Maybe we will get some conversation going. We will say the last part of our time in the session for questions from the audience save the last part of our time in the session for questions from the audience. Let me quickly introduce our group. The. Ght is we have the Principal Assistant deputy administrator at nsa, where he runs the defense program. Anita is the acting system secretary of state from the bureau arms and control. Im very pleased that we can gather the screw. This group here. Greg, going to start with then we will go to phil, anita. Greg, over to you. Greg what i thought i would do in my brief remarks is give you a little more insight into the tookach that 3 departments in conducting the Nuclear Posture review over the last year. Generalemphasize what hyten said. This is a threatbased and strategy based review. I will talk more about the approach that we took and how we did that. Onant to focus my brief time giving you a little more understanding of the rationale behind what i guess is the most controversial recommendation of the Nuclear Posture review, which is our recommendation to acquire 2 additional capabilities that expand the range of low yield Nuclear Options in the u. S. Arsenal. Let me start by walking you through how we did this review. When we were tasked by the president , the department was tasked with doing this review, it said nothing about what the answer should be come other than to ensure that the United States would end up having a Nuclear Deterrent that was effective in the 21st century, and against 21st century threats. We started out by doing a very extensive intelligence deep dive. What does the 21st century security environment look like from the perspective of Nuclear Issues . I would argue that this Nuclear Posture review took a longerterm view of the International Security environment than any previous one. That is because this is the first posture review that has ever been contacted right at the nd of a comprehensive modernization of the entire u. S. Nuclear force. That force and that infrastructure has to be able to last and be effective for decades into the future. We cannot afford to modernize the entire force every 10 years. We needed to understand what the security environment looked like that far out. In this review we start by saying what has changed in the security environment since the 2010 Nuclear Posture review . N gave a very good explanation of the obverse summations observations that we made. We then asked the Intelligence Community how far into the future do you have some confidence and been able to in being able to project the environment . It was not far enough for our purpose. We had to look beyond that time frame. What is the nature of the and certainty of the uncertainty . How can we hedge that . We then did a conference of review comprehensive review of the roles of Nuclear Weapons in our National Security strategy now and into the future. I think you will notice that they are very explicitly laid out in a list in the Nuclear Posture review. I wont go into what they are, you have already come but we were determined to be explicit already, but we were determined to be explicit about the roles. Once we determined what the roles of Nuclear Weapons needed to be, we needed to decide what our strategy was to enable Nuclear Weapons to fulfill those roles. Of acrossboth sort the entire world, and out into the future, but we also took a very tailored approach when looking at strategy. Adversary,t each as ading a ron iran future nuclear adversary. Only then, which was around three quarters of the way through the review, did we turn to capabilities. We did not look at what capabilities we would require until we got through those three steps. We were pretty disciplined about that. One we got into the capabilities, we turned back when we got into the capabilities we turned back and said ok, is the program of record for modernization that is on the books sufficient to support the strategies that we have laid out to fulfill the roles . We concluded for the most part that it was. That a comprehensive modernization of our existing force was sufficient to address to fill that strategy and address those roles. One area where we were not confident that the program of record was sufficient was as a result of our deep dive look into russian strategy, russian doctrine, and russian Nonstrategic Nuclear capabilities. Let me tell you why we made the recommendations to add a low yield capability to a limited, small number of warheads as a nearterm solution, and then a recommendation to once again field nuclear arms see launch missiles in the future. It is a growing disparity in Nonstrategic Nuclear capabilities between russia, the United States, and nato. Russia is not only replacing its capabilities, it is expanding them. We concluded that there are that there were row indications that our current strategy work real there were real indications that our current strategy was inadequate. The second is to make wider use of Nuclear Weapons to defeat nato conventional forces if there ever to coerce us through limited use. We also concluded that given the stresses on russias National Defense investment, they would not be expending their limited resources to modernize and expand their Nonstrategic Nuclear forces in in support of their strategy and doctrine if they had little or no confidence in that strategy or doctrine. We saw no reason why they would throw good money after bad. Let me say before i talk about why we recommended what we did objectivelycan determine precisely what capabilities are required. Anybody