concerning north korea's nuclear option and future relations between the country, u.s., china, and russia. this is an hour and 40 minutes. >> on behalf of all of us here, welcome, happy new year. glad to discuss an issue we know will be quite important in the new year. we hope with positive developments but we're all a little on edge about the state of the north korea crisis. we're fortunate that in today's discussion, which by the way, as you can see, is being telecast on c-span and also has a japanese translation dimension to it that i'll get to in just a moment. in today's discussion we'll begin with some polling that was that was done in the united states and japan with various other organizations in support and this is looking at united states and japanese attitudes toward the north korea crisis across a range of issues. .e'll begin with that then we'll convene a panel discussion at which i'm we'll begin with mr. kudo able to offer any thoughts he has to understand and embellish especially the japanese section of the poll. then richard bush, our the head of our east asia policy center, richard will broaden the discussion to think about south korea, obviously an interested actor in this whole equation and an important factor, and we'll try to understand south korean views, public opinion, politics, and what not and finally, playing the role of panelist at that point, i'll try to talk about military options or in my opinion the lack of good military options. this is something that will follow naturally from some of the questions in the polling. so let me just add a couple more words about our panelists and without further ado we'll get to the presentation and the rest of the day. sadat chair, he's been associated with brookings and the u.s. islamic world project throughout the whole period in one of the most eloquent voices at american relations with the broader islamic world for many years but he's also started in recent years a critical issues polling effort. and that's where we get today's material from, in large part. this is, i think, the first time he's extended in a major way to east asia. much of that polling began with focus on the middle east and the united states. it's excellent polling and we look forward to the results. i've seen them. there are a few reaffirmations of what you might expect. there are also some potential surprises that we'll have some time to discuss and then have your questions on later. he's also been a practitioner and proponent of track 2 dialogues. i think of richard as tom brady, he's timeless and ageless and always outstanding. we benefit from having him on the panel as well. hear t further ado, we'll he presentation. >> thanks so much. good morning to you and thank you for braving the cold to be here. really appreciate that. this is a pleasure for me. not only because we are talking about an important issue that concerns all of us, but also because we are partnering with japan to do twofolds -- asking some of the same questions, and trying to see how the japanese and americans differ on the issue of north korea's nuclear program and beyond that, asia security. i'm going to present both the results together so you can see them side-by-side. i am not going to show the breakdown in the u.s. democratic-republican because we would -- it would be hard to prepare the same time. i will mention some of them as i go through, but everything is posted online. it is posted on the university of maryland critical issues poll website and on the brookings website. certainly the methodology is posted there but all of the results are posted including the breakdown. feel free to pursue this after the presentation. if you have questions, there is a lot more data and breakdown as well. let me start with the methodology -- i have as i said, in japan, a sample of 1000. ur poll, we usually do it with nielsen scarborough -- it is an online panel. it is a sample of 2000 among the panel. we also have an oversample of young people just to have more confidence about the what the young people are thinking in the u.s.. the methodology is posted and you are welcome to look at. let's start with one of the first questions that we had. which of the following do you believe is the most effective way to stop north korea's nuclear program? if you look, the blue is japan. the red is the u.s. the red is the u.s. the most striking thing here is look at the two middle options - the one that says stricter sanctions against north korea and military action by the united states and its llies. you see how very few agree with those options. in the case of japan, only 11% think stricter sanctions will work. in the case of the u.s., 7%. the same thing with the military option, it percent and 11% think those would work. -- 8% and 11% think those would work for it. slightly more republicans think that is possible, but 17% so still not huge on this issue. instead, the u.s. and japan in the case of the u.s., 35% and multiparty negotiations. in the japanese, the first option is a little bit stronger than the others, 21%. between north korea and the united states -- and you see at the very bottom, a lot of people think it will not be resolved, particularly the japanese in 21% more realistic about that. the united states initiating military action against north korea in an attempt to stop its nuclear program. despite the fact that you saw how very few people say it can be solved by military option, when you put the option on the table, you end up getting more people supporting it. it is a minority, only 21% in japan. 33% in the u.s. that is quite high when you consider what mike will tell us about the options or what are ood options -- i would love to hear mike's opinion on that. you also find something a little bit more difficult to understand which is that if you breakdown that 33%, the majority of republicans support the military ption. that is very interesting because that is the president's rincipal constituency. the next question, do you think the problem relating to north korea's nuclear program will be resolved and if so, when? this is more about optimism or pessimism. it is a way of measuring how people are generally optimistic or generally pessimistic. look at how pessimistic people are. what you have, a lot of people o not to know. but among those people gave an answer, two thirds of japanese think it will not be resolved nd one third in the u.s. very few people above say it's will be resolved in the next five years so a lot of pessimism. north korea has re: acquired nuclear weapons -- has already acquired nuclear weapons. people may interpret this in ifferent ways. even with all of the realism that you see, in a way, a recognition of north korea's nuclear reality and at the same ime, you find that only 13% of japanese accept recognizing north korea as a nuclear state. 