[captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption contents and accuracy. visit ncicap.org >> next a discussion on the verification process. then q&a. live at 7:00 your calls and comments on "washington journal." today, the united states with the international partners have achieved something that decades of animosity have not. a comprehensive long-term deal with iran that will prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon. this deal demonstrates that american diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful change. change that makes our country and the world more secure. this deal is also in line with a tradition of american leadership. it is now more than 50 years since president kennedy stood before the american people and said let us never negotiate out of fear but let us never fear to negotiate. he was speaking then about the need for discussions between the united states and the soviet union which led to efforts to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons. in those days the risk was a catastrophic nuclear war between two super powers. in our time the risk is that nuclear weapons will spread to more and more countries particularly in the middle east, the most volatile region in our world. today because america negotiated from a position of strength and principle, we have stopped the spread of nuclear weapons in this region. because of this deal, the international community will be able to verify that tizz lambic republic of iran will not develop a nuclear weapon. this deal meets every single one of the bottom lines that we established when we achieved a framework earlier this spring every pathway to a nuclear weapon is cut off and the trans pecks necessary to verify that objective will be put in place. because of this deal iran will not produce the highly enriched uranium and weapons grade plutonium that form the raw materials necessary for a nuclear bomb. because of this deal, iran will remove two thirds of its installed centrifuges, the machines necessary to produce highly enriched uranium for a bomb and store them under constant international supervision. iran will not use its advanced centrifuges to produce enriched uranium for the next decade. iran will also get rid of 98% of its stockpile of enriched uranium. to put that in perspective, iran currently has a stockpile that could produce up to ten nuclear weapons. because of this deal that stockpile will be reduced to a fraction of what would be required for a single weapon. this will last for 15 years. because of this deal iran will modify the core of its reactor in iraq that it will not produce weapons grade plutonium. and it has agreed to ship the spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the lifetime of the reactor. for at least the next 15 years iran will not build any new heavy water reactors. because of this deal we will for the first time be in a position to verify all of these commitments. that means this deal is not built on trust. it is built on verification. inspectors will have 24/7 access to iran's key nuclear facilities. iran will have access to iran conversion facility and its centrifuge manufacture rg and storage facilities. this ensures that iran will not be able to diverse materials from known facilities to covert ones. some of these transparency measures will be in place for 25 years. because of this deal inspectors will also be able to access any suspirgs location. put simply, the organization responsible for tin speckses will have access where necessary, when necessary. that arrangement is permanent. and the iaea has also reached an agreement with iran to get access that it needs to complete its investigation into the possible military dimensions of iran's past nuclear research. finally, iran is permanently prohibited from pursuing a nuclear weapon under the treaty, which provided the basis for the international community's efforts to apply pressure on iran. as iran takes steps to implement this deal, it will receive relief from the sanctions that we put in place because of iran's nuclear program both america's own sanctions and sanction combs posed by the united nations security council. this relief will be phased in. iran must complete key nuclear steps before it begins to receive new sanctions relief. and over the course of the next decade iran must abide by the deal before additional sanctions are lifted. including five years for restrictions related to arms and eight years for restrictions related to ballistic missiles. all of this will be memorialized and endorsed in a new united nations security council resolution. and if iran violates the deal all these sanctions will snap back into place. so there's a very clear incentive for iran to follow through and there are very real consequences for a violation. that's the deal. it has the full backing of the international community. congress will now have an opportunity to review the details and my administration stands ready to provide extensive briefings on how this will move forward. as the american people and congress review the deal it will be important to consider the alternative. consider what happens in a world without this deal. without this deal there is no scenario where the world joins us in sanctioning iran until it completely dismantles its nuclear program. nothing we know about the iranian government suggests that it would simply capitulate under that kind of pressure and the world would not support an effort to permanently sanction iran into submission. we put saverageses in place to get a diplomat resolution and that is what we have done. without this i will never hesitate to do so when it is in our national security interests. i strongly believe that our national security interests now depends upon preventing iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. which means that without a diplomatic resolution either i or a future u.s. president would face a decision about whether or not to allow iran to obtain a nuclear weapon or whether to use our military to stop it. no deal means a greater chance of more war in the middle east. moreover, we give nothing up by testing whether or not this problem can be solved peacefully. if in a worst case scenario iran violates the deal, the same options that are available to me today will be available to any u.s. president in the future. and i have no doubt that ten or 15 years from now the person who holds this office will be in a far stronger position with iran further away from a weapon and with the inspections and transparency that allow us to monitor the iranian program. for this reason i believe it would be irresponsible to walk away from this deal. but on such a tough issue it is important that the american people and their representatives in congress get a full opportunity to review the deal. after all the details matter. we have had some of the finest scientists in the world working through those details. and we're dealing with a country -- inche -- that has been a sworn adversary of the united states for over 35 years. so i welcome a robust debate in congress on this issue and i welcome scrutiny of the details of this agreement. but i will remind congress that you don't make deals like this with your friends. we negotiated arms control agreements with the soviet union when that nation was committed to our destruction and those ultimately made us safer. i am confident that this deal will meet the national security interests of the united states and our allies. so i will veto any legislation that prevents the successful implementation of this deal. we do not have to accept an inevitable spiral into conflict and we certainly shouldn't seek it. and precisely because the stakes are so high this is not the time for politics or posturing. tough talk from washington does not solve problems. hard-nosed diplomacy, leadership that has united the world's major powers, offers a more effective way to verify that iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon. now, that doesn't mean this will resolve all of our differences with iran. we share the concerns expressed by many of our friends in the middle east including israel and the gulf states about iran's support for terrorism and its use of proxies to destabilize the region. but that is precisely why we are taking this step. because an iran armed with a nuclear weapon would be far more dangerous. meanwhile, we will maintain our own sanctions related to iran's support for terrorism, its ballistic missile program and its human rights violations. we will continue our efforts to strengthen israel's security efforts that go beyond what any american administration has done before. and we will continue the work at camp david to strengthen their