he served at the pacific northwest national laboratory. he received his phd and was awarded the distinguished service award. i'm going to have tom shea, and talk a little bit about the paper and then i will introduce or other speakers. dr. shea: is there anyone here the new agreement? i will start off with shame on you, and get to it. having just produce the document, was only yesterday? the article i have been working on is in a state of now trying to cope with the reality of the specifics of the final agreements. starting off, 25 years ago the iaea system was overhauled after it was discovered that there were clandestine nuclear weapons programs in iraq and north korea. in effect, they compelled the international community to overhaul that system and make it relevant to the threats of today . the efforts that took place, the technologies that have been applied, the authorities that have been given, all of those things have essentially been reinvented since 1990. today, with the joint comprehensive plan of action the steps are relatively straightforward, a remarkable departure from the laissez-faire sort of attitude which more often than not prevailed when there was no opportunity for consensus. with that, there is a new agreement -- this new agreement is extraordinarily detailed in-depth and believed to be studied. it will need to be analyzed in terms of obligations commitments, resources, things of that sort. the iaea, in its application of the measures will have five challenges. first to discover any additional hidden facilities which may not have come to light. whether there are any or not, i certainly don't know. whether there is any new construction from now on. the next is to verify that the known facilities are not misused third is to make sure that the nuclear materials in the country remain unaccounted for and are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. fourth is to track imports into the country which may include bans materials, dual use materials. those things that are permitted must be used for the purposes indicated. the iaea will have to seek to verify the limitations and verify those are not exceeded as the time goes on. the question of the hidden facilities, you may prefer the term clandestine i'm. i would like you to note that iran is more than twice the size of texas, so we are dealing with a very large landmass filled with mountainous terrain and complicated arrangements. to succeed in relation to these facilities, the iaea would first need to identify suspicious location and then confirm before it makes any advances, whether or not there's any reason the best position -- there's any reason the suspicion is warranted. this is sort of like getting a warrant for someone's arrest the process of building a case and going forward. it would then define how an inspection visit would attempt to clarify the characteristics of the particular site, whether there are reasons for -- then they would secure the team required, range for the analytical services. one of its commitments is to implement an additional protocol, which is an extension to a comprehensive safeguards agreement that grew out of the situation in dprk and iraq in the early 90's. this instrument requires ratification that is currently in force in 126 countries i would saying no of these 126 countries are really problem countries. it is mostly the case of building the foundation for application. will be different -- iran will be different. they agreed to implement the protocol and eight years later to seek its ratification. the information that will be available to the iaea will be varied. in terms of the 1990's with iraq and north korea, the information that is used by the iaea now includes the following. anything that comes from safeguards, and for gate -- information gathered through inspections in the field, any activities that take in acquiring samples or knowledge. it has a program of going through open source data mining. this is a practice that has come about in the 90's and continues to be refined. it is not like the national security agency looking through e-mail but it scan through all scholarly publications and the like for related subjects and that information is sometimes revealing. it looks for export information, unknown activities. there are connections to several suppliers, particularly out of the situation in iraq where companies make things like vacuum pumps that were essential for enrichment plant and some people went to prison because of selling equipment for purposes that were clearly not consistent with the laws of the nations involved. some of those companies now have direct links to the iaea and informed them if they have requests for 200 pumps for a hospital or something crazy. we should also remember that earlier, one of the sources of information which broke the news about the enrichment plant presumably the unification of iran is not 100%, so will be a step in that direction and its own people once again those countries, iraq and north korea, the provision of intelligence information to the iaea became a common -- not completely common -- but a practice that was carried out by some degree of uniformity. there is a stipulation in the iaea statute, it is article 8.a. it says that if a state has information which it believes would be helpful to the iaea in carrying out these activities, it should make that information available. according to the director general's report, more than 10 countries have provided information on iran that is a part of the safeguards fabric at this point. the statutory permission will hopefully be an expectation and maybe even some latent culpability for states. the last thing i will invention it -- the last thing i will mention is environmental samples, which is a scientific or out of the cold war. laboratories were monitoring fallout samples from china and the soviet union to track the development of their nuclear weapons as they advanced in stages with various more modern features being incorporated. the technology has now been used by the iaea. initially it was a technology that was made available to them by, in particular america laboratories, but also others. the iaea has now established its own laboratory, paid for in part by the united states, but with german and katie -- german and canadian equipment and other countries participating. that sounds like a crimes investigation kind of a thing for you take a swipe of something and with that swipe you can put whatever comes off onto a piece of plastic. individual particles which way a million millionth of a gram will show damage. when you can identify these particles, you can pick them out and put them in an instrument that will tell what the chemical composition is, what their isotopic composition is, what the morphology of the particle is so you can get tremendous amounts of information. you have to know where to look and you have to be careful to not cross contaminate. again, you want very careful attention to the collection and analysis. this is one of the main st ays. the other is access to satellite imagery. in the time of north korea in particular, u.s. intelligence sources provide satellite imagery on north korea, which was very revealing during the board of governors discussion. today, they have commercial companies which provide cable company -- commercial companies which provide capabilities which are better than the intelligence companies that then. there is a satellite imagery analysis group that buys these images and looks at them. sometimes they have their own justification for wanting to know what is going on. this first investigation with satellite imagery cost relatively little. it is not intrusive. it is not required -- it does not require the permission of anybody and gives you information that may be helpful. if you have a suspicion, then one of the things you would want to do is to continue to look at the site as you continue to go forward with further inquiries to determine whether or not anything would happen. with the additional protocol coming into force, one of its provisions is what is called arrangement for complimentary access. these are not inspections that they are access which is complementary to inspections. they still require a process where a request is made and reviewed by the government of iran and hopefully they grant access and that long chain of events then gets put into place. the inspectors go off into their work. the agency has established channels. if they are innocent, then the report becomes part of the database on all things known about iran and its verification. if the findings are inconclusive, maybe additional member -- maybe additional measures are necessary. there is a lot of information we can analyze on ongoing basis determine how best to do this process. if the findings are suspicious, then you start to ramp up with political inquiries leading to perhaps a director general being in the conversation with a resident representative or maybe a visit to the country and maybe a discussion they advanced to the board of governors. at this point, the commission has been created is somehow informed. it's unclear yet to exactly what that process will be. in any case, the opportunities for further inquiry will become clear. for the iea to succeed it means clear priority for these tasks. if we go back to the time of iraq and north korea there is an agreement that all parties have to have. these are all identical, all according to a model. one of the provisions for a