38% of the u.s. mericans are more divided. there is more acceptance. do you support or oppose japan acquiring nuclear weapons if north korea does not give up its own? this is the question of -- this s been a taboo in japan. you see far more support in the u.s. -- 33% of americans support that. only 12% of japanese support t. one of the things that are a point that mr. kudo makes no presentation about -- makes in a resentation -- it looks like more but it looks like it is increasing for people who made prefer to accept that. the same question about whether - do you support or oppose south korea acquiring nuclear weapons? we have roughly the same in america, and slightly fewer people in japan, 9%. it is roughly the same result. if north korea does not give up ts nuclear weapons, do you support the placement of american nuclear warheads in south korea or japan? here you have a lot of american supporting that, a slight majority. you still have an opposition in japan. you're 21% who support that. there is a difference between democrats and republicans on that issue as with the other issue and i will talk about that on the panel. how do you foresee the likely outcome of the situation on the north korean peninsula and the next 10 years? we do not follow it as much here and u.s. -- in the u.s. the question is what kind of outcome that is the public perceive for the korean peninsula. few people ranging from one third of americans and 20% of japanese say their stability will remain the same roughly. very few people say north korea and south korea will have reduced their attention and improve their relations. even fewer say they will be unified. people do not think that relationship is going to profoundly change. they differ on the level of instability really whether it is going to remain the same or it is going to increase in the american side -- it is going to increase. on the american side, people think it is a lot worse and that is striking in comparison to the apanese. in the case of japan, a lot of people said they do not know. how do you think the north korea crisis has affected japan's relations with the united states? again, interesting, because they both have similar perceptions. over 40% of each public thinks they have been strengthened. the people who say they have been weekend are among the japanese at 4% but it is a bit high for the american side even f it is 20%. you might ask the question, why would even be 20% given that the north korea should be unifying go with japan? when you look at the breakdown by party, you find that democrats are more likely to say then republicans that they have been weekend. -- weakened. it is not just about the relationship improving but is trump dealing with it well. we will see that in a minute because we have specific question about that. what level of military power should the united states maintain in asia? a relevant question, one that we all are grappling with. t is interesting because you have almost half of the american public, 42% of the japanese public maintaining the same level. n the u.s., a little bit more. 29% who think we should increase the level -- 12% in japan. the decrease of support, 13% in the u.s. but not much more. -- the decrease of support, 13% in japan, 9% in the u.s. but not much more. how do you view the way that president trump has handled the north korean nuclear issue? there is a huge partisan divide on this. he independents flaw the democrats way on this. you can see here the majority of both the japanese publics and the u.s. public think -- the view of the handling is unfavorable. the difference is your very unfavorable or somewhat unfavorable. more intense in the u.s. than it is in japan, but still a majority of 63% of japanese view the handling of north korea unfavorably. as do majority of the american public. -- as do a majority of the american public. which of the following is closest to your view? north korea nuclear arms buildup is mostly driven by insecurity. that is mostly driven by ambition and aggression. that it is mostly driven by a desire to be fully recognized. or it is mostly driven by a desire to maintain the regime. you see that a plurality of both publics think it is about them regime trying to maintain power. a lot of others in the middle -- a quarter believe it is mostly driven by ambition and aggression and a quarter of the japanese think that it is mostly desire to be fully recognized. this is the question that was only in the japanese market and it really had to do with china. currently, there is discord between china and the u.s.-g pan -- u.s.-japan alliance. in the future, do you think a multilateral security mechanism which includes china is necessary in order to bring a stable, peaceful environment in the region? 58% say it is necessary, only 5% say it is not. hard to interpret that because that is worth discussion -- hard to interpret that, but that is worth discussion. which of the following alliances would be the most effective? this is interesting because we tried to ask the question the ame way, understanding the japanese think about it a particular way and we think about a particular way. we put the options there, china, japan, south korea. it seems as though the publics in both places like broader multilateral coalitions. if you look at the one as the ost embrace, the u.s.-china, japan, south korea, russia -- that has the biggest support. that seems to be the case in both. please name to countries that ou believe pose the greatest threat to world peace and security. this question is an open-ended question. we do not give names, we did not ive anything at all. people can name whatever country they want. it is very interesting to look at that because this is worth real conversation, especially in a lot of the results. not surprisingly, both the u.s. nd in japan, the publics named north korea as number one. they see that as the country hat threatens world peace more than any other. owever, if you look at where the u.s. is, it is striking because it is number two for the japanese. 43% of the japanese name it as one of the two countries that is most threatening to world peace insecurity. -- world peace and security. this is not want to add up to 100 because we asked him to list two countries, not one. -- them to list two countries, not one. if you look at 13% of the american public, they say that the united states is the biggest hreat to world peace and security and edges china on that in terms of people writing t. it does not mean that they don't not think that china is a threat, it is just what comes to their mind. if you had to these country separately, they may rate china higher. it tells you about how our public is divided on this and you can see the same thing in japan. one reason why this might be so high in japan despite all of the other things we have seen is the following question that i will end up with. please name two national world leaders you think pose the greatest threat to world peace and security. it is an open-ended question. we do not try to leave them in any shape or form. -- lead them in any shape or form. in japan, donald trump number one followed by kim jong-un with 44%. even in the u.s., donald trump s roughly tied with putin at number two following the kim jong-un who is rated at number one. obviously, the complexity of japanese attitudes will be discussed. we have two superb experts on the panel who will tell us more. i will say something general and not so much about japan, we do know -- if you have done these global polls of perceptions of he u.s. and the president -- they are shown very clearly that the perception of the u.s. is highly correlated with the perception of the president. i urge you to look at if you have not seen that. this could be one of the reasons it is so high on the threat of the perception that the u.s. is one of the two most threatening states to global security is a iew of the japanese. with that, i will invite my colleagues to join me on the panel and we will have a discussion. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you. fascinating. i would like to begin this panel discussion by turning first to our japanese colleague who was the last speaker's partner in the polling. before then, turn to richard ush. this is where your translation devices will come in handy and just in case there is any kind f malfunction, i will try very briefly to summarize what we have heard from kudosahn. our understanding is that this should work with c-span audiences, that you should hear directly into english. we want to be on channel 2 with both of you here with your devices. thank you for coming so far. thank you for your excellent work on this poll. is there anything that you want to draw our attention to or in additional points beyond the last presentation? >> well, let's see, we did the poll and we released japanese media in december. it was shocking data with japanese media. japanese society took it -- why is that? that is an interesting point. that is because america -- a lot of americans support north korea and recognizing that north korea as a nuclear power. similar results can be found mongst japanese experts. a lot of japanese experts have put the idea of recognizing north korea as a nuclear power, but this is a public poll. general public in america supposing that north korea is a nuclear power was a big surprise or the japanese. north korea, who is the neighbor to us, nobody knows what the leader my to do. our allies, the american people recognizing north korea as a uclear power -- that could possibly dramatically change the strategy under the alliance. in any case, it was shocking to news for japanese society. a lot of media talked about that. at the same time, there was a lot of americans also supporting japan acquiring nuclear power. that was another big surprise. predominant supporters -- dominant supporters were republican, but that caused a lot of uncertainty and concerns amongst japanese society. now, there were new opinions in japan. we could potentially have a serious discussion about whether japan should be acquiring a nuclear power. we have done three polling's over the last one to two years. about one year ago, it was only 5% of the people that said we should be having a nuclear power that chains to 12.3% in a matter of the year and a few months. the nuclear power attitude in japan has shrunk quite a bit. 20% of japanese experts support the idea of japan acquiring nuclear weapons. this is not going to be easy process in japan because this is not accessible by japanese culture. now because of the administration happening, there are a lot of concerns, worries among japanese public. not recognizing north korea as a uclear power and being completely aligned across allies as well as neighbors, i think a lot of japanese think that has to be the strategy. that is a small insight that we have acquired. that is the most plausible scenario as we move forward. >> many important points that our friend wanted to make. japanese is surprised that the united states would have such a high support of a japanese nuclear option and maybe there is a decision that is moving gradually and not verwhelmingly. a second important point that your translation worked well, japanese were a little taken aback that the united states and americans would consider recognizing north korea as a nuclear weapon state. as you all know, we do not at present. that is going to be a good question for me to start with richard. i'm going to ask them more generally to speak about south korea and south korean attitudes but i hope you can also offer his process as to why americans seem willing to recognize north korea as a nuclear weapon state. is that a ballot to reality that -- is that a bow to reality or is it somehow favoring a formal change in america'positions? before i give the floor to richard. let me add one more clarifying point which is important, those of you who wonder why we are with focusing on japan and america perspective, this is our good fortune with those two doing the poll on those two countries. we did not have a big, long project that would have looked at five or six different countries. please do not interpret this as somehow signaling that these are he only two countries that atter. they are two of the half-dozen or so a monk of the greatest equities -- with among the greatest equities in this issue. richard, i will turn to the republic of korea -- how you view the north korean issue through their eyes and interpreting their public and politics, and then if you could, why do americans increasingly tolerate the idea of north korea s a nuclear state? richard: mike, thank you for your introduction. you may think i am ageless, but i am not. i am pleased that you're given me this opportunity to talk about south korean opinion -- that you have given me this opportunity to talk about sort korean -- south korean opinion. i think that question is quite ambiguous or assumes knowledge y the respondents that they do not have. the word "recognize" has a certain legal power when it comes to this issue. as i interpret it, it means that you are recognized as a nuclear weapons state for the purposes of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. there are other states that possess nuclear weapons that are not recognized as nuclear weapon states. i think that de facto, they are estates with nuclear weapons but we are not going to give china and russia and anybody else is going to give north korea the special privileges conferred by the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. -- that the current recognized states do. on south korean attitudes -- south korea does have the greatest equities involved here. as our colleague jonathan pollack likes to say, this is he korean peninsula. most importantly, there is a widespread assumption in policymaking circles in various countries that if the united states or south korea were to take overly aggressive action against north korea, it would lead to on acceptable retaliation by north orea against the republic of orea -- south korea. it is just about on the front lines. outh korean views have a presumptive value. olitical trends in south korea are important here as well. we had conservative presidents for nine years up until last year. now we have a progressive president. his ideas towards north korea relatively speaking are more conciliatory and more in favor of engagement than those of his predecessors. that raises the question whether public attitudes have moved as well. i'm going to draw on two recent polls. one is by gallup korea in september of last year and the other is by general on -- is by enron. the two posted and asked the same questions. first question, how much does north korea pose a threat to eace and security? people in south korea, 76% say it is a threat of some degree. 