capabilities to counter threats from iran or terrorist groups like isil. however, i believe that we must continue to test whether or not this region -- which has known so much suffering, so much blood shed, can move in a different direction. time and again i have made clear to the iranian people that we will always be open to engagement on the basis of move mutual interest and mutual respect. our differences are real. and the difficult history between our nations cannot be ignored but it is possible to change. the path of violence and rigid ideology the foreign policy based on threats to attack your neighbors or eradicate israel, that's a dead-end, a different path one of tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflict leads to more integration into the global economy, more engagement with the international community, and the ability of the iranian people to prosper and thrive. this deal offers an opportunity to move in a new direction. we should seize it. we have come a long way to reach this point. decades of an iranian nuclear program, many years of sanctions and many months of intense negotiations. today i thank members of congress from both parties who helped us put in place the sanctions that have proven so effective and the other countries who joined us in that effort. i thank our negotiating partners, the united kingdom, france germany, russia china, as well as the european union for our unity in this effort which showed the world can do remarkable thing whence we share a vision of peacefully addressing conflicts. we showed what we can do when we do not split apart. finally i thank the american negotiating team. we had a team of experts working for several weeks straight on this including our secretary of energy. and i particularly thank john kerry our secretary of stated who began his service to our country more than four decades ago when he put on the uniform and went off to war. he is now making the country safer through commitment to strong principled american diplomacy. history shows that america must lead not just with our might but with our principles. it shows we are stronger not when we are alone but when we bring the world together. today's announcement marks one more chapt anywhere this pursuit of a safer, and more helpful more hopeful world. c-span.org. announcer: national security analysts discuss the iran nuclear program agreement at the atlantic council, focusing on the role of the international atomic energy the in monitoring iranian facilities. it is moderated by barbara schliemann. this is about 1.5 hours. barbara: ok. welcome to the atlantic council. we have done it again. we have timed a program to follow by one day a historic agreement with iran. i would like to say that i planned it this way, but in this case, it is just dumb luck. as we all know, there is a lot to digest in this document that was announced yesterday. we are going to welcome your questions about any aspect of the agreement. our focus is on one of the most important issues that congress will be looking at it, other critics will be looking at, and that is verification. will we know if iran cheats? what will we do? how will be handling? is the international atomic energy agency, which is the organization task with doing this verification, is it up to the task of monitoring the deal and if not, when news to be done to augment its capabilities? to discuss these issues, we have a panel including the author of a study on this subject, tom shea. also, the chairman of our task force could not be with us today. let me say how absolutely delighted i am that we are cohosting this event with search for common ground. for those of you who don't know it, they are the pioneer in u.s.-iran diplomacy. they took the wrestlers to iran in 1998. they have done many things over the years that have helped bring us to this day. before i introduce our other speakers, i will ask ambassador bill miller to say a few words. i have known ill for about as long as i have been focusing on iran, about 20 years. at times, i have questioned his perennial optimism about u.s.-iran relations but once again, he has proven that he is more farsighted than the rest of us. so ambassador miller, if you would say a few you words? ambassador miller: thank you, barbara. you're a stalwart friend and a source of optimism. i want to thank the atlantic council for having this event today and being our gracious hosts. when we scheduled this event, we did not know the joint comprehensive plan of action would be issued just yesterday. this is an historic agreement by any standard even by standards of decades. we are pleased that this is so well-timed and the atlantic council has been able to mobilize and tell us -- and giving us the opportunity to speak today. my interest in iran began as a foreign service officer well before the revolution. this was in 1959. as it happened, this was the beginning of the iranian nuclear program. the iranian nuclear program owes almost everything to the united states. its physicists and engineers were trained in the united states. as a part of the atoms for peace program of eisenhower, we even send david lilienthal to iran to work out a comprehensive energy program. people have forgotten lil ienthal recommended that iran had 22 nuclear reactors and use its gas and oil for infrastructure. this legacy extends to this day. iran has a program that stems from that. from that time when i served in iran, i have maintained my interest. i want to quote from a letter that i carried with ramsey clark on november 6 1979, a letter from jimmy carter to ayatollah khomeini. i want to read one paragraph. i have asked both men to meet with you and to hear from you your perspective on events in i ran and problems that have arisen between our two countries. people of the united states decided to have relations with iran based on equality, mutual respect, and friendship. it has taken 36 years to carry that out. john experience part of those 36 years in prison and he is one of the optimists who believes that relations with iran make sense. now that i have a job as a senior advisor for search for common ground, for 10 years we have worked together to carry out the beginnings, the baseline for civilized relations between our countries. we have tried everything. movies poetry, art astronauts wrestlers, soccer players basketball players scholars politicians. most important scientists. people who understand the middle east. i would like to describe the beginnings of the tom shea paper which is of direct relevance today. it was clear to many of us that the agreement depends on the ability of the terms of the agreement being verified. it was the suggestion of senior members from the senate who anticipated that an agreement was pending. that the key issue before the congress would be whether the terms of an agreement with iran could be monitored effectively so that if there was any direction away from peaceful uses, it would be detected in time to take effective action. that was the baseline problem. the question then immediately arose, was the iaea good enough to fill that task. for the past year, we have been engaged in efforts to make that determination. over a year ago, after meeting with him and hearing high praise for his work for a quarter of the century in the iaea and as a scientist in american institutions, to undertake a study of the efficacy of the iaea, how it works, how it might in fact undertake the task of monitoring the agreement. he has done this job that he has done it very well. i suggest that you could go copies of the summary outside this room. i want to thank joe, the president of plowshares, for his continued efforts to bring about a rational solution to one of the great questions of arms control. we oh my stew is support over the years. i want to thank, in particular, barbara, dear friend, who brings the best of journalism and scholarship to her job. she continues to lead the way on the best approach is to iran. jim walsh is a close friend and we have struggled together in the task of bringing sense and rationality to our leadership. john lambert, of course, is a dear friend. i'm sorry that we weren't able to extract you forth with. thank you barbara. thank you tom for your good work. barbara: i neglected when we began to tell you a little bit more about bill miller. he told you he was in iran before the revolution as a foreign service officer. he was also u.s. ambassador to ukraine. he also served for 14 years on capitol hill. he was a staff director for three senate committees. tom shea search for 24 years -- served for 24 years in the iaea safeguard. develop systems for reactor fuel manufacturing plants green -- reprocessing plants. he supervised inspections of