is the incremental additional money that they've got to try to destabilize the region or send to their proxies, is that more important than preventing iran from getting a nuclear weapon? no. so i think -- again, this is a matter of us making a determination of what is our priority. the other problem with the argument that folks have been making about, oh, this is a windfall and suddenly iran is flushed with cash, and they're going to take over the world. and i say that not tongue-in-cheek, because if you look at some of the statements by some of our critics, you would think that iran is, in fact, going to take over the world as a consequence of this deal -- which i think would be news to the iranians. that argument is also premised on the notion that if there is no deal, if congress votes down this deal, that we're able to keep sanctions in place with the same vigor and effectiveness as we have right now. and that, i can promise you, is not true. that is absolutely not true. i want to repeat: we're not writing iran a check. this is iran's money that we were able to block from them having access to. that required the cooperation of countries all around the world many of whom really want to purchase oil from iran. the imposition of sanctions -- their cooperation with us -- has cost them billions of dollars, made it harder for them. they've been willing to do that because they've believed we were sincere about trying to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully and they considered that a priority -- a high enough priority that they were willing to cooperate with us on sanctions. if they saw us walking away, or more specifically, if they saw the u.s. congress effectively vetoing the judgment of 99 percent of the world community that this is a deal that resolves the iranian weapons program -- nuclear weapons program in an equitable way, the sanctions system unravels. and so we could still maintain some of our unilateral sanctions, but it would be far less effective -- as it was before we were able to put together these multilateral sanctions. so maybe they don't get $100 billion; maybe they get $60 billion or $70 billion instead. the price for that that we've paid is that now iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon. we have no inspectors on the ground. we don't know what's going on. they're still getting some cash windfall. we've lost credibility in the eyes of the world. we will have effectively united iran and divided ourselves from our allies. a terrible position to be in. i'm just going to look -- i made some notes about any of the arguments -- the other arguments that i've heard here. what about -- (off-mic) -- the end of the deal? president obama: okay, yes that's a good one. the notion -- at the end of the deal they could go back -- president obama: right. well, so let's address this issue of -- because that's the other big argument that's been made. all right, let's assume that the deal holds for 10 years, iran doesn't cheat. now, at the end of 10 years, some of the restrictions have been lifted -- although, remember, others stay in place for 15 years. so for example, they've still got to keep their stockpiles at a minimal level for 15 years. the inspections don't go away; those are still in place 15, 20 years from now. their commitment under the non-proliferation treaty does not go away; that's still in place. the additional protocol that they have to sign up for under this deal, which requires a more extensive inspection and verification mechanism -- that stays in place. so there's no scenario in which a u.s. president is not in a stronger position 12, 13, 15 years from now if, in fact, iran decided at that point they still wanted to get a nuclear weapon. keep in mind, we will have maintained a one-year breakout time, we will have rolled back their program, frozen their facilities, kept them under severe restrictions, had observers. they will have made international commitments supported by countries around the world. and -- hold on a second -- and if at that point they finally decided, you know what, we're going to cheat, or not even cheat -- at that point, they decide openly we're now pursuing a nuclear weapon -- they're still in violation of this deal and the commitments they've made internationally. and so we are still in a position to mobilize the world community to say, no, you can't have a nuclear weapon. and they're not in a stronger position to get a nuclear weapon at that point; they're in a weaker position than they are today. and, by the way, we haven't given away any of our military capabilities. we're not in a weaker position to respond. so even if everything the critics were saying was true -- that at the end of 10 years, or 12 years, or 15 years, iran now is in a position to decide it wants a nuclear weapon, that they're at a breakout point -- they won't be at a breakout point that is more dangerous than the breakout point they're in right now. they won't be at a breakout point that is shorter than the one that exists today. and so why wouldn't we at least make sure that for the next 10 15, years they are not getting a nuclear weapon and we can verify it; and afterwards, if they decide if they've changed their mind, we are then much more knowledgeable about what their capabilities are, much more knowledgeable about what their program is, and still in a position to take whatever actions we would take today? so none of this is holding out hope that they'll change their behavior? president obama: no. >> nothing different -- president obama: no. look, i'm always hopeful that behavior may change for the sake of the iranian people as well as people in the region. there are young people there who are not getting the opportunities they deserve because of conflict, because of sectarianism, because of poor governance, because of repression, because of terrorism. and i remain eternally hopeful that we can do something about that, and it should be part of u.s. foreign policy to do something about that. but i'm not banking on that to say that this deal is the right thing to do. again, it is incumbent on the critics of this deal to explain how an american president is in a worse position 12, 13, 14, 15 years from now if, in fact, at that point iran says we're going to pull out of the npt, kick out inspectors and go for a nuclear bomb. if that happens, that president will be in a better position than what happened if iran, as a consequence of congress rejecting this deal, decides that's it, we're done negotiating, we're going after a bomb right now. the choices would be tougher today than they would be for that president 15 years from now. and i have not yet heard logic that refutes that. all right. i really have to go now. i think we've hit the big themes. but i promise you, i will address this again. all right? i suspect this is not the last that we've heard of this debate. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] announcer: the u.k. was one of six countries negotiating with iran over its nuclear program. philip hammond discussed the details of the deal in the house of commons today and took questions from members of parliament. this is 45 minutes. speaker: order. secretary philip hammond. secretary hammond: i would like to make a statement on the outcome of the nuclear negotiations with iran. the world has held its breath as talks between world powers and iran have edged to a conclusion. they were difficult negotiations and all sides faced tough decisions. yesterday morning a process that began one decade ago came to a conclusion. the result is a historic deal, a moment in efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and a victory for diplomacy. the u.k. with its partners china, france, germany, russia and the u.s. have at last reached an agreement with iran on nuclear programs. with the conclusion of these negotiations, the world can be reassured that all ukrainian routes to a nuclear bomb -- iranian routes to a nuclear bomb have been closed off. the origin of these negotiations lies in the revelation 12 years ago that iran was concealing nuclear activities in violation of international optic nations. at that time, iran was not willing to meet the international community. they responded with security council resolutions. the agreement we have reached is not absolved iran blame for previous activities, nor those of white the slate clean. it offers even on the opportunity to draw a line under past behavior and build trust in his declaration that it is not pursuing the development of a nuclear weapon. this will not be a quick process. it should be possible. the government's purpose in seeking an agreement has always been clear to secure insurance that iran will not be able to develop a nuclear weapon. disagreements impose strict limits on the nuclear program, the comprehensive and long-lasting -- for 10 years, a ron's enrichment capacity -- iran's enrichment capacity will be reduced. it will only enrich to a certain level below the 90 percent level of enrichment considered necessary for a nuclear weapon. it's a stockpile of enriched uranium would be limited to 300 kilos, down from over seven tons with the balance being exported to russia. its research and development activities will be constrained so that it will not be able to enrich with advanced centrifuging for 10 years. no uranium enrichment or nuclear materials will be permitted at its underground site. the agreement also cuts off the plutonium wrote to developing a bomb. iran's heavywater research reactor will be redesigned so that it will no longer have the capability