20% said it is not much of a threat. there are no illusions in south korea about the danger that their country faces from their northern cousins. second question, how likely do you think that north korea will actually start a war? 37% of south koreans said it was a possibility to some degree. 13% said it was a high possibility. about one third of the public thought it was. 58% thought it was low possibility. that was a pretty simplistic question by gallup, but this set of responses strikes me is a good reflection of what i understand south korean opinions to be. genron npo poses this issue in a more open ended away. it is not whether south korea will start a war but whether military action will occur in esponse to north korea's nuclear weapons development. it includes the possibility that the united states might take the military action. 38.6% of koreans say yes, that ilitary action will occur. 43.1% of koreans say no. 18.3% are not sure. for 39% to say yes is not that different from gallup. you will remember that 37% said that there was a possibility that north korea would start a war. gallup's respondents agreed that the u.s. should take military action if north korea continues to test its nuclear weapons technology. this is only a continuation of testing, it is not used in some way. 33% of the public agreed that the u.s. should take military ction. 59% disagreed, 7% did not know. for 33% to agree is higher than i expected, but that number is suspiciously close to the working estimate of the strength f conservative voters in south korea. our work it model of south korean politics is a 33% are conservative, 33% are progressive, 33% are swing voters and to move in the middle. on this question, conservatives stand out. gallup asks whether south korea should have its own nuclear weapons. 35% disagreed. this seems high but my recollection is that previous polls have gotten similar results. this is not mean they do not like the u.s.-korean alliance, but this is the typical response. on the question on how to dress current situation -- how to address current situations, koreans emphasize dialogue and egotiations. 12.1% of direct talks between the united states and north korea. 47.9% in favor of some kind of diplomacy. 6.1% are in favor of strengthening sanctions. on the long-term future, genron npo asked what the korean peninsula would look like. 31.2% of said north-south onflict would intensify. 19% said there'd the and moved to unification. 20.1% said it is unpredictable. that strikes me as a pretty realistic distribution of opinions of amongst the public. hese are my takeaways. south koreans see north korea as a threat. they do not see war as likely. and they believe that south korea should go nuclear. south koreans believe the future will look about the same as oday or worse. they believe that diplomacy is a good method for addressing the current impasse. in the current context, this final opinion gives president moon jae some running groom to test intentions. tomorrow will be the first meeting of north and south negotiators to talk at least about the north participation in the winter lipids. thanks a lot -- in the winter olympics. thanks a lot. >> thank you. i want to get to your involvement in the discussion, but there are two or three other big issues that we want up on the table briefly. i'm going to do one of those which is what might military ptions be. the polling that we saw showed us that there are some interesting divides. richard just reiterated that. there is also a question about how well can sanctions that have been so intensified in recent months starting with a trump administration, ambassador haley at the u.n., but the participation of other countries -- how well can these bite in 2018 and what kind of policy prospects do we have? i do not think we will touch the last question in our presentation. the same think with -- the same thing with the sanctions and economic options. let me talk through for military options -- four military options. i do not endorse any of hem. i think they all wind up being bad ideas. as my colleagues at brookings have emphasized, we have the whole big question of how would kim jong-un respond? let me be emphatic that i am not endorsing these options. none of them presume an all-out invasion by the united states with the south korea. one of them are beginning with the option of regime change, 2003, iraq-like overthrow. in korea, it is too hard. such a war would cause at a bare minimum, many of hundreds of thousands of fatalities on the korean peninsula. they are low estimates for today because one hiroshima size bomb over a city of seoul has been estimated to cost 200,000 to 400,000 prompt fatalities. that is one nuclear weapon and north korea has several. tokyo, a little better chance given the distances and some of the systems we have the floyd -- we have deployed in the region. i want underscore, all-out war looks very bad. i'm going to talk about four more attempts at military force. there is the huge uncertainty as to whether they might. one option that was articulated a dozen years ago by two democratic secretaries of defense is to shoot down any future icbm test launch on the grounds that doing so would deprive north korea the ability to get data and develop technology of long-range missile strikes. icbm, intercontinental ballistic missile, this is what they have een trying to develop. they launched three such missiles in 2017. the last in november. we think they're making a lot of progress. we don't know if they have all the different pieces perfected. we are not sure if they have reentry vehicles that could protect the defendant warhead from heat and kinetic disruption during its this -- discent. why not prevent them from having the option of having a missile to -- a missile descend? it is an interesting option. the problems i have with drinking get through, even if we could successfully -- the problems i have with thinking it hrough, even if we could successfully, you give north korea incentives to develop other kind of technology that could be even more threatening. they are harder for us to deal with in the very early going and we do not want to steer north korea to accelerating that kind of technology. these kind of test launch, shoot down options cannot do anything about the threats to seoul or the threat to japan from shorter range missiles of which they are already many in abundance. the nuclear arsenal of north korea's unaffected by this -- the nuclear arsenal north korea is unaffected by this. our technology in these areas is much better at than it has been, but the odds of any one-shot succeeding is 25% to 50%. we could miss. we could wind up embarrassing ourselves. we could have our interceptor land in a place it was not supposed to. am not sure they endorsed under current circumstances, but it does not deal with the existing threat and it may not revent the future icbm threat. that is the first option. there are also nuclear facilities that north korea is developing to expand its nuclear arsenal. it has a working for research reactor that makes plutonium. it also has the famous uranium enrichment facility that they were not supposed to have. they told secretary kelly in 2002 that they had been doing this surreptitiously. we could in theory try to