Cspans road to the white house is providing coverage on cspan, cspan radio and cspan. Org. The New Hampshire leader along with media organizations are sponsoring the forum. Following the forum, you can provide your input by calling our callin program. Road to the white house 2016, cspan, cspan radio and cspan. Org. On tuesday, officials from the defense department, cdc and health and Human Services testified on capitol hill in regard to shipments of live sports of anthrax. Received live anthrax. This is a live interview. It is just over two hours. Two hour hearing. Good morning, welcome to our hearing dealing with anthrax once again. The subcommittee examines continue concerns over the federal agent select program with the focus on shipments of live anthrax from the department of Defense Laboratory that occurred over a ten year period. As last year we held a similar hearing that proposed dozens of cdc researchers to live anthrax due to safety procedures not being followed. The cdc director testified quote we will take every step possible to prevent any future incident that will put our Laboratory Scientist and public at risk. Yet, here we are again. We examine the mistake of avian flew and the vials of small pox in the nih building months after the hearing and after the white house ordered safety stand down the cdc revealed there was a transfer of ebola from a cdc four lab to a cdc two lab. And despite the growing number of red flags these incidents keep happening. We learned an army lab in utah shipped anthrax to facilities across the globe. At least 192 labs have received shipments of the anthrax. The testing used to validate and insure the anthrax spores were not active failed to detect the live anthrax spores. What is most troubling is that doug way used this potentially deadly process for years. This is unacceptable. It is threatening the Nation Security and Public Health. The committee hopes to learn what is being done to prevent future safety lapses. The internal review of the circumstances surrounding the shipments of anthrax and according to the report the dod was unable to determine the root cause of how and why doug way labs shipped anthrax. It is said all of the labs operate outside of the experimental data. In other words, it seems the department of defense labs have been eradiating larger numbers of spores given. This revelation begs a lot of questions beginning with why. And why for so long . Who was responsible about making the decision on which ina inactivation process to use . And what is the cdcs role in developing the processes . According to a recent and all too familiar headline, cdc announced it will conducting another review of how it regulates safety and security at bio terror labs. I think it is important to improve current regulations for processes and procedures. But the past review is not bringing about change for safety and standardized policies and procedures. As i said a year ago, what we have is a pattern of reoccurring issues of complacency and a lax culture of safety. Cdc corrector Freedman States this is a wakeup call but it appears the Snooze Button has been hit again. None of us want to be here again a year from now discussing another set of safety laps and heaven forbid a loss of life. The u. S. Accountability office is conducting work on high Containment Labs and go has been issuing recommendations for years requiring the strategy for high Containment Labs and the need for designing, structuring, commissioning and maintaining such labs yet the recommendation is not implemented which is one of the reasons we are here discussing another safety lapse threatening National Security and the Public Health. Today i would like to thank our witnesses for testifying here. I look forward to hearing from you. Please be forward with us as we learn about the procedures. This subcommittee will not relent on the compliance with select agent regulations and explore the possibility of an independent agency to oversee the labs. I recognize the Ranking Member from colorado. Thank you, mr. Chairman. You say you dont want to be back here in a year like last year but we have been here in 2007, 2009, 2014 and now 2015. So might as well mark your calendar now. And part of that is because it is important for the government to identify risk. But the work contains risk and that is why we have to contain oversight. I talked about the high Containment Lab we have in fort collins where we identified terrible lapses years ago and i worked with former colleague bob sheriff to get the built and i am proud of that. But we have to continue to make sure similar facilities across the country provide no risk to workers or the broader community. The details of the doug way incident do not inspire confidence. We are talking about a longterm series of shipments of live anthrax from the ground in utah which is one of the most sophisticated facilities in the world. This only came to light in may because of a private company contacting the cdc after discovering what it thought was activated anthrax was live anthrax. We are learns that 86 laboratories and seven Foreign Countries have received anthrax from doug way over the last 12 years. They transferred the live spores to an additional 106 labs. We are talking about almost 200 labs in all 50 states accidently receiving live anthrax for over a decade. No body seems to have fallen ill from these instances but i am worried this activity was going on for so long. I am eager to hear answers from dod on how this happened in the first place and what they are doing to make sure it doesnt happen again. The report released last week found insufficient Science Literature to develop protocols for the inactivation of spores. The