that tells you they can do that through some model or some quantitatively or quantitatively is an amateur. That is just not the nature of deterrence. Theres too much uncertainty associated with it, because it is ultimately about adversary perceptions. It does not really matter whether we think our current capabilities should be sufficient to deter that the series that adversary. We need to look for indications that that is not the case. We were uncomfortable with our look at that question, that that was the answer the russians were coming to. We also think that it has proven to air on the side of having more rather than less capability to have a significant amount of uncertainty, as long as we do not create new counterproductive to perceptions in the adversaries. We do not believe that the 2 capabilities that we recommended do that. They do not increase u. S. For strike capabilities beyond what it is today. They do not threaten the Russian StrategicNuclear Deterrent in some way that it is not already threatened. We concluded that the recommendation that we made was a sound and a prudent one. Let me go a little farther into that rationale. We were trying to reduce russian confidence in the course of escalation strategy in their coercive escalation strategy. We needed to take additional action. Russian modernization and expansion of their Nonstrategic Nuclear forces is increasing that disparity, and thus potentially increasing the risk of deterrence failure. Let me make this really clear. Reducing russian confidence in their strategy does not require that nato match russian Nonstrategic Nuclear capabilities either in quantity or diversity. For no longer compensates conventional or perceived conventional inferiority by reliance on Nuclear Weapons to deter. Nader nato requires a wider range of credible low yield Nuclear Response options to convince the russians that this that if they initiate nuclear use, our objectives will deny what they seek. Additional low yield capabilities recommended in the npr, paired with with the rest of the Modernization Program are designed to do just that. The are designed to reduce confidence and moscow in moscow in this strategy and doctrine. We do not see these additional capabilities as lowering the u. S. Nuclear threshold. That has been out there in the media. These capabilities will make a u. S. Nuclear response to russian limit use more credible limited use more credible. The purpose of these capabilities is to make a u. S. Response more credible. It is for a response to russian first use. That does not lower our threshold for first use, it raises theres, at least that is our intent. Let me talk very briefly about the specific capabilities we recommended, and why. The recommendation to rapidly field a number of low yield submarine warheads is to provide ofinexpensive augmentation our ability to credibly strike any target. These would be survivable, prompt, and is able to strike targets that are heavily defended against air delivery. All of our current low yield capability is aging. Again, fielding this capability will not increase the number of Nuclear Weapons deployed on our Ballistic Missile submarines. It is actually reducing the aggregate mega tonnage that is on the submarine. Our recommendation to pursue a launch missileea is designed to provide a response to russias increased expansion of Nuclear Forces. It is also inherently survivable. The npr makes very clear that if fresh a were to agree to address return to arms measures, the u. S. Might be able to agree to limit or four grow forgo th missilesealaunch capability. That is kind of a summary of the rationale that we had, and how we got to that conclusion. I will turn it over to anita. Hilactually we will have p next. Hil thanks. Everyone good morning, everyone. I am pleased to be here and please to have the opportunity to talk about the npr from the perspective of the department of Energy Nuclear administration. The 2018 npr does not represent a significant departure from the work that we were doing. You have heard that from greg, i think you will hear from rob. It really is a document that reflects a lot of continuity with their work over the past with our work over the past it is really a document that reflects a lot of continuity past fewwork over the years. The npr, ieak about wanted to highlight a little bit about nsas role in the National Security architecture. I want to provide context for my subsequent remarks. For those that are not familiar, the army there are three main s. Ssion the nonproliferation Nuclear Counterterrorism mission, and the role there is to prevent terror and to respond to terror. The third is to provide the u. S. Navy with nuclear propulsion. The weapons piece of the nsa budget is about 40 of the department of energys budget. I am part of the organization. Hat is part first we maintain the current stockpile through routine maintenance. The second one is that we prepare for the future deterrence through lifetime Extension Programs of the stockpile. I mean strategic material, infrastructure, science tools, so that we are prepared to support future stock pile requirements and needs, including those we dont envision right now all of this is. Meant to highlight the critical part. That we play as part of the deterrent. What does the npr mean for us . It reinforces the need for the current work. The general mentioned that infrastructure piece. Ill talk more about that in a minute. Inside. N the weapons it is our largest workload we have had on her plate on our plate. I will get you some other air force systems i will get to some other air force systems in just a second. It will also supplement the workload in response to the everchanging environment. 