deal with that or reduce that. the problem is, you cannot attack the existing research reactor because you are going to create a mini-sharon noble -- mini-chernoble if you do. it has been operational for so long that it will be a a mini-fukushima. if that were the only potential capability the north koreans had o build a bomb material, the case would be stronger. the problem is if you do that today with the reactor there believed to be trying to complete, you are not going to affect the existing research reactor. if you go after the uranium facilities, there is less concern about radioactive spillage from sites, but we do not know about additional sites beyond the one that the established location. if we go after their nuclear capability, the nuclear production capability, we are maybe getting at half the problem of a future buildup and doing nothing at all about what they own already. you are slowing the scale and pace at which their future reactor could expand their arsenal. that has some limited tactical appeal. the risks are enormous and you are not illuminating the arsenal them anyway. the third option you might onsider, not going after the eapons of mass destruction directly but block leading north korean trade as a supplement to the u.n. sanctions of a cannot et around those sanctions by cheating, working within a companies are countries that might be willing to break the sanctions, and you can use the u.s. and south korean navy to try to stop at north korean ports. it does have potential ability to further heighten the effect of sanctions. it is also an act of war under international law. the north koreans already say the sanctions are an act of war. but everybody would agree in some sense, it is an act of war. it is a tool that countries do not employ often. north korea might shoot back at our navy or other assets, but above and beyond to that is it does not prevent them from doing trade across the border with china and it does not prevent them from flying in high-technology equipment but they still need for their nuclear missile program. it runs a risk of escalation. the last option i will mention is direct assassination of kim jong-un. i would not feel like i would be very polite bringing up that kind of option if it were not already in the public discussion. we know from reports last fall, there are elements of existing combined forces that would go after military control of which kim jong-un is the top rung. therefore, one would ask, why do we not just tried to kill him? -- why do we not just try to kill them? like how we tried to essentially assassinate or kill saddam hussein? we launched a big attack at a farm complex south of baghdad and turned out that the terrorist was not there. we caught him a few months later, but the actual bombing did no good. there is always a chance that we could figure out where kim jong-un was and kill him. we could try to argue that this was justifiable under international law given his behavior and noncompliance with various international obligation and hope there is no fallout or bounce back against our own leaders. above and beyond that, the more compelling counter argument is we have no idea how his military command would react if that happened. very little reason to think they are going to accept a peaceful reunification a whatever kind of terms we are offering and go into exile. chances are, many are most -- or most would create an alternative leadership and fight. that would be seen as an -- as he opening act of war. i think on that particular option, the risks of north korean action are high. they're higher than i would feel comfortable for any of the four. sorry to go in such detail on that but i want to get on the table and before we go to you -- i want to run on the panel. richard may want to comment on what i just said and i will go to our two other speakers for any other comments they want to ake. richard: i think you stated it very well. i want your question from the udience. >> thank you. >> any other questions? >> we have been talking about so many times in the past, we did it with a chinese concept as well as many other countries. opinion polls gives us great insights. one of the messages we can take from this opinion poll is that a lot of americans and japanese believe that status quo is not going to give us a solution to he problem in north korea. japan, u.s., other neighboring countries -- maybe needing to come together to have strategy to objective together. we are not really aligned to ach other. north korea -- recognizing north korea might not be possible under npt, but they do already have the nuclear weapons and they are trying to have their own missile so they can shoot in japan's location. what we need to have is to have effective oversight, bringing doubts more effective control to the nuclear in north korea. therwise, our neighbors will not be able to take charge. not to me people have started to hink about having control or oversight. holdings, crossing finger that a nuclear program will be stopped. that uncertainty is driving go opinion poll. -- is driving opinion fall. there is a big if in the opinion oll. they were feeling unsecure because of the status quo. if the status quo doesn't give comfort to our people, what are the new solutions that we should be discussing? number two answer from america s chinese involvement. china should not only step up or economic sanctions. there could be a potential nuclear option by chinese , too. china had just changed the international law and all of the polling agencies are banned from taken polls, but we are given access the polling in china. in last year's poll results, we asked a question about, do you think north korea is a threat? nly 13% of chinese thought north korea was a threat. 25% of chinese thought that south korea was a threat. chinese experts think that north korea nuclear is a threat. chinese opinions are being controlled by central government, but experts exposed to the reality and they are aware of how risky north korea nuclear is. this discussion needs to be discussed together with us and also with china. we should start discussing about specific scenarios once we are successful for teasing their nuclear program. maybe america should take leadership in that. america was willing to take leadership in that, that is a very important question. if america can take leadership in this multilateral discussion, i think the sense of uncertainty that people are feeling that could dramatically change. nonnuclear option in korean peninsula is something we should be discussing, inviting many different countries. >> from my point of view to give my thoughts on your presentation, which i thought was extremely comprehensive and terms of putting out what people are thinking about in terms of options, a military option is unthinkable. the public seems to think that as well. when you ask them, what would it resolve? whether military action would resolve the korean issue, very few people agree that it would. 