to produce weapons grade plutonium. given a historic levels of mistrust built-up between iran and the international community, a strong inspection regime and a framework for addressing concerns about past military dimensions are vital for building trust and providing us with the confidence that iran is meeting commitments. some of the crucial monitoring and transparency measures of this deal will last indefinitely, such as the implementation of the additional protocols of the safeguard agreement. it will allow access to sites about which the iaea has concerns that cannot be addressed in other ways. iran is no exception. iran's obligations, including the obligation never to acquire or develop weapons will apply during and after the. of the deal -- period of the deal. we will not hesitate to take action including sanctions if they violate at any time. our concerns about the military dimensions of the nuclear program will be addressed. the iaea and iran have agreed a roadmap of actions to clarify these issues. taken together, these measures mean that if iran were to renate on promises and break out for a bomb, it would take at least 12 months even to require the necessary materials for a single device. the robust transparency measures we have agreed mean that we, the international community, would know almost immediately and we would have time to respond. in return for implementing these commitments and as our confidence in their program develops over time iran will receive a portion of sanctions release. initially, there will be release of the eu, u.s., and nuclear related economic and financial sanctions. the sanctions really full only be triggered once iaea verifies that iran has taken steps to limit nuclear programs. other core provisions in the existing security council resolution will be reestablished by a new u.n. resolution. important restrictions on imports and exports of conventional arms and development of ballistic missiles will be reimposed through in annex to that resolution and only listed later in the agreement. these relaxations are backed by a robust enforcement mechanism. if there is a significant violation of the nuclear provisions of the agreement all previous u.n. sanctions can be re-imposed through a snap back mechanism, which any party to disagreement can invoke. the eu and the u.s. could also reimpose their own sanctions. clearly, having made this agreement, able be strongly any ron's interested to comply with the provisions to avoid a return to the sanctions regime that has crippled its economy for so long. we need to look ahead to the implementation of the agreement. after such tough negotiations there will be bonds along the road. we entered the agreement in good faith and all struck -- all sides must try to resolve problems. the deal includes robust enforcement provisions and we will not hesitate to use them if iran goes back on its word. disagreement is focused solely on their nuclear program. it's conclusion could have -- it's conclusion could have wider, positive consequences by providing the meat -- by providing sanctions relief for economic re-engagement with the world it will allow the uranian people to feel the tangible its of international cooperation. after reading engagement materializes, we will speak to assist businesses to take advantage of the opportunity that will arise. that assistance would be enhanced through having a functioning british embassy in tehran. we remain committed to reopening our embassies in each other's countries and will do so when we have resolved outstanding issues. the deal also has the potential to build a different kind of relationship between iran and the west. a change in the positive way the dynamics of the region and beyond. in an atmosphere of developing confidence and trust, there will be an opportunity for iran to realign its approach in support of the international community's efforts, in particular, and confronting the shared challenge of isil and the resolution of regional crises such as those in yemen in syria. this will be a process, it will take time. in the meantime, we remain realistic about the nature of the iranian regime and its wider ambitions. we will continue to speak out against iran's poor human rights record. we will continue to work closely with our friends, allies partners in the region who live with uranian interference -- uranian interference -- iranian interference. an iranian bomb would be a major threat to global stability. that threat is never moved. we and iran now have a responsibility to ensure that the wider potential benefits of this deal for the region and for the international community as a whole are delivered. the u.k. is fully committed to playing its part and i commend that. >> thank you mr. speaker. can i begin by thanking the foreign secretary for his sin minute for setting up the details of this agreement. let me begin by paying tribute to him, john kerry, our european and international partners, and everybody involved for their efforts in securing a major diplomatic breakthrough. there has long been consensus across these benches that seeking an agreement with iran was the right thing for the international community to do. we have always supported the approach of sanctions and negotiations backed up by the security council resolutions and it is welcomed the talks have reach a conclusion more than 12 years since they began with the support of among others, the foreign secretary. none of us want iran to have a nuclear weapon, and nobody believes that the world would be a safer place where they ever to acquire one. reflecting on how much more grave the world might have looked at today if the house to report that talks had collapsed without an agreement. we would be facing the almost a certain restart of their nuclear program with no means of monitoring or inspection. the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the middle east and greater instability in an already-volatile region. that is why it has been right to use the negotiating opportunity the suppression of sanctions against the iranian regime has created and that this process was not rushed in order to get this right. the question now is to ensure that this agreement lives up to the words of the eu and the iranian foreign minister's joint statement yesterday. that it is not only a deal, but a good deal. mr. speaker, negotiations of this complexity are never easy. that is the nature of diplomacy. in agreement presents the international community with a chance to make progress in the right direction. we should grasp it. the foreign secretary outlined many aspects of the agreement. let me touch on a number of things. first, iran has reaffirmed that under no circumstances will they ever seek, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons. this is significant and important. the world will want to see that there words are matched by its deeds, especially those countries in the region that have particular concerns. i want the foreign secretaries assurances that independent inspections are at the heart of this agreement. is my -- it is vital that the implementation is based not on faith, but on fax, on evidence and verification. we giveaway said that iran should have to demonstrate beyond doubt that it is not pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. it realized the measures outlined in the joint action plan should now and april everybody to see that this is the case. that is essential if this agreement is going to command the confidence of world opinion. the proposals to manage access to particular sites with a commission to rule on whether inspection request by the international atomic energy agency are justified. i would be grateful at the foreign secretary could provide further detail on how this will work in practice. what assurances were given in vienna to make sure that this process will not prove to be an obstruction? mr. speaker, it is welcome that iran has pledged to remove 90% of its stockpile of enriched uranium and two thirds of centrifuges. there has been much discussion of the numbers and of the time scales involved. as the foreign secretary said, some parts of his deal though remain in place for five years such as the arms embargoes. other restrictions from 10-15 years and other transparency measures will stay in place. with support -- will the foreign secretaries by the rationale for these timescales and whether the government is satisfied that they are sufficient? would he also agree with me that while we should be positive about the implantation of this agreement, we must also go into it with our eyes open, if there is a lesson to be drawn from the collapse of the agreed framework negotiating with north korea, it is that the success of these agreements and should be judged not over months but years, so it is right that some sanctions should be removed gradually and only as iran honors commitments. were iran to violet the terms of the agreement, is the government satisfied that the provisions the sanctions to snap back are tough enough to block the path to a nuclear weapon? finally, does the foreign secretary agree with the words of the iranian foreign minister, saying yesterday, that this is still represents not a ceiling but a foundation to build on. it is no secret that iran has been involved for many years and exploiting intentions in the reason, with proxy armies are support for terrorist groups. those issues and difficulties in our own relationship with iran will not go away overnight. this agreement and does present iran with an opportunity to play a much more