his mission. mr. o'keefe: yes, please, sir? dana: thank you. dana goward with the rmt foundation. a number of senior dhs officials have identified the susceptibility of the signal to jamming and have called it a single point of critical infrastructure. can you tell us about dhs's efforts to limit that the vulnerability? sec. johnson: i am not in on a particular topic. i know we spend a lot of time -- we have an assistant secretary for critical infrastructure, and we spent a lot of time with critical infrastructure and those businesses we consider critical infrastructure on single points of failure and the like. we are in a collaborative discussion and exercise with critical infrastructure on these types of vulnerabilities. mr. o'keefe: yes, sir, way in the back? mike: mike with senator mark warren's office. as you mentioned, dhs has the responsibility for protecting the government. what would you say in terms of the authorities that you have? i know you got some last year, but in terms of the department's ability to implement countermeasures, issue directives to agencies who may not be up to the minimum standard in terms of cyber security, could you use more -- sec. johnson: legally, each agency and department has responsibility for their own system. legally. i stress that my colleagues. we have the responsibility for the overall protection of the federal civilian dot-gov world as part of a baseline. as i see it, and we see it where we need help in protecting cyber security is making expressed legal authority to receive information from other departments in government. we encounter an agency lawyer, i used to be one. i am not sure i can share that with you. that is sensitive. we encounter that. we want the expressed legal authority to make it plain that when we utilize things like einstein, einstein 3a, those other agencies are authorized to share information with us, to give us access to our network. as i mentioned in my prepared remarks, i issued what is called a binding operational directive and may pursuant to some authorities we got late last year, which was quite helpful because that basically is a direction to another agency, here is your vulnerability, you must tell us how you are cleaning up your act within a certain number of days. that plus educating people at the top of the agencies, i think, was pretty effective. this was a good exercise. we will do a lot more of these. we saw that agencies were able to clean up 60% of the vulnerabilities we identified in a very short period of time. mr. o'keefe: yes, sir, way in the far end. >> [indiscernible] is there a difference in the way the government has responded to the two incidents? and how we respond to future attacks? sec. johnson: good question. i think the only thing i could say is that there are many different factors that go into whether you are at a point at which you can, and should, identify the actors who you think hacked you. as i said in my statement, the dni said we have a leading suspect, but we are not prepared to identify who that is. the sony situation was a different type of situation. there are a lot of different factors that go into the calculations. it was in many other respects a different type of episode. a different character, a different nature. mr. o'keefe: yes, sir? >> i am from the council of scientific society presidents. can you clarify in verbal form what constitutes the difference between somebody invading from outside the country, that we consider this an act of war, versus somebody doing more damage in the cyber realm? identifying the actors, knowing what to do about it -- are we going to leave this gray area undone, or will we start formulating something concrete around it? sec. johnson: from my dod lawyer days, my view is that when you are talking about overseas acts, when you are talking about acts that involve state actors, it is less significant whether we characterize something as an act of war. more significant is the response be proportionate. not necessarily of the same kind, but proportionate. that is a basic law of war tenant. so, i don't know that we necessarily need to put a label "act of war" on something in order to respond proportionately. but i do believe that appropriate responses are important. mr. o'keefe: we have time for a couple more. mr. secretary, do you have time for two more? sec. johnson: sure. >> i am with the naval post graduate school, and i had the privilege of working when they created the whole i.t. thing at the dod. what is your relationship to cyber command at the nsa? more importantly, does it affect all government, or just you? in the defense department, we were buying computers, aircraft carriers. sec. johnson: my acquisition reform is for dhs. >> so you have not done it for all government? sec. johnson: no, i am just dhs. i'm not all government. >> i get that. but the question is so much a part of -- sec. johnson: we can, and have when it comes to cyber security at dhs, recommend various cyber security tools for other agencies. that is part of our mission. sometimes we even buy them for them. if you are asking but dod acquisitions, don't get me started. [laughter] that is a different story. >> but think about the size and the time. and what the cost could be as you have to keep repeating it. you want everybody to be doing that, not just you. sec. johnson: there are smart ways to do acquisitions in my view. not beyond our reach. i am a big believer in not necessarily going with the biggest, most expensive tool. sometimes the actor who is a little smaller, leaner hungrier, can do the job better. i know that as a service provider. we, you know, my department is only 12 years old. in many respects, we are far too stovepiped, the way the department of defense used to be. then they had goldwater-nichols in 1986, almost 40 years after their creation. i am trying to get dhs to a place where we, and a more collaborative fashion, function in terms of our acquisition decisions and budget decisions. in a more centralized way early in the cycle, earlier in the process. now whenever 13th year, not wait 40 years. that is what our unity of effort initiative is all about. mr. o'keefe: final question right here. ann: my name is ann. i am formerly with the office of inspector general. i have experienced both the dot-mil and dot-gov systems. however, i may be dissenting from the sublime to the ridiculous. you mentioned private sector partners and gateways, and how people tried to intrude upon various gateways. i wondered if dhs has communication with ebay. it appears ebay has numerous attempts at spearfishing, and i myself was a victim of that a couple of days ago. sec. johnson: if we are not, then we probably should be. that is my answer your question. [laughter] mr. o'keefe: on behalf of csis and all of us, thank you much for being with us. sec. johnson: thank you. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] narrator: on the next "rushing to internal" patrick tucker will discuss cyber threats and u.s. technological vulnerabilities -- on the next "washington journal ." and bloomberg news editor at large and columnist michael reagan talks about the greek debt crisis, instability in chinese markets, and how this impacts american investors. as always, we will take your calls, and you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. >> this week on "first ladies: influence an image," we learn about lucretia garfield and mary arthur nicole right -- mcelroy. lucretia garfield returned to ohio when her husband was assassinated to ensure his legacy by making their home into an early version of the presidential library. chester arthur, a widower, becomes president, and his sister fills the role of first lady and establishes white house social etiquette used by future presidents for decades. c-span's original series "first ladies: influence and image," examining the role of the women who filled the role of first lady. american history tv on c-span3. narrator: next weekend on c-span's "road to the white house," two nature political events in iowa, and we're the only place you can watch or listen to them in their entirety. friday night at 8:00 eastern we'll be live in cedar rapids for the democratic party hot of fame -- hall of fame dinner. all they saturday beginning at 11:00 eastern, we will be live in aims for the family leadership summit where nine leading republican presidential candidates are scheduled to speak. on c-span, c-span radio, and www.c-span.org. "road to the white house 2016," we take you there. >> with iran nuclear negotiations still ongoing in vienna next, a look at some of the terms being discussed by secretary of state john kerry and other representatives from the p5 plus one. they discussed the current state of talks and regional implications of a possible deal as negotiators work toward a monday deadline. from the heritage foundation this is an hour and 15 minutes. >> we welcome those who join us on all of these occasions on our heritage.org website. i would ask everyone in the house to make the courtesy check that cell phones are muted. it's always appreciated. internet viewers are always welcome to send questions or comments throughout the presentation by simply e-mailing us at speaker@heritage.org. and we will post the program on our webpage. dr. brooks is a senior fellow for national security of shares -- affairs. he served as assistant secretary of defense in the george w. bush administration. he worked with the central intelligence agency as well as at the state department. please join me in welcoming dr. peter brooks. [applause] dr. brooks: thank you john. i guess it's good afternoon now. welcome to the heritage foundation. i guess the deadline, like the red line is a deadline except when it is not. it seems we've blown through another "deadline" with iran and the latest round of nuclear talks. news reports from the and there are still in number of rough patches, and that talks will go until the end of the week -- maybe. these include hot button issues such as sanctions relief for iran, research and development the inspection and verification regime and the question about iran's prior work on a nuclear warhead, among others. to couple kid matters further iran is pushing for punitive sanctions to be lifted on their ballistic missile program -- to complicate matters further. as if that is not enough, tehran is also asking for an end to the weapons embargo put on iran, which is troubling considering its support for terrorist group hezbollah and the syrian regime and its regional aspirations. current legislation requires congress get not a 30-day look at the deal if they reach one but 60 days instead for briefings and hearings for the pack can be implemented by the administration. getting a nuclear deal with iran does not address the plenitude of other problems we have a tehran, including its middle east meddling and it sponsorship of international terrorism. there's a good reason to be alarmed that the deal we get in vienna will be a bad deal, especially if the united states and partners came to iran to close a deal. to investigate this further, we are joined today by the hudson institute's michael durand, ambassador robert joseph, and heritage foundation's jim phillips who look at the risks, rewards, or ruin that might come from an agreement. let me introduce the panelist in more detail before we get started as our time is limited today. ambassador joseph holds the position us senior scholar at the national institute for public policy. until march 20 -- 2007, he was under secretary of state. dr. joseph served on the national security council as a special assistant to the president and director for proliferation strategy counter proliferation, and homeland defense. he was the professor of national security studies and director and founder for the city for counter proliferation research at the national defense foundation. earlier, he was commissioned to ambassadors of u.s.