doug way lab was relying on procedures that didnt sterilize the spores. This seems troubling. How have we conducted research on this dangerous pathogen without thoroughly understanding how to inactivate it . We need to see if we use similar protocols for other agents, and if so i think we can agree we need to seize those operations to avoid putting the public at risk. Dod has issued a stop on shipping anthrax from the labs. This seems like an important first step. But i do want to know how that affects the research the lab was doing. Do we need to have to 200 labs working with anthrax . Can we limit the number of labs and limit the risk while still being able to do the important research. I want to hear if the breakdowns are indicative of broader problems at this site or across the higher containment. The incidents we have seen recently raise questions about whether we can trust high Containment Labs to handle select agents. In the last year, we have seen an anthrax exposure at cdc improper shipment of avian flu and even a potential ebola exposure at a cdc lab. I feel lucky we have not had anyone infected but it could happen. I hope you have answered on what we are doing to make serious changes and include the recommendations goa has made. With that i yield back. Anybody else on this side wish to make Opening Statements or comments . If not an article appeared in the usa today and i would like you to look at that and ask for consent to submit to the record . This is titled cdc key lab Incident Reporting policy despite scrutiny and promises. Now i will recognize mr. Palone. Thank you. I hope we can get to the bottom of this incident. Deputy of defense secretary described the lapses as a quote massive institutional failure and i hope it can be explained how this occurred. I am deeply relieved no one has fallen ill as a result of the lapses and i am hopeful this remains the case as dod and cdc continue to track the labs that receive the samples. But this incident raises questions about the safety of high Containment Laboratories across the country. Every day hundreds of labs in the federal government and academic institutions and private companies handle dangerous pathogens under the federal select Agent Program. The labs perform important work and conduct research to improve our defenses against biological atta attacks and strengthening Public Health situations. Laboratories are require to restrict and imelement safe guards. They must make sure laboratories are trained on Safety Measures. They are subject to registration and inspections by the division of select agents and toxins. They are penalties associated with lapses and safety protocol and unauthorized use of agents is subject to penalties. Incidents involving ebola, avian flu and other diseases raises the question of needing to stregthen the Safety Measures. Is the current Regulatory Framework sufficient . Do they are resources to insure oversight is robust . What is the cdc doing to prevent slab situations in the future. I look forward to hearing about the findings and recommendations from those reviews and how they can be used to enhance safety and security at all of the high laboratories. I look forward to hearing from goa about the recommendations to strengthen Safety Measures across high Containment Labs. I hope we can learn from this latest incident and take seriously the important recommendations made by recent and ongoing investigations by goa and others to make this program safer. We look forward to conductive discussion on how we can improve oversight and what this committee can do to facilitate that process. Again, i thank the chairman and Ranking Member as we proceed. I yield back. The gentlemen yields back and with no further comments we will go to our witnesses. So as you are aware. When the committee is holding an investigation hearing takes the testimony under oath. Do any of the witnesses have objection to testifying under oath . Under the rules of the house and committee, your entitled to be advised by council, do you any of desire to be advised by counsel . Rise and raise your right hand. Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth . All of the our witnesses have answered in the affirmative. You may now each give a five minute summary of your written statement. Pay attention to the lights there. We will start with dr. Hassell. Thank you, chairman murphy and Ranking Member deget te. I appreciate being able to talk about the shipment of live anthrax. I am the Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for chemical and biological defense. The use of inactivated or dead anthrax is important to develop ways to protect war fighters and the public from known biological threats. Doing this with the development and Testing Systems and diagnostic and decontamination policies. We learned of this on may 22nd, 2015 when we were alerted by a private company reporting the growth of living anthrax in a sample at the doug way ground in utah. The cdc started working with dod officials and the laboratories and fbi. All known laboratories that received activated anthrax samples has been notified to stop working with the samples. And the laboratories that produced and operated anthrax were directed to stop producing, shipping and working with any activated anthrax other than purposes related to this current matter. Tested identified other batches containing live spores and on june 2nd the department of defense notified all known recipients of activated anthrax from doug way to stop working with material whether it was confirmed to contain live anthrax or not. 31 u. S. Citizens, eight nondod and 23dod were placed on postexposure treatment that was completed yesterday. Returning to the subject