special inspection. it is not limited in any sense to any place or activity at all. the problem is that it requires consultation and, in effect, approval. the one time that it was attempted was in north korea and the north koreans refused to allow it and to this day have refused. the question of a hidden waste facility that was used to hide the fact of their processing activity acting extensively more than the declaration. whether this is a viable mechanism or not, it has been lying in a ditch. whether it ever gets resurrected, that isn't clear. what is coming now is the un security council resolution. that will be a very important document to see how it addresses the tasking, to what extent the agency is given additional authority. in particular, things like verification of centrifuge manufacturing. the actual devices are not within the scope of safeguards. there would be some extensions of authority as are appropriate. iea will require continued financial support. iaea is a member of the united nations family of organizations. it has its own membership and budget. it has a formula for assessing members in accordance with the approved budget to carry out its programs. the change that it requires -- the change requires the approval of all 35 governors. whether all 35 would be enough --forcing them to a vote is not usually the way the agency would operate. the american perspective on how to make this perspective succeed is something on the order of 50 million, which seems like a nice round number, but it is much smaller -- i can't say exactly. in relation to the police force washington d.c., i think it is very modest. in addition, technological support must be continued. there are today member states voluntary support programs. the american program is still the largest. its current funding is about $15 million per year or so. without their -- without that there is no hope that you can solve problems. scientists are engineers are really smart guys. -- scientists and engineers are really smart guys. the questions of finding a facility in a place twice the size of texas will require every bit of attention it can get. financial support, political support that is so amazing to me. the most amazing thing to me about this agreement is that the coalition has held together with germany throughout the several years of negotiation. i can only hope that that will continue to be the case. with that, i will stop my prepared remarks and respond to many questions. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. i'm going to introduce other speakers now. we are very lucky that we have a representative of the administration who has just joined us. he has served previously as senior adviser to vice president joe biden for nuclear security. he has worked at the monterey institute. he is the co-author of deadly arsenals, tracking weapons of mass distraction. let me introduce the other members of our panel who will, after john speaks. jim walsh is an expert in international security and a research associate at m.i.t. and their security studies program. his research and writings focus on international security and topics involving nuclear weapons and the middle east. he has testified before the senate on nuclear terrorism. he is one of the handful of americans who has traveled to both iran and north korea. he served as executive director of managing the atom project at harvard universities -- harvard university. he asked how to both harvard and m.i.t.. he received his phd from m.i.t.. last, but definitely not least john bloomberg is the class of 1955 professor of middle eastern studies at the u.s. naval academy. he has had a 34 year career in the u.s. foreign service, mostly in the middle east and islamic africa. in 2009, he came out of retirement to serve as deputy assistant secretary focused on iran. he helped craft some of the language that president obama has used. he has to the u.s. government have to speak to iran. he served in iran before the revolution. he was a guest of the ayatollah for 444 days. he has also authored many books on iran. first, i am going to ask john to come up. talk about verification. is this deal as full proof as we can make it? then we will have a panel discussion and take your questions. >> thank you, barbara. she was obviously not -- she did not need higher brain function to assemble the people that are going to be on this panel today. i am on her to be in the group. what i will do for a few minutes is just talk about the deals we have negotiated, and why we believe it is very much a good deal and in our security interest. then i will talk about the support for the iaea. we recognize that is a critical component. we have high confidence that the verification provision of this deal will work, because we are committed to them. and because of the agency's capabilities. we are very thankful they are there. very basically and briefly, this is a good deal. this is a very good deal. if you had told us that we have not only met and exceeded all of the inch marks that we laid out in luzon, we would have been skeptical. iran's responsibility to abide is in perpetuity. it is not limited. their requirement to abide by the treaty and not to see acquire, or pursue nuclear weapons is permanent. we have the ability to verify this under this agreement. sanctions relief does not take place until iran comes back into compliance. there is no big pot of money that they get the day they get home. they have to do a lot of very difficult things that they have been unwilling to do for many decades to get sanctions relief. once that is achieved, we have a significant. of -- we have a significant amount of time where sanctions can snap back into place. if you read through the documentation, the president can resent his waiver of sanctions with a stroke of a pen. we have the authority under this agreement to call for a un security council resolution, and through its exercise of its veto snap the sanctions back into place. we don't need russia or china. and they cannot use their veto to block the reimposition of sanctions over this time. there are a lot of people saying a is getting all of the three boards. -- all of these rewards. over the last 10 years they have paid a significant penalty. this is a price that iran has had to pay because they violated their legal commitment. this agreement gives them a pathway to come back into compliance. and therefore, once they can come back into compliance, they can do what other states can do. but in their case, it will be limited for a significant amount of time. in a way that other nonproliferation treaty members are not limited. they are paying a price for their behavior, and i think it is one that is very significant. we talk a lot about the four potential pathways that iran has to acquire nuclear weapons. all four pathways are cut off. their uranium facility will be monitored in live camera fees, remote access monitoring, radio identification, we will know everything that goes on at that facility. there will be no uranium enrichment facility. no uranium is permitted -- no nuclear material is permitted for a significant. of time. the iaea will have permanent access to that facility. the reactor at our rock -- the reactor at iraq will be redesigned so that it cannot produce weapons usable plutonium. we get to help design the fuel. we get to verify and inspected 24/7. if iran even attempts to try and misuse declared facilities we will know in days, more likely within hours. the international alarm system will be functioning. what is very important here is the sneak out scenario. we believe given the inspection capabilities and the knowledge this agreement will give us, that our ability to detect undeclared nuclear activity or facility is greatly increased as a result of the iaea rights under the protocol. it is extremely unlikely that iran could build anything of significance and begin to operate it without being detected. could they have a small facility where some guys strong pictures of a nuclear weapon? we do not suggest that this plan will prevent any and all minor activity that could be related to a possible nuclear interest. what we can say is nothing that iran could achieve if the many closer to building a nuclear bomb. and then anything of significance -- and that anything of significance but if they tried it, we would be able to detect that facility. the iaea would have the right to go there. if iran refused access, they would be, by definition, in violation. we don't claim -- is this verification plan full proof? iran can't get any closer to a nuclear weapon without us knowing about it. that is the standard that we are trying to achieve. it is one that is well within their ability to implement. iaea was the organization that got it right in iraq. the iaea, when it was a ledge that iraq was seeking weapons in africa, they got it right. to ensure that they will be able to do this job effectively, the united states will be working with other member states to ensure that they have the technology, resources, and the people needed to do this job without draining resources from other important responsibilities. that will take money, but quite frankly it is a bargain compared to what it tries -- what it takes to surveye iranil on our own. we will ensure, as will our partners, that the iaea has the resources it needs to carry out this job. it is only because of the work of people like tom and the inspectors doing this job that we will be able to have an agreement like this that