-russian commission for testing. deputy assistant secretary for arms control policy, nuclear policy and planning officer at the u.s. mission at nato. he was also an assistant professor of international relations, strategic studies at the fletcher school of law and diplomacy tulane university college p region phillips is senior research fellow for middle eastern affairs and foreign policy studies at the heritage foundation, a veteran of war and policy specialist who has written widely on security issues and international terrorism. he has testified many times before congress on middle east acuity issues, middle east terrorism and the iranian issue. >> good afternoon. it is always great to be back here at heritage. i appreciate the invitation to speak here today. i have been speaking and writing on this subject for more than two years. i have watched our negotiation position evolved in one direction. this has not been a matter of compromise, give and take of normal diplomatic negotiations. this is concession after concession on both the major and minor issues being negotiated. since the announcement in 2013, the outcome was very clear. iran would be accepted as a nuclear threshold state. of course, the nuclear ballistic missile force would not be limited in any way. these were explicit concessions acknowledged by the white house but explained away in the most convoluted fashion. no longer would iran be compelled to abandon its enrichment program, only constrained to the breakout time to build the bomb that they can deliver on a ballistic missile. these constraints would be removed after the agreement expires. and the subsequent rounds of talks, other concessions have been signaled in the media by secretary kerry and other administration sources, most often through friendly reporters. you are all likely familiar with these. now the responsibility of the iaea, no longer would iran have to come clean on these activities before an agreement goes in affected the head of the iaea. once considered essential for verification instead we now have managed access and an access mechanism that will delay inspection of suspect sites. the phasing of sanctions are relief that the administration once emphasized as a guard against iranian cheating have shown to be more words than substance. the president himself has talked about a huge signing bonus, $50 billion. moscow has been direct. there will be no reimposition of sanctions. i long concluded ago that the only real barrier is the willingness of iran to take yes for an answer. they will agree to certain conditions such as not building buildings they have never intended to build. instead, iran will be limited to operating centrifuges but also allowed to maintain and store other machines that could be brought on line quickly. research and development will go on. yes, it is better that the centrifuges are no being connected during the tenure agreement, but that does not make this a good deal. this is unquestionably, based on what we know, a bad deal. this important distinction often gets lost in the rhetoric. everyone wants an outcome. a large majority of americans when a diplomatic outcome. of course they do. the next question is would the same majority support a bad deal. i think the likely answer is a resounding no. what are the metrics to judge the outcome, whether this is a good or bad deal? they are straightforward. here are five. does the agreement deny iran nuclear weapons capability? a long-standing declared goal of the united states and international community. does the agreement prevent iran from building a nuclear weapon in a short amount of time? does the agreement extend the breakout time in a meaningful way? is the agreement effectively verifiable? is there a meaningful phased relief of sanctions and snap back provisions? the answer to each of these questions is no. it is a reality becoming apparent across party lines. how did we get into this mess? it is a mess. the answer is clear. the administration has violated every rule of negotiating practice. the basic tenants of negotiating 101. instead of increasing pressure on tehran for more sanctions they really sanctions. they do this to keep iran at the table. remember, it was these very sanctions that brought them to the table. instead of making clear to iran that you run needed an agreement more than we the administration has demonstrated the opposite, that it is desperate for an agreement. a desperation that iran's negotiators have exploited to the fullest in the demand for ending the arms embargo. instead of insisting on full compliance, the administration has in effect become iran's advocate and lawyer. reinterpreting the provisions of the agreement to keep the negotiations going. instead of insisting that the word deadline means deadline the administration has allowed iran to squeeze further concessions each time the latest deadline approaches and then passes. most important, instead of holding the line on those key issues that would actually determine whether the agreement is good or bad, whether it advances u.s. security interest or undermines him -- interests or undermines them. any agreement that allows iran to continue to build its ballistic missile force while simultaneously permitting iran to maintain its nuclear capability will undermine the u.s. national security interests as well as those of our friends and allies in the region and beyond. iran will almost certainly become the preeminent power in the gulf. with the u.s. pullout from iraq and all down from afghanistan there will be few who oppose iran's further expansion. in the past decade iran's malevolent presence has grown in syria, iraq, and yemen. this suggestion that a nuclear deal will lead to a more moderate iran is your fantasy. all you have to do is listen to what the iranians are saying. for me, because i approach these issues from a nonproliferation perspective another strategic consequence of that agreement is the increased prospect for nuclear proliferation. that is one likely result of iran's greater capacities and influence reinforced by a growing skepticism among our allies about the u.s. ability and result to defend their interests, will be decisions by other gulf states to acquire nuclear threshold capabilities similar to iran's. saudi arabia has already said openly that it will seek what iran is permitted. how can then we say no to the saudi's and others who want to in rich or perhaps reprocess -- inenrich or reprocess. the administration has undercut one and most important tools dating back to the carter administration. finally, it is united states and other p5+1 members have excluded missiles the message to other rogue states is that we are not serious for imposing costs for missile or for asian. -- missile proliferation. this could cause others to acquire missiles as a means of delivery. for iran, it could encourage closer cooperation with north korea on the transfer of missile