facilities in japan, china india, and other countries. after he retired from the iaea, he served at the pacific northwest national laboratory. he received his phd and was awarded the distinguished service award. i'm going to have tom shea, and talk a little bit about the paper and then i will introduce or other speakers. dr. shea: is there anyone here the new agreement? i will start off with shame on you, and get to it. having just produce the document, was only yesterday? the article i have been working on is in a state of now trying to cope with the reality of the specifics of the final agreements. starting off, 25 years ago the iaea system was overhauled after it was discovered that there were clandestine nuclear weapons programs in iraq and north korea. in effect, they compelled the international community to overhaul that system and make it relevant to the threats of today . the efforts that took place, the technologies that have been applied, the authorities that have been given, all of those things have essentially been reinvented since 1990. today, with the joint comprehensive plan of action the steps are relatively straightforward, a remarkable departure from the laissez-faire sort of attitude which more often than not prevailed when there was no opportunity for consensus. with that, there is a new agreement -- this new agreement is extraordinarily detailed in-depth and believed to be studied. it will need to be analyzed in terms of obligations commitments, resources, things of that sort. the iaea, in its application of the measures will have five challenges. first to discover any additional hidden facilities which may not have come to light. whether there are any or not, i certainly don't know. whether there is any new construction from now on. the next is to verify that the known facilities are not misused third is to make sure that the nuclear materials in the country remain unaccounted for and are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. fourth is to track imports into the country which may include bans materials, dual use materials. those things that are permitted must be used for the purposes indicated. the iaea will have to seek to verify the limitations and verify those are not exceeded as the time goes on. the question of the hidden facilities, you may prefer the term clandestine i'm. i would like you to note that iran is more than twice the size of texas, so we are dealing with a very large landmass filled with mountainous terrain and complicated arrangements. to succeed in relation to these facilities, the iaea would first need to identify suspicious location and then confirm before it makes any advances, whether or not there's any reason the best position -- there's any reason the suspicion is warranted. this is sort of like getting a warrant for someone's arrest the process of building a case and going forward. it would then define how an inspection visit would attempt to clarify the characteristics of the particular site, whether there are reasons for -- then they would secure the team required, range for the analytical services. one of its commitments is to implement an additional protocol, which is an extension to a comprehensive safeguards agreement that grew out of the situation in dprk and iraq in the early 90's. this instrument requires ratification that is currently in force in 126 countries i would saying no of these 126 countries are really problem countries. it is mostly the case of building the foundation for application. will be different -- iran will be different. they agreed to implement the protocol and eight years later to seek its ratification. the information that will be available to the iaea will be varied. in terms of the 1990's with iraq and north korea, the information that is used by the iaea now includes the following. anything that comes from safeguards, and for gate -- information gathered through inspections in the field, any activities that take in acquiring samples or knowledge. it has a program of going through open source data mining. this is a practice that has come about in the 90's and continues to be refined. it is not like the national security agency looking through e-mail but it scan through all scholarly publications and the like for related subjects and that information is sometimes revealing. it looks for export information, unknown activities. there are connections to several suppliers, particularly out of the situation in iraq where companies make things like vacuum pumps that were essential for enrichment plant and some people went to prison because of selling equipment for purposes that were clearly not consistent with the laws of the nations involved. some of those companies now have direct links to the iaea and informed them if they have requests for 200 pumps for a hospital or something crazy. we should also remember that earlier, one of the sources of information which broke the news about the enrichment plant presumably the unification of iran is not 100%, so will be a step in that direction and its own people once again those countries, iraq and north korea, the provision of intelligence information to the iaea became a common -- not completely common -- but a practice that was carried out by some degree of uniformity. there is a stipulation in the iaea statute, it is article 8.a. it says that if a state has information which it believes would be helpful to the iaea in carrying out these activities, it should make that information available. according to the director general's report, more than 10 countries have provided information on iran that is a part of the safeguards fabric at this point. the statutory permission will hopefully be an expectation and maybe even some latent culpability for states. the last thing i will invention it -- the last thing i will mention is environmental samples, which is a scientific or out of the cold war. laboratories were monitoring fallout samples from china and the soviet union to track the development of their nuclear weapons as they advanced in stages with various more modern features being incorporated. the technology has now been used by the iaea. initially it was a technology that was made available to them by, in particular america laboratories, but also others. the iaea has now established its own laboratory, paid for in part by the united states, but with german and katie -- german and canadian equipment and other countries participating. that sounds like a crimes investigation kind of a thing for you take a swipe of something and with that swipe you can put whatever comes off onto a piece of plastic. individual particles which way a million millionth of a gram will show damage. when you can identify these particles, you can pick them out and put them in an instrument that will tell what the chemical composition is, what their isotopic composition is, what the morphology of the particle is so you can get tremendous amounts of information. you have to know where to look and you have to be careful to not cross contaminate. again, you want very careful attention to the collection and analysis. this is one of the main st ays. the other is access to satellite imagery. in the time of north korea in particular, u.s. intelligence sources provide satellite imagery on north korea, which was very revealing during the board of governors discussion. today, they have commercial companies which provide cable company -- commercial companies which provide capabilities which are better than the intelligence companies that then. there is a satellite imagery analysis group that buys these images and looks at them. sometimes they have their own justification for wanting to know what is going on. this first investigation with satellite imagery cost relatively little. it is not intrusive. it is not required -- it does not require the permission of anybody and gives you information that may be helpful. if you have a suspicion, then one of the things you would want to do is to continue to look at the site as you continue to go forward with further inquiries to determine whether or not anything would happen. with the additional protocol coming into force, one of its provisions is what is called arrangement for complimentary access. these are not inspections that they are access which is complementary to inspections. they still require a process where a request is made and reviewed by the government of iran and hopefully they grant access and that long chain of events then gets put into place. the inspectors go off into their work. the agency has established channels. if they are innocent, then the report becomes part of the database on all things known about iran and its verification. if the findings are inconclusive, maybe additional member -- maybe additional measures are necessary. there is a lot of information we can analyze on ongoing basis determine how best to do this process. if the findings are suspicious, then you start to ramp up with political inquiries leading to perhaps a director general being in the conversation with a resident representative or maybe a visit to the country and maybe a discussion they advanced to the board of governors. at this point, the commission has been created is somehow informed. it's unclear yet to exactly what that process will be. in any case, the opportunities for further inquiry will become clear. for the iea to succeed it means clear priority for these tasks. if we go back to the time of iraq and north korea there is an agreement that all parties have to have. these are all identical, all according to a model. one of the provisions for a special inspection. it is not limited in any sense to any place or activity at all. the problem is that it requires consultation and, in effect, approval. the one time that it was attempted was in north korea and the north koreans refused to allow it and to this day have refused. the question of a hidden waste facility that was used to hide the fact of their processing activity acting extensively more than the declaration. whether this is a viable mechanism or not, it has been lying in a ditch. whether it ever gets resurrected, that isn't clear. what is coming now is the un security council resolution. that will be a very important document to see how it addresses the tasking, to what extent the agency is given additional authority. in particular, things like verification of centrifuge manufacturing. the actual devices are not within the scope of safeguards. there would be some extensions of authority as are appropriate. iea will require continued financial support. iaea is a member of the united nations family of organizations. it has its own membership and budget. it has a formula for assessing members in accordance with the approved budget to carry out its programs. the change that it requires -- the change requires the approval of all 35 governors. whether all 35 would be enough --forcing them to a vote is not usually the way the agency would operate. the american perspective on how to make this perspective succeed is something on the order of 50 million, which seems like a nice round number, but it is much smaller -- i can't say exactly. in relation to the police force washington d.c., i think it is very modest. in addition, technological support must be continued. there are today member states voluntary support programs. the american program is still the largest. its current funding is about $15 million per year or so. without their -- without that there is no hope that you can solve problems. scientists are engineers are really smart guys. -- scientists and engineers are really smart guys. the questions of finding a facility in a place twice the size of texas will require every bit of attention it can get. financial support, political support that is so amazing to me. the most amazing thing to me about this agreement is that the coalition has held together with germany throughout the several years of negotiation. i can only hope that that will continue to be the case. with that, i will stop my prepared remarks and respond to many questions. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. i'm going to introduce other speakers now. we are very lucky that we have a representative of the administration who has just joined us. he has served previously as senior adviser to vice president joe biden for nuclear security. he has worked at the monterey institute. he is the co-author of deadly arsenals, tracking weapons of mass distraction. let me introduce the other members of our panel who will, after john speaks. jim walsh is an expert in international security and a research associate at m.i.t. and their security studies program. his research and writings focus on international security and topics involving nuclear weapons and the middle east. he has testified before the senate on nuclear terrorism. he is one of the handful of americans who has traveled to both iran and north korea. he served as executive director of managing the atom project at harvard universities -- harvard university. he asked how to both harvard and m.i.t.. he received his phd from m.i.t.. last, but definitely not least john bloomberg is the class of 1955 professor of middle eastern studies at the u.s. naval academy. he has had a 34 year career in the u.s. foreign service, mostly in the middle east and islamic africa. in 2009, he came out of retirement to serve as deputy assistant secretary focused on iran. he helped craft some of the language that president obama has used. he has to the u.s. government have to speak to iran. he served in iran before the revolution. he was a guest of the ayatollah for 444 days. he has also authored many books on iran. first, i am going to ask john to come up. talk about verification. is this deal as full proof as we can make it? then we will have a panel discussion and take your questions. >> thank you, barbara. she was obviously not -- she did not need higher brain function to assemble the people that are going to be on this panel today. i am on her to be in the group. what i will do for a few minutes is just talk about the deals we have negotiated, and why we believe it is very much a good deal and in our security interest. then i will talk about the support for the iaea. we recognize that is a critical component. we have high confidence that the verification provision of this deal will work, because we are committed to them. and because of the agency's capabilities. we are very thankful they are there. very basically and briefly, this is a good deal. this is a very good deal. if you had told us that we have not only met and exceeded all of the inch marks that we laid out in luzon, we would have been skeptical. iran's responsibility to abide is in perpetuity. it is not limited. their requirement to abide by the treaty and not to see acquire, or pursue nuclear weapons is permanent. we have the ability to verify this under this agreement. sanctions relief does not take place until iran comes back into compliance. there is no big pot of money that they get the day they get home. they have to do a lot of very difficult things that they have been unwilling to do for many decades to get sanctions relief. once that is achieved, we have a significant. of -- we have a significant amount of time where sanctions can snap back into place. if you read through the documentation, the president can resent his waiver of sanctions with a stroke of a pen. we have the authority under this agreement to call for a un security council resolution, and through its exercise of its veto snap the sanctions back into place. we don't need russia or china. and they cannot use their veto to block the reimposition of sanctions over this time. there are a lot of people saying a is getting all of the three boards. -- all of these rewards. over the last 10 years they have paid a significant penalty. this is a price that iran has had to pay because they violated their legal commitment. this agreement gives them a pathway to come back into compliance. and therefore, once they can come back into compliance, they can do what other states can do. but in their case, it will be limited for a significant amount of time. in a way that other nonproliferation treaty members are not limited. they are paying a price for their behavior, and i think it is one that is very significant. we talk a lot about the four potential pathways that iran has to acquire nuclear weapons. all four pathways are cut off. their uranium facility will be monitored in live camera fees, remote access monitoring, radio identification, we will know everything that goes on at that facility. there will be no uranium enrichment facility. no uranium is permitted -- no nuclear material is permitted for a significant. of time. the iaea will have permanent access to that facility. the reactor at our rock -- the reactor at iraq will be redesigned so that it cannot produce weapons usable plutonium. we get to help design the fuel. we get to verify and inspected 24/7. if iran even attempts to try and misuse declared facilities we will know in days, more likely within hours. the international alarm system will be functioning. what is very important here is the sneak out scenario. we believe given the inspection capabilities and the knowledge this agreement will give us, that our ability to detect undeclared nuclear activity or facility is greatly increased as a result of the iaea rights under the protocol. it is extremely unlikely that iran could build anything of significance