we believe will stand the test of time. with that, i'm happy to turn things over. [applause] >> thank you so much. very useful remarks. i am actually going to start with a question. then we will get back into the technical discussion. john i wanted to ask for your reflections on this agreement as somebody who has unique experience in iran. you have written an excellent piece for the cairo review about the ghost of history. to what extent are we exercising these ghosts? knowing iran as you do, do you think they will implement the still faithfully? did you think it does represent some kind of turning point for the regime? >> thank you, barbara. let me also thank ambassador miller who undertook a humanitarian issue back in 1979. what we are seeing now is essentially president carter's letter getting a response after 36 years. we are also seeing president obama's outreach efforts which he began as senator obama in 2007, with the opposition of then senator hillary clinton -- those efforts also bearing fruit. it comes down to the word that you hear so much is trust and mistrust. what you hear from the opponents in both capitals is very similar. you hear we cannot trust them. you can interchange the we and the them according to where you are. this is a real issue. i will just give you one quick example of this. a few years ago, the iranians announced they were ready to switch on their nuclear power station. the project goes back to the 1970's. people tell me at the time they bought obsolete german equipment to build this thing in the mid- 1970's. in 2010, they were ready to switch it on. someone asked then secretary of state hillary clinton, what do you think about this. she said we are not worried about it. we are well aware. it is not something that we are concerned about. then reporters went back and asked an iranian official what do you think about this. what do you think about the secretary's statement? the answer was i don't know what it is, but i know there is a trick somewhere. the americans just don't say that. we have seen variations of this phenomenon in both places. in the u.s. we have seen what i call the rise of the geneticists. we have heard things like deception is in iranian dna. well geneticists talk about dna. we have heard something similar from a very distinguished retired military officer who was now the president of one of the great universities in this country. he talked about persian imperialism is in iranian dna. where does this stuff come from? where did people start being geneticists? if i were talking about nuclear physics then to talk about genetics. to quote lyndon johnson -- to paraphrase lyndon johnson -- he once said i don't know much, but i know the difference between chicken soup and chicken salad. he used in our dear expression. [laughter] when i hear people pretending to be geneticists, you know what to do. you hear it again. we cannot trust them. if you go to iran events in this town, you will hear things like well we know the iranians are working for a nuclear bomb, and the question is how do you know. the answer is because they are bad people, and variations of that. getting back to the answer this way -- this issue of trust people say and ask me, do you trust the iranians. what i say is no, because to quote the president, you don't make agreements like this with your friends. you don't spend two years and 100 pages with a country that you have the media trust with. -- you have immediate trust with. but as someone who practice diplomacy for 30 years, when i hear these comments, here is where i come out. diplomacy is basically making them perfect agreements with people you neither like nor trust. imperfect agreements with perhaps dubious people. that essentially is what kept us safe in the cold war for 40 years. that is what this agreement is about. it is not about trust. it is about verification. >> i am going to ask all three of our other speakers to look specifically at the verification issue. as ambassador miller pointed out, it began in 1950 nine, and the united states is largely responsible. we supported the idea of 22 civilian power directors for iran. there have been fits and starts. it started again during the iraq war. are you all confident that iran is satisfied with the level that it has reached for now? that it is satisfied with the agreement and will carry it out safely? and that his object really is not a weapon? -- and that it is really not a weapon? >> we believe that our run has determined -- we believe that iran has determined that it is in their interest. we are not leaving that to trust. the verification provision will give us the ability to determine if they are going to comply. that is true in day 20 as it is in day 2020. in terms of their satisfaction, satisfaction is an emotion. what they are required to do is lay out a detailed research and development plans and to declare to the iaea what their plans are. those plans have to be consistent with the spirit and the letter of the agreement. because of the details of the plan that we have and that will be provided to the iaea, we have very high confidence that the plan's strictly defined progression, that they are satisfied. where they will go into the future, is for them to thesdecide. in some ways it comes into a basic principle. under the treaty they are obligated not to seek or pursue in any way nuclear weapons. if we believe that they are out of compliance with that, we can find ourselves right back in the situation that we inherited when we took office in 2009 and that led to this negotiation and culminated in this agreement. >> let me just ask you about the pmd question. they have to satisfy the iaea by december 15? >> they have to satisfy the iaea by october. the iaea must provide a report by december. >> is there a date in october? >> i will have to take a look. this situation has been lingering because the iranians felt they would have to give access and that we would use that to impose further sanctions. we have found a formula which says if you abide by the principles of access, and the iaea is satisfied, and that five years from now they cannot say you did not need to go into the facility back then, then we are prepared to move forward with this. without that commitment and follow through to access, there will be no sanctions released and we will not have a deal. >> your thoughts on the iranian program and whether they will implement it. >> i think it is important to step back and put this in some sort of context. this is not our first rodeo. this is not the first time we have wrestled with the problems of verification. we have done this for decades. we have had agreements with bad actors. we find ourselves now with that decades of experience in a situation where, like with every arms control agreement, you are trying to identify how risky this is, and what is our level of confidence. it seems to me the first place to start is where the director of national intelligence begins. he says iran had a program which it ended in 2003. they have not made a decision to pursue nuclear weapons. every time you hear that iran is racing to the bone, that is in direct opposition to what the u.s. intelligence community has resolved. i think it is actually quite -- when you compare the other verification challenges we have had, this is a pretty good situation to be dealing with. it is the most-watched country in the world. i feel pretty good about it. it will be odd for iran to negotiate an agreement in which there was more intrusive inspection. and then cheat. that would be a pretty dumb thing to do. you would not open it up and then cheat. now, that may change. the regime may change. what we are doing now is locking them into a situation he for they have made the decision to pursue that nuclear weapon. i don't want to go on for too long. your remarks were right on. understandably the american public and members of congress have an idea about verification frozen in their minds that goes to the 1990's. obviously the iraq situation is very different. that is the way people think about it. as you suggested, this is not your father's iaea anymore. i remember what my first computer was like in the 1990's. we have tools. science and technology is available to us that the him agency -- that the agency could not have imagined them. the way the regime -- it has been dynamic. we responded to the crisis by writing new rules that are stronger. crisis, iteration, improvement. that has been the story of iaea. i think on-site inspection will be critical. one of the things that the snowden revelations would suggest, is that the u.s. has robust intelligence capabilities. there are lots of ways to do verifications. you might have for the story of the overanxious lawyer who was defending a client accused of fighting off -- fighting off the finger of a man in a bar fight. a witnesses on the stand. were you in the room and this happens? did you see my client bite the finger. yet you are up. ?why are you so confident that he did that? the person replied that i saw him spit it out. that is a way of illustrating that there are lots of ways to find things out. the most powerful of which will be the iaea. >> i would like to talk a little bit about how verification strategies have improved. what are the methods now used? >> i want to come back to the pmd's for a moment. in 2011 one of the papers obtained a list of 10 areas where iran had allegedly investigated aspects of developing nuclear weapons. they included design work, high