78 first is to replace the w icbm warhead. We had a program on the books and we will started to reduce we will start it to reduce the risk and make sure we intend alignment with the air force programs. We will retain the be 63 gravity b63 gravity bomb longer. The u. S. Will modify a number of existing warheads to provide a low yield option. Dod toll work with pursue a nuclear sealaunch cruise missile. There has been a lot of focus on the last 2. A lot of the npr reinforces the need that we need to get the Current Program of record right. The other side of the coin it is oin istructure c the infrastructure. We realized the need to modernize infrastructure. This is not a 510 year undertaking, these are programs that will be around for many years capabilities that will be around for many years. Much of the infrastructure and capability that was the best in the world and its time, has atrophied since the cold war. A large portion of our facilities date back to the manhattan project. This npr was done at a time where we are taking a fresh look at not only the nnsa piece, but the Delivery Systems and other things. It is very important that we get these programs started and completed, because they will be with us for decades. There is no margin for further delay. We need to get it right, we need to get it done quickly. Items in then some media about Nuclear Explosive testing. I want to be clear about the u. S. Policy on Nuclear Explosive testing. Despite some of that media coverage, there is no change to the policy. U. S. Will seek to will not seek to ratify the comprehensive , we willest ban treaty continue to observe the that began in 1992. That effort will continue. Taken it a step further, there has been some other media commentary about the nuclear test rate and its posture. There is also no change to the test rate and its posture. It remains as it was largely since 1992, with some mike judge minor changes. This npr does not reflect any change from that posture. The continuity is also evident in the nprs strong support for nnsa counter proliferation programs. These are not mutually exclusive with the weapon sight of an nsa nnsa. E of an effective deterrent that ushers allies, reduces the likelihood that others will seek weapons. Nonproliferation effort will. Integral toal protect the homeland. As you heard several times today , the previous three nprs were drafted in the context of a very different threat environment, a very different security environment. There is quite enough of this on the deterrent there was quite an emphasis on the deterrent, which meant under emphasis on infrastructure. We started the process to climb out of that hole that we are in. It is absolutely critical that nnsa continues to be part of the response. As others have said, this is the bedrock of the nation security. Part of that bedrock is the nnsa infrastructure, and that is why we need to get it right. Thank you. Thank you, phil. Anita, over to you. Much forank you so hosting us today. The dod, this interagency review led by the dod has received a lot of attention, and deservedly so. It is especially important that we continue this discussion here today. We need to better understand the underpainting underpinning and analysis and strategy that went into the npr. Where to interject about general hyten ended. We have such a rich group of interagency participants, experts, this is a phenomenal opportunity for us to all benefit from this. I am very pleased to say that we and as many other agencies departments do, we have a very rich in turn Program Internship program. I will emphasize many of the points that the distinguished speakers before me have made, but they certainly bear to be repeated. First and foremost, the fact that while there are certainly changes in the Nuclear Posture review, there is much continuity. I want to emphasize 5 points with you today. First, the 2018 Nuclear Posture withw is fully consistent several decades of u. S. And allied thinking regarding Nuclear Weapons policy impostures. Policy and postures. For anso prepare uncertain future, certainly a point that has been stressed today. While there is continuity in our strategy, each mpr is really a rroduct of its time each np is a product of its time. For decades the u. S. Took the lead and Nuclear Disarmament in Nuclear Disarmament and arms control, hoping to set an example the others would follow. We have seen a return to the Great Power Competition and a degradation of the overall security environment. These changes have specifically been in the area of Nuclear Capabilities, were fighting doctrines, war fighting doctrines, and the actions and behavior of russia, china, and the dprk. We have not abandoned arms control. That does not mean that we have abandoned any of our commitments to Nuclear Disarmament. It just means that the reality is we are in a different environment right now. So, i would also like to pull in our allies are. The u. S. Government view on the security situation is not exclusive here. We had more than 30 governments that we consulted throughout the npr process that have agreed that the security environment has worsened. Second, this environment calls for strengthening deterrence and assurance. Our capabilities need to remain effective against evolving threats. It declares our recognition and willingness to collaborate with allies and partners. The United States extends deterrence to over 30 allies. That is really an impressive number if you think about it. Ea