and begin to operate it without being detected. could they have a small facility where some guys strong pictures of a nuclear weapon? we do not suggest that this plan will prevent any and all minor activity that could be related to a possible nuclear interest. what we can say is nothing that iran could achieve if the many closer to building a nuclear bomb. and then anything of significance -- and that anything of significance but if they tried it, we would be able to detect that facility. the iaea would have the right to go there. if iran refused access, they would be, by definition, in violation. we don't claim -- is this verification plan full proof? iran can't get any closer to a nuclear weapon without us knowing about it. that is the standard that we are trying to achieve. it is one that is well within their ability to implement. iaea was the organization that got it right in iraq. the iaea, when it was a ledge that iraq was seeking weapons in africa, they got it right. to ensure that they will be able to do this job effectively, the united states will be working with other member states to ensure that they have the technology, resources, and the people needed to do this job without draining resources from other important responsibilities. that will take money, but quite frankly it is a bargain compared to what it tries -- what it takes to surveye iranil on our own. we will ensure, as will our partners, that the iaea has the resources it needs to carry out this job. it is only because of the work of people like tom and the inspectors doing this job that we will be able to have an agreement like this that we believe will stand the test of time. with that, i'm happy to turn things over. [applause] >> thank you so much. very useful remarks. i am actually going to start with a question. then we will get back into the technical discussion. john i wanted to ask for your reflections on this agreement as somebody who has unique experience in iran. you have written an excellent piece for the cairo review about the ghost of history. to what extent are we exercising these ghosts? knowing iran as you do, do you think they will implement the still faithfully? did you think it does represent some kind of turning point for the regime? >> thank you, barbara. let me also thank ambassador miller who undertook a humanitarian issue back in 1979. what we are seeing now is essentially president carter's letter getting a response after 36 years. we are also seeing president obama's outreach efforts which he began as senator obama in 2007, with the opposition of then senator hillary clinton -- those efforts also bearing fruit. it comes down to the word that you hear so much is trust and mistrust. what you hear from the opponents in both capitals is very similar. you hear we cannot trust them. you can interchange the we and the them according to where you are. this is a real issue. i will just give you one quick example of this. a few years ago, the iranians announced they were ready to switch on their nuclear power station. the project goes back to the 1970's. people tell me at the time they bought obsolete german equipment to build this thing in the mid- 1970's. in 2010, they were ready to switch it on. someone asked then secretary of state hillary clinton, what do you think about this. she said we are not worried about it. we are well aware. it is not something that we are concerned about. then reporters went back and asked an iranian official what do you think about this. what do you think about the secretary's statement? the answer was i don't know what it is, but i know there is a trick somewhere. the americans just don't say that. we have seen variations of this phenomenon in both places. in the u.s. we have seen what i call the rise of the geneticists. we have heard things like deception is in iranian dna. well geneticists talk about dna. we have heard something similar from a very distinguished retired military officer who was now the president of one of the great universities in this country. he talked about persian imperialism is in iranian dna. where does this stuff come from? where did people start being geneticists? if i were talking about nuclear physics then to talk about genetics. to quote lyndon johnson -- to paraphrase lyndon johnson -- he once said i don't know much, but i know the difference between chicken soup and chicken salad. he used in our dear expression. [laughter] when i hear people pretending to be geneticists, you know what to do. you hear it again. we cannot trust them. if you go to iran events in this town, you will hear things like well we know the iranians are working for a nuclear bomb, and the question is how do you know. the answer is because they are bad people, and variations of that. getting back to the answer this way -- this issue of trust people say and ask me, do you trust the iranians. what i say is no, because to quote the president, you don't make agreements like this with your friends. you don't spend two years and 100 pages with a country that you have the media trust with. -- you have immediate trust with. but as someone who practice diplomacy for 30 years, when i hear these comments, here is where i come out. diplomacy is basically making them perfect agreements with people you neither like nor trust. imperfect agreements with perhaps dubious people. that essentially is what kept us safe in the cold war for 40 years. that is what this agreement is about. it is not about trust. it is about verification. >> i am going to ask all three of our other speakers to look specifically at the verification issue. as ambassador miller pointed out, it began in 1950 nine, and the united states is largely responsible. we supported the idea of 22 civilian power directors for iran. there have been fits and starts. it started again during the iraq war. are you all confident that iran is satisfied with the level that it has reached for now? that it is satisfied with the agreement and will carry it out safely? and that his object really is not a weapon? -- and that it is really not a weapon? >> we believe that our run has determined -- we believe that iran has determined that it is in their interest. we are not leaving that to trust. the verification provision will give us the ability to determine if they are going to comply. that is true in day 20 as it is in day 2020. in terms of their satisfaction, satisfaction is an emotion. what they are required to do is lay out a detailed research and development plans and to declare to the iaea what their plans are. those plans have to be consistent with the spirit and the letter of the agreement. because of the details of the plan that we have and that will be provided to the iaea, we have very high confidence that the plan's strictly defined progression, that they are satisfied. where they will go into the future, is for them to thesdecide. in some ways it comes into a basic principle. under the treaty they are obligated not to seek or pursue in any way nuclear weapons. if we believe that they are out of compliance with that, we can find ourselves right back in the situation that we inherited when we took office in 2009 and that led to this negotiation and culminated in this agreement. >> let me just ask you about the pmd question. they have to satisfy the iaea by december 15? >> they have to satisfy the iaea by october. the iaea must provide a report by december. >> is there a date in october? >> i will have to take a look. this situation has been lingering because the iranians felt they would have to give access and that we would use that to impose further sanctions. we have found a formula which says if you abide by the principles of access, and the iaea is satisfied, and that five years from now they cannot say you did not need to go into the facility back then, then we are prepared to move forward with this. without that commitment and follow through to access, there will be no sanctions released and we will not have a deal. >> your thoughts on the iranian program and whether they will implement it. >> i think it is important to step back and put this in some sort of context. this is not our first rodeo. this is not the first time we have wrestled with the problems of verification. we have done this for decades. we have had agreements with bad actors. we find ourselves now with that decades of experience in a situation where, like with every arms control agreement, you are trying to identify how risky this is, and what is our level of confidence. it seems to me the first place to start is where the director of national intelligence begins. he says iran had a program which it ended in 2003. they have not made a decision to pursue nuclear weapons. every time you hear that iran is racing