constructive, global role particularly with our shared interest in defeating the threat from isil or daesh. does he agree that opening links with iran will help the process of reform within the country which as the foreign secretary said, news to include improving its human rights record, and for britain specifically, he mentioned ongoing efforts to reopen our embassy in tehran. when does he realistically expect that to take place? is just speaker, working together as an international community is a well-worn phrase, but this moment does show what can be achieved through patience and diplomacy. if history teaches us anything, however, it is that peace is a process, not an event. the iranian president called this a new chapter -- we all live in hope that this will one that will be to a safer, more peaceful world, free of nuclear weapons. we will continue to support all efforts to make that hope a reality. speaker: the foreign secretary. secretary hammond: i'm grateful for the comments and thank him for the continued support from the opposition bench. asas this has been across party approach for many years turn he mentioned a long duration of negotiations and i would like to -- it is not just about foreign secretaries -- it is also about the experts and diplomats who have been carrying out negotiations on the team that traveled back from vienna yesterday, there was one person who has been on this project for 10 years. and who now faces finding a new career after 10 years on this particular project. they have been complex negotiations. it is important that the outcome is a win-win. coming back from vienna with something that was a triumph for us but not a win for iran would be a hollow victory, because it would eventually fall apart are there has to be something solid for iran, for the iranian people, there has to be in opportunity for the iranian people to build a future and ensure the future prosperity of their country and i am confident that this agreement will allow that. we should not underestimate the importance in a country like iran of the religious edict against building nuclear weapons. that is now firmly enshrined in the words of the supreme leader, iran will not build or seek to acquire a nuclear weapon. but he is right. we have to be pragmatic and a robust inspection regime is at the heart of our ability to do this. he asked me how the monitoring and access arrangements would work. the monitoring is multifaceted. there will be electronic monitoring, sophisticated, advanced telemetry on equipment taken out of use. there will be cctv cameras within facilities, there will be regular inspections by iaea inspectors. if there is any suspicion by the iaea that they need access to a site that they do not regularly inspect, they can demand such access if the iranians deny access -- the question of whether access should be allowed will be referred to the jccoa commission and it will be determined on a majority vote. the members of the commission are the e3+3, the eu hybrid representative, and iran itself. we are confident that in that format, proper access will be insured. he asked about the different timescales. we are comfortable with the end result. obviously, this was a negotiation and we did not get as long on some restrictions like arms control, conventional arms control, as he would have liked. on the nuclear path of the d -- of the deal, we are comfortable that we have respected our timelines, which are about maintaining a minimum 12 month break out for a minimum of 10 years and we are very confident that we have asked -- we have well in excess of that. he also asked about snapback. the mechanisms for snap back are robust. we insisted upon them. if any member, any member of the joint commission, including the u.k. believes iran is insignificant violation, that member is entitled the un security council to vote on a negative resolution which would cause the sanctions to snap back. the honorable gentleman mentions north korea, and i understand why he is tempted to do so. having spent some time with the iranian negotiators in finding a more than i knew about iran, i want to say this. iran is a different country than north korea. iran is a major player in the region. it is a big country with huge resources, a large and well-educated population. it can, if it chooses, play and enormously positive role and the development of the middle east and indeed, can contribute positively to world affairs. he asked me about mohammed said reef -- rouhani is a reformer but we do not delude ourselves that everybody in tehran is welcoming this agreement, that everybody in tehran shares their vision of a more open, engaged iran. our job is to make sure that as this agreement is implemented, we reinforce the majority that would like iran to engage in a responsible way with the world. part of that is ensuring that we work with iran to deal with the shared threat of isil across the region. finally, on the question of the embassy, there are some technical issues that i have explained before. on both sides, they will have to be resolved. there is a clear will to do it. i would be working directly with my iranian counterpart to ensure that we clear those obstacles over the next few months. i hope we will be in a position to reopen our respective embassies before the end of this year. i look forward to going to tehran to go so. secretary hammond:speaker: mr. blunt. >> this opens the way for iran to play a constructive role in regional affairs and noting that we have a common interest in defeating daesh, and the reaction from riyadh, will be employ the full weight of british diplomacy to forge intelligence, and effective cooperation between riyadh and tehran to her the common strategy of defeating dotdaesh. secretary hammond: my honorable friend is quite right. the hague prices to achieve a measure of reconciliation between riyadh and tehran, and engagement between those regional powers in addressing the many challenges facing the region. that will not happen overnight. he is absolutely right, the measured tone of the response we heard from saudi arabia, which was in stark contrast to responses we held from elsewhere in the region, is promising, and i spoke last night to the crown prince of saudi arabia. we will maintain our engagement doing two things encouraging our partners and allies in the arab countries around the gulf to be willing to engage with iran over time and a sensible and measured way, but also providing them with the reassurance they need about their security to allow them to take a little more -- to try to realize the opportunities this presents. >> may i congratulate the foreign secretary and all others involved on this historic agreement, which is meticulous and has taken an enormous amount of time, effort, and detail. it is appropriate to congratulate barack obama probably the greatest achievement of his presidency. this agreement demonstrates the dictum of winston churchill. yes, the iranian regime has many objection in -- objectionable and nasty -- and we look for improvements on civil rights in iran, but iran is a player and it is very important indeed that she be engaged rather than shunned. will the foreign secretary make clear to the government of israel, which, unlike iran, is not a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty, which has hundreds of nuclear warheads in missiles, that any attempt by them to interfere with, negate, or frustrate this agreement will not be tolerated. secretary hammond: mr. speaker i'm grateful for the honorable gentleman's remarks. he took the words out of my mouth. i was trying to explain to my conversation with the crown prince of saudi arabia -- i found it difficult to convey across the language barrier. what he says is right, iran has been subject to 35 years of isolation, its own choice and own fault. getting iran and engaged in the affairs of the region again in a sensible and measured way will be a huge benefit. i'm going tonight to israel and i will have a chance to convey our message directly to prime minister netanyahu tomorrow. he has made clear that he intends to fight it all the way and that israel will seek to use its influence in the u.s. congress to obstruct the progress of the deal. i am confident that that action will not succeed or it i am also confident that israel has shown time and again that it can be pragmatic and once it has exhausted that avenue of opportunity, that it will seek to engage in a sensible and pragmatic way to deal with the new reality on the ground in the middle east to benefit everybody. >> mr. speaker my honorable friend is right, that if iran gives up nuclear ambitions, it is a huge move forward in regional and global security. if we have confidence in verification, and must be on feathered and unrestricted. can my honorable friend guaranteed to the house that under this agreement iran can be forced to grant access to any site that is designated and how quickly would iran be forced to do so? again, he is right that the wider potential and positive implications for this agreement there are also wider potential negative implications. if iran has sanctions lifted and money pours back into iran, what assurances and guarantees are being stott that this will not simply be used to fund proxies so that hamas and hezbollah can provide greater instability to the region? secretary hammond: my honorable friend makes a series of good points and he is right that access for verification is the crucial underpinning of this agreement. if we had not been able to secure robust access arrangement, robust monitoring