technology and nuclear weapons technology as well. with tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief for iran's military -- in sanctions relief, iran's military will have more opportunity. a bad agreement will result in a less safe world, for the region, israel, and the united states. the administration still clings to the old talking points you've heard them in the last couple of days, that it will not accept a bad deal, that it will walk away if iran does meet its demands, and that no one yet knows how this will turn out because nothing is agreed until all is agreed. let me say that if you find these statements credible, given all that we do know, i think you are living in the bizarro world. i concluded that the supreme leader was less likely to distort the status of the negotiations to his public than the white house was to the american public. the american people, as president obama has said, deserve the truth. let's ensure that they get it. thank you very much. >> thank you, ambassador. jim. >> the emerging deal has significant risks that could dangerously undermine national u.s. security either directly in terms of the nuclear technologies and capacities that that deal grants iran or indirectly in terms of the regional implications to the deal. i would like to focus my comments primarily on the regional implications how some of our allies in the region look at this deal. although the administration entered the negotiations pledging that these negotiations would cut off the path of iran to a nuclear weapon, it has become clear that this is little more than a dip account -- than a diplomatic speedbump that will only delay, if not give iran iran opportunities to cheat on a new set of arrangements. -- delay if not give, iran opportunities to cheat on a new set of agreements -- arrangements. once restrictions expire, it will be easier for iran to cross that threshold. their infrastructure is largely intact, and they are well on their way to the building and industrial uranium enrichment capacity. this fact is not lost on our allies or our friends who are willing to take up insurance to explore their own nuclear options. there could be a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world today. they see a perspective deal would allow iran to maintain an huge infrastructure, facilities built in violation of their commitments, and this deal would legitimize the operations while imposing very few penalties on iran. that sets up a dangerous situation for potential proliferators in the future. incredibly, the administration is offering the ayatollahs in iran today uranium in richmond and wrenches -- enrichment arrangements that it denied back in the 1970's. for more than five decades washington has opposed the spread of nuclear technologies including uranium enrichment, even for its allies. it should not make an acceptance -- acceptance for iran. -- an exception for iran. they can renege on their concessions if they decide to do so. sanctions will take time to be reimpose, if they can be reimposed at all. the russians and the chinese are sure to bring objections that they see it is in the interest -- their interest to do that. this snap back provision is more of a myth than a legitimate institutional arrangement. the elephant in the room that the obama administration downplays is iran's long history of violating previous agreements. the administration says it provides for an unobtrusive inspection regime, but iran has walked away from some of those commitments. saddam hussein's iraq was subject to sanctions, but frequently blocked them until he was ousted in 2003. the administration has sought to ease anxieties by stressing the role of the international atomic energy agency, but the iaea only has access to declared facilities, and missed the covert program before it was revealed by a run in 2002. president obama insists that -- was revealed by iran opposition in 2002. they signed a deal in 2013 trumpeting it as a great agreement. today, that regime continues to use gas against its own people with little fear of consequences. the administration's acceptance of that flawed arrangement and its refusal to enforce its own red lines when it is confronted by cheating is an alarming president, not least for our regional allies who fear a similar dynamic in the iran deal. given the administration's recent actions, playing lawyer and explaining away violations failures to convert uranium, as noted in today's washington post editorial is another flashing warning sign for our allies that were undermined confidence in the united states and confidence that it will take strong action if iran violates the agreement. another major problem is that it is clear -- not clear that iran will be required to come clean on the military dimensions of its nuclear program. pmd and iaea parlance, that's because it's impossible to develop a clear picture of the breakout time if you don't know what is the base of iranian actions from which it will break out. the nuclear deal also gives iran billions of dollars in sanctions relief, and economic shot in the arm that will bolster the most hostile and dangerous regime in the middle east and bolster a threat to the united states and its allies. iran would get a 30-50 billion dollars signing bonus, and would pocket between 130-140,000,000,000 in revenues. overall, iran would benefit the benefits of greater oil revenues once the sanctions are lifted. iran's oil ministry expects that iran will eventually double its oil exports from 1.2 million barrels a day today to about 2.3 million barrels a day in the future, and that will give it much greater financial resources to finance terrorism and subversion abroad and its brutal repression at home. the economic payoff of a nuclear deal would also help to ron the regional balance of power in its favor and could -- help iran shift the regional balance of power in its favor. allies in the region are also alarmed that washington has backed off its red lines. they are fading to pink. meanwhile, iran is adding new red lines and the supreme leader last month added a set of red lines that would make a deal and possible. some have interpreted these pronouncements as a bargaining tactic but it could also spell in the long run a death knell of the talks. the supreme leader's