to the bone, that is in direct opposition to what the u.s. intelligence community has resolved. i think it is actually quite -- when you compare the other verification challenges we have had, this is a pretty good situation to be dealing with. it is the most-watched country in the world. i feel pretty good about it. it will be odd for iran to negotiate an agreement in which there was more intrusive inspection. and then cheat. that would be a pretty dumb thing to do. you would not open it up and then cheat. now, that may change. the regime may change. what we are doing now is locking them into a situation he for they have made the decision to pursue that nuclear weapon. i don't want to go on for too long. your remarks were right on. understandably the american public and members of congress have an idea about verification frozen in their minds that goes to the 1990's. obviously the iraq situation is very different. that is the way people think about it. as you suggested, this is not your father's iaea anymore. i remember what my first computer was like in the 1990's. we have tools. science and technology is available to us that the him agency -- that the agency could not have imagined them. the way the regime -- it has been dynamic. we responded to the crisis by writing new rules that are stronger. crisis, iteration, improvement. that has been the story of iaea. i think on-site inspection will be critical. one of the things that the snowden revelations would suggest, is that the u.s. has robust intelligence capabilities. there are lots of ways to do verifications. you might have for the story of the overanxious lawyer who was defending a client accused of fighting off -- fighting off the finger of a man in a bar fight. a witnesses on the stand. were you in the room and this happens? did you see my client bite the finger. yet you are up. ?why are you so confident that he did that? the person replied that i saw him spit it out. that is a way of illustrating that there are lots of ways to find things out. the most powerful of which will be the iaea. >> i would like to talk a little bit about how verification strategies have improved. what are the methods now used? >> i want to come back to the pmd's for a moment. in 2011 one of the papers obtained a list of 10 areas where iran had allegedly investigated aspects of developing nuclear weapons. they included design work, high explosives for triggering, fusing, and now the director general has traveled to tehran a week ago and has come back with an agreement that will allow the iaea to enter into this activity and reach a conclusion -- i think it is 90 days after the implementation of the security council resolutions -- none of us knows what is in this agreement. to my mind there are questions of if you are given an explanation that this was peaceful activity it does not mean that the activity was also carried out for other purposes. how the director general will formulate his report will be a question of artistry and diplomacy as far as i'm concerned. so what about these activities? if you assume that these accuracy -- activities were carried out and were successful it means that i run has --iran has more knowledge. it would mean that the time between if there were to be a breakout would be shorter than it would otherwise be. that is an important consideration. but it is already factored into the fact that the agency will be doing inspections and gathering information on critical things on a daily basis, essentially in real time. it does not really affect what could he do other than that? that is one aspect that i am ok with. the other aspect is supposing it finds something down stream that is going on. how can it determine that this is something new versus something that predated the report that will be coming in december? that will be a thorny issue along the way. as far as the technology, it all depends on what kind of facility you are looking at. what the materials are, and so on. the iaea today has over 100 different verification systems that are approved for use in the field. to get there is now a much more demanding process. you go through a specification evaluation of prototypes until you ultimately get to equipment that can be relied upon. and the reliability and efficacy -- it is still some of these old seals that are in place. compared to digital ones that have fiber-optic receptors that can be reviewed automatically. the surveillance cameras of old where the movie cameras that were used and engineered so they would start and stop and stretch it out so that you could get a time of surveillance that would be maybe three months. now you have large-scale digital storage. the equipment is nothing like what it was. the reliability is phenomenal and the performance and the information given and the fact that it incorporates protective features, so that you simply cannot fiddle with it and expect you can defeat this equipment. you can heated up, you can put the wrong voltage into it, but that would be a separate matter. it very much depends on an enrichment plant and the equipment that is appropriate. an isotope production reactor is very different. it is all designed according to those looking in the field. obviously you are more concerned with eyeballs. an intelligent inspector who is trained and knows what to look for is worth any number of items of equipment. >> we are going to open it up to your questions now. say if your question is directed to one or the other of the panel. wait for the mike. >> this is a question for tom. the iranians in the past have demonstrated great sensitivity to the nationality of the inspectors. i wonder if you can tell us how much of a concern that is for the future, both in maintaining the integrity of the inspections of iran, but also the precedents set for other countries around the world vetoing inspectors. >> inspectors can come from any one of 176 countries. any country can say yes or no to any individual inspector that is proposed. iran does not except american inspectors today. whether it will in the future, i am hopeful that it will prove a circumstance in which iran will change his attitude in this regard. that would be a very helpful thing. i think there is a need for more americans on the staff. at the present time, the iaea budget -- one quarter of it is paid for by the united states. the iaea has kept the full support of the united states government at 25%. it also donates about $50 million a year and extra budgetary contributions that allow the agency to do think that it otherwise could not do. in affected entitles the united states to have one out of every four staff being an american. a few years later -- a few years ago the united states gave up about 5%. the last time i checked the numbers were running about 12% for americans. part of the problem that we face is that we don't send enough people -- good people over there. this is due to the fact that the experts would come from national laboratories, the federal government, from academia, and from the industry. and we don't have a mechanism which makes it in the u.s. interest for people to go. i am hopeful that part of this legislative review will be to address what things could be done to assist in this regard. >> are they any other nationalists -- nationalities that are barred? >> i just don't know the answer to that. >> i know a lot of the inspectors have been from scandinavia, latin america, and italy. >> i have some experience in dealing with iraq. the criticism has already been made that the verification has too many steps. we have seen with iraq how easy is it is -- how easy it is to play cat and mouse. how would you answer the criticism that there is so much time lag built into this, giving iran numerous opportunities to barricade? that the purpose of the inspection could be mitigated by that? >> you're right that this is a criticism that is being led the. i think it is one of the reasons why we have talked about the agreement. the fact is that under the additional protocol, the iaea can request access to a site and under normal circumstances they can get access within two hours. no authorization. there is an inspector in the country, they are properly equipped, and they are able to go in a short amount of time. they have an opportunity to say will the satisfy you? if the agency says no, and the state then says what you can get in, immediately the red flag goes up. there is no cat and mouse. everybody is going to be watching this one piece of desert, right? in the agreement there is a process that no more than 24 days can pass. within less than four weeks the iaea gets in, or they are in violation of the agreement. if we see anything going out the back door, iran is in violation of the