seven-day truce and more hostages released, now in flux, stunning new reporting on who knew what and when about what hamas was planning for october 7th long before the fact. later, what the multiindicted congressman george santos said about his defense today on tomorrow's vote about whether to expel him. barely months after cnn revealed a probe into sexual misconduct at the coast guard academy and how it was kept from the public, another exclusive. what we're learning about another even broader reaching investigation and another cover-up four years earlier. good evening. a lot to get to tonight. we begin with breaking news. new and highly detailed reporting just out from "the new york times" in a piece headlined "israel knew hamas' plan more than a year ago." reporters from "the times" lay out just how much they say was known in advance about what hamas was planning and ultimately carried out on october 7th. it came just hours after hamas freed eight more hostages today and just four hours until the shaky seven-day truce with israel expires. joining us now from "the new york times" ronan bergman who shares a byline on this stunning new report. thanks for being with us. talk about what your team learned about this blueprint and the length of time that israel had to review these plans, and why it wasn't listened to. >> so somewhere around 2022, israeli intelligence was able to get the plan for hamas attack. its it was code named by israeli intelligence the wall of jericho, the jericho wall. and it details in many, many, many different details how the attack is going to take place, exactly as it took place more than a year after. this could be an intelligence victory for israel, but israeli analysts, some of the seniors of israeli intelligence saw the plan as more of they call it the building of the forces where hamas wants to be, but not where hamas is. so while having that plan, they saw this as something that hamas is far from being capable of doing. they believed that hamas doesn't have the ability to conduct such a massive operation. we're talking about the plan to break the fence between gaza and israel in 60 different places. israel believed they could do that maybe in two places. it called for the bombing and destruction of the cameras instantly, the same simultaneously, the beginning of the attack, the cameras, the automatic guns, the communication centers, and then the ramping of the division headquarters, the gaza division headquarters that is in charge of protecting the front. in july of this year, so a year after, an analyst that was reviewing intercepts about hamas military exercises wrote a letter, an email, an exchange of email, encrypted email. she becomes from 8 to 200, the equipment to the american embassy, and she described and she said that she believes hamas is narrowing the gap between the wall of jericho plan and its real capabilities. and there was a pushback from senior, more senior intelligence officers, told her this is an imaginary plan. they cannot do that. and so here is the tragedy for israeli intelligence, for israeli public. instead of positioning -- it's not just an intelligence debate, if israel and israeli defense forces would adopt this plan as something that hamas can do, even without any connection to the intention of hamas. a decision to execute. this is something the analysts couldn't say. she did not push back on the israeli wisdom at that time, that time meaning three, four months ago, that hamas doesn't want to go to holy war. but if israeli defense establishment had the knowledge that hamas is capable of launching such an attack, that would put a total different size of forces on the border. the outcome could be very different. >> also according to your reporting, this analyst, this woman analyst saw an exercise that hamas undertook, a trial run, and raised red flags again, saying this looks very much like the wall of jericho plan that we had discussed before. and again, would seem to have been dismissed. >> not just that, she even has -- she says here's an interesting bit of information. the same quote from the koran that begins with which this detailed plan for action, this public for attacks starts with, this is something about moses, but it's about the surprise entry through a gate. it's not a coincidence that hamas picked this up. the people participating, the hamas gunmen participating in that drill were using the same quote, the same quote is now part of the emblem of hamas used in statement and videos since the attack. >> as you know, the israeli government posted online on x last month, quote, contrary to the false claims, under no circumstances and at no stage was prime minister netanyahu warned of hamas' war intentions. they went on to say at no point was a warning given to prime minister netanyahu on hamas' intention to start a war. on the contrary, all the defense official, including the heads of the intelligence director said that hamas was deterred. do you know if the prime minister was in fact informed? because it sounds like from your reporting that this document was widely disseminated in intelligence and military circles. >> so we don't know if prime minister netanyahu got the -- was presented with this document. we do know, and this comes from previous reporting, that he was warned again, again, again and again, and in details at least in four different letters throughout the last year that the members of the so-called axis of resistance, iran, hamas, hezbollah sees israeli weakness, and they might decide to use what they believe the window opportunity to attack. >> yeah. >> this document was sent to many, and i think this is a good point for further reporting about who saw and who decided to continue with this so-called conception, the ability to believe that hamas is contained. >> it's incredible reporting. thank you. more now on the forces at play. joining us alex marquardt and political foreign policy analyst barak ravid, and retired general mark hertling. how damning is this for the israeli government? >> well, i think this is part of a series of stories that appeared in the israeli press over the last week or two weeks that what happens behind them is a fight between israeli intelligence community or parts of it, especially the military intelligence and the political echelon. with each side leaking stuff that are more comfortable to him when it comes to everything that happened in the year before the war. and, you know, a lot of people in israel think that the reason that now we hear about those documents is because it's very comfortable for benjamin netanyahu and