intervention goes beyond good cop bad cop. it goes right to the problem with the regime, the fact that you have a government negotiating with the west that could be at any point overruled undermined and done with an end run around by the supreme leader. he reflects the interests of the revolution and that tension between the logic of the revolution and the logic of the state has made iran a prickly case for negotiating with. we have seen that time and again in trying to negotiate with iran. i predict that if there is an agreement signed that may not be the end of negotiations, because the supreme leader will have new red lines about how to implement the agreement. i would say that this supreme leader may be so adamantly opposed to any kind of flexibility that a good deal with iran may be impossible to get until after he has left the stage. from the viewpoint of many u.s. allies and friends in the region , this agreement looks like a looming disaster for their interests. israel, with which is in range of missiles has stated they have the right to launch a preventative strike if the agreement or fails -- fails to give adequate safeguards. prime minister netanyahu has warned that this agreement is paving the path to a nuclear weapon. for israel, this is an x essential issue. -- this is an extra important issue. it is a one bomb country while a run consisting greater damage. this rhetoric does not look well for the future. israelis argued that the administration has played a strong hand. as the ambassador said relieving sanctions, downplaying the military option, and both of these -- the effect of both of these is to release pressure on iran to not only come up with an acceptable agreement, but come up with any kind of agreement by deadlines. the more it digs in its heels, the more it is rewarded. israel is not alone. saudi arabia, whose kingdom boycotted the white house summit at camp david in may as a sign of unhappiness, is also unhappy with the trajectory of nuclear negotiations. it is medically or that it will demand every concession iran receives, to build civilian reactors that could become the basis of a full-fledged nuclear weapons program. saudis fear the the results of the negotiations, so they are hedging their bets, seeking better relations with moscow and beijing, and making plans for their own nuclear program. the united arab emirates has greater restrictions put on their enrichment programs than what it looks like iran will be able to gain. they may want to renegotiate their arrangements. this agreement may open the doors to a nuclear arms race. after restrictions on enrichment are east, iran will be in a better position to make that final sprint. even if you assume that iran will not cheat on the agreement, will not build a bomb after the greatest restrictions are east prudent governments that fear iran are bound to take out insurance policies in the form of their own nuclear programs and this ginsburg cascades of proliferation that would include saudi arabia, possibly turkey, egypt, united arab emirates, maybe algeria. that would lead to a multipolar middle east with each country on a hair trigger because they will be lacking secure second strike capabilities, a use it or lose it situation. if you think the middle east is volatile now, just wait. even some former senior officials involved in formulating the administration's policy on the nuclear issue last month warned in an open letter organized by the washington institute for near east policy that an emerging deal may fall short of meeting the administration's own standards. the bottom line is that the obama administration now has an agreement in principle with the regime that has few principles except to expand its power and export its revolution. this emerging deal has already weakened alliances with important friends in the region. it has undermined the perceived reliability of the united states as an ally. it has reduced influence and puts iran in a position to expand its own influence. it weakens long-standing nonproliferation goals, and it could contribute to a very dangerous multipolar middle east. the picture is not pretty. >> mike. michael: thanks for having me. thank you for coming. i can't add any happiness and sunshine to this picture. i will confine my remarks to the region and take up on some things jim said. the allies of the united states in the middle east disagree about many consequential things. for the last 36 years there is one thing they could all agree on. that is that the united states is the guarantee the one who guarantees order -- the one who guarantees order. as the allies have watched as the united states negotiates this agreement, they have come to the conclusion that president obama has shed this responsibility. he has taken the united states out of the game of containing iran. the president doesn't admit that. he continues to talk in those terms. when he brought everybody to camp david summit here last month, there was a lot of newspaper commentary by supporters that talked in those terms. i will get back to that in a minute. if you look carefully at what the president said, he has in fact gotten out of the iran containment business. the me talk about the concern of the allies, what they have been thinking as they watch these negotiations, and a couple of the arguments that the administration has put out to try to quell the concerns of the allies, and why the allies find these arguments completely unsatisfactory. then a couple words about the consequences of all this. so, there are four trends that the allies have seen while washing this negotiation -- while watching this negotiation. the first one is american retreat. they negotiation -- the history of negotiation has been the history of u.s. concessions, starting with the interim deal itself. the interim deal was traded -- temporary and reversible concessions. the united states agreed to a sunset clause meaning this would only be a temporary agreement, and conceded the right to enrichment, recognize iran is a threshold power. it did that as a first step. in return for that massive concession, they got an agreement by the iranians to to a rarely -- to ao reduce the pace of their program. that is just one example. we know the other ones that have been mentioned. the secure