arrangements, we would not have been able to make this deal. there would have been too much risk attached. i have described in response to the honorable gentleman earlier the arrangements for identification of sites for inspection and reference of any iranian objections to the commission heard we are confident those arrangements will work. it would mean, typically, around a period of 20-21 days between initial the man's and mandated access. if iran continues to deny access to a site that the commission has mandated should the access that would be a breach of the agreement subject to step back under the u.n. security council resolution. my honorable friend asked me about the question of iran's assets. ultimately if the deal is fully implemented, it will be to the unfreezing of about $150 billion of iranian assets which are currently frozen outside the country. this will not happen overnight. it will be a progressive process. my honorable friend asked two questions -- what will happen with that money and how can we be sure it will not go used to foster interference in the region? of course, we cannot be absolute be sure that it won't release a two things. first of all iran has a huge deficit of infrastructure investment, and its energy, exporting infrastructure its transport infrastructure -- and he's a new fleet of civilian aircraft. there are huge demands for the use of those assets and the reformers in iran, who president ronnie is one -- president ronnie -- president rouhani is one. the second point i would make is with very little money available and under the full burden of international sanctions, the iranian -- the islamic revolutionary guards have made up effective job of interfering in lebanon, syria, and elsewhere. this body was itching to do things and unable to do them -- it has been able to be pretty effective on a shoestring and we do not think that the release of these funds is going to make a material difference. >> i would gently point out to the house that the member from manchester -- he is a right honorable gentleman and he is the father of houston -- it is important to get these things right. >> president rouhani is a distinguished graduate of glasgow heliconia university. for -- glasgow hellenic university. -- it is true of relationships between nations. to see this welcome agreement as a start of a process of engagement which will bring the government and above all the people of this remarkable country back into the community of nations. >> i have to confess to the right honorable gentleman that i was not aware that president rouhani was a graduate from a glass cow university but i am -- i graduate from a glasgow university. he clearly does understand what we are saying -- or maybe not. [laughter] i totally agree with the honorable gentleman, there is a huge opportunity here to be grasped. is in our interest that we ensure that we do so. speaker: dr. julian lewis. >> will the foreign secretary bear in mind that the world breathed a sigh ever leave the 1972 at the signing of the biological weapons convention only to discover after a defection in 1989 that russia had been cheating on a massive and industrial scale. whilst in such negotiations we must always hope for the best, i hope you will bear in mind that we must also be prepared for the worst. >> i think my honorable friend's cautionary statement -- the difference in the case of russia's cheating on the biological weapons agreement was that we didn't have the kind of comprehensive intrusive inspections and access that we will have in relation to iran. he is right that while we should go forth with optimism as others have suggested, we should also be cautious. we should recognize that there is a big deficit of mistrust to be overcome. we need these access and inspection regimes. we need to proceed cautiously. not least because we cannot reassure our partners in the region that we are approaching this cautiously and sensibly, we will lose them and we will not be able to encourage them to engage in the way that we want to see. >> can i gently say to the foreign secretary that history will decide whether this was a historic agreement are not and it may just be a bit premature at this stage. negotiations took longer to reach and then the safeguards he has stated -- it took us more than 10 years to get to this point. can i just returned to the point about using the sanctions lifted to support its proxies? i do think he views to reassure this house more that the lifting of sanctions will not mean that iran becomes our property to wipe out enemies? secretary hammond: she is obviously right. she corrects me for an error that many of us have made, describing something that is historic on a somewhat premature basis. she talks about a 10 year timescale. the significance is that many of these measures that have been taken will have an effect which lasts much longer than 10 years. frankly, the challenge now is to change the mindset in iran of the iranian leadership -- we have a 10-15 year period starting from now when we need to get it firmly enshrined in the iranian mentality that it is better for iran, that iran will have more influence, more prosperity, more success working with the international community than working in isolation. that is why it is so important that we engage with them. i look forward to doing that. speaker: sir eric pickles. secretary hammond: i hope my right honorable friend will forgive me for pressing him on one aspect for it he talks about trang a line could be don't actually have a line yet. we have in the words of the agreement a roadblock which will arrive. given iran's past activities of clandestine i'm sites -- clandestine sites -- what is the position for an order when verification takes place, we know it is against the position that actually exist? secretary hammond: my right honorable friend makes a good pointer the international atomic energy authority who has responsibility for this has agreed with iran a roadmap set of activities that need to be carried out to allow it to publish its final report -- we don't know how long that will take, probably about six months or so. there is conditionality. until that report is published they sanctions will not be lifted. that is part of the process that needs to be completed. they will have the ability to gain technical access where they need to do so to have technical discussions with iranian experts in their confident -- this is completely independent of the negotiations indiana -- they are confident that the measures they have put in place that iran has agreed to as part of this deal are adequate to allow them to do their job, complete their mission, and issue that report. >> the foreign secretary talked about the issue of inspections. how confident is the foreign secretary that the citizens of this country can be assured that in that period of arbitration in discussions about axis that iran won't be able to cover up activity? secretary hammond: mr. speaker negotiations have gone on for a long time and on each and every one of these issues, we have had very lengthy details and discussions. this is one of the issues i have been focused on. i have sod detailed -- i have stopped detailed -- i have sought detailed reassurances that allow them to be confident of maintaining eyes on a situation from the time access was demanded until the time access was granted and i -- after many hours of discussion -- i have been satisfied that it will be possible for us to retain a very high degree of confidence that the question has not been tampered with or if it has, to know how it has been tampered with during that interval. in the case of radioactive material, removing things from a site is not so easy. the radioactive footprint will be present and that is very, very extension extensive. >> it would take further 1.5 hours to accommodate colleagues to the present trend needs to be blocked. let's of to a new member to lead us by example. >> my late father wrote extensively on the nonproliferation of weapons in a key point was that it was decision is -- fist digits -- secretary hammond: mr. speaker i believe that president rouhani and the supreme leader is genuine and making against nuclear weapons -- i am not naive -- there will be some within the power structure including some of the military structure, i am sure, who still hark after the idea of nuclear weapons. >> i am pleased this agreement has been reached. as a result, does the foreign secretary think there is a possibility of holding the middle east weapons of mass destruction free zone conference that was envisioned at the last nonproliferation treaty review conference was supported by all parties including iran and this is a surely a great opportunity to push forward to and proliferation across the whole region? secretary hammond: the honorable gentleman has been a supporter of this approach for a long time and we, as a government, also supported, as he knows, the u.k. has been advocating this conference and moving fort on this agenda. removing the iranian issue i don't thing in itself is going to solve the problems that we have in bringing this to a conclusion but we are continuing to press for the conference and we will continue to do so. >> thank you. whatever way the house looks at this, it is a diplomatic trial for the partners who have come to this conclusion. when my right honorable friend agree with me that we will need to make sure that in this there in long-term project, that it will be essential for greater contacts between this country and iran across a much broader area than that which is currently