of the four dod laboratories that produced activated anthrax, on may 29 the deputy of defense ordered all of them test anthrax in their inventory to identify the presence of live spores. The results are in and since 2003, the four laboratories made 149 batches of live anthrax spores. Of the 96 samples available to test, 17 tested positive for the presence of live anthrax all coming from doug way. We know over the past 12 years, 86 laboratories in 20 states, washington, d. C. And countries received directly from doug way inactivated samples with live spores. An additional 106 labs received secondary transfers from some of the 186 direct recipient labs bringing the total to 192 labs in all 50 states. We completed the root causes of the incident resulting in key findings including the key issue is lack of standards to guide the development of protocols, processes, and Quality Assurance measures. The result recommendations are grouped into enhance quality programs, establish testing protocols based on relative Scientific Data and improve program management. The department is committed to insuring this doesnt happen again and we will implement the recommendations in the report and outlined by deputy work on the 23 rd of july. We remain committed to transparency as we go forward. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and i welcome your questions. I want to note we have not had a chance to review a lot of your testimony because it wasnt in until 9 oclock and the Committee Rules are we ask for 48 hours. So when we get to the testimony at the last minute it is difficult for us to review it. I dont want to think that cdc is trying to frustrate our purposes here but i want to indicate to you if you could pass the word on to cdc that for future testimony we want the 48 hour limit adhered to. We would like to hear from you for five minutes at this point. Chairman murphy, and Ranking Member and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would like to share what the cdc has done with the release of live anthrax from doug way proving ground and provide information on the Selective Program cdc supports. Cdc works 24 7 to save lives and protect people. We activated the Operation Center in the face and uncertainty of this. We understand how concerning this incident has been and the primary focus continues to make sure people are safe and the anthrax materials are secured and ultimately disposed it. This incident raises serious and challenging issues. It is important to note however that Scientific Research in laboratories is a vital component of our Nations Defense against naturally occurring diseases and bioterrorism. This research is complex and sometimes dangerous. While it is not possible to eliminate all risk, those of us working in this field across the country and around the world must do what we can to minimize risk. Here is what we know about the doug way incident today. There has been no suspected or confirmed cases of anthrax infection associated with the samples. Some risk and people who have accepted treatment will have complet completed antibiotics yesterday and no complications were reported. The facilities that received the samples appropriately securied r destroyed them. Highlighting this positive news is not meant to downplay the seriousness of the situation. On multiple occasions, over more than a decade the production methods failed to inactivate the spores. The failure was evident was growth was being deducted on the runs. The runs were sent back for radiation and it should have been seen as the indication the margin of safety with the method was not sufficient. And testing at doug way to confirm the activation failed to detect live spores. We have looked and found no evidence of a similar problem at other facilities that inactivate anthrax spores. The existing rules and regulations on anthrax spore and regulations are under review. We dont know the federal select Agent Program relies on testing to assure its agent can no longer grow. We are unsure if there is a problem with the execution of the testing at doug way or the biology wasnt understood to make the procedure reliable. Here is what we are doing moving forward. We are maintaining the moratorium on the use and transfer of spores until we have an incredible approach to increasing asafety and security. We are developing an agenda on spore biology to answer questions about activation and help to conduct that research. At the doctors direction, we are initiating a review of the cdc select program and it will co compliment ongoing work. There is a thorough review of the program to make sure it is meeting mandets. The world benefits from discoveries made working with dangerous pathogens and science who work with the pathogens have a commitment to the Public Health and safety. We must achieve balance to protect the community and encourage and support advancement. But safety comes first. One characteristic of the cdc stewardship of the federal Celebrity Agency program is the commitment to improvement. The regulations have been refined with advice from many including review bodies and the public leading to revisions concerning personal reliability, Incident Reporting, coordination of inspections with federal partners, and tracking shipments of select agents. Although much work has been done to enhance the effectiveness of the cdc Regulatory Oversight more work needs to be done. Where improvements can be made, we will make them. Where there is disagreement on the best path forward we will contribute to the debate. We will work diligently and thoughtfully with anyone sharing the commitment to protect americans from biological threats. Thank you. Mr. Demske recognized for five minutes. Good mor