facility, and on and on. when the allies look at this, it is troubling enough to see the terms of the agreement the results from this capitulation. the spectacle of the capitulation is equally unnerving. it makes them wonder if they are in a pinch with respect to a rand, will the united states actually be there at their side. -- with respect to iran will the united states actually be there at their side. it undermines confidence in u.s. resolve. the second issue trend they see , is this conceding permanent concessions for temporary ones i the rainy and's embodied in the sunset clause in the agreement. -- embodied in -- concessions for temporary ones that are embodied in the sunset clause in the agreement. united states is out of the business of containing iran, and now managing its rise. it around is going to be a nuclear power and we will manage its rise. the recognition of the inevitable rise of a rand suggest -- iran, suggests the united states is pulling back and iran is filling the vacuum. this is compounded by the third trend, the unsettling nature of these developments, the new normal that we have seen it emerge over the last 18 months in relations between the united states and iran. we used to talk about iran as an enemy. we still pay lip service to that. we now engaged iran in a way that one doesn't engage with one's enemies. as was mentioned, we are serving as iran's lawyer in these negotiations, rather than holding their feet to their fire -- the fire. we are coming to their defense against our allies who are criticizing them. we watched a severe deterioration in relations between united states and israel, saudi arabia. it's been more visible with respect to the israelis because i ministered netanyahu has been vocal about expressing his concerns with the iran deal. all of the gulf allies in the region have exactly the same feelings about this that prime minister netanyahu has. they decided to deal with the problem differently. they decided to grin and bear it and wait the president out and be polite. and not openly express their opposition. if you heard quiet, off the record discussions by the leaders of the arab states, you would see that they are saying the same thing as the israelis. the greatest achievement of the obama administration in the middle east is that it has brought saudi arabia and israel together faster than anyone would have thought possible. this friction with our allies contrasts with the images we see it on our screens daily of the smiling john kerry and foreign minister of iran giving the impression of a new era of friendship between the two countries. the administration insists that this is just an arms control negotiation, only about the nuclear issue, and is not looking to build on this for anything larger. we keep hearing credible reports about much wider discussions between iran and the united states, the islamic state and a rack, stabilizing syria, yemen and so on and so forth. our allies are left to wonder how wide is his cooperation. what are the long-term plans of the united states. is the united states actually thinking of iran as a partner for regional security. that leads to the most important thing, the lack -- the total lack of response -- the dog that did not bark in the story of the last 2-3 years is the absence of any attempt by the united states to impose costs on iran for its intervention in iraq, syria, and yemen. there is concern about what iran is doing, the plumbing iraqi militias in syria -- deploying iraqi militias in syria, and so on. let alone actions designed to impose costs. on the contrary, when the iranians were running sorties in iraq with their air force, and john kerry was asked about it he said it was a good thing. those kind of statements by the united states lauding intervention by iran in neighboring countries send shivers down the spine of our traditional allies. a couple of words about the arguments the administration is making and why they are inadequate, and then we will turn it over for questions. in the interest of time, i will hit two quickly to actually, i will hit three. -- in the interest of time, i will hit two quickly. actually, i will hit three. the development of a mutual dependence between the united states and the iranians will change the calculus in tehran. as bob said, this really is a bizarro world. there is no reason to believe this. the only way you can believe this is if you assume that the rhetoric and action of the iranians over the last 30 years has no bearing on what they're going to do tomorrow. i don't know in any field of prediction where that would actually be the case. when in the course of human history has someone got $100 billion at the stroke of the pen and decided that everything they have done is wrong. i don't think it requires going into any more detail than that. the administration has come up with these arguments arguing that they think the iranians are going to spend all of their new money on butter and not guns. what is the evidence? this is a direct quote. there is no evidence for this. they start lifting -- listing all of the needs of the iranian people and economyy, and of course the regime will be concerned about them. they are making things up, right? they have the obvious fact that a ramble get more powerful, much more wealthy, very quickly. it is unnerving the allies. they don't have a good answer about what to do or how to mitigate it. so they say that they are sure they will spend the money on butter. recognizing that this really isn't an adequate argument, the president has come up with a different one, which is that once the agreement is in place that will provide a breathing space, and then we will start containing iran in the region. that takes me back to my original point. if you look closely at how he is defining containment, his use of the word and the use of the word by our allies are two different things. when allies talk about containment, they're talking about rollback, imposing costs focusing specifically on the subversive activities of the revolutionary guard and specifically on those activities in iraq, syria, lebanon, and yemen. those are the activities that are most threatening to those regimes right now. they want the united states to organize the coalition to oppose those activities. the president