available and will he also agreed that our arab partners are firmly brought in behind the efforts to normalize relationships with iran? secretary hammond: i agree. contact with iran is going to be critical. that opening the country up through trade, investment travel contact iranian students traveling abroad -- one of the things that the u.s. will do as part of this deal is and the pre-notification requirement in certain categories and -- categories of iranian students studying in the u.s. the more they travel abroad, the more they travel to iran, the better we understand each other. >> iran currently supports the terrorist organization hamas in gaza and elsewhere in promoting terrorism. what will the agreement have on the situation? secretary hammond: in an ideal world, as in iran becomes more engaged in the international community, more engaged in the affairs of the region, we will be able to engineer a situation where iran's leverage over organizations like hamas can be a force for good. we are not there yet or automatically, but there is at last an opportunity to engage with iran on these issues, which there hasn't been while the nuclear cloud has been hanging over us. >> judging iran by actions rather than words, but hardliners remain at the heart of the iranian government. the foreign secretary talks about -- they are already interfering massively. has the foreign secretary spoken to our nato ally turkey and what is the reaction to this deal? secretary hammond: i have not spoken to my turkish counterpart since we did this deal but i have met with him on many occasions over the last few months. turkey is also an important player in this region. all of the powers in the region -- saudi arabia, iran, turkey, israel, have to be engaged if we are going to have a stable region, which has any chance of breaking out of the cycle of despair that we have seen for the last 40 years. announcer: on the next washington journal, chris stewart, a member of the intelligence committee will talk about the role of congress in reviewing the nuclear agreement with iran and congressman mark takano. announcer: this weekend, politics books, and american history. wrote to the white house coverage features all presidential candidates and begins friday night in iowa. we are live from cedar rapids, iowa for the hall of fame dinner. all day saturday, starting at 11:00 eastern, we are live at the family leadership summit in ames, iowa. john kasich who plans to a nessus candidacy on monday. on book tv, saturday morning, we are live from new york city for the 17th annual harlem book fair with author talks and panels on economics, african identity, and race and politics. sunday night, political commentator ann coulter says the greatest issue facing the u.s. is immigration. american history tv on c-span3 the warren g. harding symposium on modern first ladies. speakers include patricia crider. an adequate, jake ursuline of the national archives shows how the u.s. government used propaganda during world war ii to persuade citizens to join the military. get our complete schedule at c-span.org. announcer: national security analysts discuss the iran nuclear program agreement at the atlantic council, focusing on the role of the international atomic energy the in monitoring iranian facilities. it is moderated by barbara schliemann. this is about 1.5 hours. barbara: ok. welcome to the atlantic council. we have done it again. we have timed a program to follow by one day a historic agreement with iran. i would like to say that i planned it this way, but in this case, it is just dumb luck. as we all know, there is a lot to digest in this document that was announced yesterday. we are going to welcome your questions about any aspect of the agreement. our focus is on one of the most important issues that congress will be looking at it, other critics will be looking at, and that is verification. will we know if iran cheats? what will we do? how will be handling? is the international atomic energy agency, which is the organization task with doing this verification, is it up to the task of monitoring the deal and if not, when news to be done to augment its capabilities? to discuss these issues, we have a panel including the author of a study on this subject, tom shea. also, the chairman of our task force could not be with us today. let me say how absolutely delighted i am that we are cohosting this event with search for common ground. for those of you who don't know it, they are the pioneer in u.s.-iran diplomacy. they took the wrestlers to iran in 1998. they have done many things over the years that have helped bring us to this day. before i introduce our other speakers, i will ask ambassador bill miller to say a few words. i have known ill for about as long as i have been focusing on iran, about 20 years. at times, i have questioned his perennial optimism about u.s.-iran relations but once again, he has proven that he is more farsighted than the rest of us. so ambassador miller, if you would say a few you words? ambassador miller: thank you, barbara. you're a stalwart friend and a source of optimism. i want to thank the atlantic council for having this event today and being our gracious hosts. when we scheduled this event, we did not know the joint comprehensive plan of action would be issued just yesterday. this is an historic agreement by any standard even by standards of decades. we are pleased that this is so well-timed and the atlantic council has been able to mobilize and tell us -- and giving us the opportunity to speak today. my interest in iran began as a foreign service officer well before the revolution. this was in 1959. as it happened, this was the beginning of the iranian nuclear program. the iranian nuclear program owes almost everything to the united states. its physicists and engineers were trained in the united states. as a part of the atoms for peace program of eisenhower, we even send david lilienthal to iran to work out a comprehensive energy program. people have forgotten lil ienthal recommended that iran had 22 nuclear reactors and use its gas and oil for infrastructure. this legacy extends to this day. iran has a program that stems from that. from that time when i served in iran, i have maintained my interest. i want to quote from a letter that i carried with ramsey clark on november 6 1979, a letter from jimmy carter to ayatollah khomeini. i want to read one paragraph. i have asked both men to meet with you and to hear from you your perspective on events in i ran and problems that have arisen between our two countries. people of the united states decided to have relations with iran based on equality, mutual respect, and friendship. it has taken 36 years to carry that out. john experience part of those 36 years in prison and he is one of the optimists who believes that relations with iran make sense. now that i have a job as a senior advisor for search for common ground, for 10 years we have worked together to carry out the beginnings, the baseline for civilized relations between our countries. we have tried everything. movies poetry, art astronauts wrestlers, soccer players basketball players scholars politicians. most important scientists. people who understand the middle east. i would like to describe the beginnings of the tom shea paper which is of direct relevance today. it was clear to many of us that the agreement depends on the ability of the terms of the agreement being verified. it was the suggestion of senior members from the senate who anticipated that an agreement was pending. that the key issue before the congress would be whether the terms of an agreement with iran could be monitored effectively so that if there was any direction away from peaceful uses, it would be detected in time to take effective action. that was the baseline problem. the question then immediately arose, was the iaea good enough to fill that task. for the past year, we have been engaged in efforts to make that determination. over a year ago, after meeting with him and hearing high praise for his work for a quarter of the century in the iaea and as a scientist in american institutions, to undertake a study of the efficacy of the iaea, how it works, how it might in fact undertake the task of monitoring the agreement. he has done this job that he has done it very well. i suggest that you could go copies of the summary outside this room. i want to thank joe, the president of plowshares, for his continued efforts to bring about a rational solution to one of the great questions of arms control. we oh my stew is support over the years. i want to thank, in particular, barbara, dear friend, who brings the best of journalism and scholarship to her job. she continues to lead the way on the best approach is to iran. jim walsh is a close friend and we have struggled together in the task of bringing sense and rationality to our leadership. john lambert, of course, is a dear friend. i'm sorry that we weren't able to extract you forth with. thank you barbara. thank you tom for your good work. barbara: i neglected when we began to tell you a little bit more about bill miller. he told you he was in iran before the revolution as a foreign service officer. he was also u.s. ambassador to ukraine. he also served for 14 years on capitol hill. he was a staff director for three senate committees. tom shea search for 24 years -- served for 24 years in the iaea safeguard. develop systems for reactor fuel manufacturing plants green -- reprocessing plants. he supervised inspections of facilities in japan, china india, and other countries. after