E spoke about military and his is 45 minutes. There is a reward for your patience. Welcome the retired fourstar germ who commanded u. S. Forces afghanistan and 41nation contingent there. From march 20162018. Longest span that anyone commanded those forces and he has been described as one of the leading experts in the battlefield situation in that country. We are going to have a conversation as informal as we can sitting here under bright lights and microphones where we will go through issues that came up this morning with regard to the diplomatic domain and then the military domain and open the floor to questions. In order to keep this organized and not distract from your meal, you will find cards in the middle of your tables. Please write our questions on the cards. They will be gathered up and find their way up here one way or the other. With no further ado, general, thank you very much for being here. Let me pose the most awkward question i can to begin with in part because it is complimenter temporary. You have been described as a warrior diplomat. Im interested in giving the conversations we had this morning and your perceptions on how that process works, right . You have been on the ground with diplomatic counterparts and trying to determine how to move forward. What is that process like for you . Do you have advice in terms of best practice and how to proceed . First off, thanks, bill and thanks to the meriedian universities of michigan and va. That term im uncomfortable in the presence of such distinguished diplomats in the room and i wouldnt present sume to adopt that title but it illustrates that a conflict, pulled into this space where you have to deal with the political environment and numerous examples from my time in afghanistan. My role is to lead a coalition of 41 nations. So by by that mere fact alone, you are involved and each of those nations have its domestic political revolutions and a number of governments change. During the course of the time i was commander and you are drawn into these conversations with each of the allies. With respect to their commitments. Additionally, we are working in a sovereign country, in afghanistan, dealing on a daily basis multiple times with the leaders of that government. You have to be aware of the political realities and diplomatic realities. The outcomes we dealt with were delivered through political means. For example, every two years, nato will have a summit and in my time in command were two in 2016 and 2018 and it was critical to the future of afghanistan. In that summit, the alliance agreed on the extension of Security Assistance to the afghan assistance for four more years and once that political outcome was achieved, then he we could do the military opportunity. Many, many examples. Another example and i say given the political side, the effect of domestic politics in afghanistan on the fight and so, a good story to illustrate that point would be in the summer of 2016 and we had some political tensions at the governmental level. There was a concern there might be fracturing of the government, which could find its way into the Security Forces. So as the Coalition Commander and as one of those involved in advising and assisting the forces, the cohesion of the Afghan Security forces was essential to the outcome. If that cohesion is threatened by other forces, political rivalry, tribal differences, et cetera, that could put our security gains at risk. This is a point where we engaged with afghan political leaders from the government and the opposition to not allow their political differences and with full respect to the political process dont allow those things to find their way into the Security Forces and i respected that. These are how routinely leaders of coalitions, be they be american are brought into the political space. I wonder if you could say a little bit how you work with a partner like afghanistan one of the themes that came up throughout the morning is aid without dependency is the way i would summit up. But this idea that you would provide support advise and assist without creating dependency of a nature that vulnerability if and when the u. S. Pulls back and what the proper sequencing and how you empower local institutions and all of those important things. There is always going to be some amount of dependency because the funding is coming from donor nations and the United States. So really cant get around that level of dependency because the ability of the Afghan Government to sustain a Security Force is a longer term undertaking. But the president was focused on that. We have frequent conversations on how to reduce the amount of money that was costing the United States in terms of the Security Forces to reduce the bill he was asking other nations to pay. So the other thing i would point out, if you take a stip back from the conflict and we had a 140 Coalition Forces and today we have 20,000 Coalition Forces, it is the Afghan Security forces that are bearing the brunt of the fight and they are willing to do that. So dependency is not just financial. They have taken the fight to the end. When we came out of the wausau summit with four more years of Security Assistance, one of the things we did is do an assessment, what was working, what was not working and what needed to be fixed and he was cognizant of that time line and how we could deliver more of a selfsustaining Security Force by that time. Of course, the best way to deliver is to lower the level of violence and a Peace Agreement and enduring Peace Agreement would lead to a lower level of violence which would make them. And clearly the issue on dependency as well. Before we move on to another question, i want to say this, the Afghan Security forces deserve tremendous credit and dont get the credit they are due in terms of their willingness to continue to take the fight to