has resolutely refuse to do it. he has refused to do this explicitly. what he is doing, he offered to fast track arms purchases, to work on interoperable missile defense, do counterterrorism cooperation, and so on and so forth. what he's offering in response to the allies criticism is enhanced conventional deterrence against a conventional attack from the uranium's -- iranians and security cooperation. none of that meets the actual need that is expressed. it's like a doctor offering medicine to a cancer patient. it doesn't begin to address what they are really concerned about. that takes me to my original point. the president is announcing that the united states is out of the containment business as traditionally understood. the results of this are actually dire, but i don't know that we are going to see the direct lines of causality. everything i'm saying has been obvious to the gulf allies for at least one year or longer. they have drawn their conclusions. their conclusion is that they're going to go their own way, do their own thing. we will mention it to the americans at a time and place that suits us. the good example of that is the saudi intervention in yemen. they organized the intervention against the iranians, and informed the united states one hour before they went in. that was to send a clear signal to president obama that if you are not going to do it, we will. anybody that was watching closely could see that. what it means to sum up. is that the united states is in a machiavellian no man's land. . my cavalli said that when there are conflicts involving your allies -- micro that's where we are. we are big enough and powerful enough that our friends will not express their disloyalty. even our enemies will hide their contempt but when it comes to determining their actions, their actions are filled with contempt , and our allies actions are filled with the trust. -- filled with distrust. we have lost the ability to influence in a region that remains vital to the sign -- vital to the united states. we may find ourselves involved in another major war sometime soon. when that war starts, we will have no alternative other than to use massive unilateral u.s. force because we don't have allies organize on the ground to meet the threat. thank you. >> thank you. thank you all for that rich and informative discussions. raise your hand if you have a question. give your name and affiliation as a courtesy to our speakers. if you are with the press, make that known as well. one question per questioner. hopefully we will get a second round of's questions. if it's addressed to a specific person, please let us know. -- hopefully we will get to a second round of questions. we will try to get to as many of those as we can. >> thank you for your remarks. my question is for the panel. you were speaking about the risk of a proliferation cascade in the region after a deal. i was hoping you could comment on the counter argument that we heard that the gcc and other regional powers are more likely seek technical parity. thank you. >> who wants to take that? >> you're probably the biggest expert here? >> i'm certainly willing to go first. [laughter] >> it's a good question. it goes to the issue of whether no agreement is better than a bad agreement. i think president obama is right , and he has repeatedly said that as he moved to towards a bad agreement. [laughter] >> the saudi's have been most explicit. they have said they will have what it around is permitted whether or not there is an agreement. -- they have said that they will have what iran is permitted, whether or not there is an agreement. the saudis see this arrangement emerging for what it is. there may be a temporary pause in terms of the number of centrifuges being connected. clearly iran is now a threshold state. we have abandoned the goal of denying it a nuclear weapons capability, which was the goal of the international community as registered in multiple un security council resolutions. we have abandoned that and said that what we are going to do now is going to move to 12 months breakout time. that is a fatally flawed idea. the saudis see that for what it is. how do you know when the clock begins? unless iran decides to break out in a facility that has iaea monitors. they will not do that. iran has demonstrated that it is a master of denial and deception. no one knows that better than the saudis. geography is a powerful force. our job ishas has not been good. if you look at our experience in this, we have failed. some of our most profound intelligence failures have been in this area. just look at whether north korea had an enrichment facility. that debate was only result when the north koreans invited an american scientist to come to the enrichment facility. they showed it in operation. .1, we won't know -- point one we won't know. even if we know, what's the likely response going to be. it has taken years for us to get to the point to declare that russia is in violation of the inf agreement. it took years to get the iaea board of governors to vote on iran violating its safeguard agreements. even more years for the security council to react. this notion that 12 months is meaningful in the context of a response is simple fallacy. third, even if you assume that we would know, and even if you assume the international community would respond in an effective way, we don't have the baseline knowledge to be able to assess whether that 12 months is credible. we don't know what progress the iranians have made. they have stonewalled us on that. they have stonewalled the iaea. they have identified with 12 activities possibly associated with militarization. we don't know what the outcome is going to be of the enriched uranium stockpiles in iran. will it remain in iran. ? the rainy and subset no. we have said yes. you choose which one you believe. -- the iranians have said no. there is also an open question about what happens to the enriched uranium at 20%. what will happen to that? maybe it will be resolved, but we have not been told that it has been resolved, at least before the last round of negotiations. for those reasons, all of which the saudis are aware of, there's no credibility and extending the breakout time. we may fool ourselves and the american public, but were not going to