he retired from the iaea, he served at the pacific northwest national laboratory. he received his phd and was awarded the distinguished service award. i'm going to have tom shea, and talk a little bit about the paper and then i will introduce or other speakers. dr. shea: is there anyone here the new agreement? i will start off with shame on you, and get to it. having just produce the document, was only yesterday? the article i have been working on is in a state of now trying to cope with the reality of the specifics of the final agreements. starting off, 25 years ago the iaea system was overhauled after it was discovered that there were clandestine nuclear weapons programs in iraq and north korea. in effect, they compelled the international community to overhaul that system and make it relevant to the threats of today . the efforts that took place, the technologies that have been applied, the authorities that have been given, all of those things have essentially been reinvented since 1990. today, with the joint comprehensive plan of action the steps are relatively straightforward, a remarkable departure from the laissez-faire sort of attitude which more often than not prevailed when there was no opportunity for consensus. with that, there is a new agreement -- this new agreement is extraordinarily detailed in-depth and believed to be studied. it will need to be analyzed in terms of obligations commitments, resources, things of that sort. the iaea, in its application of the measures will have five challenges. first to discover any additional hidden facilities which may not have come to light. whether there are any or not, i certainly don't know. whether there is any new construction from now on. the next is to verify that the known facilities are not misused third is to make sure that the nuclear materials in the country remain unaccounted for and are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. fourth is to track imports into the country which may include bans materials, dual use materials. those things that are permitted must be used for the purposes indicated. the iaea will have to seek to verify the limitations and verify those are not exceeded as the time goes on. the question of the hidden facilities, you may prefer the term clandestine i'm. i would like you to note that iran is more than twice the size of texas, so we are dealing with a very large landmass filled with mountainous terrain and complicated arrangements. to succeed in relation to these facilities, the iaea would first need to identify suspicious location and then confirm before it makes any advances, whether or not there's any reason the best position -- there's any reason the suspicion is warranted. this is sort of like getting a warrant for someone's arrest the process of building a case and going forward. it would then define how an inspection visit would attempt to clarify the characteristics of the particular site, whether there are reasons for -- then they would secure the team required, range for the analytical services. one of its commitments is to implement an additional protocol, which is an extension to a comprehensive safeguards agreement that grew out of the situation in dprk and iraq in the early 90's. this instrument requires ratification that is currently in force in 126 countries i would saying no of these 126 countries are really problem countries. it is mostly the case of building the foundation for application. will be different -- iran will be different. they agreed to implement the protocol and eight years later to seek its ratification. the information that will be available to the iaea will be varied. in terms of the 1990's with iraq and north korea, the information that is used by the iaea now includes the following. anything that comes from safeguards, and for gate -- information gathered through inspections in the field, any activities that take in acquiring samples or knowledge. it has a program of going through open source data mining. this is a practice that has come about in the 90's and continues to be refined. it is not like the national security agency looking through e-mail but it scan through all scholarly publications and the like for related subjects and that information is sometimes revealing. it looks for export information, unknown activities. there are connections to several suppliers, particularly out of the situation in iraq where companies make things like vacuum pumps that were essential for enrichment plant and some people went to prison because of selling equipment for purposes that were clearly not consistent with the laws of the nations involved. some of those companies now have direct links to the iaea and informed them if they have requests for 200 pumps for a hospital or something crazy. we should also remember that earlier, one of the sources of information which broke the news about the enrichment plant presumably the unification of iran is not 100%, so will be a step in that direction and its own people once again those countries, iraq and north korea, the provision of intelligence information to the iaea became a common -- not completely common -- but a practice that was carried out by some degree of uniformity. there is a stipulation in the iaea statute, it is article 8.a. it says that if a state has information which it believes would be helpful to the iaea in carrying out these activities, it should make that information available. according to the director general's report, more than 10 countries have provided information on iran that is a part of the safeguards fabric at this point. the statutory permission will hopefully be an expectation and maybe even some latent culpability for states. the last thing i will invention it -- the last thing i will mention is environmental samples, which is a scientific or out of the cold war. laboratories were monitoring fallout samples from china and the soviet union to track the development of their nuclear weapons as they advanced in stages with various more modern features being incorporated. the technology has now been used by the iaea. initially it was a technology that was made available to them by, in particular america laboratories, but also others. the iaea has now established its own laboratory, paid for in part by the united states, but with german and katie -- german and canadian equipment and other countries participating. that sounds like a crimes investigation kind of a thing for you take a swipe of something and with that swipe you can put whatever comes off onto a piece of plastic. individual particles which way a million millionth of a gram will show damage. when you can identify these particles, you can pick them out and put them in an instrument that will tell what the chemical composition is, what their isotopic composition is, what the morphology of the particle is so you can get tremendous amounts of information. you have to know where to look and you have to be careful to not cross contaminate. again, you want very careful attention to the collection and analysis. this is one of the main st ays. the other is access to satellite imagery. in the time of north korea in particular, u.s. intelligence sources provide satellite imagery on north korea, which was very revealing during the board of governors discussion. today, they have commercial companies which provide cable company -- commercial companies which provide capabilities which are better than the intelligence companies that then. there is a satellite imagery analysis group that buys these images and looks at them. sometimes they have their own justification for wanting to know what is going on. this first investigation with satellite imagery cost relatively little. it is not intrusive. it is not required -- it does not require the permission of anybody and gives you information that may be helpful. if you have a suspicion, then one of the things you would want to do is to continue to look at the site as you continue to go forward with further inquiries to determine whether or not anything would happen. with the additional protocol coming into force, one of its provisions is what is called arrangement for complimentary access. these are not inspections that they are access which is complementary to inspections. they still require a process where a request is made and reviewed by the government of iran and hopefully they grant access and that long chain of events then gets put into place. the inspectors go off into their work. the agency has established channels. if they are innocent, then the report becomes part of the database on all things known about iran and its verification. if the findings are inconclusive, maybe additional member -- maybe additional measures are necessary. there is a lot of information we can analyze on ongoing basis determine how best to do this process. if the findings are suspicious, then you start to ramp up with political inquiries leading to perhaps a director general being in the conversation with a resident representative or maybe a visit to the country and maybe a discussion they advanced to the board of governors. at this point, the commission has been created is somehow informed. it's unclear yet to exactly what that process will be. in any case, the opportunities for further inquiry will become clear. for the iea to succeed it means clear priority for these tasks. if we go back to the time of iraq and north korea there is an agreement that all parties have to have. these are all identical, all according to a model. one of the provisions for a special inspection. it is not limited in any sense to