his people, and they're trying to put those things out in order to build a case for the inquiry committee that most likely is going to be formed on the day after the war. >> i mean, barak, as you know, intelligence officials, military officials have accepted responsibility. benjamin netanyahu has not in any form accepted any responsibility for the take on october 7th. he had very early on, right before the operation in gaza, he had tweeted out a criticism of the heads of the military and intelligence, and then quickly withdrew that tweet and apologized for that. but it certainly seems like this is something he wants out there. >> no doubt. by the way, it was a huge intelligence failure. it's not that it's not true. there was a huge intelligence failure. in one of the emails, this analyst from israel's signals and intelligence agency, a-200, one of the headlines of one of her emails that was warning from this plan, the headline was "death in the kibbutz." okay. how symbolic is that, okay? several months ago, "death in the kibbutz" she wrote. so there was a huge intelligence failure. not at the lower level, but the higher level, the people actually making the decision, and that their job is to accurately warn the political echelon of what was going on. but at the same time, netanyahu did get a lot of other warnings that had to do also with the general situation where israel's enemies were planning to gang up on it, because of the domestic crisis over netanyahu's judicial overhaul in the months before the war. >> alex, what do you make of this report? how are u.s. officials reacting? >> anderson, i really do think it goes to this theme that we've been reporting on for quite some time of the underestimation of what hamas was capable of doing, and certainly what they intended to. do you and i have talked about intelligence reports and assessments, both on the israeli and the american side in the days leading up to october 7th that indicated that hamas might do something. now what that something was expected to be was what we had seen before in previous rounds of fighting were frankly rather inconsequential for israel. and that would be rockets being fired across the border, which then likely would have been intercepted by the iron dome, which is exactly what we're seeing on our screen right there. but there was no sense that hamas would be able to break through the fence and carry out the types of massacres that they did. there is acknowledgment and public acknowledgment here in u.s. from intelligence officials and biden administration officials that this was purely an israeli intelligence failure. american intelligence officials are not taking any responsibility for this. they are laying it at the feet of the intelligence apparatus and security apparatus in israel. essentially, the u.s. has been so focused on china and on russia and ukraine that they just don't spend a lot of time thinking about hamas and other palestinian militant groups. now will that change going forward? that remains to be seen. we've certainly seen u.s. intelligence playing a much bigger role during this conflict with drones and other kinds of signals intelligence gathering. but in their minds, this is an israeli intelligence failure. i think most people will tell you that netanyahu is not expected to survive this, but there is also an expectation that the heads of the agencies will also roll there. >> should be a reckoning. general hertling, from a military -- when military intelligence sees an enemy training for a very specific scenario, i mean, would it surprise you that a report like this would not have gone to the very top of the israeli government? >> yes and no, anderson. i'm going go back a little bit. i was in the fusion center near be'eri with my counterpart in israel in 2012. i saw the women who collect the intelligence, that fuse it together and provide to it the commanders. there was a focus on hamas and gaza in 2012 when i was there. that focus deteriorated over the years because of focus in other areas like the west bank. but truthfully, as a commander, you get all sorts of intelligence reports from your intelligence collection cells, your fusion. the young sergeants and privates that put the information together. it only depends on what you pay attention to. and if the israeli military and israeli government was not paying attention to that fusion cell in be'eri, and they have several other fusion cells throughout the country, one in northern israel against hezbollah, another one in the west bank where they formulate the intelligence and gather it and say here's what we think is going to happen. but truthfully, all those intelligence young soldiers can do is pass that forward. even with the kind of headlines that alex just mentioned of disaster in the kibbutz, that should gain attention, but a cultural bias sometimes prevents commanders and political leaders from understanding the importance of some of this. and sometimes those intelligence officers will put a headline that screams disaster about to approach, and it has to be weighed with all the other sorts of intelligence. as concerns the u.s. paying attention to this, yes, we take a lot of information from national governments in terms of what kind of terrorist activities that are going on all over in the world, in the suhail in africa, in israel, in the middle east, and some of that sometimes just goes by the wayside. and it's unfortunate, but that's what happens. >> or in the level of details, though, that israel at least -- that people in israel in the government, in the military and the intelligence service in this report, i mean, they had the intelligence. they had the right information down to very specific details, which is an intelligence success because early on, there are all these questions like how is it possible that they didn't have any eyes on this. clearly, they got this report early on from intelligence, somehow from intelligence sources in gaza or elsewhere in the hamas infrastructure. it was accurate. they just didn't believe it. and it didn't get enough people believing it. >> it was a complete lack of imagination that led israel to believe that something like this was never possible. israel knew exactly where hamas was exercising, exactly how they exercised, and in what numbers. they could openly see the exercise sites. in fact, when the idf took me into gaza several weeks ago, we looked over a mock israeli village they created. israel simply didn't believe it was hobble that hamas could carry out such a large-scale and coordinated attack. and on top of that, at the political