for the saudis and the other gulf countries. i was in the uae the sense of the united states of having abandoned the region, the lack of credibility of this administration is palpable. they hold us in contempt. they hold american policy in disdain. let's face it for what it is. that is the message. our performance in the negotiations is just one measure of that. the other one was mentioned. that is failing to respond to the red line when bashar al-assad use chemical weapons. that had a profound affect on the united states. abandoning mubarak in egypt. it had a profound effect on how we are perceived. this is a fertile ground for proliferation. i think you are going to see it. i think the real question is, will this lead to the in of the regime -- the end of the regime, which is a very important concern. >> let's go here, and then we will come over this way. >> american university. hi. this is for mr. doran. you said our allies are looking at us in contempt. what do you say to the fact that in september 2014, that there was a request to intervene with isis and the fact that there has been an overwhelming amount of appreciation and respect for that agreement in europe, not only with european governments but with companies and corporations. >> i'll take the last one. of course corporations like the agreement. it opens up new markets for them. the europeans have got out of the security game. the germans have a long-standing approach to the problem that is based primarily on their economic interests in iran. the british are moving in the german direction. our policy has speeded that movement. it was put to me very candidly by a conservative french politician last week. the french have been the staunchest on the nuclear issue and they have been trying to put the brakes on some of the speed by which we have been making concessions to the iranians. this guy came to me and said that basically we are suckers for having done this. now we had irritated the obama administration and we are at the back of the line for getting new contracts from the iranians. the british were smarter. they saw it coming. they helped obama and got themselves at the front of the line for contracts. it's our job to hold the line. that is what we do in the world. that is what we have been doing in the middle east. >> these countries did not want to putto put the sanctions on iran in the first place. >> let him finish. >> with regard to your second question, you didn't exactly characterize what i said correctly. i said that john kerry thought it was a good thing that the iranians were intervening in iraq. i think we should be very concerned about that. i think that when iraqi politicians show an inclination to invite the rainy and zen -- the iranians in, we should calm down hard on them from the point of view of our own interests. we should recognize that iran is subverting iraq, and now controls the sector of shia iraq. we should stand for territorial integrity, but also national sovereignty and see iran is a primary threat to national sovereignty. we have to be aware of the effect this is having on our sunni allies. the administration is suggesting strongly and friends saying explicitly, that iran can be our ally against the islamic state. it's simply not true. it's not true on every level. first of all iran does not regard the islamic state as an enemy the way we do. it does threaten iranian interests to a certain degree in southern iraq but it also has created tremendous opportunities for iran to secure its control over iraqi politics. also, to sell itself to gullible westerners as an ally against the islamic state. we have created a polarization in the region, where our sunni allies don't trust us and think our war against the islamic state will facilitate the rise of iran throughout the region. as a result, we have a coalition of over 60 partners that can't defeat the islamic state, which is 30,000 guys with pickup trucks and bad attitudes. why can't we defeat them? our partners don't want to defeat it. they have signed up to be polite to us. they don't want to defeated, because that means facilitating irani and hedge control over the region. >> run for america. my question is for the panel. you talk about how we have a bad negotiating position. how do we get that position back? we've taken back some of our sanctions. what more could we do to put pressure on iran that would not send them into the open arms of russia and china. ? >> as a pessimist, i don't think this administration is capable of coming up -- correcting the mistakes it has made and coming up with a coherent negotiating position that could produce an acceptable agreement. that puts the onus on congress to take a look at what is emerging. each day it seems like there is a new element than what we have heard before. we need to walk away from the table. we need to let economic forces take their course in iran. even without the sanctions the iranian regime itself has so many bad policies and so much corruption that over time political opposition will grow. i'm not sure that it is possible to walk this back. >> one more question. do you want to say something? >> very briefly. i testified last month an answer that question. congress can do a number of things. first, they can vote no if this is a bad agreement. they will have that opportunity. that is an important expression of the view of the american public that emanates from congress. i said congress can also try to ensure to the degree that it can

Related Keywords

Moscow , Moskva , Russia , American University , Al Qahirah , Egypt , Germany , Afghanistan , Iran , Algeria , Turkey , Beijing , China , Cedar Rapids , Iowa , United States , Syria , United Arab Emirates , Lebanon , As Iran , Az Arbayjan E Sharqi , Washington , District Of Columbia , United Kingdom , Iraq , Israel , Tehran , Saudi Arabia , North Korea , Vienna , Wien , Austria , Ohio , Yemen , France , Greece , Americans , America , Saudi , Chinese , North Koreans , Greek , Germans , Iranians , Saudis , Iranian , Israelis , French , Iraqi , British , German , Gulf States , Syrian , Russians , American , Michael Reagan , Patrick Tucker , John Kerry , George W Bush , Jim Phillips , Lucretia Garfield , Robert Joseph , Dana Goward , Mary Arthur Nicole , Chester Arthur , Bashar Al Assad ,