11%. japan is even fewer. there is agreement that it would not happen. in my opinion, the reason you slightly higher numbers supporting military action when you ask in the u.s., 33 percent, it is because we are split on everything. you are either pro-trump or against trump. that is part of the problem in reading out poland. want it -- our polling. i want to say something that is broader about the option. my colleague said that the u.s. hould take leadership in the multilateral negotiation for it the american public and the japanese public prefer ultilateral talks. in order to take leadership, eople have to trust you. they have to have a moral position to lead. the buffet think that you are not a threat. when they think you are a -- they have to think that you are not a threat. when they think the president of the u.s. is a greater threat to world peace than the leader of orth korea, it is very hard to persuade people to join you on whatever option you want to do. whether it's going to be additional sanctions, a military which i think is unthinkable but if somebody might go there -- ome of the republican public has changed to be open to the idea. who is going to join you in the world when you are doing hat? if you are going to lead in a multilateral way, for what agenda with a trust you to lead if you do not have the agenda. clearly, we have the crisis in the way of we are projecting ourselves in the world. hat is seen in places like japan which on this issue should be a clear outline and it is. but we see that -- a clear ally, and it is. but we see that and the attitudes. not to mention in our own country. we are in such a crisis internally, divided like we have never been i think in our history -- the difference between republicans and emocrats is 80% are over 80%. it is like we are two different countries. how is any leader going to morally mobilize us to do the right thing let alone to bring all of these people around the world when we are increasingly solated and seem not to be trusted? >> that is the challenge we face in reality. > let's go to you. i would like to take three questions at a time. please wait for a microphone and identify yourself. please limit yourself to one question per person and you can direct the question to a specific individual or to the whole panel. start right here please. >> i've done polling all my life and it can be quite tricky. am interested, if you could have one wildcard question at the end of the survey, what might you have added? for example, one asked the question if trillions of dollars is going to be spent focused around the nuclear conflict or developing people? something like that that will enable you to analyze the is -- the results. it was quite difficult to know who was experts in terms of answering. >> will go over here to the oman in the third row. >> hi, i am a freelance journalist. i would like to ask the panelists, what do you think motivates kim jong-un in the talks that should start tomorrow? how optimistic are you that this could lead to multilateral talks? >> excellent. we will have one more in the econd row. >> bill, usaid, your comment egarding control and oversight begs the question of north korea selling off their nukes to terrorist organizations. it seems like a hard question to answer, but has that been thought of and are their ideas on how to mitigate the problem? >> great. how about our two panelists take the first and then richard will take what kim jong-un might be hinking, and we can all wait and on the final question about the broader risks. >> if you have something you want to add, feel free. know it is a rhetorical question, but my own sense of whether public is -- of where the public is -- the public would generally say that will do ot want war. the american people are still anti-war. the post-iraq war sentiments still hold and they do not think that war solves problems. the question is whether they want to spend american money to develop other countries. the public is really divided on this along partisan lines. in three, they are open to it but they are posted to foreign aid -- in theory, they are open to it that they are opposed to foreign aid. one of the big things that we tried to get at in the poll is what people think is motivating the north korea. is it insecurity, it is aggression, is it regime protection -- insecurity and regime protection are one in the same thing. you combine them together, a lot of people think that. that is a good interpretation because if that is one of the big motives, insecurity, then our people who say this is an opportunity because they are rying and once they have a successful icbm test, they think they have effective the turns against the u.s. -- effective deterrents against the u.s. the question is is if the negotiation with south korea is an attempt to influence south korean public opinion away from the u.s. whether it is a genuine conversation, i would love to ear both of our panelists on his. >> richard? richard: with respect to the talks that we will begin tomorrow, the scope of the talks is to talk about the winter games. kim jong-un has an interest in his athletes participating in the games for them to be excluded is a kind of humiliation. i expect that some sort of ormula will be found for north korean athletes can participate and pever happen -- perhaps under a single flag. can these talks then be extended to go into other issues? there will be an attempt, but my guess is it will not get very far. each side has very different demands and excitations of the other. -- and expectations of the other. we will find that north korea sets out a very tough agenda concerning the future of inter-korean relations. it will be something the president's moon cannot accept. >> we have bob in dialogue. and jonathan whose book was the first to basically sober us all. >> nuclear materials, not actual weapons, would they threaten to sell a weapon if the u.n. sanctions have squeezed their economy that they have no other choice? i could see them making that threat. these are the kinds of fundamental uncertainties we have about future north korean behavior and hard to be more precise. > could i comment on that? let's go to a second round of questions here. let's start with mack in the first row. >> i believe richard raise the question about -- raise the the quest -- raised the question, i wonder if the question might have been put not confuse of the nonproliferation treaty. i wanted the answer would have more support if it was phrased as reluctant acquiescence because we lacked other options. >> thank you. >> my name is peter. given the options you described, you could say that they they log military action to diplomacy. ilitary action is been considered horrific but given our government's behavior with the tpp and iran-nuclear deal, we do not have a lot of credibility. where does that leave us? >> third question. >> and kim jong-un's famous sense about the button, i did not see anyone else pay attention to the second half of the question where he said if he has a button that she has a button and he will not use it unless he feels threat and. -- threatened. what about tension reduction and assurance -- they have a much igher probability. >> do you want to begin this round? >> mac, i wish they had asked the question that way. it would be more useful when thinking about policy responses. i agree with you that military option is horriffic. i agree that we are hurting ourselves by these statements of the president. i