explosives for triggering, fusing, and now the director general has traveled to tehran a week ago and has come back with an agreement that will allow the iaea to enter into this activity and reach a conclusion -- i think it is 90 days after the implementation of the security council resolutions -- none of us knows what is in this agreement. to my mind there are questions of if you are given an explanation that this was peaceful activity it does not mean that the activity was also carried out for other purposes. how the director general will formulate his report will be a question of artistry and diplomacy as far as i'm concerned. so what about these activities? if you assume that these accuracy -- activities were carried out and were successful it means that i run has --iran has more knowledge. it would mean that the time between if there were to be a breakout would be shorter than it would otherwise be. that is an important consideration. but it is already factored into the fact that the agency will be doing inspections and gathering information on critical things on a daily basis, essentially in real time. it does not really affect what could he do other than that? that is one aspect that i am ok with. the other aspect is supposing it finds something down stream that is going on. how can it determine that this is something new versus something that predated the report that will be coming in december? that will be a thorny issue along the way. as far as the technology, it all depends on what kind of facility you are looking at. what the materials are, and so on. the iaea today has over 100 different verification systems that are approved for use in the field. to get there is now a much more demanding process. you go through a specification evaluation of prototypes until you ultimately get to equipment that can be relied upon. and the reliability and efficacy -- it is still some of these old seals that are in place. compared to digital ones that have fiber-optic receptors that can be reviewed automatically. the surveillance cameras of old where the movie cameras that were used and engineered so they would start and stop and stretch it out so that you could get a time of surveillance that would be maybe three months. now you have large-scale digital storage. the equipment is nothing like what it was. the reliability is phenomenal and the performance and the information given and the fact that it incorporates protective features, so that you simply cannot fiddle with it and expect you can defeat this equipment. you can heated up, you can put the wrong voltage into it, but that would be a separate matter. it very much depends on an enrichment plant and the equipment that is appropriate. an isotope production reactor is very different. it is all designed according to those looking in the field. obviously you are more concerned with eyeballs. an intelligent inspector who is trained and knows what to look for is worth any number of items of equipment. >> we are going to open it up to your questions now. say if your question is directed to one or the other of the panel. wait for the mike. >> this is a question for tom. the iranians in the past have demonstrated great sensitivity to the nationality of the inspectors. i wonder if you can tell us how much of a concern that is for the future, both in maintaining the integrity of the inspections of iran, but also the precedents set for other countries around the world vetoing inspectors. >> inspectors can come from any one of 176 countries. any country can say yes or no to any individual inspector that is proposed. iran does not except american inspectors today. whether it will in the future, i am hopeful that it will prove a circumstance in which iran will change his attitude in this regard. that would be a very helpful thing. i think there is a need for more americans on the staff. at the present time, the iaea budget -- one quarter of it is paid for by the united states. the iaea has kept the full support of the united states government at 25%. it also donates about $50 million a year and extra budgetary contributions that allow the agency to do think that it otherwise could not do. in affected entitles the united states to have one out of every four staff being an american. a few years later -- a few years ago the united states gave up about 5%. the last time i checked the numbers were running about 12% for americans. part of the problem that we face is that we don't send enough people -- good people over there. this is due to the fact that the experts would come from national laboratories, the federal government, from academia, and from the industry. and we don't have a mechanism which makes it in the u.s. interest for people to go. i am hopeful that part of this legislative review will be to address what things could be done to assist in this regard. >> are they any other nationalists -- nationalities that are barred? >> i just don't know the answer to that. >> i know a lot of the inspectors have been from scandinavia, latin america, and italy. >> i have some experience in dealing with iraq. the criticism has already been made that the verification has too many steps. we have seen with iraq how easy is it is -- how easy it is to play cat and mouse. how would you answer the criticism that there is so much time lag built into this, giving iran numerous opportunities to barricade? that the purpose of the inspection could be mitigated by that? >> you're right that this is a criticism that is being led the. i think it is one of the reasons why we have talked about the agreement. the fact is that under the additional protocol, the iaea can request access to a site and under normal circumstances they can get access within two hours. no authorization. there is an inspector in the country, they are properly equipped, and they are able to go in a short amount of time. they have an opportunity to say will the satisfy you? if the agency says no, and the state then says what you can get in, immediately the red flag goes up. there is no cat and mouse. everybody is going to be watching this one piece of desert, right? in the agreement there is a process that no more than 24 days can pass. within less than four weeks the iaea gets in, or they are in violation of the agreement. if we see anything going out the back door, iran is in violation of the agreement. let's talk specifics. what are we worried about? are we worried they are going to build an underground facility? if they are, you cannot get rid of it in 24 days. radiation and nuclear materials last a long time. or if we go when and we notice materials, you cannot say it is a baby milk factory. again, it is for us to decide are they in compliance or not. there is no scenario that i can envision where iran would say we are going to take the chance. i don't want to be reassuring because when i tell me -- when a nuclear engineer tells me a nuclear facility is perfectly safe, i get nervous. there are things that can go wrong. but if they tried, we will catch them. -- but if they try it, we will catch them. the agreement that george w bush negotiated with the north koreans in 2005, which contain no verification provisions at all, was five pages long. the treaty of moscow, which was between george bush and vladimir putin, was three pages long. it got 71 votes in the senate. this is over 100 pages long. it is like no other nonproliferation agreement that has been negotiated. the details are here. as jim says, we have done our homework. we are very open to understanding and constructive criticism. we are giving a defense to a -- to what we believe is a very effective agreement. we are assuming they are going to try to cheat, and we know that we can catch them. >> right there in the middle. >> while we're on the subject of criticism of the deal, i think that everything that has been said in terms of the strength of the agreement in the nuclear space is accurate, is a good deal, is a win-win in terms of diplomacy. the criticism that i worry about over the next 60 days, within the body politic, is you are giving iran over time all this money with which to conduct the activities in the region that we put them on the state-sponsored terrorism list year after year. i would be appreciative of your comment about that space. >> i would like to talk about that for a second. i am confused by this argument. i am deeply confused for a couple of reasons. it seems to me if you don't like iran, they are terrorists, then you don't want them to have a nuclear weapon. what is worse then iran involved in terrorism? it is ironic involved in terrorism with -- it is iran involved in terrorism with a nuclear weapon. what is that mean, then? what that means is those people are saying we cannot have any nuclear agreement. they are imagining that there is going to be a nuclear agreement where iran does everything we want them to do on the nuclear and they get zero in return. they don't get any relief. i am not aware of any agreement in the history of humankind that would work like that. if you are saying we cannot give any sanctions relief because they will use it for terrorism you are essentially saying no agreements relief restraints. >> i think people are brought to be concerned about iran's behavior. they threaten our neighbors and americans. they're holding american citizens. they are engaged in activities in countries that lead to real regional instability and insecurity. we are not blind to that. ever started with a question about is this turning a