any place or activity at all. the problem is that it requires consultation and, in effect, approval. the one time that it was attempted was in north korea and the north koreans refused to allow it and to this day have refused. the question of a hidden waste facility that was used to hide the fact of their processing activity acting extensively more than the declaration. whether this is a viable mechanism or not, it has been lying in a ditch. whether it ever gets resurrected, that isn't clear. what is coming now is the un security council resolution. that will be a very important document to see how it addresses the tasking, to what extent the agency is given additional authority. in particular, things like verification of centrifuge manufacturing. the actual devices are not within the scope of safeguards. there would be some extensions of authority as are appropriate. iea will require continued financial support. iaea is a member of the united nations family of organizations. it has its own membership and budget. it has a formula for assessing members in accordance with the approved budget to carry out its programs. the change that it requires -- the change requires the approval of all 35 governors. whether all 35 would be enough --forcing them to a vote is not usually the way the agency would operate. the american perspective on how to make this perspective succeed is something on the order of 50 million, which seems like a nice round number, but it is much smaller -- i can't say exactly. in relation to the police force washington d.c., i think it is very modest. in addition, technological support must be continued. there are today member states voluntary support programs. the american program is still the largest. its current funding is about $15 million per year or so. without their -- without that there is no hope that you can solve problems. scientists are engineers are really smart guys. -- scientists and engineers are really smart guys. the questions of finding a facility in a place twice the size of texas will require every bit of attention it can get. financial support, political support that is so amazing to me. the most amazing thing to me about this agreement is that the coalition has held together with germany throughout the several years of negotiation. i can only hope that that will continue to be the case. with that, i will stop my prepared remarks and respond to many questions. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. i'm going to introduce other speakers now. we are very lucky that we have a representative of the administration who has just joined us. he has served previously as senior adviser to vice president joe biden for nuclear security. he has worked at the monterey institute. he is the co-author of deadly arsenals, tracking weapons of mass distraction. let me introduce the other members of our panel who will, after john speaks. jim walsh is an expert in international security and a research associate at m.i.t. and their security studies program. his research and writings focus on international security and topics involving nuclear weapons and the middle east. he has testified before the senate on nuclear terrorism. he is one of the handful of americans who has traveled to both iran and north korea. he served as executive director of managing the atom project at harvard universities -- harvard university. he asked how to both harvard and m.i.t.. he received his phd from m.i.t.. last, but definitely not least john bloomberg is the class of 1955 professor of middle eastern studies at the u.s. naval academy. he has had a 34 year career in the u.s. foreign service, mostly in the middle east and islamic africa. in 2009, he came out of retirement to serve as deputy assistant secretary focused on iran. he helped craft some of the language that president obama has used. he has to the u.s. government have to speak to iran. he served in iran before the revolution. he was a guest of the ayatollah for 444 days. he has also authored many books on iran. first, i am going to ask john to come up. talk about verification. is this deal as full proof as we can make it? then we will have a panel discussion and take your questions. >> thank you, barbara. she was obviously not -- she did not need higher brain function to assemble the people that are going to be on this panel today. i am on her to be in the group. what i will do for a few minutes is just talk about the deals we have negotiated, and why we believe it is very much a good deal and in our security interest. then i will talk about the support for the iaea. we recognize that is a critical component. we have high confidence that the verification provision of this deal will work, because we are committed to them. and because of the agency's capabilities. we are very thankful they are there. very basically and briefly, this is a good deal. this is a very good deal. if you had told us that we have not only met and exceeded all of the inch marks that we laid out in luzon, we would have been skeptical. iran's responsibility to abide is in perpetuity. it is not limited. their requirement to abide by the treaty and not to see acquire, or pursue nuclear weapons is permanent. we have the ability to verify this under this agreement. sanctions relief does not take place until iran comes back into compliance. there is no big pot of money that they get the day they get home. they have to do a lot of very difficult things that they have been unwilling to do for many decades to get sanctions relief. once that is achieved, we have a significant. of -- we have a significant amount of time where sanctions can snap back into place. if you read through the documentation, the president can resent his waiver of sanctions with a stroke of a pen. we have the authority under this agreement to call for a un security council resolution, and through its exercise of its veto snap the sanctions back into place. we don't need russia or china. and they cannot use their veto to block the reimposition of sanctions over this time. there are a lot of people saying a is getting all of the three boards. -- all of these rewards. over the last 10 years they have paid a significant penalty. this is a price that iran has had to pay because they violated their legal commitment. this agreement gives them a pathway to come back into compliance. and therefore, once they can come back into compliance, they can do what other states can do. but in their case, it will be limited for a significant amount of time. in a way that other nonproliferation treaty members are not limited. they are paying a price for their behavior, and i think it is one that is very significant. we talk a lot about the four potential pathways that iran has to acquire nuclear weapons. all four pathways are cut off. their uranium facility will be monitored in live camera fees, remote access monitoring, radio identification, we will know everything that goes on at that facility. there will be no uranium enrichment facility. no uranium is permitted -- no nuclear material is permitted for a significant. of time. the iaea will have permanent access to that facility. the reactor at our rock -- the reactor at iraq will be redesigned so that it cannot produce weapons usable plutonium. we get to help design the fuel. we get to verify and inspected 24/7. if iran even attempts to try and misuse declared facilities we will know in days, more likely within hours. the international alarm system will be functioning. what is very important here is the sneak out scenario. we believe given the inspection capabilities and the knowledge this agreement will give us, that our ability to detect undeclared nuclear activity or facility is greatly increased as a result of the iaea rights under the protocol. it is extremely unlikely that iran could build anything of significance and begin to operate it without being detected. could they have a small facility where some guys strong pictures of a nuclear weapon? we do not suggest that this plan will prevent any and all minor activity that could be related to a possible nuclear interest. what we can say is nothing that iran could achieve if the many closer to building a nuclear bomb. and then anything of significance -- and that anything of significance but if they tried it, we would be able to detect that facility. the iaea would have the right to go there. if iran refused access, they would be, by definition, in violation. we don't claim -- is this verification plan full proof? iran can't get any closer to a nuclear weapon without us knowing about it. that is the standard that we are trying to achieve. it is one that is well within their ability to implement. iaea was the organization that got it right in iraq. the iaea, when it was a ledge that iraq was seeking weapons in africa, they got it right. to ensure that they will be able to do this job effectively, the united states will be working with other member states to ensure that they have the technology, resources, and the people needed to do this job without draining resources from other important responsibilities. that will take money, but quite frankly it is a bargain compared to what it tries -- what it takes to surveye iranil on our own. we will ensure, as will our partners, that the iaea has the resources it needs to carry out this job. it is only because of the work of people like tom and the inspectors doing this job that we will be able to have an agreement like this that we believe will stand the test of time. with that, i'm happy to turn things over. [applause] >> thank you so much. very useful