agreement. let's talk specifics. what are we worried about? are we worried they are going to build an underground facility? if they are, you cannot get rid of it in 24 days. radiation and nuclear materials last a long time. or if we go when and we notice materials, you cannot say it is a baby milk factory. again, it is for us to decide are they in compliance or not. there is no scenario that i can envision where iran would say we are going to take the chance. i don't want to be reassuring because when i tell me -- when a nuclear engineer tells me a nuclear facility is perfectly safe, i get nervous. there are things that can go wrong. but if they tried, we will catch them. -- but if they try it, we will catch them. the agreement that george w bush negotiated with the north koreans in 2005, which contain no verification provisions at all, was five pages long. the treaty of moscow, which was between george bush and vladimir putin, was three pages long. it got 71 votes in the senate. this is over 100 pages long. it is like no other nonproliferation agreement that has been negotiated. the details are here. as jim says, we have done our homework. we are very open to understanding and constructive criticism. we are giving a defense to a -- to what we believe is a very effective agreement. we are assuming they are going to try to cheat, and we know that we can catch them. >> right there in the middle. >> while we're on the subject of criticism of the deal, i think that everything that has been said in terms of the strength of the agreement in the nuclear space is accurate, is a good deal, is a win-win in terms of diplomacy. the criticism that i worry about over the next 60 days, within the body politic, is you are giving iran over time all this money with which to conduct the activities in the region that we put them on the state-sponsored terrorism list year after year. i would be appreciative of your comment about that space. >> i would like to talk about that for a second. i am confused by this argument. i am deeply confused for a couple of reasons. it seems to me if you don't like iran, they are terrorists, then you don't want them to have a nuclear weapon. what is worse then iran involved in terrorism? it is ironic involved in terrorism with -- it is iran involved in terrorism with a nuclear weapon. what is that mean, then? what that means is those people are saying we cannot have any nuclear agreement. they are imagining that there is going to be a nuclear agreement where iran does everything we want them to do on the nuclear and they get zero in return. they don't get any relief. i am not aware of any agreement in the history of humankind that would work like that. if you are saying we cannot give any sanctions relief because they will use it for terrorism you are essentially saying no agreements relief restraints. >> i think people are brought to be concerned about iran's behavior. they threaten our neighbors and americans. they're holding american citizens. they are engaged in activities in countries that lead to real regional instability and insecurity. we are not blind to that. ever started with a question about is this turning a page. we are assuming that iran will not change. we don't want them to have access to a nuclear weapon or get there quickly. we intend to increase our capability to challenge iran throughout the region, because we do expect that some of this money will enhance their activity. >> i would point out that iran is under the most crippling sanctions system that have ever been imposed. it is not a shortage of money that is preventing them from terrorism. they are doing that anyway. is there an incremental risk? are we going to be taking steps for allies to match that? you bet. there is also a very interesting set of steps that is coming out. by how much does saudi arabia outspend iran? this is not just purely a money scheme. it is a capabilities scheme. it is a sharing scheme. it is what we have leaders here for the camp david summit. we are expecting the neighborhood is going to be bad because the neighborhood is bad. but it gets worse if they have a nuclear program. >> way for the microphone. -- wait for the microphone. >> of all the joys and jubilation that we are getting clips of, it is all young people out there patiently waiting for the sanctions to be lifted. with all these measures that have been put into this agreement to stop iran are making a nuclear bomb, it seems to me that this regime will be on a suicide mission if they do not comply with this agreement. they have a lot of answering to do to their own domestic population and also to the world . i need your input on this, thank you. >> people say it is the regime and the regime makes all the decisions and public opinion has nothing to do with it. public opinion does have something to do with the policies undertaken by the government. they do a lot of things in the region that most iranians do not support. they would like to see their money spent at home. but in 2009, there was an earthquake call the green revolution. the government stolen election to reelect a leader. millions of people came out on the street and said where's my vote. even though the regime crushed the protest, it shook them to the core. so they made sure that in 2013 when there was another election, there was a reasonable choice of candidates. the new team has been able to negotiate this agreement. this is their second time around. they have succeeded. they are well aware of popular sentiment. they know what sanctions have done. unemployment is extremely high. the new leader gives hope and economic development tops. some of the money that iran will receive lines up and has -- lines up with hezbollah, yes of course it will. but i will argue that if this government wants to retain legitimacy -- and remember what the supreme leader here is doing , he is making a pact with the great satan, and everyone knows this -- if the system wants to continue, it will have to meet some of the aspirations of its people, i would argue. wait for the microphone, please. >> thank you for a fascinating panel. a few questions. first of all, in parallel to the inspection regime that will be led by the iaea, is there any provision unilaterally for the administration to collect the best minds? to alleviate a lot of this inherent suspicion? on another issue, the president gave an interview about one month ago to israeli tv, where he conceded that the breakout time could be reduced to nearly zero? i would love to hear from your experts. how can that be ameliorated and reinforced? >> if i understand your first question, how are we going to make sure that the best people are working on this problem and that the iaea and government have what they need? that is why we are here. the iaea received a tremendous amount of support from the united states. they get great to hickey's from the national laboratories. we help train their people. in terms of the technical capabilities and leadership, the iaea already has that. we are working closely with them to determine what more they need. there is a thermostat that you can set. they will send an alarm out and tell us when they have gone above the enrichment level. we will expect that there will be more recesses -- resources. our military and intelligent -- intelligence capabilities will change over time. we are constantly evaluating those things. there are still some decisions that have to be made. just as we learned lessons from the north korean agreements, we are learning lessons. in terms of the breakout timeline, what we have been able to achieve in the jcp aoa is predictability. some of the documents are laid out very clearly in the jcp 08. there is a strict path on those enrichment levels. more importantly the amount of enrichment material they may have. beyond that, there is a research and development plan that iran must provide that provides predictability and is consistent with their energy needs and development. it's in the year 14 -- right now we have a plan through year 13. they will have to continually update that based on their development. if the plan says we are going to have 5000 that appears inconsistent with their obligations, we will still have the right to say, that appears inconsistent with us. we can work to impose sanctions. we can work to get our allies equally as concerned. the predictability is what we have been able to achieve, and the iaea will get access to that plan. dr. ernest moniz has been working out these provisions. we don't -- the agreement does not provide for the exponential increase in enrichment capacity or a drop off. >> can i follow up on that for a second? i offer several ideas. assessment is not about imagining all the bad things that