the enemy to improve on their weaknesses. Ill give you an example. When we talked about what was working and not working, some of the outcomes of that were to double the Afghan Forces and doubling of the Afghan Air Force and go after corruption and leadership deficiencies inside the Afghan Security forces and president ghani with great strength of will went after. Hose things at great political the inhernt was to retire officers that were above the international norms, but give them some sort of a retirement that they could look forward to so we could bring in the next generation of younger leaders. The typical afghan leaders were 1015 years older. With all of the things that would come with that, energy levels, willing to take risks. Additionally on corruption. President ghani turned over everyone who was in the supply system was removed and replaced. That could lead to a shortterm problem as you try to get new problem and learning new systems. The more prone they were tore corruption. The doubling of the special forces and the more than doubling of the air force made a big difference on the battlefield and seeing it more, went from 0 Commando Companies to 60 Commando Companies. The effectiveness of the air force have been tremendous. There are Success Stories that are contributing to a lack of a dependence and ability to take over the fight on their own. I was pleased with the willingness of the afghans attack of these issues. I know you didnt serve in iraq personally. Im curious as i think all of us are veterans of these lunches and conversations, if you move this time line back a bit and talk about iraq people wouldnt have present districted how those forces withered in the faces of the challengeses they faced and policy makers were set back when they did. Im curious what you sort of see as the key distinctions here. Clearly you think the Afghan Forces have done well and admirably. What have we done better . What is the cultural distinctiveness . What are the key components we should be learning as a country . I never served in iraq and cant speak firsthand. I served six years in afghanistan. But i can tell you about the perceptions that existed in afghanistan. When people saw what was happening in iraq, they said lets not let that happen here. This is a social issue and i would say inside the enemy camp as well. And i believe this has been a motivation on the part of the taliban in negotiations, they dont want to see afghanistan generate into a scenario where sis gained a foothold. This will expecter of a civil war and syrialike scenario, i think proved to be an incentive for some people and deterrent for not allowing this to happen, point number one. Secondly, the Afghan People have endured four decades of war. And yes, the others in the middle east have endured long wars. This has been crushing. The misery and suffering of the Afghan People has produced a country that desires peace and ready for peace and see the International Community are the ones that achieve a peace that they cant achieve on their own. The express of International Support for them and these expressions are extremely important. In 2016 when the u. S. Had been talking about, at one point, a complete withdrawal of u. S. Forces by the end of 2016, instead what we saw in the summer of 2016 was a renewal of commitment for another four years. I think this helped to strengthen the will of the Afghan People and the relevant parties to stay with it. But again, overall i dont think neither the people of afghanistan nor the neighbors want to see a complete collapse and the kind of situation you had in iraq. Certainly the military i know feels strongly about that. So, i hope that this is enough to keep it but i touched upon the social issues and other issues. And this is something i do want to highlight. We tend to, i think, westerners look at things through a political or a military or diplomatic lens. But the social pressure for peace, the religious pressure for peace inside afghanistan is significant. And should not be discounted in all of this. We saw the Peace Movement start after the south asia policy was announced and then we saw some incidents occur which led to a Peace Movement which really spontaneously started to spread around the country to different provinces, different ethnic groups, different locales. This coupled with the religious movement by the ulamah of afghanistan to declare a fatwa against suicide bombing and declare that the war was not jihad, so we saw levels of engagement for peace beyond just the ones that we tend to think of in the west. Philip so building on that, when you were there, you negotiated or were part of negotiating the first ceasefire in the country and so i have a sense of your view on kind of the parameters for what peace and negotiation might entail. But one of the key things this morning in our discussions with this was this idea of selfreinforcing deals. That in the longer term, no third party was going to be able to be in a position to enforce a deal between the taliban and the government and other entities. So this needed to be something that was attract to have all parties. Mr. Nicholson broadly philip broadly speaking, what do you see as sort of the negotiating space that would won dane deals that would be potentially of contain deals that would be potentially of that description, satisfying to all parties . What are the key parameters . Mr. Nicholson thanks. First off, its a very tough job that ambassador khalil and his team have undertaken. Im deeply grateful that hes been willing to take this on and that the u. S. Government is so committed to it. This is extremely important. What were getting at, i believe, is what are the elements of an enduring peace . If it were something that was simply about a troop withdrawal and a renunsation of al qaeda, i dont believe renunsation of al