think that underneath the rhetoric, there is a policy that is emerging. that is containment and deterrence to include sanctions. sanctions do not have an impact ight away. they have to be in effect for a longish period of time, they ave to be applied in a comprehensive way. the really tough sanctions are only now beginning to take ffect. china is only now beginning to add its weight to a comprehensive shanks -- conference of sanctions campaign -- comprehensive sanctions ampaign. whether this will change north korean policies, i do not know. this seems to be the most likely approach to achieving some sort of goal that has a broad international support. i did not hear the question in the back, but the problem with any kind of negotiations is not because the two sides do not understand each other or do not have an opportunity to get to a compromise. at this point, they had very different goals. north korea says we are going to be a nuclear state, get over it. no country in the and national -- no country in the international community that ave been a part of six party talks are willing to accept that the goal. ours remains at denuclearization. it is not clear to me that there are -- would be an opportunity to find middle ground. >> now, in the united states, it is a very cold country. but i am feeling more comfortable because i am away from north korea now. i think i am speaking from one side and you are speaking from the other side because distance differences are from north korea. north korea is having nuclear power already. if military option is not think of all, the only thing is to raise the containment. i agree with that. for japan to have better deterrence, maybe that needs to be discussed across japanese society. if they engaged the discussion, other neighbors might. somebody talked about the nuclear spill over to terrorists organizations, but that may add on top of that, there are a lot of layers of complexity associated with that. if we recognize north korea as a nuclear power, that could have -- that could potentially damage o the -- damage the security framework we are relying on. we invited -- in our dialogue, e wanted to see a common objective about the treaty of our region. with south korea and japan, they can quite a agree about nonnuclear in north korea, but the americans do not think that according to the poll. 10 people, 60% said no nuclear ut 40% are opposed to. as an ally, that attitude for america was troublesome for many japanese perspectives. there is one stage, north korea. it owns nuclear weapons and if e see them and if this continues, security strategy in japan has to be changed. we do not want to change it. we are victim of nuclear, we are very allergic to have a good nuclear weapons or allowing other countries nuclear weapons in our land, so nonnuclear is the only option for many japanese people. there are only two options to do hat. one is to strengthen economic sanctions so we could have more effective diplomatic talks, or military option to some degree. we want to do it peacefully. how can we raise pressure and give the most to north korea bite -- but having them stop. having nonnuclear north korea is the only valuable option and i hope international community agrees. this is the additive of japan. -- the adjective of japan. >> it is interesting that if you ask the same question to experts, you are probably going to get the same answer even if you know more. what you find in the results is exactly what you might expected which is that most expect that you will not change the reality, but most do not want a formal recognition. they may not know the meaning of that, but they have a sense that this question means you are asking for formal recognition, there is a huge or less -- reluctance. you get the results that you might ask that -- that you might xpect. on insecurity, richard is right on saying that there are different names. that is the case. the question is what are the basis of starting a negotiation with different names? at some point you are going to have to start some negotiation. the reality is even if you do not think that the principal motivator for north korea is insecurity, no one would deny that part of it is insecurity given their history for the people or for the insecurity of the regime. the question is whether if you give them some sense of security, whether that will make them more open to negotiation. when you go into something like a suggestion written by an article writer that says let's lay 50,000 chinese troops on north korea soil to a sure that we would never attack north korea. that is innovative thinking. in principle, those are the kinds of things and ideas that we need to think about. with the question of our credibility and the possibility of war, despite all that we have said -- despite what might all the different options, there is no good military option ere. not to mention consequences for the neighbors of south korea and japanese and everyone else. this by of that, i do not have the confidence to say that our government would do it. that is the scariest part of all. ith the fact that you have options, you can assess the risks. if you are in the white house and you want to do this, and maybe some of you have a next terminal theory about how our presidents makes his decisions -- and next terminal -- an external theory about how our president makes his decisions, i do not. even without the president really putting it on the table, it tells me that is not unthinkable. we all have to not be satisfied with the fact that we are analytically -- we do not think it is possible or should not be possible. it should be unthinkable. public opinion does not think that it is going to solve the problem because there are all the other things we have to worry about. that is something loose sleep -- lose sleep over. >> on february 29, 2012, the united states and north korea came to an agreement. it was a limited agreement. orth korea would suspend nuclear missile tests and we would provide food aid. a kind of freeze for freeze. the hope on the united states side was that this could progress to something else. three weeks, north korea reneged on the agreement. that, among other things, raises the questions about the credibility of their commitments. i was going to talk about something else, -- >> i agree with you, richard. bob and i have written about a freeze for freeze construct but i agree that they had to assume the north koreans are going to try to cheat. the idea that mom and i have been trying to develop is that how could we get the north koreans to freeze not just nuclear missile testing but uclear production? there must be some way to get a sense of all of their nuclear production capabilities which ill be hard. in particular, it might be located. we have to not give them too much for the deal. we should not formally recognize them as a nuclear weapon states and i believe most of the u.s. sanctions would have to stay in place even with that kind of deal. we could tolerate some more chinese and russian trade at that juncture and let up on some of the pressure to tighten the u.s. sanctions. this is some of the basic thinking that bob and i have been trying to get at. the one thing the united states could give