can go wrong and listing them. assessment is you try to put parameters and measure the risks involved and calculate trade-offs. how do you do that? you compare one thing to another . we have talked about this being a stronger agreement compared to -- the most robust nonproliferation agreement in history. a second evaluation criterion is how does it compare to the alternatives? a lot of folks are saying 15 years is not long enough. a part of me has to fight hard and resist going down the road of i heard this song before. prime minister netanyahu said we need at least a few weeks or months notice the four iran does something. -- a few weeks or months. john kerry said we are going to have six months. then he was told six months is not enough. then they come back with an agreement that says one year. then we hear actually we need two years. i don't know if there is any number that we could choose that would satisfy people. it seems to me that 15 years is a long time. less compared with the alternatives. let's say we use military force to decimate the program. after doing that, iran would be able to recent constitute -- reconstitute his program and roughly four years. what we do? we wipe it out again, i guess? we are talking about an agreement that is going to go for 15 years, compared to the four years they would take to reconstitute their program. all of these debates are important, but how you judge things is compare them to other things. you compare them to other agreements and your alternatives. >> we have the iaea being involved which is an international organization that grew out of president eisenhower's proposal of 1953. it is responsible to its member and one of its obligations is to respect the sovereignty of each of these states. it cannot act in an impromptu or whiplash effect. it has to proceed with due caution so as to avoid false allegations on the one hand. while being mindful that if there is something going on, that it must act in sufficient time to allow an adequate response. and that will be a problem if depending on what goes forward. and so these questions of the 24 days, etc., to my mind, that's sort of a period during which the degree of certainty would continue to build up. not maybe it's denied or not yet permitted to go to a particular location. but there are a lot of other things that will be going on in a circumstance like that. so my own perception is maybe clouded by the fact that i'm an optimist. and i want this to succeed. but i think that this is a new era. and that i'm hopeful that iran will seize upon this as a chance to demonstrate its commitment to the obligations that it's entering into. because if it doesn't we're going to know about it. and the things that interference with activities or just the color of how much cooperation is there is it something which is demonstrated on a daily basis by providing assistance that the inspectors can actually do their work. or are there things that get in the way? so that will be known soon. >> and i think we know the iranians have abided by the interim agreement that was reached back in 2013. quite faithfully. for the last couple of years. and that's a good precedent. ok. wait for the microphone. >> my name is mike sonder but everybody here agrees that the agreement is a good agreement. my curiosity is since there's no longer any state secrets, when you use the word "tough negotiations," what didn't they agree to? because at this particular point, only what they didn't want to do is relevant. what did the united states want that iraq -- iran did not want? there should be no secrets on this. i was once the director of oin vegases at the office of naval research. we know what was going on. if somebody asked us a question, we either said i don't want to tell you, or i'm going to tell you. tell us what they didn't agree to. >> no. [laughter] i'm not going to tell you. we will have lots of discussions over the next several months about well, iranians won. or they got all these things they wanted. >> that wasn't my question. >> i understand. >> the question was what did you want that they did not agree to? >> -- >> you can say i don't want to tell you. but tell me, we'll find out. >> i'm not sure i understand the second part of the question. but i'm happy to talk about the ver of indication and why we think the deal is a good one. >> that wasn't my question. >> and it's his prerogative not to answer. >> inaudible] >> i can't provide you with an answer to that question. >> we have run out of time. those who have more questions, please if our folks here have time, they will be happy to answer them. and check out the report of tom shay and it should be available on our website and on the search for common ground website we plan to bring you live coverage the start time set for 9:00 a.m. eastern on c-span 2. >> today u.s. cuba diplomatic times will officially be reestablished with the opening of the cuban embassy in washington, d.c. cuban foreign minister expected to speak. then the american embassy in havana also opens its doors today. our live coverage begins at 10:30 a.m. eastern. both of those events here on c-span. live coverage of the u.s. house, congressional hearings and news conferences bringing you events that shape public policy. every morning "washington journal" live with elected officials, policy makers and journalists and your comments by phone facebook, and twitter . [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption contents and accuracy. visit ncicap.org ♪ >> this week on "q&a," our guest is new york-based artist and writer molly crabapple. she talks to us about her career, political views, and how she approaches her work. brian: molly crabapple, where did you get that name? molly: it is a nickname from an old boyfriend. brian: why did you change your name? molly: i was working as a naked model when i was 18 to pay my way through school and i needed a fake name to keep stalkers away. then i just kept using it. brian: what is your real name? molly: my real name? brian: jennifer? molly: people can google. my real name is jennifer caban. brian: where did you grow up? molly: i grew up in far rockaway and long island. brian: what do you do now for a living? molly: i'm an artist and journalist. i travel around the world and draw and write about prisons and conflict zones. about three weeks ago, i was in gaza under the airstrikes. i also have a book coming out with harpercollins called "drawing blood." brian: why did you go to gaza? molly: i was in palestine for a literary festival. i hadn't planned to go to gaza and then i met a journalist who walked me through the bureaucratic process by which a journalist can go there. because you know, it is under blockade, so it is difficult to visit right now. and i had the opportunity, and so i went. brian: where were you in gaza? molly: i was staying in gaza city. brian: what did you see? molly: the piece i did was about a suburb of gaza city that was very close to israel and was completely flattened by israel. during "operation protective edge." i saw a level of decimation that i'd never seen outside of the one-day i went to syria. in fact, it was almost more serious. more thorough. because, in syria, the decimation is done primarily by bombing campaigns. there's bombs, then there are tank shells, and bulldozers. so it was just flat. the whole neighborhood was gone. you saw people living in ruined houses, surrounded by the smashed rubble of their former lives. you saw a lot of poverty. you saw people really living in an open-air prison. brian: this on the screen now is your piece, one of your pieces of work from gaza. what are we looking at? molly: that is the ruins of a hospital which was a rehabilitation facility for paralyzed and disabled adults. it was shelled during operation protective edge. fortunately, there were no casualties, but the nurses were forced to evacuate. to evacuate the patients in a pitchdark building without electricity. brian: when you saw this, when did you actually do this piece? molly: after i got home. when i do pieces like that, i need to do them in my studio. as you can see, there's ink, there's dye, there's acrylic. my technique of working is, i go around with my iphone and sketchbook. i take thousands of iphone photos. i also draw from life. i can draw a really, really fast. it is a way that i build rapport with people. when i come home, i take the stuff that i've drawn from life and my iphone photos and figure out, what are the images i want to have here? what are the most dramatic shots? what are the shots with the best lines? what are the things that boil down the essentials for the viewer? and, those are the images brian: i choose t

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