qaeda, i dont believe that would be enduring. So there are reasons that the social gains that have been made in afghanistan need to be discussed as part of this. And, to some extent guaranteed as part of this. Why do i say that . Because i dont believe it will be an enduring peace settlement if these issues are not addressed. To simply negotiate a deal that allows for the withdrawal of International Forces and some sort of renounceation of terrorism in my view will not last. And so it wont be enduring and therefore it wont protect our security interests, nor will it protect the gains that need to be preserved inside afghanistan. Inside afghanistan, again, back to the social pressure and the religious pressure, there are demands by the Afghan People for this dialogue to occur with the taliban. Ive sat in many shuras throughout afghanistan, but one that was most striking was in kandahar, with the women shura in kandahar, talking about and they saying, look, let us talk to these guys. We know them. We know who they are. Theyre from our families. Many of them are our cousins. We know how to talk to them about these issues. And we know how to work towards a solution. And so there was a hunger on the part of many, many afghans and from civil society, social groups, to talk to the taliban. And we saw peace marches occur where groups out down in kandahar, of course from helmand all the way to kabul, of civilians who were not aligned with the government, not aligned with the coalition, not aligned with the taliban but aligned for peace. And so there is a Strong Demand for this dialogue. So this what were calling the interafghan dialogue is really this conversation that has to be in my view, at the core of any enduring solution. So these issues need to be discussed between the parties that will be there when were all gone, and, to your point, this is what will produce a selfreinforcing peace. Now, if it one of our primary interests, of course, is that afghanistan not be a haven for terrorists to launch attacks on us or elsewhere in the west. So that is a legitimate security interest that we have and it needs to be preserved as well. Can they do that . I believe that the afghans could. And if the violence between the taliban and the government were lowered, and they dealt with their differences through political means, then this would allow taking the fight in a more concerted manner to groups like isis and others before they would spread. However, these simply having an agreement that gets u. S. Troops out of there, Coalition Troops out of there, and renunsation of terrorism to me is not going to be enduring. So the sequencing of these issues and some conditionality being applied to these issues, in my view, is extremely important. Let me give you an example. A troop withdrawal is verifiable. U. S. Troops get on a plane to leave the country, everybody sees it, its covered by the media. Thats verifiable. A ceasefire is verifiable. If you have a universal ceasefire as we did in 2018, then you know, if theres violence in certain areas or not, and hopefully you can figure out if there is violence, who caused it. The renunsation of terrorism is less verifiable. So how do you ensure that because someone even if they say they renounce their ties with al qaeda, how can you verify that they truly have renounced their ties with al qaeda . So do we trade a verbal final thing, a troop withdrawal, for a less remember final thing . Or do you align a verifiable troop withdrawal with a verifiable ceasefire which then provides space and time for the interafghan dialogue to occur . So not again, not second guessing the negotiating process, because its very, very difficult and theres many, many factors. International, regional, national, etc. But the elements and their sequencing and the maybe the conditionality of a staged withdrawal tied to certain verifiable actions i think would have the promise of being thats uring than one simply negotiated our withdrawal. Philip let me tie these points together a little bit with a more specific aspect of any resolution. And reject this premise, if youre inclined to. But it seems that the incorporation of the taliban into the military and or police of afghanistan is an inevitable part of any durable solution. Thats the premise, again, reject if you disagree. But id love to hear why. What do you think thats going to do in terms first of all, how would that be accomplished, foast accomplished most effectively . And what would it do in terms of some of the points you were bringing up before about this carefully developed cohesiveness and effectiveness, particularly in some of the units youve described, in the air force and the special forces . Do those have to be kept sacrosanct . How does one frankly kind of protect this house of cards thats been built over time from what is a fundamental cultural change potentially that would have to be part of a negotiated settlement . Mr. Nicholson its a good question. Its a hypothetical. I dont want to second guess what general miller and his team are doing now. Having been gone over well over a year now, from the theater, this is not a question that we were deep into on my time. But fundamentally, if you have a peace deal, and you have a process by which reconciliation is occurring inside the social fabric of afghanistan, then this reduces the potential for tension inside all the institutions of government. Not just the military forces. The other thing id say is it would allow a focus on common enemies. So isis is a common enemy for both the Afghan Government and the taliban. And so in one sense it would enable a degree of cooperation. Again, obviously, theres much to be worked out here on how this would occur. So i personally havent thwarted any ideas on how youd go about doing that. I think i would point to the fact that the Afghan Military today is an int