page. we are assuming that iran will not change. we don't want them to have access to a nuclear weapon or get there quickly. we intend to increase our capability to challenge iran throughout the region, because we do expect that some of this money will enhance their activity. >> i would point out that iran is under the most crippling sanctions system that have ever been imposed. it is not a shortage of money that is preventing them from terrorism. they are doing that anyway. is there an incremental risk? are we going to be taking steps for allies to match that? you bet. there is also a very interesting set of steps that is coming out. by how much does saudi arabia outspend iran? this is not just purely a money scheme. it is a capabilities scheme. it is a sharing scheme. it is what we have leaders here for the camp david summit. we are expecting the neighborhood is going to be bad because the neighborhood is bad. but it gets worse if they have a nuclear program. >> way for the microphone. -- wait for the microphone. >> of all the joys and jubilation that we are getting clips of, it is all young people out there patiently waiting for the sanctions to be lifted. with all these measures that have been put into this agreement to stop iran are making a nuclear bomb, it seems to me that this regime will be on a suicide mission if they do not comply with this agreement. they have a lot of answering to do to their own domestic population and also to the world . i need your input on this, thank you. >> people say it is the regime and the regime makes all the decisions and public opinion has nothing to do with it. public opinion does have something to do with the policies undertaken by the government. they do a lot of things in the region that most iranians do not support. they would like to see their money spent at home. but in 2009, there was an earthquake call the green revolution. the government stolen election to reelect a leader. millions of people came out on the street and said where's my vote. even though the regime crushed the protest, it shook them to the core. so they made sure that in 2013 when there was another election, there was a reasonable choice of candidates. the new team has been able to negotiate this agreement. this is their second time around. they have succeeded. they are well aware of popular sentiment. they know what sanctions have done. unemployment is extremely high. the new leader gives hope and economic development tops. some of the money that iran will receive lines up and has -- lines up with hezbollah, yes of course it will. but i will argue that if this government wants to retain legitimacy -- and remember what the supreme leader here is doing , he is making a pact with the great satan, and everyone knows this -- if the system wants to continue, it will have to meet some of the aspirations of its people, i would argue. wait for the microphone, please. >> thank you for a fascinating panel. a few questions. first of all, in parallel to the inspection regime that will be led by the iaea, is there any provision unilaterally for the administration to collect the best minds? to alleviate a lot of this inherent suspicion? on another issue, the president gave an interview about one month ago to israeli tv, where he conceded that the breakout time could be reduced to nearly zero? i would love to hear from your experts. how can that be ameliorated and reinforced? >> if i understand your first question, how are we going to make sure that the best people are working on this problem and that the iaea and government have what they need? that is why we are here. the iaea received a tremendous amount of support from the united states. they get great to hickey's from the national laboratories. we help train their people. in terms of the technical capabilities and leadership, the iaea already has that. we are working closely with them to determine what more they need. there is a thermostat that you can set. they will send an alarm out and tell us when they have gone above the enrichment level. we will expect that there will be more recesses -- resources. our military and intelligent -- intelligence capabilities will change over time. we are constantly evaluating those things. there are still some decisions that have to be made. just as we learned lessons from the north korean agreements, we are learning lessons. in terms of the breakout timeline, what we have been able to achieve in the jcp aoa is predictability. some of the documents are laid out very clearly in the jcp 08. there is a strict path on those enrichment levels. more importantly the amount of enrichment material they may have. beyond that, there is a research and development plan that iran must provide that provides predictability and is consistent with their energy needs and development. it's in the year 14 -- right now we have a plan through year 13. they will have to continually update that based on their development. if the plan says we are going to have 5000 that appears inconsistent with their obligations, we will still have the right to say, that appears inconsistent with us. we can work to impose sanctions. we can work to get our allies equally as concerned. the predictability is what we have been able to achieve, and the iaea will get access to that plan. dr. ernest moniz has been working out these provisions. we don't -- the agreement does not provide for the exponential increase in enrichment capacity or a drop off. >> can i follow up on that for a second? i offer several ideas. assessment is not about imagining all the bad things that can go wrong and listing them. assessment is you try to put parameters and measure the risks involved and calculate trade-offs. how do you do that? you compare one thing to another . we have talked about this being a stronger agreement compared to -- the most robust nonproliferation agreement in history. a second evaluation criterion is how does it compare to the alternatives? a lot of folks are saying 15 years is not long enough. a part of me has to fight hard and resist going down the road of i heard this song before. prime minister netanyahu said we need at least a few weeks or months notice the four iran does something. -- a few weeks or months. john kerry said we are going to have six months. then he was told six months is not enough. then they come back with an agreement that says one year. then we hear actually we need two years. i don't know if there is any number that we could choose that would satisfy people. it seems to me that 15 years is a long time. less compared with the alternatives. let's say we use military force to decimate the program. after doing that, iran would be able to recent constitute -- reconstitute his program and roughly four years. what we do? we wipe it out again, i guess? we are talking about an agreement that is going to go for 15 years, compared to the four years they would take to reconstitute their program. all of these debates are important, but how you judge things is compare them to other things. you compare them to other agreements and your alternatives. >> we have the iaea being involved which is an international organization that grew out of president eisenhower's proposal of 1953. it is responsible to its member and one of its obligations is to respect the sovereignty of each of these states. it cannot act in an impromptu or whiplash effect. it has to proceed with due caution so as to avoid false allegations on the one hand. while being mindful that if there is something going on, that it must act in sufficient time to allow an adequate response. and that will be a problem if depending on what goes forward. and so these questions of the 24 days, etc., to my mind, that's sort of a period during which the degree of certainty would continue to build up. not maybe it's denied or not yet permitted to go to a particular location. but there are a lot of other things that will be going on in a circumstance like that. so my own perception is maybe clouded by the fact that i'm an optimist. and i want this to succeed. but i think that this is a new era. and that i'm hopeful that iran will seize upon this as a chance to demonstrate its commitment to the obligations that it's entering into. because if it doesn't we're going to know about it. and the things that interference with activities or just the color of how much cooperation is there is it something which is demonstrated on a daily basis by providing assistance that the inspectors can actually do their work. or are there things that get in the way? so that will be known soon. >> and i think we know the iranians have abided by the interim agreement that was reached back in 2013. quite faithfully. for the last couple of years. and that's a good precedent. ok. wait for the microphone. >> my name is mike sonder but everybody here agrees that the agreement is a good agreement. my curiosity is since there's no longer any state secrets, when you use the word "tough negotiations," what didn't they agree to? because at this particular point, only what they didn't want to do is relevant. what did the united states want that iraq -- iran did not want? there should be no secrets on this. i was once the director of oin vegases at the office of naval research. we know what was going on. if somebody asked us a question, we either said i don't want to tell you, or i'm going to tell you. tell us what they didn't agree to. >> no. [laughter] i'm not going to tell you. we will have lots of discussions over the next several