixing them all up together. I am not confident whenever i think about how easy iran will be to negotiate with, i pull up the iranian constitution and read the preamble, which is antiamerican. They talk about supporting the oppressed of the world against the oppressors. Theres a lot in the basis of the iranian state, which supports a radical iranian polic