in addition to some food aid and other humanitarian gesture of that type would be some kind of cap on the size of future military exercises with a clear emphasis, however, that this is not meant to tolerate the reduction or readiness of the combined forces in korea. we have to substitute a big one with a few smaller ones. with the talked to colonel tim who was the head of our brigade and korea last year and many other military officers to figure out how we could do this. if we were not comfortable with the proposal, we would have to walk away from it. we could cap the size of exercises that is a relatively high number, 15000 or 20,000. that is the kind of freeze for freeze that we have been talking about. let's do one last round and i would like to favor people -- folks from the region. i have not seen too many japanese or korean hands, but i want to give first preference if there are any. we will start with the woman standing in the back and then the gentleman standing in the back and then we will come in the third row and we will wrap p. >> thank you, this is a leasee -- alecia. with in the last month, we have seen russia align its assessment of the icbm capabilities -- they have aspects of icbm. they have reached aspects of icbm capabilities. one of the diplomatic alternatives that i did not see discussed here was a partial test ban treaty. anted your thoughts to u.s.-russia fixed party talks etting to north korea to limit further testing to belowground -- that is not beyond the pale of thought considering the future of north korea past nuclear testing. thank you. thank you. >> microphone over here please. >> thank you, nonproliferation bureau. one thing that did not come up was the u.s. public opinion and it seemed that 33% that did not have an opinion of did not seem to know -- or did not seem to know. i was curious that they did not seem to have a comfort level with the response. you talk to them during dinner, is that because people despite it being in the news, do not have an opinion? what are your opinions on that on the high level of on-response. >> and finally to jennifer here in the third row. >> thank you for the participants. and on the nuclear testing idea, i was thinking north korea participated in the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and only country with nuclear weapons who signed this recent nuclear ban treaty, for whatever that's worth. my question was really about the role of russia. i wonder if the panelists could discuss that more. >> just quickly, it's not the right impression. on the u.s. side. on the u.s. side very few don't know except on one or two questions. the rest of them were very, very low and they were detailed questions and don't know much about it. we don't get a lot of don't knows. more in japan than the u.s. >> any last word here on those questions or a quick word of onclusion? >> so, you mentioned about a lot of japanese response, i don't know. very many japanese people say i don't know. and so question is those americans t 25% of say they don't know for military option and i think this can sway a big way, depending how we investments will take place. so and once the opinion gets swayed one way, that can have a huge impact to the political assets and that can then become uncontrollable. so before anything, a big crisis two count tries need to engage with each other, communicate with each other. what japan can do, japan can only do only a few things. we can make a complement of future assistance to the development of north korea. but another thing that japan can contribute is an exercise on this north korean issue because the north korean issue being resolved, there is no peaceful framework in that region, because there is no peaceful institution in our region. u.s. is there. there is no peaceful ommunication channels or institutions. china, south korea, japan, the u.s., maybe the four of us should get together about the new peaceful institutions that can possibly work in the region. but japanese media is busy about talking about mr. trump's tweets, mr. trump's attitudes, about missiles from north korea. are short in a lot of media coverage. and that is the reason a lot of japanese people are saying, i don't know as my answer. seriously ave to face solution discussions about this problem. and i think the starting point objective i faced my across countries. and by the way, this event taught a lot of things for me. there are a lot of different perspectives from americans that are different from japan and i'm ot cite sizing that. japanese people need to recognize the american people's opinions so we can have discussions about new order in our region. but in any case, for northeast asia to be peaceful, north korea nuclear issue has to be resolved. that's what japan wants to emphasize. >> on the question of russia. russia's formal position on what the outcome should be has always been very good. complete denuclearization. i will say there has been concern in the last year that russia may undercut the tougher and tougher sanctions that are being imposed and came in behind the chinese. if the chinese are disloyal, and third, there has been expert analysis that suggests that the remarkable progress that north korea has made in the last two years on rockets or missiles was the result of new help that they received from the russian enterprise that produces rockets. no information on who ordered that company to do that. but that's concerning. because it's made a bad situation much worse. on the question in the back, we spent a lot of time arguing with ourselves arguing about what's the right formula of getting north korea to the table and what's the right formula to getting to yes. i will offer in response what secretary james baker said around 1990, when he was talking about negotiations with nicaragua and where we had a similar problem. 202, 1234. if north korea has some ideas on what could get us to yes, they know who to call. >> i will add one brief concluding word. and i share certainly his concerns and the poll and did a nice job highlighting how much japanese share concerns about the leadership we have at that very white house that richard just mentioned and i'm not here to suggest that i'm completely at ease with the decision making of our commander chief. and this is a slight word of reassurance. the quality of the advice president trump will get will be excellent. and the secretary mattises of the world and the these gentlemen have seen too much war in their lives to be in any way delusional of what it would entail. some of them are on record that a war in korea would be substantially worse than anything they have seen in the middle east. think you are going to have a sophisticated discussion of the costs and risks. i don't know what decisions that will produce and i would wish the public's arctic can you lation were of a somewhat different tone and character especially from the man at the top. i know his team for a long time as well as others in the room and it's a rock solid team inquest of war and peace. i'm confident it will be very good. and i hope that is something we can finish with deal with reassurance. i tharning the panel and the excellent poll. please join me. device. members are advised theha