months about well, iranians won. or they got all these things they wanted. >> that wasn't my question. >> i understand. >> the question was what did you want that they did not agree to? >> -- >> you can say i don't want to tell you. but tell me, we'll find out. >> i'm not sure i understand the second part of the question. but i'm happy to talk about the ver of indication and why we think the deal is a good one. >> that wasn't my question. >> and it's his prerogative not to answer. >> inaudible] >> i can't provide you with an answer to that question. >> we have run out of time. those who have more questions, please if our folks here have time, they will be happy to answer them. and check out the report of tom shay and it should be available on our website and on the search for common ground website i >> c-span has partnered with new hampshire dsupeion leader newspaper to host on august 3. the 17 announced g.o.p. candidates have been invited to participate. we talked to the publisher of the union leader for more details about the event. >> this is the headline. outfosmed. voters forum to be the first. joining us from manchester is the publisher. thanks very much for being with us. >> steve, thanks for having me. thanks for c-span playing a part in this. >> we are pleased to be a partner. how and why did it come about? >> it came about because we're 7 months or 6-1/2 months from the first voters getting a chance to wino the field as it were iowa, new hampshire south carolina. and fox got the first official debate from the -- fox announced that only ten candidates based on a compilation of national polling done in august were going to determine the ten seats for the debate. as you know, steve there are a lot more credible serious candidates than that. and we thought it unfair that only ten got to be on the fox stage. so we said about a month ago that we were going to do our own event. this was also prompted in part by a letter that more than 50 new hampshire republicans including a couple of former governors wrote to fox protesting this format and asking that they instead break the top polling candidates into two groups and have two back-to-back debates. but fox didn't want to do that. >> your cosponsors, including the post courier in charleston, south carolina and the gazette. what is the format and what's the objective? >> a couple of things. i'm really tickled about those two newspapers because we know them because we're all in a group called the independent newspaper group which by its name is independently owned newspapers in the country. and there aren't a lot of those any more and it happens there's one in south carolina and one or two in iowa. the format is pretty simple and straight forward. all the candidates will be introduced and in short bio lines read by an announcer. one at a time the candidates will be called up on stage to sit with the moderator who is a gentleman named jack, who runs a radio show in new hampshire quite well respected among candidates. he doesn't ask gotcha questions. he asks tough questions. the questions are going to come in part from a survey that we're going to put out asking readers to pick five out of 25 or 26 topics that they would like to see discussed. and jack will be formulating the questions based on that and will put them one at a time to the candidates. we haven't gotten as far as to mixing up how many questions there will be and who gets what question but i know that we're not going to announce the order of the candidates until that night because i don't want the first one skipping out after and the last one not coming in until it's his or her turn. and we expect we're going to have upwards of 15 candidates, which would be great and which is what iowa new hampshire, and south carolina are all about. looking at all the candidates before making a decision. and looking them, comparing them what they say at the same time in the same place. schs what fox is apparently unable to accomplish. >> the forum will be live here on monday, august 3rd beginning at 7 p.m. eastern time. you have already been in touch with a number of the candidates and their campaign staffs. what are they telling you about this approach? >> well, they like it especially the ones who are not the best known candidates. donald trump isn't going to have any trouble getting on the fox stage based on his polling numbers. but a lot of the other candidates have trouble with the fact that donald trump gets on and they may not. and adds senator lindsey graham has said in the past couple of weeks, brad pitt could get on that stage based on national polling and candidates like graham like governor john casic who is not officially in the race but is going to be in the race, are outside looking in. and that troubles them. senator graham is actually having a press conference in new hampshire later today to continue to protest the way this is going down with fox. but we've now had eight canned dates accept our invitation without reservation they really haven't asked much. we send them an invite and they're happy to do it. i think especially because they appreciate the early primary and caucus states. >> and finally, joe mcquade, as the publisher, you have seen a lot of campaigns and a lot of candidates 15 official republicans in this race. soon to be 17. have you ever seen such a crowded field? >> no. there have been a lot of names on our ballot because it used to not cost much to get on. but credible candidates, i think the democrats had eight once. there was a woman and seven guys and i think we called them snow white and the seven dwarfs and republicans back in 1980 with ronald reagan had quite a few but not this number. the house taking up a five-month extension. what's the deadline and why five months? >> so they're facing a july 31 deadline. the reason they're only going five months is because the highway trust fund has been struggling for years, since 2009 to be exact. the congress has passed a number of short-term patches since 2009 because they've been having trouble finding the money to pay for an overhaul of the fund because states are struggling to make up the difference in money to pay for roads, bridges, and highways that are in disrepair. so congressman ryan and the ways and means committee put forward a five-month extension to get the highway trust fund and the transportation department to the end of the year december 18. and then they will need to do this all over again and try to find hopefully a long-term fix. >> and to be clear, they're facing an end of july deadline. but as these things go, getting an earlier start than usual, still, a short-term extension. if they don't pass something by the end of july what happens? does money get shut off? >> well, yes. so transportation secretary anthony fox actually sent a letter to state officials yesterday saying that if there is not a short-term patch, then the federal highway administration will have to close down its doors and have to furlough a number of its employees and there won't be personnel there to then do their job to help aid states with processing approvals for different projects or assisting with highway projects. so it definitely will have an impact. and the states are already feeling it. a number of officials have told me that they've had to pull millions of dollars worth of projects due to the uncertainty surrounding the highway trust fund. >> you're tweeting about the administration begrudgingly accepting this patch being pro pose bid the house. saying the white house unhappily accepts the house bill. won't veto it. the obama administration supports passage of h.r. 3038 to give house and senate necessary time to complete work on a long-term bill. in an ideal world, what does a long-term bill look like? >> a six-year build would be what the white house would like to see in order to get to the six-year bill though congress has to come up with roughly $100 billion that would span over those six years to make up for the gap in the highway trust fund right now. that's not going to be easy. so far in the senate and the house there has been little discussion about what that pay-for would be for long-term bill. >> let's look at the senate. you're writing about it. the headline says, senate g.o.p. keeps eye on long-term highway bill as the clock winds down. you say there's bicameral support in the senate for multiyear highway bill. is that a bit of a surprise? >> it probably is. democrats have been pushing this for a long time saying even slightly threatening that they might block a short-term extension. but yesterday senate majority leader mitch mcconnell said that he is in favor of a long-term bill. that is not going to be pursuing just a short stop gap measure. he wants to see something bigger coming out of the senate. so he's keeping the pressure on but again yesterday while he was talking to his republican conference a little came out of the meeting as to what they would use to pay for such a long-term bill. so there could be the option of maybe in the senate pushing something that goes to the end of the fifrl year which would be at the end of september and then after that making sure that a long-term bill is passed. >> now house debate on the highway bill. this hour-long debate begins with transportation and infrastructure committee chair bill shuster. and include extraneous materials on h.r. 3038. the speaker pro tempore: without objection. mr. shuster: mr. speaker, pursuant to house resolution rule 362, i call up the bill h.r. 3038, to provide an extension of federal aid highway highway safety, motor carrier safety transit and for other purposes funded in the highway trust fund and for other purposes. the speaker pro tempore: the clerk will report the title of the bill. the clerk: h.r. 338, a bill to provide an extension of federal aid highway, highway safety, motor carrier safety transit and other programs funded out of the highway trust fund, and for other purposes. the speaker pro tempore: pursuant to house resolution 362, the bill is considered as read. the bill will be debatable for one hour controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the committee on transportation and infrastructure and the chair and ranking minority member of the committee on ways and means. the gentleman from pennsylvania mr. shuster, the gentleman from oregon, mr. defazio, the gentleman from wisconsin, mr. ryan, and the gentleman from michigan, mr. levin, each will control 15 minutes. the chair now recognizes the gentleman from pennsylvania, mr. shuster. mr. shuster: thank you, mr. speaker. i yield myself such time as i may consume. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized. mr. shuster: mr. speaker, i rise today in support of h.r. 3038 the highway and transportation funding act of 2015, part 2. this bill extends the federal surface transportation programs through december 18 of 2015. h.r. 3038 is a clean extension and funds the programs that authorizes levels for fiscal year 2014. the bill also ensures the solvency of the highway trust fund. we have an immediate critical need to address the solvency of the trust fund and extend the current surface transportation law. if congress fails to act, the states will not be able to be reimbursed for past expenses, projects and jobs across the country will be at risk, over 4,000 u.s. department of transportation employees will be furloughed. i appreciate chairman ryan's attention to this pressing issue as well as his commitment to addressing the solvency of the trust fund. a long-term surface transportation re-authorization bill remains a top priority for this committee and it should be for this congress. i am committed to continuing to work with chairman ryan, ranking member defazio and others on achieving a long-term re-authorization bill. i believe this extension gives us our best shot, so i strongly urge all members to support 3038, and i reserve the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from pennsylvania reserves. the gentleman from oregon is recognized. mr. defazio: i yield myself such time as i may consume. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized. mr. defazio: i ronically it was exactly one year ago today -- ironically it was exactly one year ago today that the chairman of the ways and means committee said they needed time to come together for funding a six-year surface transportation bill investing in our transportation system. one year ago today. there was an extension till may. there was the extension until the end of the year. there was an extension to may. i think 34 temporary extensions we've seen now. and now we're talking about another temporary extension with the hope that maybe they can find some money under the couch cushions or pass tax reform and cut taxes on rich people and use dynamic scoring and put it in the trust fund. i don't know what their solution is. we've had a user-fee funded transportation system in this country since dwight david eisenhower was president. followed by ronald reagan who doubled the tax and ronald reagan also put transit into the highway trust fund, saying we should not ignore our population centers and are actually centers of economic growth. and then in 1993, granted it, democratic president, democratic congress, but we didn't quite have the votes to increase the gas tax and bud shuster, our republican chair of the transportation committee back then, actual relation to the current chairman, he brought us quite a number of republicans to vote with the democrats to go with 18.3 cents a gallon and there it stood since 1993. we're hearing now you can't increase the gas tax, so i've offered alternatives. let's eliminate the gas tax and put a tax on a barrel of oil a fraction that goes into taxable transportation uses, which economists say wall street might eat part of that because they're speculating so much. exxonmobil might eat part of that. opec, hey, we might get saudi arabia to pay for a little bit of our infrastructure. i'm told, no, they can't do that. proposed just indexing the existing gas tax and bonding. pay it back over time with that increment. now, if we double index the gas tax it might go up 1.7 cents next year, and there's apparently a fear in this place that if gas went up 1.7 cents a gallon unlike exxonmobil jacking it up 20 cents in may because memorial day is coming, but filling the potholes fixing the bridges, raising 1.7 cents, oh, my god, people will lose their elections. we've seen six republican states raise their gas tax and those same states said to us in testimony, it's not enough we're raising the gas tax. we need more federal investment. the system's falling apart. 140,000 bridges, 140,000 need replacement. 70% of the national highway system needs to be dug up and rebuilt. and our transit systems, $84 billion backlog to bring them up to a state of good repair. it's so bad in washington d.c., they're killing people. they're killing people on the transit system because it is so outmoded. now if we made those investments and we made them in a more robust level than we're doing now, we could put hundreds of thousands of americans to work not just construction workers, you're talking manufacturing, you're talking small business, you're talking minority business enterprises, you're talking engineering, you're talking technical. the buy america requirements are the strongest in the whole government. it would have an incredible stimulus effect on the economy in addition of putting people back to work and we could climb back toward we were. dwight david eisenhower gave us a system that was the envy of the world. we were number one in infrastructure. we're now 16th. we're dropping like a rock. pretty soon we'll be down there with, you know, third-world countries in terms of state of our infrastructure in this country. it's embarrassing. it's pathetic. it's not necessary, and today we should be considering a long-term bill. we've introduced a viable long-term bill. we proposed a way to pay for the first two years saying benedict arnold can't buy a pharmacy overseas but we're enjoying all the protections of our citizens, military but we don't want to pay for it and our infrastructure. but there are ways forward. there seems to be an incredible reluctance on our side saying, here we are again saying let's do a patch until december 18. meanwhile, the senate over there is spinning in who knows what kind of circles. they're proposing to get most of the money by reducing retirement for federal employees. now, that is a tremendous relationship to infrastructure and user fees. let's not get too far away from the idea of user pays. with that i retain the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from oregon reserves. the gentleman from pennsylvania is recognized. mr. shuster: thank you, mr. speaker. i now yield two minutes to the gentleman from louisiana, mr. graves. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from louisiana is recognized for two minutes. mr. graves: thank you mr. speaker. mr. speaker, i want to make note that the highway program funding mechanism expires at the end of this month. it expires. it means it runs out of funding. voting against this bill causes the program to shut down, causes a decline, a dropoff in investment in our nation's infrastructure. right now we're seeing growth, we're seeing increasing demand. as the gentleman from oregon just noted we're seeing underinvestment in our infrastructure system. we've got to increase the investment. we've got to work hard to address the outdated funding mechanism that funds our current highway system. as was noted, we have lost value in the current funding mechanism. having a user fee is absolutely critical, but a user fee that ensures the level of investment that we truly need. this extension gives us time to re-create that. we have been using the same user fee for decades. a user fee with static figures since 1993 as was just mentioned, and a user fee that has conflicting federal policies that reduces the value of the income of this trust fund as a result of the corporate average fuel economy, cafe standards, that require greater fuel standards out of vehicles. so we've got to take a fresh look at this. we've got to take this time and use it wisely to ensure that we can ensure the level of funding that we need to invest in our nation's infrastructure. we need a fundamentally different approach and we need to do it without raising taxes. mr. speaker, back in our home state of louisiana we have some of the worst traffic in the nation for a reason of its size. we have an area that the interstate system, the only place in the nation where it literally drops down to one lane. the interstate. an incredible bottle neck in the same area where we're having a manufacturing renaissance, where we're seeing tens of billions of dollars in new economic development opportunities. yet, the infrastructure is struggling. the infrastructure is strangling that growth and strangling that investment. i urge all members to support this. i urge all members to work together to ensure we develop a new funding stream that meets the demand of our crumbling infrastructure in this nation. i want to thank chairman shuster. i want to thank chairman ryan and ranking member defazio to ensure that this legislation moves forward. thank you. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from oregon is recognized. mr. defazio: with that i yield three minutes to the gentleman from washington, the ranking member of the surface transportation subcommittee -- the gentlewoman from washington, ranking member of the surface transportation subcommittee, ms. norton. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlewoman is recognized. ms. norton: i thank the gentleman for yielding. mr. speaker, the majority has turned virtually its only congressional policy, tax savings on its head with useless short-term transportation bills and extensions. their short-term policy on the nation's highways, bridges and transit has simply transferred the transportation tax burden to the state taxes of their constituents. 21 states and the district of columbia have raised their gas user fees six cents july 1. iowa new hampshire, pennsylvania rhode island, virginia, vermont, the district of columbia, south dakota, idaho, georgia, nebraska vermont. states going in that direction, michigan, north carolina, utah and washington state. states also considering user fee increases are kentucky missouri new jersey, south carolina. that makes almost half the states that congress has driven to state taxpayers alone. states that have nothing in common except the desire to keep their transportation infrastructure, the key to a growing economy from completely disintegrating. meanwhile, their representatives in washington have continually failed to pay their part. on the average about 50% of the cost of state infrastructure with federal dollars. yet, the federal dollars are only a path through that goes right back to the states. for 22 years, we have allowed the federal user fee to remain fixed at 1993 levels, all though fuel efficiency long ago made that obsolete. . although american taxpayers have stepped up, they can't do their projects without a federal long-term bill. in the nation's capital, for example the iconic memorial bridge, gateway to arlington cemetery and the south and on the north, the national mall, is partially closed, leaving thousands of workers unable to take metro bustos get to work. even brings like the h street bridge here which needs only repair is standing in the way of billions of dollars of nontransportation development here and nationwide system of whatever the congress does in the next authorization bill, two things must be done. we must put in pilots that instruct us, guide us, for new ways to fund transportation infrastructure in light of fuel efficiencies such as cars like my hybrid ford c-max. and most of all to be useful at all, we must have a six-year transportation bill. i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlelady's time has expired. >> i yield three minutes to the gentleman from florida, mr. mica. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized. mr. mica: thank you, mr. chairman, thank you, mr. speaker. here we are, last minute to avoid an infrastructure disaster across the country. how did we get here? well when we knew that we needed a substantial amount of money, the other side of the aisle found out that there was a little bit of money left and we had asked the -- asked several months ago to consider going to the end of the year, when we're doing tax reform, and we could find sufficient money to fund a four to six-year bill. they said no. they had to spend the last dime in the cookie jar, take it out of the cookie jar and that's what put us in this situation. what that has done is, at least seven states have almost closed down their infrastructure projects. states that -- my state isn't affected by some of the northern states are affected because they have a very short work period. they're missing that work period. and states don't operate like the federal government. they have to pay their bills. they can't be spending and producing and printing paper money without backing. so we've let them down. so here we are asking to go where we wanted to go before to december. so i urge my -- the members to go and pass this legislation. and it's kind of interesting sometimes i think that there's a lot of amnesia around here. maybe we -- mr. speaker, i don't know if we can go down to the health clinic and get a supply of gingko, but it would be good to give the members on the other side of the aisle gingko to help their memory. three years ago, they controlled the house, the senate and the white house. they could have passed this legislation. we would have a bill in place now. the president came in, i was there, ray lahood came out, cut the knees out of mr. oberstar when he was chairman and said, they weren't going to move forward take weren't going to raise taxes. now they call for raising taxes. 21 states have raised it. they've done the responsible thing. they have to do it. it's better for home to do it because the overhead and carrying charge is so great in washington. so they have to do it. going to the well instead of raising gas taxes? didn't we recommend that to the other side and they ignored it? i think we need a double dose of gingko. i think now we step up to the plate, we help mr. shuster and mr. ryan, they'll get us to december. the leadership of the house is committed to a long-term bill and we'll get that done. everybody working together and maybe a few people having another little dose of gingko might help around here. i yield back the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman yields back. the gentleman from oregon is recognized. mr. defazio: i must say, it's one of the most bizarre and fanciful things i've ever heard. there was never a viable plan to go to year end. the republicans never proposed revenue they just recently found revenues under couch cushions to get us through december 18. and they have not meaningfully addressed long-term funding for despite having control for 4 1/2 years and they blame us. the chairman started a meet sayinging, no user fees. you have now ruled out the traditional way of paying for infrastructure so they have to come up with something else but that was totally bizarre. with that i yield two minutes to the gentlewoman from maryland, ms. edwards. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlewoman is recognized for two minutes. ms. edwards: thank you very much, mr. speaker. i thank the ranking member. for months, mr. speaker, republicans have actually squandered an opportunity to develop and pass a long-term authorization for highway spending. and it's pretty regrettable. since may 19, republicans simply brought up and passed another two month extension. we've already heard, sometimes we lose count, is it 33 or 34 extensions? unfortunately, here we are two months later and we're careening gentleman again to another crisis, another republican-made crisis more gridlock for the highway trust fund right in the middle of the critical construction season. hundreds of thousands of jobs, as has been said and vie sal construction projects across the country are hanging in the balance. here we just have a few days left. what do we know? we know the republicans done have a plan and they don't have any ideas. we have some ideas. and those ideas are contained in the grow america act. i'm one of the original co-sponsors. it's a six-year $478 billion bill that would be a framework for our discussions. we could put that on the floor here today vote on it, and make sure that we get under way. but oh no, we're stuck yet again with another extension and frankly i'm not really sure whether, when we get to december that we won't be stuck with yet another extension. this goes on and on and on. the american people have had enough. we know that if we invest in our infrastructure, we create jobs and we know that our infrastructure is falling apart. this seems like a no brainer to most americans and to working people and i don't understand what the complication here is, mr. speaker. but enough is enough. it's time for republicans to be the adults at the table, to bring up a plan and a program to themerica back to work, not six months at a time, not two months at a time but for a long time. with that i yield. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlelady yields back. the gentleman from oregon reserves. the gentleman from pennsylvania. >> i would like to remind my colleagues, the house -- mr. shuster: i would like to remind my colleagues, the house was controlled by their party, the senate was controlled by their party until january, and the white house is controlled by their party. they were going to squander $800 billion. if they'd listened to the ranking member at the time they'd have put a lot more money into the investment of infrastructure instead of that $800 billion bill about $68 billion went to transportation system of everybody can point fingers at everybody but the reality is, here we are. we need to extend this to give the ways and means committee and the finance committee in the senate to figure out the dollars in a responsible way, not to continue to raise the debt and the deficit but find a responsible funding level to get us to a six-year bill, which i'm committed to. i know chairman ryan has said many,

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