remarks. i am actually going to start with a question. then we will get back into the technical discussion. john i wanted to ask for your reflections on this agreement as somebody who has unique experience in iran. you have written an excellent piece for the cairo review about the ghost of history. to what extent are we exercising these ghosts? knowing iran as you do, do you think they will implement the still faithfully? did you think it does represent some kind of turning point for the regime? >> thank you, barbara. let me also thank ambassador miller who undertook a humanitarian issue back in 1979. what we are seeing now is essentially president carter's letter getting a response after 36 years. we are also seeing president obama's outreach efforts which he began as senator obama in 2007, with the opposition of then senator hillary clinton -- those efforts also bearing fruit. it comes down to the word that you hear so much is trust and mistrust. what you hear from the opponents in both capitals is very similar. you hear we cannot trust them. you can interchange the we and the them according to where you are. this is a real issue. i will just give you one quick example of this. a few years ago, the iranians announced they were ready to switch on their nuclear power station. the project goes back to the 1970's. people tell me at the time they bought obsolete german equipment to build this thing in the mid- 1970's. in 2010, they were ready to switch it on. someone asked then secretary of state hillary clinton, what do you think about this. she said we are not worried about it. we are well aware. it is not something that we are concerned about. then reporters went back and asked an iranian official what do you think about this. what do you think about the secretary's statement? the answer was i don't know what it is, but i know there is a trick somewhere. the americans just don't say that. we have seen variations of this phenomenon in both places. in the u.s. we have seen what i call the rise of the geneticists. we have heard things like deception is in iranian dna. well geneticists talk about dna. we have heard something similar from a very distinguished retired military officer who was now the president of one of the great universities in this country. he talked about persian imperialism is in iranian dna. where does this stuff come from? where did people start being geneticists? if i were talking about nuclear physics then to talk about genetics. to quote lyndon johnson -- to paraphrase lyndon johnson -- he once said i don't know much, but i know the difference between chicken soup and chicken salad. he used in our dear expression. [laughter] when i hear people pretending to be geneticists, you know what to do. you hear it again. we cannot trust them. if you go to iran events in this town, you will hear things like well we know the iranians are working for a nuclear bomb, and the question is how do you know. the answer is because they are bad people, and variations of that. getting back to the answer this way -- this issue of trust people say and ask me, do you trust the iranians. what i say is no, because to quote the president, you don't make agreements like this with your friends. you don't spend two years and 100 pages with a country that you have the media trust with. -- you have immediate trust with. but as someone who practice diplomacy for 30 years, when i hear these comments, here is where i come out. diplomacy is basically making them perfect agreements with people you neither like nor trust. imperfect agreements with perhaps dubious people. that essentially is what kept us safe in the cold war for 40 years. that is what this agreement is about. it is not about trust. it is about verification. >> i am going to ask all three of our other speakers to look specifically at the verification issue. as ambassador miller pointed out, it began in 1950 nine, and the united states is largely responsible. we supported the idea of 22 civilian power directors for iran. there have been fits and starts. it started again during the iraq war. are you all confident that iran is satisfied with the level that it has reached for now? that it is satisfied with the agreement and will carry it out safely? and that his object really is not a weapon? -- and that it is really not a weapon? >> we believe that our run has determined -- we believe that iran has determined that it is in their interest. we are not leaving that to trust. the verification provision will give us the ability to determine if they are going to comply. that is true in day 20 as it is in day 2020. in terms of their satisfaction, satisfaction is an emotion. what they are required to do is lay out a detailed research and development plans and to declare to the iaea what their plans are. those plans have to be consistent with the spirit and the letter of the agreement. because of the details of the plan that we have and that will be provided to the iaea, we have very high confidence that the plan's strictly defined progression, that they are satisfied. where they will go into the future, is for them to thesdecide. in some ways it comes into a basic principle. under the treaty they are obligated not to seek or pursue in any way nuclear weapons. if we believe that they are out of compliance with that, we can find ourselves right back in the situation that we inherited when we took office in 2009 and that led to this negotiation and culminated in this agreement. >> let me just ask you about the pmd question. they have to satisfy the iaea by december 15? >> they have to satisfy the iaea by october. the iaea must provide a report by december. >> is there a date in october? >> i will have to take a look. this situation has been lingering because the iranians felt they would have to give access and that we would use that to impose further sanctions. we have found a formula which says if you abide by the principles of access, and the iaea is satisfied, and that five years from now they cannot say you did not need to go into the facility back then, then we are prepared to move forward with this. without that commitment and follow through to access, there will be no sanctions released and we will not have a deal. >> your thoughts on the iranian program and whether they will implement it. >> i think it is important to step back and put this in some sort of context. this is not our first rodeo. this is not the first time we have wrestled with the problems of verification. we have done this for decades. we have had agreements with bad actors. we find ourselves now with that decades of experience in a situation where, like with every arms control agreement, you are trying to identify how risky this is, and what is our level of confidence. it seems to me the first place to start is where the director of national intelligence begins. he says iran had a program which it ended in 2003. they have not made a decision to pursue nuclear weapons. every time you hear that iran is racing to the bone, that is in direct opposition to what the u.s. intelligence community has resolved. i think it is actually quite -- when you compare the other verification challenges we have had, this is a pretty good situation to be dealing with. it is the most-watched country in the world. i feel pretty good about it. it will be odd for iran to negotiate an agreement in which there was more intrusive inspection. and then cheat. that would be a pretty dumb thing to do. you would not open it up and then cheat. now, that may change. the regime may change. what we are doing now is locking them into a situation he for they have made the decision to pursue that nuclear weapon. i don't want to go on for too long. your remarks were right on. understandably the american public and members of congress have an idea about verification frozen in their minds that goes to the 1990's. obviously the iraq situation is very different. that is the way people think about it. as you suggested, this is not your father's iaea anymore. i remember what my first computer was like in the 1990's. we have tools. science and technology is available to us that the him agency -- that the agency could not have imagined them. the way the regime -- it has been dynamic. we responded to the crisis by writing new rules that are stronger. crisis, iteration, improvement. that has been the story of iaea. i think on-site inspection will be critical. one of the things that the snowden revelations would suggest, is that the u.s. has robust intelligence capabilities. there are lots of ways to do verifications. you might have for the story of the overanxious lawyer who was defending a client accused of fighting off -- fighting off the finger of a man in a bar fight. a witnesses on the stand. were you in the room and this happens? did you see my client bite the finger. yet you are up. ?why are you so confident that he did that? the person replied that i saw him spit it out. that is a way of illustrating that there are lots of ways to find things out. the most powerful of which will be the iaea. >> i would like to talk a little bit about how verification strategies have improved. what are the methods now used? >> i want to come back to the pmd's for a moment. in 2011 one of the papers obtained a list of 10 areas where iran had allegedly investigated aspects of developing nuclear weapons. they included design work, high explosives for triggering, fusing, and now the director general has traveled to tehran a week ago and has come back with an agreement that will allow the iaea

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