level, they believed that hamas was more interested in economic rehabilitation of gaza, in the permits that israel was giving it. they were ready to approve more permits, much of this report was already known. in fact, the haaretz article from a week ago pointed out a year before october 7th, israel's army had insight into hamas' plan to attack israeli towns and idf bases. although "the new york times" adds some details here, there have already been many reports as that israel knew much of what was going to happen and simply didn't believe it was possible. everyone at every level we have spoken to from political to military pointed out there will be a deep and thorough investigation about what went wrong. what this report makes clear it was a the military level and the political level. >> what makes this report from "the new york times" different is they've actually seen the document. and it is startling the level of detail in this document. oren liebermann, thank you. mark hertling. next, my conversation with the parents of hersh goldberg-polin, whose son, as you know, was wounded on october 7th. his left arm, most of it was blown off. it's believed he remains in captivity tonight. later, george santos on the eve of tomorrow's vote on whether to expel him from congress. and one of his democratic colleague, daniel goldman, who wants him gone. tonight's breaking news with "the new york times." israeli officials actually had more than a year in advance hamas' plan for the october 7th massacre, a blow to anyone mourning the losses from that day or waiting to be reunited with a loved one now being held by hamas or some other faction or group in gaza. they're hoping a truce set to expire at midnight is extended. today's hostages did not bring freedom for any americans, including 23-year-old hersh goldberg-polin. he was badly wounded by a grenade on october 7th, tossed into a bunker where he was hiding with 28 other people. his friends were attacked in that bunker, many murdered by hamas killers why trying to hide in that shelter. this is video of hersh being taken captive. most of his left arm has been blown off. a bone is sticking out of his left arm. we've been in touch with his parents, rachel goldberg and jonathan polin from the beginning. i spoke with them again earlier today. rachel and john, thank you so much for being back with us. have you gotten any information at all lately? >> we have gotten no information lately. obviously, like everybody else, we're kind of on edge here as we're getting i think to the end of the list of women and children to be released. but we have no new information. we are hearing rumors of who is going to categorize what and how and when, but we don't know. we have no information. >> and rachel, the way you get information is the way everybody else gets information? or do you get, you know -- i assume some representative from the government or the idf who will talk with you when there is something to know. but this waiting and wondering, which all the families go through, it's intolerable. >> well, we do have an army representative that checks in with us every day, and she is wonderful. but, you know, there isn't a lot of information to share. this past week has been actually a really hopeful week and a very -- the first time that we've had any ray of light because so many of these women and children who were released are the relatives of friends of ours now, in these past 55 days, we've become really close to these families that are, you know, on the same planet as we are. and so it was actually just such a relief and a respite from all of the sadness, which calling what we're experiencing sadness is, you know, a complete understatement. but it has been a really positive experience watching people come out back to their families. so we don't have new news yet. but at least we had a decent week. >> every day when a list is comes out, i imagine -- you're just waiting to hear who is on the list, like everybody else. >> we are. but, you know, we didn't -- we had been told beforehand that this was just going to be women, children, and babies. so there wasn't pressure, you know. there wasn't anticipation, could it be hersh, because he doesn't fall into those buckets. i mean, he is our child. he'll always be my baby, but i realize that's not how he is going to be categorized. >> and jon, as rachel just mentioned, the current deal covers women, children and babies. today a member of israel's knesset told cnn the government is willing to discuss a different framework for the release of men and soldiers held by hamas. do you have a message to the israeli government and those at the negotiating table? >> look, one of the things that we haven't heard in 55 days is discussion of wounded or critically wounded, right. so even now as we're getting through the women and children and starting to have discussions about the men, it's so complex. it's hard for us to advocate for our kid over other kids, and it's not even that i want to do that. hersh is not the only wounded one. i know there are other wounded. and i just think that probably deserves to be a category, even to the extent that anybody talks about wounded. it's just a word thrown out there. and you've seen the video. you sent us the video of hersh with his arm blown off and bone sticking out. it looks pretty dramatic. but we're also 55 days in, and even if he got surgery and even if he got antibiotics, we imagine the pain he must be in, especially now that we're hearing that people are sleeping on concrete floors and plastic chairs and being moved. we don't know the real details. but let's not lose sight of the fact that probably excruciating pain to have a limb blown off and not have it treated properly for 55 days. >> the other thing i don't understand why there hasn't been more outrage about globally is -- i mean, not only the taking of hostages, but that the red cross has not been allowed any contact with hostages, and that those holding the hostages have not been forced to at least give some proof of life or the less give a list of who is being held for all these families to be in this limbo state, hoping that their loved one is being held hostage, because the alternative is that that person has -- is not alive anymore. i don't understand why there is not more of a demand that hamas and whatever other groups at least produce a list of everybody who is being held. >> join the club. >> exactly. >> you know, for the first few weeks when i was personally calling the red cross every day and being told "we're here at the border, we're ready to go in, but we'r